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ANCIENT GREEK PHILOSOPHY



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HISTORICAL DICTIONARY

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A

ABDERA

Ἀβδηρα. A city in northern Greece (Thrace), not far from the current border between Greece and Turkey, 40°57'N 24°59'E. Populated by refugees from Persian expansion, it was repeatedly taken by the Persians and became a leading member of the Delian League. **Leucippus**, **Democritus**, **Protagoras**, **Anaxarchus**, and **Hecataeus** were Abderites, as was Anacreon, the poet. Abdera was totally leveled by the Turks in their retreat from the area in the early 20th century; only the foundations of the ancient buildings remain. #640 in Hansen & Nielsen 2004.

ABSTRACTION

The Greek term is *aphairesis*, ἀφαίρεσις, an abstract noun built on the verb *aphairein*, to take away—for example, to draw blood. **Aristotle** introduces a technical sense of the term to refer to separating out by thought something that is not (for him) ontologically separable. He uses the term in this sense primarily for mathematical attributes (e.g., **Metaphysics** XI.3, 1061a29ff.).

ACADEMIC

In the context of this dictionary, “Academic” means a philosopher who is a member of, or primarily associated with, **Plato’s Academy**.

ACADEMIC SKEPTICISM

See [ACADEMY](#); [SKEPTIKOS](#).

ACADEMY

Ἀκαδημία. **Plato**’s school in **Athens**, established some years after the death of **Socrates** (383 BCE?) in a location that had previously been used as a wrestling school. (At **Lysis** 203, Socrates is represented as walking from the wrestling school at the Academy to the wrestling school at the **Lyceum**.) The school was in a sacred grove of olive trees (**Thucydides** II.34), respected by the Spartans when they invaded Attica. The grove was a public space; Plato acquired a small garden in the vicinity, presumably including a building, and possibly the gymnasium of the Academy; discussion and instruction occurred in any of these places, collectively called “the Academy.”

After the death of Plato, his nephew **Speusippus** seems to have inherited the private property and to have taken over

the role of **Scholarch**. In 339 **Xenocrates** was elected Scholarch, and **Polemon** in 314. Polemon was succeeded by **Crates**, **Arcesilaus**, and **Lacydes**, then a series of people of whom we know little but their names. With Crates, the Academy became less dogmatic and more skeptical, reading Plato's dialogues as models of avoiding definitive conclusions in philosophical discussions.

The olive grove that had been respected by the Spartans was cut down by **Sulla** to aid in his siege of Athens (86 BCE); he destroyed or severely damaged the gymnasium and other buildings that may have comprised the physical structure of the Academy at that time. We do not know the extent of the physical reconstruction of the Academy that might have occurred in subsequent years, or just where Platonic instruction was offered. To a considerable degree, the word "Academy" became metaphorical or an idea of a school, more than a particular physical place.

Cicero tells, in his *Academica*, how matters stood in his student days. **Philo of Larissa** was formally Scholarch, but was visiting **Rome** at the time of the Sullan invasion. He remained in Rome, and Cicero studied with him there before going to Athens. Another of Philo's students, **Antiochus of Ascalon**, had philosophical disagreements with Philo (recounted by Cicero) and is said by **Numenius** to have "founded another Academy." Cicero studied with Antiochus in Athens in 79 BCE but does not talk about the physical location of that instruction.

The next snapshot of Platonic instruction in Athens comes from 66/7 CE, when **Plutarch of Chaeronea** (46–c. 122 CE) studied **Platonism** with a philosopher named **Ammonius**. Although Plutarch did a great deal to revive interest in Platonism, he seems to have favored his native Chaeronea as the home of his Platonic circle.

Another snapshot comes from 176 CE, when the emperor **Marcus Aurelius** endowed four chairs of philosophy (as we would say) in Athens: Platonism, Aristotelianism, Stoicism, and Epicureanism. A philosopher named **Atticus** seems to have been the first occupant of that chair. Certainly by this time, and probably already by the time of Cicero, "Academic" philosophy had come to mean the intellectual tradition stemming from Socrates and Plato, not owing allegiance to **Aristotle**, **Epicurus**, or **Zeno of Citium**.

In that sense, Academic philosophy seems to have continued in Athens, with a notable revival in the 5th century

CE, until 529 CE, when the Platonic school of Athens was closed by order of the emperor **Justinian**. Heirs of the Academic tradition continued teaching for another century in Alexandria. For Academic Skeptics, see [SKEPTIKOS](#).

ACCIDENT, ACCIDENTAL

One philosophical definition of “accident” (unrelated to ordinary English usage) is a “non-essential **attribute**” of something. Essential attributes are those that are included in the definition of a **species**—having a long nose is an essential attribute of the elephant—but if a **particular** elephant has a saddle, then having a saddle is one of that elephant’s accidents. This is an **Aristotelian** distinction; he calls non-essential accidents ***symbebēkota***. “Accident” is derived from the Latin equivalent of “*symbebēkos*.” In the context of causal explanations, some events, or some descriptions of events, are described as *kata symbebēkos*, or “accidental.”

In ***Physics*** II, Aristotle distinguishes a class of “accidental” events that he attributes to “luck” (***tychē***) and a larger class that he attributes to *to automaton*, which we may translate as “the automatic” or simply “chance.” A lucky event is one that a person would have chosen if he had known—like meeting “accidentally” with someone who owes you money, and the person actually has money along, or buying a lottery ticket “at random” and actually winning a prize. An event attributed to *to automaton* is a random event that according to some description occurs contrary to expected regular processes. If you happen to be washing your face when an eclipse of the moon occurs, neither event is causally connected to the other; they are correlated *kata symbebēkos*.

Epicurus speaks of ***symptomata***, characteristics of bodies attributed as a consequence of particular perceptual relations to those bodies (*Letter to Herodotus*, 72). These would be “accidental” in approximately the same sense.

ACCOUNT

See [LOGOS](#).

ACRAGAS

Ἀκράγας, Agrigentum, Agrigento, Girgenti (Sicilian). Town on the south coast of Sicily, 37°19'N 13°35'E, Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #9. Home of **Empedocles** and of **Gorgias**’ student **Polus**.

ACTUALITY

“*Actualitas*” is a Latin word invented in the medieval period to translate **Aristotle**’s ***energeia*** and ***entelecheia***. Since “*actus*” is the past participle of “*agere*,” (to do, impel),

originally *actualitas* was not a bad translation. “Actuality” has come to have something of a static connotation, and *energeia* is definitely dynamic, so “activity” would be a better translation. Aristotle lays out his theory of *energeia* in **Metaphysics** IX.6–9.

ADDITIONAL PREMISE

See [PROSLĒPSIS](#).

ADEIMANTUS OF COLLYTUS

Ἀδεῖμαντος. Older brother of **Plato**, a major participant in the **Republic**. See Nails, *The People of Plato*, 2–3. Collytus was a **deme** of **Athens**, south of the Acropolis.

ADĒLON

Ἄδηλον. Unclear, non-evident. (Privative *a* plus *dēlon*, clear). **Anaxagoras** says, “Phenomena are a glimpse of the *adēla*” (B21). For the **Epicureans**, *adēla* are those things that exist but cannot be directly perceived, only demonstrated on the basis of observation—for example, the void. Academic Skeptics were accused of making *everything* non-evident.

See also [PHAINOMENON](#); [SKEPTIKOS](#).

ADIAPHORA

Ἀδιάφορα. Indifferents. (*Phora*, that which is carried; preposition *dia*, through, across; *diaphora*, things that are carried across, things that are different; plus privative *a*, indifferent). According to orthodox **Stoic** doctrine (**Zeno**), anything that does not directly contribute to virtue (*aretē*) is “indifferent.” Thus life, health, pleasure, **beauty**, wealth, strength, and so on are “indifferents” since any of them can contribute to vice (*kakia*) as well as to virtue (*aretē*). But then some Stoics distinguish within the class of “indifferents” some things that are “**preferred**” (life, health, etc.) from other things that are “**dispreferred**” (death, illness, etc.), **Diogenes Laertius** VII.101–105.

ADIKIA

Ἀδικία. (*Dikē*, justice; plus privative *a*.) Injustice.

According to **Aristotle**, **Nicomachean Ethics** V, if a person does something wrong, knowing that it is wrong, that person does an unjust act. If, on the whole, the person prefers to do unjust acts than just acts, that person is an unjust person.

See also [DIKĒ](#), [DIKAIOS](#), [DIKAIOSYNĒ](#).

ADRAMYTTIUM

Ἀδραμύττιον. Now Edremit, on the Ionian coast of Turkey, not far from the island of Lesbos, 39°35'N 27°01'E, Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #800. **Diodorus of Adramyttium** (1st BCE **Academic**) came from there.

ADRASTUS OF APHRODISIAS

Ἀδραστος. (2nd CE.) **Peripatetic** philosopher who wrote on the arrangement of **Aristotle's** writings and on the Aristotelian system, cited by **Simplicius**. His commentary on **Plato's** *Timaeus* is quoted by **Porphyry**, and his commentary on the *Categories* by **Galen**. He is cited by the mathematician **Theon of Smyrna** for his contributions to harmonics. Stephanus of **Byzantium** notes the name Adrastus of Philippi as a Peripatetic philosopher—this may or may not have been the same person.

See also [APHRODISIAS](#).

ADUNAMIA

Ἀδυναμία. Incapacity, lack of a *dynamis*; impossibility, either physical or logical. **Aristotle** *Metaphysics* V.12, 1019a29.

ADUNATON

Ἀδύνατον. Impossible, physically or logically; absurd, as at Aristotle *Physics* IV.8, 216b12.

AEDESIA

Αἰδεσία. Fifth-century CE **Alexandria Neoplatonist**. Related to **Syrianus**, she married **Hermeias** and was the mother of **Ammonius** and **Heliodorus**. She accompanied Heliodorus to **Athens** to study with **Proclus**; when she died, at great age, **Damascius** eulogized her.

AEDESIUS

Αἰδέσιος. (d. 355 CE.) **Neoplatonist**, student of **Iamblichus** in **Apamea**, he taught in **Pergamon**. His students there included **Eusebius of Myndus**, **Maximus of Ephesus**, and the future emperor **Julian**. We have his biography in **Eunapius' *Lives of the Sophists***.

AEI

Ἀεί. Temporally everlasting; always, in contrast to usually. Heraclitus' book apparently began, "This *logos* existing always people fail to understand both before they have heard it and once they have heard it" (DK B1). **Aristotle** complains (*Rhetoric* III.5, 1407b11) that this is ambiguous: does "always" modify "existing" or "fail to understand"?

AELIAN (CLAUDIUS AELIANUS)

(2nd–3rd CE.) A popular and prolific author who taught rhetoric; when he gets philosophical, it tends to be **Stoic**. See his *On the Nature of Animals*, tr. G. McNamee, 2011; *Historical Miscellany*, tr. N. G. Wilson, Loeb 1997.

See also [RHĒTORIKĒ](#).

AELIUS ARISTIDES

(117–181 CE.) Greek orator afflicted with a mysterious disease; his *Sacred Discourses* recount his many attempts to discover a cure, revealing a great deal about the practice of medicine (*iatrikē*) and paramedicine in the 2nd century CE. His ideas were subjected to a critique by **Sextus Empiricus**; see D. Kardimas, *Sextus Empiricus against Aelius Aristides*, 1996.

AENEAS OF GAZA

Αἰνεῖας. (d. c. 518 CE.) **Neoplatonist** convert to **Christianity**, he studied with **Hierocles of Alexandria** and was a contemporary of **Procopius of Gaza**. A **dialogue**, *Theophrastus*, and some letters are extant and have been published. He rejects some typically Platonic positions in favor of Christian views—for example, he rejects the pre-existence of the soul and the everlastingness of the material world.

See also [DAMASCIUS OF DAMASCUS](#); [GAZA](#); [ZACHARIAS \(SCHOLASTICUS, BISHOP OF MITYLENE\)](#).

AENESIDEMUS

Αἰννοῖδης. (1st BCE.) **Academic Skeptic**. Born in **Crete**, trained as a Skeptical Academic, and by **Philo of Larissa**, he broke with the **Academy** when it became more dogmatic and less skeptical. Aenesidemus moved to **Alexandria** and founded his own school, claiming **Pyrrho** as its inspiration. He is the author of the 10 “**tropes**” or ways of arguing to skeptical conclusions, preserved in **Sextus Empiricus**, *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*, and elsewhere. See R. J. Hankinson, *The Sceptics*, 1995; R. Bett, *Pyrrho*, 2000.

See also [SKEPTIKOS](#).

AĒR

Ἀήρ. Air, the fundamental material for **Anaximenes** and **Diogenes of Apollonia**, is also assumed by them to be the basis for life and intellection. This idea was ridiculed by **Aristophanes** in the *Clouds* but continued to be influential through the “**pneumatic**” theory of the soul (*psychē*) and the idea that the *aithēr* or pure upper air is the abode of divine beings.

AESARA OF LUCANIA

Αἰσάρα. (4th or 3rd BCE.) Woman **Pythagorean** author of *On Human Nature*, quoted by **Stobaeus** I.49.27. Part of the quotation: “Human nature seems to me to provide a standard of law and justice both for the home and for the city.” Lucania was a territory in southern Italy north of **Croton**.

See also [WOMEN IN ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY](#).

AESCHINES (ATHENIAN ORATOR)

(389–314 BCE.) Included here mainly for disambiguation from the two following. Several of his orations are extant. He supported peace with Macedon in opposition to Demosthenes; when Demosthenes won that dispute, Aeschines moved to **Rhodes** where he opened a school of rhetoric, then to **Samos**.

See also [RHĒTORIKĒ](#).

AESCHINES OF NEAPOLIS

Αἰσχίνης. Student of Melanthius of **Rhodes**, he shared leadership of the **Academy** with Charmadas and **Clitomachus** around 100 BCE. Noted by **Cicero** *De Oratore* I.11 and **Diogenes Laertius** II.64.

There were many municipalities named “Neapolis” in ancient Greece—it means “New City”—the one we know as “Naples” is the most famous.

AESCHINES OF SPHETTUS

Αἰσχίνης. (c. 425–c. 350 BCE.) Student of **Socrates**, he wrote several Socratic **dialogues**; we know most about his *Alcibiades* and his *Aspasias*. Publius **Aelius Aristides** (2nd CE) quotes extensively from the *Alcibiades*, and a significant passage is included in Oxyrhynchus papyrus #1608. Socrates challenges **Alcibiades**’ preparation for a political life, showing him that he does not know what he needs to know; Alcibiades weeps.

The *Aspasias* is cited by **Athenaeus**, **Plutarch**, and **Cicero**. (The bits are available in Gabriele Giannantoni, *Socratis et Socraticorum Reliquiae*, 1991). Socrates recommends that he send his son Hipponicus to **Aspasias** to learn politics, arguing that **women** may have the same abilities as men.

Aeschines was present at the death of Socrates. He is included in **Diogenes Laertius**’ *Lives*.

Sphettus is a deme (political subdivision) of Athens, so this Aeschines is sometimes known as “Aeschines of Athens.”

AETIUS

(c. 100 CE.) A rather shadowy **doxographer**, reconstructed by Hermann Diels in the 19th century; the reconstruction has been criticized by Jaap Mansfeld. **Diels-Kranz** credit “Aetius” as the source for many of the fragments and testimonia printed in their *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*. A treatise sometimes attributed to him is included in the **corpus** of the works of **Plutarch of Chaeronea**; called the *Placita*, it is a summary of opinions of various philosophers, relying extensively on the work of **Theophrastus**. Those who are

unsure of the attribution call the author “Pseudo-Plutarch.” Somewhat similar passages occur in **Stobaeus**, attributed to the same source by Diels. See J. Mansfeld, “Doxography of Ancient Philosophy,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

AFFECTION

See [PATHOS](#), [PATHĒ](#).

AFFINITY

See [OIKEIŌSIS](#).

AGAPIUS

Ἀγάπιος. 5th–6th CE **Neoplatonist** in **Athens** when **Marinus of Neapolis** was **Scholarch**, after **Proclus**. John Lydus may have heard him lecture on **Platonism** in **Constantinople** (see [BYZANTIUM](#)) in 511; **Christodorus** in *On the Disciples of the Great Proclus* writes that “Agapius is assuredly the last but the first of all.” See **Suda**, *Agapios*; **John Lydus**, *De Mag.* III.26.

AGATHIUS SCHOLASTICUS

Ἀγαθίας σχολαστικός. (532–582 or later CE.) Government official, poet, and historian of part of the reign of **Justinian**. He is the source of the story of the closing of the school of **Athens** in 529 CE and includes brief comments about some of the other philosophers active during the period of his *History*. See J. D. Frendo, *Agathias: The Histories*, 1975.

AGATHOBULUS OF ALEXANDRIA

(c. 125 CE.) **Cynic**, teacher of **Demonax** and **Peregrinus Proteus**. **Jerome**’s *Chronicle* lists him as one of the main philosophers during Hadrian’s reign, with **Plutarch of Chaeronea** and **Oenomaus of Gadara**. **Lucian** (*Demonax* 3 and *Death of Peregrinus* 17) adds a bit more information about him.

AGATHON

Ἀγαθόν. Good. The primary form (*eidōs*) in **Plato**’s *Republic*. For **Aristotle**, one of three general objects of pursuit, along with *kalon* and *hēdyn*. While *hēdyn* clearly means “pleasurable,” the distinction between *agathon* and *kalon* is not clear cut. *Kalon* has more of a connotation of “beauty” or “nobility,” and *agathon* has a connotation, in some contexts, of exchange value. The standard word for “gentleman” in **Athens** in Aristotle’s day was “*kalokagathos*,” someone who was both *kalos* and *agathos*.

See also [KALOKAGATHIA](#).

AGENT INTELLECT

Nous poiētikos. Νοῦς ποιητικός. In *De Anima* III, **Aristotle** distinguishes between the passive aspect of mind

(**nous**), capable of accepting information from the senses, and the active aspect of mind, capable of creating concepts and initiating intelligent action. It is characteristic of ancient Greek philosophy to use the idea of mental activity to describe the nature of **God**. From **Xenophanes** through the unmoved mover (**akinēton kinoun**) of Aristotle to the God of the **Stoics**, God is an active mind.

AGNŌSTOS

ἄγνωστος. Unknowable, unknown. For **Protagoras**, questions about the **gods** were too difficult and life too short. That line of thought leads to Skepticism, which teaches that you cannot even be confident that knowledge is possible.

Although most ancient Greek thinkers had confident positive theologies, in later Greek philosophy negative theologies appeared more frequently. Such theologies asserted that God is beyond comprehension, knowledge, and description; somehow, saying that God is beyond being is taken to be quite different from saying that God does not exist.

In another sense, **Socrates** in the **Theaetetus** (202b) points out that if you define knowledge as analysis of complexes into simples, then the simples themselves are unknowable.

AGRAPHOS NOMOS

ἄγραφος νόμος. Unwritten law; “convention” in the legal sphere. **Plato’s Eleatic Stranger** in the **Statesman** 295a equates “unwritten law” with ancestral customs; at **Nicomachean Ethics** VIII.13, 1162b, **Aristotle** distinguishes between two kinds of justice: unwritten and legislated. In modern legal parlance, de facto law.

See also [NOMOS](#).

AGREEMENT

See [HOMOLOGIA](#), [HOMOLOGOUMENOS](#).

AGRIPPA THE SKEPTIC

Ἀγρίππας. (1st CE.) He is the author of the five “tropes” that are said to establish the impossibility of certainty. **Sextus Empiricus** presents the tropes in *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*; **Diogenes Laertius** ascribes them to Agrippa. See J. Barnes, *The Toils of Skepticism*, 1990.

AIDIOS

ἄϊδιος. Everlasting. In principle, this word is used for unending time, rather than timelessness, though ancient philosophers were no more careful about this distinction than more recent thinkers. In some cases, the word means “permanent”—for example, a permanent monarchy, **Aristotle**,

Politics V.1, 1301b27—but Aristotle also applies it to the celestial spheres, in *Metaphysics* XII, which he takes to be necessarily everlasting.

See also [AEI](#).

AIDŌS

Αἰδώς. Shame, modesty, respect for others. In the *Protagoras*, **Protagoras** says that Zeus endowed human beings with a sense of justice and shame to enable them to cooperate with each other and survive in a hostile world. In the *Charmides*, Charmides suggests that “shame” is the basis of temperance; Socrates replies that temperance is always good, but sometimes “shame” is not good. In the *Nicomachean Ethics* II.7, 1108a32, Aristotle says that it is not a virtue, but there is a mean with respect to the emotion of shame.

Ta aidōia, τὰ αἰδοῖα, is the standard term for both male and female private parts.

AIŌN

Αἰών. In early Greek thought, an individual person's life-span, or “age.” **Parmenides** suggests a contrast between time (*chronos*) and the timelessness of **being**, to which he applies the word *aiōn*. Thus the word comes to mean “timeless eternity” (**Plato**, *Timaeus* 37d); in that guise it plays an important role in **Neoplatonism**.

AIR

See [AĒR](#).

AISTHĒSIS

Αἴσθησις. Perception, sensation. **Pre-Socratic** thinkers tended to suggest materialist theories of perception—for example, streams of particles from the perceived item to the sense organ. **Theophrastus** wrote a book, *On the Senses*, intended to present and critique the views of earlier philosophers; he suggests that there are two general sorts of pre-Socratic theories: those that suppose that “like is known by like” (**Empedocles** is a good example of someone who held this sort of theory), and those who suppose that contrast is essential for perception—as Theophrastus sees it, **Anaxagoras** counts as having this sort of theory.

Plato analyzes *aisthēsis* rather carefully in the *Theaetetus*, ostensibly to refute the claim that “knowledge (*epistēmē*) is perception,” but effectively constructing a theory that allows perception to contribute to knowledge. “Knowledge is not in the perceptions, but in putting together an account (*sylogismos*) about them” (186d).

Aristotle attempted to develop the conceptual structure of

the understanding of perception further in the *De Anima* and *Sense and Sensible Objects*. His definition of *aisthēsis* is reception of the sensible form without the **matter**. This reception is done by the various sense organs, which can be understood as possessing a proportionality or **logos** of the material elements that permits the required receptivity.

AITHĒR

Αἰθήρ. “Ether.” In early Greek thought, including the poets, *aithēr* is the purer air breathed by the **gods** on the mountaintops, or the realm of light in the heavens. For **Aristotle**, *aithēr* is the “fifth element” after **earth**, **water**, **air**, and **fire**; it is the material substrate of astronomical entities, and it naturally moves in a circle. It is also, for Aristotle, the **medium** for the transmission of light. And he suggests some sort of affinity between *aithēr* and **pneuma**, the special material instrument of the soul (**psychē**) in his *Generation* and *Movement of Animals* (GA II.6; MA 10).

AITHIOPS OF PTOLEMAIS

Αἰθιοψ. (3rd BCE.) According to **Diogenes Laertius**, a student of **Aristippus I** in the **Cyrenaic school**. The name might indicate that he was a black African: Aristotle’s description of *aitiopes* is that they are black (*History of Animals* III.9). There is a chronological difficulty—the town was named after Ptolemy III Euergetes, 246–222 BCE, and Aristippus I died in 356 BCE. On the other hand, the town existed since the 6th century BCE; it was just renamed, so Diogenes could be referring to the new name of Aithiops’ hometown. It is not far from **Cyrene**, 32°42’N 20°57’E.

AITION, AITIA

Αἴτιον, αἰτία. Responsibility, cause. In legal contexts, this word means “legal responsibility.” **Aristotle** adopts the word to designate the answers to his four sorts of demand for explanation. What is it? What is it made out of? What brought it into being? What is it for? Aristotle’s account of explanation differs in several ways from modern philosophy of science accounts. For one thing, it is meant to be close to ordinary language explanations and thus needs to accommodate explanations appealing to intention and choice (**proairesis**) on the one hand and to luck (**tychē**) and chance on the other (see, e.g., *Physics* II). For another, Aristotle regularly allows simultaneous parallel explanations, appealing to **matter** and movement (**kinēsis**) as one sort of explanation of some state of affairs, and at the same time allowing a teleological and formal explanation of the same state of affairs. He resolutely

resists reductionist accounts, in particular the sort of explanation called “mechanical” since the 16th century.

See also [ARCHĒ](#); [EIDOS](#), [EIDĒ](#); [TELOS](#).

AITION AUTOTELEŚ

Αἴτιον αὐτοτελής. Complete cause. In **Stoic** philosophy, this phrase is roughly equivalent to “sufficient condition.” (*Auto*, self; plus *telēs*, final; “complete in itself.”)

AKATALĒPTON

Ἀκατάληπτον. In **Stoic** epistemology, non-cognitive, as applied to sensory impressions received when one is in an abnormal state, for example, being mentally ill or under the influence of drugs. In ordinary Greek, “incomprehensible.” (*A*, privative; plus *kata*, down; plus *lēpton*, grabbed; “not grabbed down.”)

AKINĒTON

Ἀκίνητον. Unmoved, immovable. According to **Parmenides**, **Being** is “unmoved, immovable.” In the **Timaeus**, **Plato** says that **earth** is *akinētotatē*, “most immobile” (55e1), though in another way the cosmic deities are immobile (40b3), in the sense that they are changeless other than their circular movement.

AKINĒTON KINOUN

Ἀκίνητον κινούν. Unmoved mover. **Aristotle** pursues that thought a bit and argues that the ultimate cause of the entire universe is the *akinēton kinoun*, the “unmoved mover” (**Metaphysics** XII.6; **Physics** VIII.6). In fact, Aristotle distinguishes three senses of *akinēton*, totally incapable of being moved, moved with difficulty, or movable but not currently in motion (*Phys.* V.3, 226b). The “unmoved mover” is of course immovable in the first sense, not the sort of thing that could be moved at all, since non-spatial.

AKOLASIA, AKOLASTOS

Ἀκολασία, ἀκόλαστος. Licentiousness, intemperance, the vice opposed to **sōphrosynē**. The word literally means “uncorrected, undisciplined.” **Socrates** uses that implication to good effect in arguing with **Callicles** in the **Gorgias** (505b ff.): Callicles wants to pursue unlimited bodily pleasures, but also wants to remain “in control,” and thus not *akolastos*. When Socrates makes him aware of the incompatibility of these goals, Callicles tries to break off the discussion.

Aristotle discusses *sōphrosynē* and *akolasia* in **Nicomachean Ethics** III.10–12. The *akolastos* intentionally pursues bodily pleasures to excess. He notes that the word is also applied to undisciplined children; where it occurs with that

usage, English translators typically use the word “naughty” in that place. (*Kolastos* means punished, corrected.)

AKOLOURTHEIN, AKOLOURTHIA

Ἀκολουθεῖν, ἀκολουθία. To follow; consequentiality, logical consistency.

AKOUSMATA, AKOUSMATIKOI

Ἀκούσματα, ἀκουσματικοί. Literally, things heard; eager hearers. The word *akousmata* is applied to a group of somewhat mysterious **Pythagorean** sayings apparently learned and studied by new initiates to the Pythagorean way of life. The word *akousmatikoi* is applied to those initiates.

See also [ANDROCYNDES](#); [HIPPOSASUS OF METAPONTUM](#); [MATHĒMATIKOI](#).

AKRA, AKRON

Ἄκρα, ἄκρον. Extremity. This term is used in geometry to speak of the ends of a line, for example; in everyday conversation, the ends of the fingertips. **Atomists** talk about the “extremities” of atoms that touch each other. **Aristotle** uses *akra* of the “terms” of a syllogism; *akroi* is also used of the best people, somewhat as we say “tops” in English.

AKRASIA, AKRATEIA, AKRATĒS

Ἀκρασία, ἀκράτεια, ἀκρατής. “*Akrateia*” appears to be an alternative spelling of “*akrasia*.” “Lack of power, debility, lack of self-control.” The *akratēs* is the person who exhibits a lack of control. The word is used of physical disability in the **Hippocratic corpus**; in **Plato’s** *Timaeus* (86d) the word is used for a propensity for sexual overindulgence and is described as a physical disease. Similarly male and female homosexual intercourse are attributed to *akrasia* at **Laws** I, 636c. The idea of *akrasia* fits readily into Plato’s psychology, since he represents the soul (*psychē*) as divided into parts that could be in conflict with each other—think of the **Phaedrus** charioteer struggling and perhaps failing to control the horses.

Aristotle discusses *akrasia* at length in **Nicomachean Ethics** VII.1–11. Since *akolasia* is the vice of excess related to the virtue *sōphrosynē*, one might wonder whether *akrasia* and *akolasia* are really the same thing, distinguished only by the fact that the *akolastos* is honest about what he is doing, while the *akratēs* tries to make excuses for his behavior. Aristotle tries to make a space for *akrasia* by arguing that some who profess good intentions might really not have control over their actions in all circumstances. He makes that point partly by arguing that people do not always consciously

mean what they say—they might be mouthing the words without really grasping their import, like the person who recites the verses of **Empedocles** when he is drunk (*EN* VII.3, 1147b12). He also compares the condition of people who suffer from “beastliness” (*thēriotēs*)—they lack control over their actions to the point where they do things that human beings would not normally even *want* to do.

The akratic person, Aristotle believes, entertains practical syllogisms that have inconsistent conclusions, then acts on one while professing belief in the other. For example: “Eat sweet things—this chocolate cake is sweet—eat this cake” and “Do not eat things that are not healthy—this chocolate cake is not healthy—do not eat this cake” and then proceeds to eat the cake, while professing to believe, intellectually, the second syllogism.

Aristotle calls people who, as we say, “lose their temper” akratic in a qualified sense (*EN* VII.4, 6); it may be reasonable to be angry with someone, but not to the extent of taking a poke at him.

See also [PRACTICAL SYLLOGISM](#).

ALBINUS

Ἀλβῖνος. (2nd CE.) **Platonist** living in **Smyrna**, student of **Gaius the Platonist** and teacher of **Galen**. He wrote an extant short essay, *Introduction to Plato's Dialogues*, dividing the **dialogues** into logical, critical, physical, and ethical, and mentions the division of dialogues into tetralogies. He recommends starting by reading the *Alcibiades* (1), *Phaedo*, *Republic*, and *Timaeus*. At one time the *Didascalicus*, now ascribed to **Alcinous**, was attributed to him. See J. Reedy, tr. *The Platonic Doctrines of Albinus*, 1992; J. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists*, 1996.

ALCIBIADES

Two dialogues in the Platonic **corpus** are named after this famous student of **Socrates**. The *First Alcibiades* (Ἀλκιβιάδης α') was never questioned in antiquity, and indeed was regarded as an excellent first dialogue to read. It was called into question by F. Schleiermacher in 1836, and since that time there has been a division of opinion about it. Socrates addresses the young **Alcibiades** concerning his obvious political ambition; he makes it clear that the young man does not know nearly as much as he thinks he knows, particularly about justice and the governance of the *polis*. In order to be fit to rule, one must know himself; Socrates proposes that he is in a position to make him know himself, and Alcibiades should

study with him.

The *Second Alcibiades* (Ἀλκιβιάδης β') is generally regarded as the product of a later **Academic**. Socrates encounters Alcibiades on his way to pray; Socrates argues that it is better not to ask the gods for anything, because we do not know whether we are asking for something that is good for us, or bad.

ALCIBIADES

Ἀλκιβιάδης. (c. 450–404 BCE.) Student of **Socrates**, Athenian statesman. He appears in the *Protagoras*, *Symposium*, and two **dialogues** (not necessarily authentic) named for him, *Alcibiades* 1 and 2. He is mentioned in the *Gorgias* and *Euthydemus*. His relationship with Socrates is examined also by **Xenophon** (*Mem.* 1.2, 12–28, 39–47). **Thucydides** 5–8 and Xenophon *Hellenica* 1–2 are two of the most important primary sources for his place in the history of Athens. Since he was prominently both close to Socrates and a traitor to Athens, many have supposed that the vote for executing Socrates was at least partly influenced by the desire to punish the teacher for the sins of the student.

ALCIDAMAS

Ἀλκιδάμας. (4th BCE.) **Sophist**. An extant composition, *On the Sophists*, praises extemporaneous speech and by implication attacks the contemporary **Isocrates**. (See J. V. Muir, *Alcidamas*, 2001). **Aristotle** criticizes his style in *Rhetoric* III.3. He is perhaps most famous for saying “God has made all people free, nature has made no one a slave.” See J. Dillon & T. Gergel, *The Greek Sophists*, 2003.

See also [DOULOS](#), [DOULEIA](#).

ALCINOUS

Ἀλκίνου. (2nd CE.) Author of the extant *Didascalicus*, a handbook of **Platonic** philosophy. At one time this text was attributed to **Albinus** (known as a teacher of **Galen**), but that attribution has been disproved. J. Dillon, tr., *Alcinous, the Handbook of Platonism*, 1993.

ALCIPHRON

Ἀλκίφρων. (2nd CE?) **Sophist**. There is a collection of 116 fictional letters presenting a wide range of characters expressing their opinions on a wide range of subjects, ascribed to Alciphron as author. It is a tour de force of epistolary fiction. The letters are available online.

ALCMAEON OF CROTON

Ἀλκμαίων. (c. 570–490 BCE.) Some believe that Alcmaeon was an early member of the **Pythagorean** school. If

that is so, he is unusual in his focus on biology and medicine (*iatrikē*). He believed that health depends on a balance of various “powers” (*dynameis*) in the body. He seems to have been the first in the Greek philosophical tradition to attribute cognition to the brain, and he developed an early version of the argument for immortality of the soul (*psychē*) which appears in **Plato**’s *Phaedrus* at 245, that the soul is the ultimate cause of change, and the ultimate cause of change cannot itself be destroyed. See C. Huffman, “Alcmaeon,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

See also [CROTON](#).

ALĒTHEIA

Ἀλήθεια. Truth. **Parmenides** divided his poem into the *Way of Truth* and the *Way of Opinion*; the *Way of Truth* tells of “what is” while the *Way of Opinion* tells what people believe. **Protagoras**, in contrast, in a book that might have been called “The Truth,” wrote, “Human beings are the measure of all things, of what is, that it is, and of what is not, that it is not.” **Plato** sides with Parmenides in closely associating *alētheia* with **Being**, while **Aristotle** favors a more syntactical definition of truth in *Metaphysics* IV.

In the Hellenistic period, philosophers sought a “canon” (*kanōn*, standard) or criterion (*kritērion*) of truth. **Epicurus** argued that perceptions (*aisthēseis*), preconceptions (*prolēpseis*), and feelings (*pathē*) are criteria of truth. For Epicurus, the primary feelings involved are pleasure (*hēdonē*) and pain (*lypē*); the perceptions are either immediate individual perceptions or generalizations based on perception. Epicurus believed that immediate perception is infallible. “Preconceptions” or *prolēpseis* are crucially important to the epistemological position, since they are the general notion of a particular kind of experience; for example, we may have a preconception of body, or of space, or of number, making possible experience of a particular kind.

The **Stoics** attempted to distinguish between cognitively reliable and cognitively unreliable perceptions; correct *prolēpseis* make some perceptions cognitively reliable. There are significant discussions of these issues in **Cicero**’s *Academica* and **Sextus Empiricus** *Against the Professors*.

Since *lēthē* is forgetfulness, *alētheia* is lack of forgetfulness.

ALEXANDER OF AEGAE

Ἀλέξανδρος. (1st CE.) **Peripatetic**, student of **Sosigenes of Alexandria**, tutor of the emperor Nero. According to

Simplicius, he wrote commentaries on Aristotle's *Categories* and *De Caelo* (*In Cat.* 10.20, 13.16; *In De Caelo* 430.29–32). Aegae was a town, now an archaeological site, near the town of Aigeira, halfway between **Corinth** and Patras, 38°9'N 22°21'E, Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #229.

ALEXANDER OF APHRODISIAS

Ἀλέξανδρος. (2nd to 3rd CE.) Alexander was appointed to a chair of **Peripatetic** philosophy, possibly in **Athens**, by the emperors Septimius Severus and Caracalla between 198 and 209. Alexander wrote extant commentaries on **Aristotle's** *Prior Analytics* I, *Topics*, *Metaphysics*, *Meteorologica*, and *Sense*. His extant "original" works include *On the Soul*, *Problems*, *On Fate*, and others. Regarded as the most reliable commentator on Aristotle in subsequent centuries, his works (including many now lost) were often incorporated into the commentaries of others. See Dorothea Frede, "Alexander of Aphrodisias," in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

See also [APHRODISIAS](#).

ALEXANDER OF LYCOPOLIS

(3rd–4th CE.) Egyptian philosopher who attacked **Manicheism**. It is not possible to tell from the nature of his attack on dualism whether he was a **Christian** or a **Platonist**. Lycopolis is in the Nile Delta, the same town that **Plotinus** came from, 31°5'N 30°57'E. See J. Mansfield, tr., *An Alexandrian Platonist against Dualism*, 1974.

ALEXANDER OF MACEDON

(356–323 BCE.) **Aristotle's** most famous student. Philip II of **Macedon**, Alexander's father, engaged Aristotle as Alexander's tutor in about 343 BCE; the teacher–student relationship seems to have lasted only a year or two. When Alexander became king after the death of his father in 336, he moved fairly quickly to consolidate his hold over Greece; in his peace treaty with **Athens**, apparently one of the terms was that Aristotle, not a citizen of Athens, would be permitted to open a school in that city. While Alexander was a warrior, not a philosopher, the effect of his conquests was the opening of the Middle East to Greek ideas—and Greece to Middle Eastern ideas—with many important consequences over the next thousand years. Primary ancient sources for Alexander include **Arrian**, *Anabasis Alexandri*; **Diodorus Siculus**; **Plutarch**: *Alexander* and *On the Fortune of Alexander*.

ALEXANDER POLYHISTOR

Ἀλέξανδρος ὁ Πολυῖστωρ. (2nd–1st BCE.) Author of *Successions of Philosophers*, a major source for **Diogenes**

Laertius, and a work on Pythagoreanism, a source for Diogenes' account of that philosophy. He also wrote *On the Jews*, bringing together a wide variety of sources on this topic. See O. Romanov, "Alexander Polyhistor," *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. "Polyhistor" is a nickname, meaning a person who does many investigations.

ALEXANDRIA

31°12'N 29°55'E, on the Mediterranean coast of **Egypt**. Founded by Alexander the Great, it became the capital of the Ptolemaic rulers of Egypt. They made it the home of the famous **Museum (*Museion*) and Library**, center for scientific and philosophical investigation from the late 4th century BCE until the martyrdom of **Hypatia** in 415 CE. Philosophical teaching in Alexandria was revived by **Hermeias** toward the end of the 5th century; his successors **Ammonius** and **Olympiodorus** continued his teaching, instructing **John Philoponus**, a Christian commentator on **Aristotle**, and others, who continued a Christian philosophical tradition until the city was taken by a Muslim army in 641.

See also **NEOPLATONISM**. Here are some of the philosophers and philosophically important people in this dictionary associated with Alexandria: **AGATHOBULUS OF ALEXANDRIA**; **AMMONIUS HERMIAE**; **AMMONIUS SACCAS**; **APOLLONIUS OF RHODES**; **ARISTARCHUS OF SAMOS (SAMOTHRACE)**; **ARISTO OF ALEXANDRIA**; **ARIUS DIDYMUS OF ALEXANDRIA**; **ASCLEPIADES OF ALEXANDRIA**; **ASCLEPIODOTUS OF ALEXANDRIA**; **CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA**; **DIO OF ALEXANDRIA**; **ERASISTRATUS**; **ERATOSTHENES**; **EUCLID OF ALEXANDRIA**; **EUDORUS OF ALEXANDRIA**; **HELIODORUS OF ALEXANDRIA**; **HERAISCUS OF ALEXANDRIA**; **HERO OF ALEXANDRIA**; **HEROPHILUS OF CHALCEDON**; **HIEROCLES OF ALEXANDRIA**; **HORAPOLLON**; **ISIDORE OF ALEXANDRIA**; **MENELAUS OF ALEXANDRIA**; **OLYMPIODORUS (1)**; **OLYMPIODORUS (2)**; **PHILO OF ALEXANDRIA**; **POTAMO OF ALEXANDRIA**; **SOSIGENES OF ALEXANDRIA**; **SOTION OF ALEXANDRIA**; **STEPHANUS (STEPHEN) OF ALEXANDRIA**; **THEON OF ALEXANDRIA**.

ALEXINUS OF ELIS

Ἀλεξίνος. (4th to 3rd BCE.) **Dialectician**, successor of **Eubulides**, noted for his critique of **Zeno** the **Stoic**, using parodies of Zeno's arguments. When he tried to start his own school in Olympia (50 km away) the students revolted.

See also **ELIS**.

ALGOS

ἄλγος. **Pain** of body or mind. The more frequently used word is *lypē*. The denizens of Plato's Cave (*Republic* VII.515c8) experience *algos* when forced to look at the light.

ALIENATION

Allotriōsis, ἀλλοτρίωσις. Estrangement. In **Stoic** philosophy, the opposite of *oikeiōsis*, οἰκεῖωσις, **appropriation**.

ALLĒGORIA

Ἀλληγορία. Speaking in such a way as to be interpreted other than literally; interpretation of speech or text other than literally. *Agoreuein* is to speak in the assembly, or generally to give an important speech; *allos* is other, so combined it means to say something importantly different.

Plato's image of the Cave in the *Republic* is usually referred to as an "allegory," and in general most readers take his "myths" to be allegorical in character. But he does not use the word "*allēgoria*"; he uses the word *hyponoein* (*Rep.* II, 378b–d; cf. **Laws** III, 679c). **Plutarch** explicitly gives allegorical interpretations, and later authors followed his lead in the interpretation of literary and philosophical texts. Cf. Epistle to the Galatians 4:24.

See also [MYTHOS](#).

ALLEGORY

See [ALLĒGORIA](#).

ALLOIŌSIS

Ἀλλοίωσις. Qualitative change, that is, the same entity becoming qualitatively different while remaining the same entity (see **Physics** V.2, 226b1). One of **Aristotle's** examples is a person getting a tan. In *De Anima* II.5, 417b15, Aristotle distinguishes two senses: from absence to presence of a quality, and change of the *hexis* (condition) and *physis* (nature). *Allos* is "other"; the *-osis* suffix implies making something.

ALTERATION

Alteration is another term for qualitative change. *Alloiōsis* is **Aristotle's** standard word for qualitative change; *heteroiōsis* occurs only a couple of times.

See also [KINĒSIS](#); [METABOLĒ](#).

AMBIGUITY

See [AMPHIBOLIA](#).

AMBROSE (AURELIUS AMBROSIUS)

(d. 397 CE.) Bishop of Milan, he wrote, for example, *On the Duties of Priests*, applying Ciceronian ethics to the clergy.

As a theologian and religious writer with excellent skills in Greek, he was instrumental in converting classical learning to the uses of **Christianity**. The works of Ambrose are readily available online.

AMEINIAS

(6th–5th BCE.) According to **Diogenes Laertius**, he was a **Pythagorean** and a teacher of **Parmenides**.

AMELIUS

Ἀμέλιος. (3rd CE.) **Neoplatonist**, student of **Numenius of Apamea** and **Plotinus**. He functioned as a secretary to Plotinus, making copious notes of his teachings; he wrote several works of his own that do not survive except as reports in later writers. At the death of Plotinus, he moved to **Apamea** in Syria.

AMMIANUS MARCELLINUS

(325/330–after 391 CE.) Roman soldier and historian who wrote (in Latin) a history of **Rome** from 96 to 378, but only the part from 353 to 378 is extant. He mentions some of the philosophers functioning in that 25-year period, for example, **Asclepiades the Cynic**, **Maximus of Ephesus**, and others. It is available online.

AMMONIUS HERMIAE

Ἀμμώνιος. (c. 440–c. 520 CE.) **Scholarch** of the **Neoplatonist** school in **Alexandria**, he focused attention on the works of **Aristotle**. Ammonius was the son of **Hermeias**, who had studied with **Syrianus** in **Athens**, and **Aedesia**. Ammonius was in turn the teacher of **Olympiodorus**, **Damascius** (the last Scholarch in Athens), **John Philoponus**, and **Asclepius**. There are extant commentaries by Ammonius on the **Categories**, **On Interpretation**, and **Prior Analytics**. The commentaries on Aristotle by Asclepius and Philoponus reflect his teaching. See D. Blank, “Ammonius,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

AMMONIUS OF ATHENS

Ἀμμώνιος. (1st CE.) **Platonist**, teacher of **Plutarch of Chaeronea**. Plutarch praises him for his knowledge of **Aristotle**, so some have thought that he was a **Peripatetic**. **Athenaeus** refers to a book on altars and sacrifices and a book on Athenian courtesans by “Ammonius”; one or both might be by him.

AMMONIUS SACCAS

Ἀμμώνιος Σακκάς. (c. 175–242 CE.) He has been given the title of “the first **Neoplatonist**.” The teacher of **Plotinus**, **Clement**, and **Origen**, he tried to synthesize the teachings of

Plato and **Aristotle** with the religious and philosophical teachings from the cultures with which he was familiar. The denomination “Saccas” comes from his study of philosophy in India—either he was an Indian of the clan of Gautama Buddha, or it was given to him as an honorific.

AMPHIBOLIA

Ἀμφιβολία. Ambiguity. (*Bolē*, throw; with the prefix *amphi-*, both; “throw both ways.”) **Chrysippus** wrote extensively on the varieties of ambiguity. According to **Galen**, he distinguished eight different kinds of ambiguity, some of them developments of **Aristotle**’s distinctions between synonymy, paronymy, and homonymy in the **Categories**, but some of them are interesting observations of the ways in which the Greek language can be abused. In the **Poetics** (25, 1461a25) Aristotle notes the use of ambiguity in poetry using the word *amphibolia*.

AMPHICLEIA

(3rd–4th CE.) Student of **Plotinus**. She married Ariston, the son of **Iamblichus**. (**Porphyry**, *Life of Plotinus* 9.)

AMPHIPOLIS

Amphipolis was a town in **Macedonian** Greece, 40°49’N 23°51’E, Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #553. One of the military campaigns in which **Socrates** fought was at Amphipolis. **Demetrius**, student of Plato and Hermagoras, a 3rd BCE Stoic, came from this place.

ANACHARSIS THE SCYTHIAN

(6th BCE.) As chronicled by **Diogenes Laertius**, he came to **Athens** and became the friend of **Solon** and was notorious for his sharp comments on Athenian mores. “In Athens, the wise speak and the fools decide.” “The vine has three leaves—first is pleasure, second drunkenness, third repentance.” **Herodotus** (IV.76) says that he was the only remarkable person to emerge from the area around the Black Sea. The **Cynics** regarded him as an important forerunner of their way of doing philosophy. See J. F. Kindstrand, *Anacharsis*, 1981.

Scythia was the territory known today as the Ukraine, plus the part of southern Russia near the Caucasus.

ANAGKĒ, ANANKĒ

Ἀνάγκη. Necessity. Early Greek philosophy is regularly concerned with what happens of necessity, and to a lesser extent, what necessarily does not happen. **Anaximander** asserts that things that come to be perish again into the indefinite “by necessity” (f. 1); for **Parmenides**, “mighty Necessity” holds **Being** in the bonds of limits (f. 8, line 30);

Leucippus says, “Nothing happens at random, but everything happens for a reason and by necessity” (f. 2).

In **Plato’s** *Timaeus*, Timaeus’ mythic **cosmology** is divided into three sections, the works of reason (**logos**), the works of *anagkē*, and the cooperation of reason and necessity. The “*anagkē*” section features the receptacle (**hypodochē**), the space-time continuum or the ground of otherness of sensibilia. It is important to recognize that for Plato in the *Timaeus*, the “necessary” is not the predictable and orderly, but the unpredictable and disorderly, which becomes orderly only when subjected to the ordering of mind (**nous**) and reason.

Aristotle distinguishes simple (*haplōs*) necessity from conditional (*ex hypotheseōs*) necessity. Those processes are simply necessary that always happen in the same way: astronomical processes would be a good example. But most natural processes do not *always* happen in the same way. These can be understood by looking at how and to what degree they serve some end. For example, the growth of teeth in such animals as dogs and cats is “conditionally” necessary, since their teeth enable them to get their nutrition, and without them they would not be able to survive. Both of these senses of necessity are contrasted with the “forced” (*biaion*), where a process thwarts some natural end (**Physics** IV.8, 215a3). This “unnatural” necessity actually accords more with the most frequent popular uses of the term *anagkē*; in non-philosophical contexts, “necessity” is usually “dire” and contrary to inclination and desire.

While we may see the fragment of Leucippus cited above as an anticipation of the modern concept of “mechanical” necessity, neither Plato nor Aristotle has much time for what we would call “mechanical” necessity.

Epicurus, however, takes seriously the **atomist** assertion of universal causality and attempts to make room for “free will” by asserting that there is some element of randomness in the movement of the atoms, a “**swerve**,” that gives some room for human self-determination.

The **Stoics** asserted an absolutely universal **determinism**; everything that happens, happens of necessity, to such a degree that when everything that can happen has happened, it all happens again, in exactly the same way. In later antiquity, the debate turned on the concept of “fate.”

See also [HEIMARMENĒ](#).

Ἀναγωγή. Literally, “bringing up.” (*Ana*, up; plus *agōgē*, bringing.) So in **Aristotle**, *Meteorology* II.2, 355a15, the sun “draws up” moisture. But Aristotle also uses it in a logical sense, going back to first principles (*Posterior Analytics* II.3, 90a37).

See also [ANALYSIS](#); [EPAGŌGĒ](#).

ANALOGIA

Ἀναλογία. Proportion, analogy. (*Ana*, up; plus *logia*, reckoning.) Mathematically, an *analogia* is an equality of ratios (*logoi*). **Aristotle** applies proportionality to the idea of justice in *Nicomachean Ethics* V.3, where he distinguishes discrete from continuous proportions, geometrical from arithmetic. Aristotle also speaks of different “unities”: one in number, one in species, one in genus, and analogically one (*Metaphysics* V.6, 1016b30).

In **Epicurean** and **Stoic** epistemology, analogy is one of the ways that concepts arise from perception (*aisthēsis*) (**Diogenes Laertius** VII.53, X.32). **Cicero** argues that the range of our application of the word “good” comes from an application of analogy, a thought that might well go back to Aristotle, *EN* I.6, 1096b28.

ANALOGY

See [ANALOGIA](#).

ANALYSIS

Ἀνάλυσις. Loosening, resolving, reduction, solution of a problem. (*Ana*, up; *lusis*, freeing.) In *Generation of Animals* I.18, 724b18, **Aristotle** speaks of the waste product of an unnatural “analysis” in the body; but more normally, analysis is one of the objectives of logical investigation (e.g., *Posterior Analytics* II.5, 91b13).

ANAMNĒSIS

Ἀνάμνησις. Recollection. (*Ana*, up; plus *mnēmē*, memory.) **Plato**’s **Socrates**, especially in the *Meno*, *Phaedo*, *Phaedrus*, and by implication *Timaeus*, uses the **Pythagorean** doctrine of *metempsychosis* to argue that human knowledge is made possible by experiences of truth (*alētheia*) that souls have between lives. Since the empirical world is not true (not real), it can at best remind us of whatever reality and truth we experienced between lives. Such “recovered memories” may enable us to gain some provisional understanding of sensory experiences, but the objective is to recover as much as possible of the original experience of reality. Aristotle uses the word without the freight, for example in *Nicomachean Ethics* III.10, when he says that we enjoy

odors because they remind us of things we have taken pleasure in, for example food.

ANAPODEIKTON

Ἀναπόδεικτον. Unproven, indemonstrable, inconclusive. (*Deikton*, shown; *apo*, from; privative *an*; thus “unshown-from.”) **Aristotle** talks of the “unproven” opinions of experienced people as valuable evidence in ethical contexts (***Nicomachean Ethics*** VI.11, 1143b12). In the ***Prior Analytics***, he notes that some **sylogisms** are “inconclusive” (e.g., II.1), and **Chrysippus** follows that usage and develops it for the propositional calculus for which **Stoic** logicians are famous.

ANAXAGORAS OF CLAZOMENAE

Ἀναξαγόρας. (c. 500–428 BCE.) Though born in Ionia, Anaxagoras moved to **Athens** in the 460s where he became the personal friend and advisor of Pericles. In about 434 he was accused of impiety, and was forced to return to Clazomenae. He was notable for his scientific investigations: investigating a meteorite, he concluded that at least some of the astronomical bodies had to be earthy in character; observing fossils of shellfish on the tops of hills he concluded that the sea must have covered that land at some time. Anaxagoras had a rather unique **cosmological** theory: all sorts of materials are infinitely divisible, and there is a portion of everything in everything. A cosmic Mind (***nous***) sets up a rotation, a vortex (***dinē***) that tends to separate out similar materials, giving rise ultimately to the various things that we see in the universe. Both **Plato** and **Aristotle** complain, in different ways, about Anaxagoras’ failure to give an account of complex entities, so we might conclude that his focus is on the generation of basic materials. See D. Sider, *The Fragments of Anaxagoras*, 1981; P. Curd, “Anaxagoras,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

Clazomenae (Κλαζομεναί) was about 20 miles west of **Smyrna** (Izmir) on the Ionian coast of what is now Turkey. It was also the home of a predecessor of Anaxagoras, **Hermotimus**. Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #847.

ANAXARCHUS OF ABDERA

Ἀναάρχος. (c. 380–c. 320 BCE.) **Atomist**, follower of **Democritus**, with **Pyrrho** accompanied **Alexander of Macedon** to the East. As reported by **Diogenes Laertius**, he may have influenced the development of **Skepticism**.

See also **ABDERA**.

ANAXILAUS OF LARISSA

(1st BCE.) A **Pythagorean** and physician, he was banished from Rome in 28 BCE by Augustus for practicing **magic**. **Pliny the Elder** cites him for his writings on the properties of minerals and herbs and several “magic” tricks.

See also [LARISSA](#).

ANAXIMANDER OF MILETUS

Ἀναξίμανδρος. (c. 610–545 BCE.) He wrote a prose book that seems to have been primarily geographical in intent, but the book began with **cosmological** speculations, and it was those that captured the imagination of some of his successors. **Theophrastus** quoted a bit of his text, and that quotation was later preserved by **Simplicius**. Anaximander said that the origin of everything is the *apeiron*, or “indefinite,” and all the “heavens and universes” come to be from it, and ultimately necessarily return to the indefinite. “For they give justice and reparation to each other according to the arrangement of time.” Anaximander believed that the **earth** is cylindrical in shape, that we live on one of the “flat” (or rather a bit concave) surfaces, and that the earth is in the middle of the universe because there is no reason for it to go anywhere else. See Dirk Couprie, “Anaximander,” *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

See also [MILETUS](#).

ANAXIMENES OF LAMPSACUS

Ἀναξίμενης. (c. 380–320 BCE.) Rhetorician and historian, opponent of **Isocrates**, he is widely credited with writing the *Rhetoric to Alexander* included in the Aristotelian **corpus**. He wrote a history of Greece and accompanied Alexander on his campaigns, writing a history of those events. Fragments of these works have been edited and are available online.

ANAXIMENES OF MILETUS

Ἀναξίμενης. (c. 585–528 BCE.) Younger contemporary of **Anaximander**, he envisioned the world as enclosed by a membrane full of air. He seems to have thought that the contents of the world are all derived somehow from air (*aēr*), by condensing into water, and then solidifying. He is quoted as saying, “As our soul, being air, rules and holds us together, so breath and air encompass the whole universe” (DK 13b2). He thought of the **earth** as flat and thin, held up by the air like a floating leaf. See D. W. Graham, “Anaximenes,” *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

See also [MILETUS](#).

ANDREIA

Ἀνδρεία. Courage, literally “manliness.” (*Anēr*, *andros* is

gendered “man.”) Analyzed by **Socrates** in **Plato’s** ***Laches*** and ***Protagoras***, and by **Aristotle** in both the ***Eudemian*** and ***Nicomachean Ethics***. In the ***Republic*** courage is the signature virtue of the **guardian** class; Plato clearly believes that a wide range of behaviors belong under this general title. Aristotle in contrast believes (in the ***Nicomachean Ethics*** at least) that it is first and foremost a military virtue exhibited on the field of battle, though his comments in the ***Politics*** (e.g., I.12, 1262a21) indicate the possibility of a more nuanced theory.

ANDROCYNES

Pythagorean of uncertain date BCE. Fragments of his work *On Pythagorean Symbols* are present in quite a few later works. It is a major source, ultimately, for the Pythagorean way of life. He thought of the ***akousmata*** as puzzles or **allegories**. Some refer to him as physician to **Alexander of Macedon**.

ANDRONICUS OF RHODES

Ἀνδρόνικος. (1st BCE.) **Peripatetic** and **Scholarch**. Andronicus is credited (**Plutarch**, *Sulla* 26) with editing the works of **Aristotle**, putting them in their current arrangement. He is otherwise said to have been the teacher of **Boethus of Sidon**, Peripatetic commentator, and his successor as Scholarch. See Andrea Falcon, “Andronicus of Rhodes,” supplement to “Commentators on Aristotle,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

See also [RHODES](#).

ANEPHKRITOS

Ἀνεπίκριτος. Undecidable, in a fundamental sense. (*Kritos*, decided or decidable; *epi*, on; privative *an*.) The Skeptics argued that there was no ground or basis for judging . . . anything.

See also [SKEPTIKOS](#).

ANGEL

Angelos (ἄγγελος) in classical Greek is simply a “messenger.” The translators of the Septuagint adopted the word to avoid using the word ***daimōn***, a word with far too much pagan freight. Incidentally, **Aristotle** remarks at ***Progression of Animals*** 11, 711a1, that the representation of *Erōtēs* (cupids) with two legs, two arms, and two wings is biologically impossible, unnatural. That would hold for the standard representation of angels as well.

ANIMA

Latin translation of ***psychē***, “soul.”

See also [DE ANIMA](#).

ANIMAL

See [ZŌĒ](#), [ZŌON](#), [ZOOLOGY](#).

ANNICERIS

Ἀννικερῖς. According to **Diogenes Laertius**, he ransomed **Plato** from pirates who had captured him on his way home from Sicily. Some say that Dionysius of Syracuse sold Plato to slavers, whence he was bought “by friends.” See A. S. Riginos, *Platonica*, 1976, pp. 86ff.

See also [ANNICERIS OF CYRENE](#).

ANNICERIS OF CYRENE

Ἀννικερῖς. (c. 300 BCE.) **Cyrenaic**, student of Parabates, colleague of **Hegesias**. Although **Diogenes Laertius** says that he was the one who ransomed Plato, that is chronologically impossible if it is true as the **Suda** says that he lived at the time of **Alexander of Macedon**. Diogenes Laertius also says that he was the teacher of **Theodorus the Atheist** (II.98). Fragments of his philosophy indicate that he was a hedonist, like other Cyrenaics.

See also [CYRENE](#).

ANOMIA

Ἀνομία. Lawlessness. **Plato**, *Republic* IX, 575a, notes the “lawlessness” of the “tyrannical” constitution. (**Nomos** is “law.”)

ANTECEDENT CAUSE

See [PROĒGOUMENON AITION](#).

ANTHRŌPOS

ἄνθρωπος. Human being. This word is often translated “man,” but it must be recognized that *anthrōpos* is gender neutral; the gendered word for “man” would be *anēr*, ἀνὴρ.

ANTIKOPE

Ἀντίκοπη. Collision (striking against). In **Epicurean** physics, a collision of **atoms**. If all the atoms were moving in the same direction at the same speed to start with, why are they moving in all directions today? Two reasons: first, the **swerve**, second, collisions.

See also [PHYSIS](#); [HISTORIA PERI PHYSEŌS](#).

ANTIOCH

Ἀντιόχεια. Hellenistic, Roman, and medieval city, now known as Antakya, in southern Turkey near the Mediterranean coast and the border with Syria, 36°12'N 36°9'E. “Antiochus” was, in mythology, son of Heracles, and a fairly popular name throughout antiquity. The city was named by Seleucus—who acquired this part of **Alexander’s** conquests—after his father. As the capital of the western part of the Seleucid kingdom and

an access point from the Mediterranean to the East, it was something of a magnet for commerce and intellectuals. For example, Erisistratus practiced medicine here before moving to **Alexandria**. It became a center for **Christian** intellectuals, starting with St. Luke.

ANTIOCHUS OF ASCALON

Ἀντίοχος ὁ Ἀσκαλῶνιος. (c. 130–c. 68 BCE.) He studied with the **Stoic** Mnesarchus and with **Philo of Larissa** in the **Academy**. He broke with Philo at about the time of **Sulla**'s invasion of **Athens**; after that, he set up his own "Academy" where he taught **Cicero** in 79 BCE. See J. Allen, "Antiochus of Ascalon," *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

See also [ASCALON](#).

ANTIPATER OF CYRENE

Ἀντίπατρος. (4th BCE.) Student of **Aristippus** in the **Cyrenaic school**. According to **Cicero** (*Tusculan Disputations* v.38) he was blind, and when some women bewailed the fact, he responded, "Do you think the night can furnish no pleasure?"

See also [CYRENE](#).

ANTIPATER OF TARSUS

Ἀντίπατρος. (c. 200–c. 130 BCE.) Head of the **Stoic** school in **Athens** between **Diogenes of Babylon** and **Panaetius**. He defended Stoic principles against the Skeptical attacks of **Carneades**.

See also [TARSUS](#).

ANTIPATER OF TYRE

Ἀντίπατρος. (1st BCE.) He taught **Stoicism** to Cato in **Rome**.

See also [TYRE](#).

ANTIPHASIS, ANTIPHANAI

Ἀντίφασις, ἀντίφαναί. Contradiction, that is, a contradictory pair of propositions; to contradict. (Literally, saying against, saying the opposite.) Cf. **Metaphysics** IV.7, 1011b23.

See also [LAW OF NON-CONTRADICTION](#).

ANTIPHON (OF ATHENS)

Half brother of **Plato** who recounts the conversation between **Socrates**, **Parmenides**, and **Zeno** in the **Parmenides**.

ANTIPHON (OF RHAMNOUS?)

Ἀντιφῶν. (c. 479–411 BCE.) **Sophist** who may or may not be the same person as the Athenian orator Antiphon of Rhamnous. One or more individuals with the name Antiphon

attempted to square the circle; interpreted dreams and offered psychotherapy; wrote a book *On Truth*, extant in fragmentary form; wrote and published forensic speeches (several are extant); wrote plays; and was convicted of complicity with the oligarchy and executed in 411 (thus the death date cited).

Antiphon the Sophist (author of *On Truth*) contrasts nature and convention (***physis*** and ***nomos***), defending the thesis that convention or law is repressive, but by nature all human beings are free and in principle equal; it is law that makes people unfree and unequal. Some think that those sentiments are inconsistent with the known oligarchical political stance of Antiphon of Rhamnous. See R. Kent Sprague, ed., *The Older Sophists*, 2001; Dillon & Gergel, *The Greek Sophists*, 2003, pp. 133–202. Rhamnous is a **deme** of Athens.

ANTISTHENES OF ATHENS

Ἀντισθένης. (c. 440–370 BCE.) Some take him to be the founder of the **Cynic** school of philosophy. He is said to have studied first with **Gorgias**, then with **Socrates**. Antisthenes was notable for wearing exceedingly ragged and dirty clothing to demonstrate his disdain for material things. Philosophically, he emphasized the centrality of virtue (***aretē***). Antisthenes was the teacher of **Diogenes of Sinope**, who has a better claim to be the first Cynic. Some of Antisthenes' ideas reappear in doctrines of the older **Stoics**. See J. Piering, "Antisthenes," *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

ANTONINUS

(4th CE.) **Neoplatonist**, son of **Eustathius** and **Sosipatra**, he ran a school in Canopus, Egypt. An older contemporary of **Hypatia**, he avoided confrontation with the Christians. His life is chronicled by **Eunapius**.

AOCHLĒSIA

Ἀοχλησία. Unperturbedness, the goal of life according to **Speusippus** and the **Epicureans**. *Ochlēsis* is "disturbance."
See also [ATARAXIA](#).

AORISTON

Ἀόριστον. Indefinite. *Horos* is a boundary or limit. In the **Politics** (III.1) Aristotle mentions "indefinite" terms of office, for example. In **Stoic** logic, the word is used of a sentence with an indefinite article as subject or predicate.

See also [LOGIKĒ](#).

APAMEA

Ἀπάμεια, *Apameia*. City in northwest Syria, 35.418°N 36.398°E. Birthplace of **Posidonius**, Stoic philosopher; in the 2nd century CE, **Numenius** established a **Platonic** school of

philosophy there that trained **Amelius**, an associate of Plotinus, and **Iamblichus**. **Sopater** came from there to study with Iamblichus in **Athens**. The school seems to have played a role in the translation of Greek texts into Syriac, part of the process of preserving Greek knowledge in the Islamic world.

APATHEIA

Ἀπάθεια. Condition of being unaffected. For **Aristotle**, it is important that the mind (**nous**) is “unaffected,” in contrast to the sense organs, which are affected by external causes (**De Anima** III.4–6). For the **Stoics**, **pathē** are unnatural physical processes that interfere with rational behavior; thus a condition of *apatheia* is much to be desired.

APAXIA

Ἀποξία. **Stoic** term for “disvalue.” (*Axia*, worth; plus *apo*, away.)

APEIRON

ἄπειρον. Literally, “without limit” or “without definition.” *Peirar* means “completion, decision.” **Anaximander** says that “the *apeiron*” is the origin of all things; **Theophrastus** understands him as meaning that the *apeiron* is a material substrate that as yet has no characteristics. Some later writers took Anaximander as meaning that the *apeiron* is indefinitely extended space and time.

The idea of infinity in Greek philosophy took a large step forward in the 5th century BCE with the paradoxes of **Zeno of Elea**. He argued, for example, that if space is infinitely divisible, one would have to make an infinite number of moves to go any finite distance, so motion is impossible. **Melissus**, **Empedocles**, **Anaxagoras**, and **Democritus** all seem to have believed the universe to be spatially infinite.

Aristotle, in contrast, denied that the universe is spatially infinite. The **Stoics** accepted Aristotle’s finite universe but asserted an infinite void outside the universe. **Plato**’s use of “limit” and “unlimited” (*peras* and *apeiron*) in the *Philebus* led to more elaborate conceptual structures based on this contrast in **Neoplatonic** philosophy. The identification of “the One” with the **Form** of the **Good** on the one hand and indefinite multiplicity with **matter** and absence of good on the other lends a negative evaluative slant to the concept of “indefiniteness” in some late Greek thinkers.

APELLICON OF TEOS

Ἀπελλικῶν. (2nd–1st BCE.) According to the story told by **Strabo** (XIII.53), Apellicon was a **Peripatetic** book lover who had acquired the library of works by **Aristotle** and **Theophrastus** that had previously belonged to **Neleus of Scepsis**, a student of Theophrastus; this collection was confiscated by **Sulla** in 84 BCE, where it was put in the care of **Tyrannion**. Scholars of Aristotle like to blame Neleus, Apellicon, Tyrannion, and others, including the bookworms in Neleus’ cellar, for bits of text they do not like, and they may occasionally be right about that.

See also [SKEPSIS](#), [SCEPSIS](#); [TEOS](#).

APHAIRESIS

Ἀφαίρεσις. Abstraction. *Aphairesis* is an abstract noun built on the verb *aphairein*, to take away, for example to draw blood. **Aristotle** introduced a technical sense of the term to refer to separating out by thought something that is not (for him) ontologically separable. He uses the term in this sense primarily of **mathematical attributes** (e.g., *Metaphysics* XI.3,

APHRODISIAS

Small classical city, now the village of Geyre, in southwest Turkey, 37°42'30"N 28°43'25"E, Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #1005. Significant architectural ruins remain. It was the home of **Alexander of Aphrodisias**, one of the most significant **Peripatetics** of antiquity. In about the same time frame as Alexander, we hear of **Adrastus of Aphrodisias**, also a Peripatetic. In late antiquity, when the classical schools were under threat from the Christians, **Asclepiodotus** of Alexandria opened a school in Aphrodisias where he instructed **Damascius**.

APODEIXIS

Ἀπόδειξις. Exposition, demonstration, proof. (*Deixis*, showing; plus *apo*, away.) In **Plato's** *Phaedo*, at 73a, **Cebes** asks **Socrates** for *apodeixeis* that the soul (*psychē*) has pre-existed this present life. In the *Theaetetus* 162e, it is contrasted with merely plausible arguments. For **Aristotle**, the word tends to be used as a technical term for drawing a conclusion from true premises in a valid **sylogism** (*Posterior Analytics* I.17, 81a40). The word also has this sense for the **Stoics**.

APOGEGENĒMENA

Ἀπογεγενήμενα. Developments; literally, things generated from. An **Epicurean** term for emergent properties of concatenations of atoms (*atoma*).

APOKATASTASIS

Ἀποκατάστασις. Restoration. (*Kata-stasis* is standing down; *apo*, away or again. Reestablishment.) In **Stoic** philosophy, the periodic new beginning of the universe after the universal conflagration (*ekpyrōsis*); in some **Neoplatonic** philosophers (notably **Proclus**), the reunion of the individual soul (*psychē*) with the **World Soul**; in the **Christian** philosophy of **Origen**, the reconciliation of all parts of the universe with God.

APOLLODORUS OF ATHENS

Ἀπολλόδωρος ὁ Ἀθηναῖος. (c. 180–after 120 BCE.) Student of **Diogenes of Seleucia**, **Panaetius** the **Stoic**, and **Aristarchus of Samothrace**, he lived in **Alexandria**, **Pergamon**, and **Athens**. His major work was the *Chronicle*, a history of Greece in verse, often cited by later writers. It is sometimes the source of information about early Greek philosophers. He also wrote *On the Gods*, a history of Greek religion, and a long essay on Homer's "Catalogue of Ships."

Only fragments remain.

APOLLODORUS OF SELEUCIA

Ἀπολλόδωρος. (fl. c. 150 BCE.) **Stoic**, student of **Diogenes of Seleucia**. He wrote introductions to various aspects of Stoicism, often cited by **Diogenes Laertius**. The account of **Cynicism** in Diogenes Laertius VI may rely on his work.

See also [SELEUCIA](#).

APOLLODORUS THE EPICUREAN

(2nd BCE.) Head of the **Epicurean** school in **Athens**, he was the teacher of **Zeno of Sidon** (or **Tarsus**), who succeeded him as head of the school in about 100 BCE. He is said to have written a life of Epicurus and a collection of doctrines and many other books (**Diogenes Laertius** X.2, 26).

APOLLONIUS CRONUS

(4th BCE.) A **Megarian** philosopher from **Cyrene**. According to **Strabo**, he was the pupil of **Eubulides** and teacher of **Diodorus Cronus** (Strabo XIV.2.21, XVII.3.22; **Diogenes Laertius** II.111). “Cronus” is not a place-name but a nickname derived from Kronos, the father of Zeus and other Olympian deities, with the implication of “old fogey.”

APOLLONIUS MOLON

Ἀπολλώνιος ὁ Μόλων. (2nd–1st BCE.) Teacher of rhetoric in **Rhodes**, he counted both **Cicero** and Julius Caesar among his students. Two of his controversial claims: (1) the Delphic oracle did not say that **Socrates** was the wisest, because the form in which it is reported is incorrect; (2) the Jews are actually Egyptians (reported by **Josephus**, *Against Apion*). “Molon” may indicate a relationship with the general Molon of King Seleucus, who in turn may have taken on the name from the slogan of the Spartans at Thermopylae, “molon labe,” or “come and get it.”

See also [RHĒTORIKĒ](#).

APOLLONIUS OF CHALCEDON

(2nd CE.) **Stoic** teacher of the Roman emperors Commodus and **Marcus Aurelius**. Marcus has nice things to say about him in *Meditations*.

See also [CHALCEDON](#).

APOLLONIUS OF RHODES

Ἀπολλώνιος Ῥόδιος. (d. 247 BCE.) Alexandrian poet, author of *Argonautica*, and head of the library and museum in **Alexandria**. An English translation of *Argonautica* is available online at Project Gutenberg.

See also [MUSEUM](#) ([MUSEION](#), Μουσεῖον) **AND**

APOLLONIUS OF TYANA

Ἀπολλώνιος ὁ Τυανεύς. (2 BCE–98 CE.) Probable founder of the **Neopythagorean** movement. His life and teachings are recorded in an extant work by **Philostratus** (English translation available at Livius.org); this work is so full of claims of miracles performed by Apollonius that modern scholars are tempted to discredit everything said in the book, leaving us with a legend rather than a person. Still, we know that he wrote on a range of subjects, including (apparently) some letters still extant, and that his writings were collected and copied at the command of the emperor Hadrian (76–138 CE), for wide distribution through the empire, so it is reasonable to believe that his thought was influential from the end of the 1st century through the 2nd century CE at least. Indeed, Hierocles (proconsul of Bithynia), in the 3rd century, was still arguing that Apollonius was better than Jesus Christ. Apollonius has continued to attract attention from occultists and mystics from time to time. Tyana (Τύαννα) is now an archaeological site in the Cappadocian region of Turkey; it was abandoned in the 10th CE.

APOLLONIUS OF TYRE

(fl. 50 BCE.) **Stoic** author of a work on **Zeno**, according to **Diogenes Laertius** (VII.1, 2, 6, 23, 28). It has been suggested that he was also the author of a work on female philosophers noted by **Photius** (Cod. 161). See **Strabo** 16.2.24.

See also [TYRE](#).

APOLOGY

(Dialogue by **Plato**.) Representation of **Socrates**' defense before the Athenian jury. Socrates responds to the popular opinion that he is a **Sophist** by denying that he teaches for money and by claiming that Apollo, through the Delphic oracle, has directed him on his path of challenging claims to wisdom. Against the charge that he has corrupted the young, he argues that if so, he must have done it unintentionally, because he would not want to live among corrupt people; the charge of impiety, stated by his accusers as atheism, he refutes by pointing out his well-known claim to be guided by a *daimonion*, or divine being. Convicted by a relatively narrow margin and asked to name his alternative punishment, he suggests that the just punishment is state-supported free lunch for life, though he formally suggests a fine, paid for by his friends. He is sentenced to death by a greater margin than the first vote. See T. Brickhouse & N. D. Smith, *Socrates on Trial*, 1990.

In Greek, an *apologia* is a defense, “explaining away.” Obviously Socrates does not “apologize” in the modern English sense.

APOPHANSIS

Ἀπόφανσις. “Saying from.” Declaration, proposition, assertion—a sentence with a truth value. **Aristotle**, *Posterior Analytics* I.2, 72a11.

APOPHASIS, APOPHATIKOS LOGOS

Ἀπόφασις, ἀποφατικὸς λόγος. Negation, denial, negative proposition; cf. **Aristotle**, *Prior Analytics* II.15, 64a15. “Saying away.”

APOPROËGMENA

Ἀποπροηγμένα. In **Stoic** philosophy, “things dispreferred.” *Proegmena* would be things preferred, leading things (“going ahead of”); *apo* in this case is “dis-.”

See also [ADIAPHORA](#).

APORIA

Ἀπορία. “No path”; puzzle. *Poros* is road or path. **Socratic** questioning is designed to lead people to discover that they did not know what they thought they knew, that is, to an *aporia*. Socratic dialogues typically end in an *aporia*—we don’t have an account of friendship at the end of the **Lysis**, nor of courage at the end of the **Laches**, nor of knowledge at the end of the **Theaetetus**. **Aristotle** tends to attack an area of inquiry by gathering the various puzzles surrounding the topic, as well as the various opinions of “most people, or the wise, or most of the wise.” Generally Aristotle, unlike **Plato**’s Socrates, sooner or later proposes solutions to most or all of the puzzles posed at the beginning of the inquiry. For example, he poses a whole set of *aporai* in **Metaphysics** III, then in XI proposes solutions.

APOTELESMA

Ἀποτέλεσμα. Literally, “completion”; **Stoic** word for the effect of causes. (*Apo* plus *telos*, end.)

APPELATIVE

See [PROSËGORIA](#).

APPETITE

See [EPITHYMIA](#).

APPROPRIATE

The English word is used ambiguously to refer to two different **Stoic** concepts: *kathēkon*, one’s moral duty, and *oikeion*, what is proper to oneself, one’s own.

APULEIUS OF MADAURA

(c. 123–c. 180 CE.) Born in North Africa, M’Daourouch in

modern Algeria, 36°4.6'N 7°49.2'E, he is most widely known for his novel, *The Golden Ass* (*Metamorphoses*). His more philosophical works include "On the God of **Socrates**," "On **Plato's** Teachings," and "On the Universe." He is counted among the "**middle Platonists**." Most of his works are readily available online; for philosophical assessment, see J. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists*, 1996.

ARATUS OF SOLI

Ἀράτος ὁ Σολεύς. (c. 315–240 BCE.) Didactic poet, author of the extant *Phaenomena*. He studied with Menecrates in **Ephesus**, with Philitas in Cos, with **Praxiphanes** and **Zeno of Citium** in **Athens**, and knew Callimachus of **Cyrene** and **Menedemus** of the **Eretrian school**. From 276 he was at the court of the **Macedonian** king Antigonos II Gonatas, where he wrote a (lost) poem commemorating Antigonos' victory over the Gauls, and the *Phaenomena*. One might not today think of this poem as "philosophical," but remember, **Aristotle**, among his writings, did the *Meteorologica*, with very similar subject matter.

See also [SOLI](#).

ARCESILAUS OF PITANE

Ἀρκεσίλαος. (c. 316–c. 241 BCE.) Student of **Theophrastus** and **Crantor**, **Scholarch** of the **Academy** after **Polemon** and **Crates**; he initiated the period of **Academic Skepticism**. Pitane was a city on the Ionian coast, across from the island of Lesbos, 38°55'41"N 26°56'14"E. See C. Brittain, "Arcesilaus," *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

See also [SKEPTIKOS](#).

ARCHĒ

Ἀρχή. Origin, beginning, source, rule. **Heraclitus** says (f. 70), "In a circle, the beginning (*archē*) and end are common." **Alcmaeon** says (f. 2), "People are unable to connect the end with the beginning." From an Aristotelian point of view, the early Greek philosophers were seeking the "origin" of all things, for the most part the *material* origin. When **Aristotle** distinguishes the senses of the word, he begins from immanent starting points (the heart of a living being, for example) and external origins (the parents of the child, for example). In another sense, it means the ruling authority. Importantly, the basis on which something is known is the *archē*, so not only the material and moving causes are *archai*, but in a way all the causes, including formal and final (Aristotle, *Metaphysics* III.1).

See also [AITION](#), [AITIA](#).

ARCHĒ KINĒSEŌS

Ἀρχὴ κινήσεως. The Aristotelian cause with which **archē** is most closely associated is the *moving* cause, since **Aristotle**'s most normal way of referring to it is *archē kinēseōs*, or "beginning of movement."

See also [KINĒSIS](#).

ARCHEDEMUS

Ἀρχέδημος. (fl. 140 BCE.) **Stoic** author of *On Voice* and *On the Elements*, according to **Diogenes Laertius** VII, who says he was from **Tarsus**. **Plutarch** (*De Exilio* 14) mentions an Archedemus who left **Athens** and went to Babylon to found a Stoic school. Archedemus is also mentioned by **Cicero** (*Acad. Quaest.* II.47) and **Seneca** (*Ep.* 121).

ARCHELAUS OF ATHENS (?)

Ἀρχέλαος. (5th BCE.) He is thought to be a student or associate of **Anaxagoras**, mentioned most explicitly by **Diogenes Laertius** (II.16, 17, 23) and **Hippolytus** (I.8). If he was indeed an Athenian, he was the first of the city to become a philosopher. His views include the opinion that mind (**nous**) is closely associated with air (**aēr**), an idea going back to **Anaximenes** and shared with **Diogenes of Apollonia**. The "air" theory of the soul (**psychē**) and mind (**nous**) is put into the mouth of **Socrates** in **Aristophanes**' *Clouds*, suggesting that in the popular mind, Socrates was associated with one or both of these cosmologists at the time of the production of the play (423 BCE).

ARCHIMEDES OF SYRACUSE

Ἀρχιμήδης. (287–212 BCE.) Mathematician, scientist, and inventor. While not normally counted among the standard "philosophers," his theoretical mathematical work had, and in some ways continues to have, implications for theoretical physics and **cosmology**. His *Sandreckoner*, for example, presents a way of representing symbolically the number of grains of sand it would take to fill up the known universe (of his time), 8×10^{63} in modern notation. He also significantly improved the accuracy of the calculation of π . His works are readily available online.

See also [SYRACUSE](#).

ARCHYTAS OF TARENTUM

Ἀρχύτας. (Late 5th to mid-4th BCE.) Archytas was a **Pythagorean**, roughly contemporary with **Plato**. As political leader of **Tarentum**, he rescued Plato from Dionysius II of **Syracuse** in 361 BCE. While it is difficult to know just how much of the work attributed to him is really his, it does seem

clear that he made significant advances in mathematics and is a significant source of the “Pythagorean” aspects of Plato’s philosophy. See Carl Huffman, “Archytas,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

See also [MATHĒMA](#), [MATHĒMATA](#); [TA MATHĒMATIKA](#).

AREOPAGUS

Ἄρειος πάγος. A rocky hill near the Acropolis of **Athens**, it was (in principle) the meeting place of a supreme court during much of Athenian history. **Aristotle** notes that this court was an enduring oligarchical element in the Athenian constitution (*Politics* II.12, 1273b39) and that Peisistratus, though a “tyrant,” responded to the summons of this court (*Pol.* V.12, 1315b22). The ***Athēnaiōn Politeia*** outlines its activities from the days of **Solon** until the late 4th BCE. Perhaps most famous for St. Paul’s sermon to this group, resulting in the conversion of **Dionysius**, we hear of philosophers summoned to explain themselves to this body.

ARETE

Ἀρετή. (4th CE.) Dedicatee of one of the books of **Iamblichus**. In 351, her neighbors tried to get her thrown out of her home, but the emperor **Julian** went to Phrygia in person to help her.

ARETĒ

Ἀρετή. Virtue, excellence. The **Sophists** claimed to instruct their students in *aretē*, which meant for them any teachable human excellence, but particularly those that would help their students to become social and political leaders. Skill in persuasion and public speaking, and techniques of leadership, were among their promised outcomes.

Plato’s Socrates repeatedly challenged their practice and the assumptions upon which it rests, calling attention to the moral dimension of each conventional human excellence and of the general concept of human excellence. Although individual virtues are examined in one dialogue or another—temperance or moderation (*sōphrosynē*), courage (*andreia*), piety (*hosiotēs*), justice (*dikaiosynē*), wisdom (*sophia*)—they always seem to be systematically interrelated, and most likely all dependent on wisdom, but a wisdom that often seems beyond the possibility of instruction.

Aristotle, however, tries to provide individual accounts of the virtues (in ***Nicomachean Ethics*** III–V) that hold out the possibility of successfully exhibiting some of the virtues without necessarily having them all. Many of the virtues are represented as a mean between extremes. For example,

courage is a mean between foolhardiness and cowardice, so it seems possible that someone might more or less hit the mark with some virtues and not with others. The **Stoics** return to the Socratic ideal with a vengeance, since they propose that there is a theoretical person who is completely wise (**sophos**) and consequently has *all* the virtues—and no one else really has any of them, since when it comes to perfection, a miss is as good as a mile.

ARETE OF CYRENE

Ἀρήτη. (fl. 5th–4th BCE.) Daughter of **Aristippus**, possibly his successor as head of the **Cyrenaic school**, teacher of her son, Aristippus II. The spurious *Socratic Epistle* 27 represents Aristippus advising her to go to **Athens** after his death.

See also [CYRENE](#).

ARGUMENT

See [LOGOS](#).

ARIGNOTE

Ἀριγνώτη. (c. 500 BCE.) **Pythagorean**, student (perhaps daughter) of **Pythagoras** and **Theano**. According to the **Suda**, she wrote a *Bacchica* and a *Rites of Dionysus*. A fragment attributed to her: “The eternal **essence** of number is the most providential cause of the whole heaven, earth and the region in between. Likewise it is the root of the continued existence of the gods and **daimones**, as well as that of divine men.”

ARISTAEUS OF CROTON

(6th–5th BCE.) Student of **Pythagoras**; according to Iamblichus, when Pythagoras died, Aristaeus succeeded him and married his widow. Fragments of a work on harmony were attributed to him.

See also [CROTON](#).

ARISTANDER

(1st–2nd CE.) **Proclus** mentions a commentary on the **Timaeus** by him in his own commentary, book III.

ARISTARCHUS OF SAMOS (SAMOTHRACE)

Ἀρίσταρχος. (c. 310–230 BCE.) Astronomer and mathematician, he studied with **Strato of Lampsacus** in **Alexandria**. He asserted a heliocentric solar system (anticipating Copernicus) and made a serious attempt to calculate the distance of the moon, sun, and stars from **earth** on the basis of careful observations, preserved in *On the Sizes and Distances of the Sun and the Moon*. That he was not believed by other ancient scientists should not detract from his accomplishment. His works, translated by T. Heath in 1913,

are now available online.

See also [SAMOS](#).

ARISTIPPUS OF CYRENE

Ἀριστιππος. (c. 435–356 BCE.) Aristippus was a disciple of **Socrates** and founder of the **Cyrenaic school**. As an ethical hedonist, Aristippus anticipated **Epicurus**. He was succeeded as **Scholarch** by his daughter **Arete** (probably the first woman to direct an ancient philosophical school) and his grandson **Aristippus**. The stories told about Aristippus in **Diogenes Laertius** II sound a bit like attempts to show dramatically that hedonism is a shameful theory, but some of them might nevertheless be true. See T. O'Keefe, "Aristippus," *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

See also [CYRENE](#); [HĒDONĒ](#), [HĒDYN](#).

ARISTIPPUS OF CYRENE, THE YOUNGER

(4th BCE.) Grandson of the first Aristippus, son of Arete, some say that he was actually the founder of the school. He is called "Metrodidactus" because taught by his mother.

See also [CYRENAIC SCHOOL](#); [CYRENE](#).

ARISTO OF ALEXANDRIA

Ἀρίστων. (1st CE.) **Peripatetic**. **Strabo**, his contemporary, says that he wrote a book on the Nile, as did Eudorus (not **Eudorus of Alexandria**, who lived a century earlier); the books were so much alike that they charged each other with plagiarism. Strabo XVII; **Diogenes Laertius** VII.164.

ARISTO OF CEOS

Ἀρίστων ὁ Κέως. (fl. c. 225 BCE.) **Peripatetic**, student of **Lycō**, who succeeded **Strato** as **Scholarch**. Aristo probably succeeded Lycō. **Cicero** assesses him in *De Finibus* V.5. **Diogenes Laertius** indicates that there was some dispute about whether some works were his or written by **Aristo of Chios**. Everything that remains of his work has been published by W. W. Fortenbaugh and W. White, 2006.

See also [CEOS](#).

ARISTO OF CHIOS

Ἀρίστων ὁ Χίος. (Mid-3rd BCE.) Aristo was a **Stoic**, a student of **Zeno of Citium**. Aristo seems to have taken a hard line limiting philosophy to moral issues and favoring some **Cynic** positions. **Diogenes Laertius** 7.160–164 seems mainly interested in his baldness.

See also [CHIOS](#).

ARISTOBOULUS THE PERIPATETIC

Ἀριστόβουλος. 2nd BCE? Aristoboulus claimed that Jewish philosophy was older than Greek and was the source

of much of Greek philosophy. He anticipated the attempt by **Philo** to synthesize Jewish and Greek thought. **Eusebius**, *Praeparatio Evangelica* VIII.10, XIII.12; *Historia Ecclesiastica* VII.32, 17.

ARISTOCLEA

See [THEMISTOCLEA](#).

ARISTOCLES

According to **Diogenes Laertius** IV, **Plato's** actual given name; "Plato" was a nickname, dating to his days as a young wrestler.

ARISTOCLES OF MESSENE

Ἀριστοκλῆς. (1st CE.) **Peripatetic**, some think that he taught **Alexander of Aphrodisias**. Among his reported works is a history of philosophy, cited by **Eusebius**, *Praeparatio Evangelica* XIV, XV.

ARISTOCREON

Ἀριστοκρέων. (fl. 200 BCE.) **Stoic**, nephew of **Chrysippus**. **Plutarch** writes that he erected a bronze statue of his uncle with an inscribed verse (*De Stoic. Repugn.* 1033e).

ARISTOPHANES

(c. 448–380 BCE.) Aristophanes was a comic poet, the author of 11 surviving plays, the only complete pieces of "old comedy" from **Athens** still extant. Several of his plays reflect philosophical discussion current in his society. The *Clouds* presents **Socrates** as a major character, propounding a mixture of views attributed by historians of philosophy to **Anaxagoras**, **Diogenes of Apollonia**, **Protagoras**, and **Prodicus**. In **Plato's** *Apology*, Socrates is represented as obliged to disavow the opinions expressed in that play, written some 25 years before his trial. The play clearly shaped public opinion about philosophy in general, and Socrates in particular; if taken at its word, it provides a good deal of evidence that Socrates had clearly "un-Athenian" religious opinions, and that he corrupted the young, the character Pheidippides in particular.

Aristophanes reflects ongoing philosophical discussion also in the *Ecclesiasuzae*, for example, with its utopian communitarianism anticipating Plato's *Republic*. Aristophanes appears as a character himself in Plato's *Symposium*, where he is represented as presenting an especially vivid myth designed to explain various sexual preferences. It is likely that Plato was influenced by Aristophanes' dramatic techniques in his composition of the dialogues.

Aristophanes' plays are readily available online.

ARISTOTLE OF CYRENE

Ἀριστοτέλης. (fl. 325 BCE.) Contemporary of **Stilpo**, he taught Cleitarchus and Simmias of **Syracuse** before they studied with Stilpo (**Diogenes Laertius** II.113). DL says that he wrote a book on **poetry**. Bit of advice: "You should not accept a favor from anyone. Either you have trouble if you try to pay it back, or you appear to be ungrateful if you don't."

See also [CYRENE](#).

ARISTOTLE OF MYTILENE

(fl. 2nd CE.) **Peripatetic** in the time of **Galen**. Galen wrote that Aristotle of **Mytilene** never drank cold water because it gave him spasms; attacked with a disease, it was thought necessary for him to drink cold water—when he did, he died.

De Consuetudinibus (Peri Ethon).

ARISTOTLE OF STAGIRA

Ἀριστοτέλης. (384–322 BCE.) Ancient Stagira (Στάγειρα) was on the coast of the Chalcidice, northwest of Mount Athos (40°35'30"N 23°47'41"E); it is now an archeological site. Aristotle's father, Nicomachus, was court physician of the **Macedonian** king, Amyntas III, the father of Philip II and grandfather of **Alexander**. Both Nicomachus and Aristotle's mother, Phaestis, were from Aesclepiad families; both died when Aristotle was young. His guardian, Proxenus, sent him to **Plato's Academy** at age 17; Aristotle remained there as a student and teacher for 20 years, until nearly the time of the death of Plato in 347.

Around the time of Plato's death, Aristotle traveled to visit **Hermias**, satrap (subsidiary ruler under the Persians) of Atarneus in what is now northwest Turkey. He was accompanied by **Xenocrates** and joined Erastus and **Coriscus**; the whole group settled for a time in **Assos**, a town across from the island of Lesbos, home of **Theophrastus**; the group moved at some point to Lesbos. During this time Aristotle met Pythias, who would later become his wife. He also carried out a good deal of biological investigation and probably wrote some of his critiques of **Platonism**.

In 343, Aristotle returned to Macedonia, invited by Philip II to be tutor of Alexander, who was 13 at the time. In 340, Alexander became regent, ending the educational relationship. It is not clear whether Aristotle remained in Macedonia, or went to Stagira, or returned to Lesbos until 335, when, under pressure from Alexander, the Athenians agreed to allow the non-citizen Aristotle to operate a school in **Athens**. During this

period Pythias died, and Aristotle began a relationship with Herpyllis which continued until his death. He opened his school in the **Lyceum** and operated it for the next 12 years. At the death of Alexander in 323, anti-Macedonian feeling in Athens led to charges being made against him, and he retired to Chalcis, where he died in 322.

The body of Aristotle's writings, known collectively as the **Corpus Aristotelicum**, was organized in antiquity according to topic, in some cases according to indications left by Aristotle himself in the text. The first group of writings is known collectively as the **Organon**, or "Tool"; it includes the ***Categories***, ***On Interpretation***, ***Prior Analytics***, ***Posterior Analytics***, ***Topics***, and ***Sophistical Refutations***. At its most basic level, the *Organon* is a study of language; from that perspective, the *Categories* examines predication, specifically the kinds of predicates there are; *On Interpretation* looks at declarative sentences and their potential truth value; the *Prior Analytics* develops an account of **sylogistic** reasoning; and the *Posterior Analytics* looks at how we find the premises for syllogistic arguments. *Topics* is a study of where to find arguments, and *Sophistical Refutation* is a study of bad arguments.

From the *Organon* one could proceed to any part of Aristotle's philosophical work; in a way, a natural direction would be to the study of ***Rhetoric*** and ***Poetics***, but those works are tucked in at the end of the corpus. Instead, the corpus proceeds to natural philosophy. The ***Physics***, ***Generation and Corruption***, ***On the Heavens***, ***Meteorologics***, for what we would call the "inorganic" world; then we have ***On the Soul***, several short psychobiological treatises known as the *Short Natural Treatises* (***Parva Naturalia***), and several frankly zoological books: *History of Animals*, *Parts of Animals*, *Generation of Animals*, *Movement of Animals*, and *Progression of Animals*. If we count up the total number of pages, the biological part of Aristotle's work is a very significant proportion—nearly a third of the entire corpus.

After the books on natural philosophy we find a longish treatise, in 14 books, called the ***Metaphysics***. In the *Metaphysics*, as in several of his other works, Aristotle locates his philosophical position in relation to his predecessors and constructs a systematic interpretation of many of the issues that had vexed earlier philosophers.

The *Metaphysics* is followed by several works on **ethics**

and politics—the *Nicomachean Ethics*, the *Eudemian Ethics*, and a work called the *Magna Moralia*, as well as the *Politics*. The *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Eudemian Ethics* partially overlap, as if one were a partial revision of the other, though there is no complete agreement about which came first. The *Nicomachean Ethics* has been the one most usually studied ever since a commentary was constructed by several Greek writers, and the whole thing translated into Latin by Robert Grosseteste (1170–1253 CE) and his helpers. Also, the *Nicomachean Ethics* is closely tied to the *Politics*, almost as if they were one continuous work.

The series of treatises continues with the *Rhetoric* and the *Poetics*, full of recommendations on how to construct effective literary compositions. Added to the corpus in the late 19th century was a “Constitution of Athens” (*Athēnaiōn Politeia*) accepted by many as written by Aristotle himself, and by others as the work of a colleague in the **Lyceum** at the same period as Aristotle. Several more works are traditionally included in the corpus but are not generally regarded as by Aristotle, and there are a number of compositions that exist only in fragmentary form, not listed here.

Systematically, Aristotle’s philosophy is based on his revised conception of what exists primarily, *ousia*. Rejecting the apparent tendency of most early Greek philosophers to take “**matter**” as primary existence, and the explicit position of the **Pythagoreans** and Plato to assert the primacy of form (*eidos*), Aristotle follows the lead of the Greek language in asserting that the sorts of things that are named as subjects of normal declarative sentences are most likely to count as primary existences—individual persons and animals, and natural kinds, are the best candidates. Natural kinds have the virtue of being clearly definable, and that definition can state clearly what sorts of things can belong to that natural kind.

Since natural kinds are primary existences, Aristotle turns to the examination of nature (*physis*), defining it as “source or cause of changing or not changing in that to which it belongs primarily.” The causative aspect of nature may be according to any one or more of the four “causes” (*aitia*), matter (*hylē*), mover (*kinoun*), form (*eidos*), and end (*telos*).

Paradigmatic of natural things are *living* things, entities with a soul (*psychē*); the soul is the cause of the body in the sense of mover, form, and end. And the paradigm for living beings is the human person. The soul is defined as the first level of **actuality** of a natural living body with organs; the

various functions of the soul are present in the organic parts as their activity. The only possible exception to that rule, according to Aristotle, is the mind (**nous**), which appears to enter in “from outside” and to be in some way independent of any particular organic part.

Just as each organic part has its function, so (Aristotle believes) the whole person has a function, namely “virtuous activity.” That activity must, of course, be carried out in a social context. Human beings are language-using animals, and the primary function of language is to enable people to function within a social environment. Achievement of the best possible functioning is, for Aristotle, **eudaimonia**, human happiness.

Similarly the society (**polis**) that maximizes the opportunities for its members to achieve the greatest human functioning of which they are capable is the happiest society.

For access to the very large literature on Aristotle, see C. Shields, “Aristotle,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

ARISTOXENUS OF TARENTUM

Ἀριστόξενος. (c. 370–300 BCE.) **Peripatetic**. Aristoxenus was a student of **Aristotle** who wrote on music, preserved in a work called *Elementa Harmonica*, available online at archive.org. He also wrote biographies of various philosophers, preserved in fragments. He is one of the major sources, ultimately, for our knowledge of Pythagoreanism from its inception until the late 4th century BCE. See C. A. Huffman, *Aristoxenus of Tarentum*, 2011.

See also [TARENTUM](#).

ARISTUS OF ASCALON

(1st BCE.) Brother of **Antiochus of Ascalon**, friend of Brutus. He succeeded his brother as head of the “**Academy**” that Antiochus had founded. His students included **Cicero**, **Cratippus of Pergamon**, and **Aristo of Alexandria**, but he was succeeded by Theomnestus.

ARITHMOS

Ἀριθμός. Number. **Pythagoras** is reputed to have brought the theory that everything is composed of numbers from **Egypt**. There may be some truth to the tale, for the Egyptians did indulge in some number mysticism. At any rate, the Pythagoreans developed the concept of number and its application in many areas, only some of which make sense to us today. First, one must recognize that “*arithmos*” has not only ordinal and cardinal meanings (as the English word “number”) but also refers readily to quantity. Further, the Pythagoreans tended to identify cardinal numbers with

geometrical figures. If “three” is the triangle, then one might conclude that “two” is the line, and “one” is the point (*stigmē*). Going in the other direction, “four” may be the tetrahedron, the first three-dimensional figure that can be constructed out of straight lines and flat surfaces.

Early Pythagoreans also interested themselves in mathematical ratios, for example, in musical harmonies and overtones, supporting the thesis that the world is fundamentally arithmetical or geometrical in nature (cf. **Aristotle**, *Metaphysics* I.5, 985b23ff.). Aristotle finds it odd that the Pythagoreans went on to assert that things like justice (*dikaiosynē*), mind (*nous*), and opportunity are also “numbers” in some way.

In *Metaphysics* I and elsewhere, Aristotle says that **Plato** followed the Pythagorean lead, particularly in asserting that the Forms (*eidē*) are in fact numbers. There is not a lot of evidence supporting that assertion in the dialogues, but Aristotle knew Plato for 20 years, so we have to assume that he knew what he was talking about. For Aristotle, numbers are not *ousia* but are rather predicates in the category of quantity. That is, the things that are measured or counted pre-exist the measuring and counting.

Plotinus asserts that numbers do belong to the intelligible world, but he rejects the Pythagorean number mysticism that had become popular (again) in his time (*Enneads* VI.6).

ARIUS

(250–336 CE.) **Christian** originator of the heresy named after him (Arianism) that Jesus Christ was created by God and was thus in some measure separate from and inferior to God the Father. Arius is mentioned here because his position was proposed as having a philosophical foundation.

ARIUS DIDYMUS OF ALEXANDRIA

Ἀρειος. (Before 70–after 9 BCE.) Arius was a well-known philosopher in **Alexandria** when Augustus defeated Cleopatra in 30 BCE; Augustus invited him to become the court philosopher of newly imperial **Rome**. Arius seems to have written *On Sects* and *Epitome*, both **doxographies**, possibly different parts of the same book. His goal seems to have been to highlight points of agreement among the various philosophical positions. **Stobaeus** includes many passages of Arius’ work, particularly sections on **Stoic** and **Aristotelian ethics**. W. Fortenbaugh has published the fragments and testimonies, 2002.

“Didymus” means “the twin,” although it is possible that

the name of any particular “Didymus” might be derived from the sacred site **Didyma**.

ARNOBIUS OF SICCA

(3rd–4th CE.) Converted to **Christianity**, he wrote *Against the Pagans*, deploying **Platonic** and **Stoic** arguments. It is available in English at intratext.com with the title “Seven Books against the Heathens.”

ARRIA PAETUS THE ELDER

(1st CE.) **Stoic** wife of Caecina Paetus. He was involved in a conspiracy against the emperor Claudius and was ordered to commit suicide. Arria stabbed herself first, then handed the dagger to her husband, saying, “It doesn’t hurt, Paetus.”

ARRIA PAETUS THE YOUNGER

(1st CE.) **Stoic** wife of Thrasea Paetus. When Thrasea was ordered to commit suicide, she wanted to do the same as her mother, but Thrasea told her to stay alive to care for their daughter.

ARRIAN OF NICOMEDIA

Lucius Flavius Arrianus (c. 92–c. 175 CE). Known to historians of philosophy primarily for his nearly stenographic reports of the *Discourses* of **Epictetus**, he also wrote a very important account of the campaigns of **Alexander of Macedon**, the *Anabasis Alexandri*, and a report of the sail back from **India** of the **Macedonian** fleet under Nearchus, the *Indica*. In addition to his literary career, Arrian was also active as a military and political leader; his written accounts of his military campaigns continue to be of interest to military historians. These works of Arrian are readily available in print and online.

Nicomedia was a city a bit to the east of the present Istanbul, 40°46’N 29°55’E.

ART

There does not seem to be much of a concept of “art” distinct from “*technē*” in antiquity. That is, *technē* denominates a learnable skill; to the extent that products (*poiēseis*) are attributed to divine inspiration there seems to be no ground for either praising or blaming the “artist” who has been, after all, only the medium for the work of the Muses (see *MOUSIKĒ*, *TA MOUSIKA*). That is the point of view of most philosophers from **Plato** (*Ion*, *Republic*) onward. At the same time, some writers were rather confident that the skills involved could be analyzed and taught; **Aristotle’s** *Poetics* bears witness to that confidence.

ARTEMIDORUS OF EPHESUS (OR DALDIS)

(2nd CE.) Author of *Oniroticon*, or the *Interpretation of Dreams*, an extant text, tr. R. J. White, 1975. An earlier (c. 100 BCE) person with the same name was a geographer, quoted by **Strabo**.

See also [EPHESUS](#).

ASCALON

Ἀσκόλων. Today: Ashkelon, a city in Israel, just north of the Gaza Strip, 31°40'N 34°34'E. **Antiochus of Ascalon** is perhaps the best-known philosopher from this place; there is also his brother **Aristus**. Later, the Alexandrian mathematician **Eutocius** came from Ascalon.

ASCLEPIADES OF ALEXANDRIA

(5th CE.) Brother of **Heraiscus** and father of Horapollon. He taught in Alexandria, where one of his students was **Isidore of Alexandria**.

ASCLEPIADES OF BITHYNIA (OR PRUSA)

(c. 124–40 BCE.) Physician who rejected the **Hippocratic** humoral theory in favor of an atomist theory of health and disease, influenced by **Democritus** and **Epicurus**. Advocate of humane treatment of patients, including mental patients, some say that his popularity was assisted by his liberal use of wine as a remedy. His most famous student was **Themison**, originator of the Methodist school of medicine. See J. T. Vallance, *The Lost Theory of Asclepiades of Bithynia*, 1990.

Prusa was a town in the territory of Bithynia; it is now known as Bursa, Turkey, 40°11'N 29°03'E. **Dio Chrysostom** was a later native of this place.

See also [HIPPOCRATES OF COS](#); [IATROS](#), [IATRIKĒ](#).

ASCLEPIADES OF PHLIUS

Ἀσκληπιάδης. (c. 350–c. 270 BCE.) Co-founder, with **Menedemus of Eretria**, of the **Eretrian school**. Asclepiades and Menedemus studied with **Stilpo** in **Megara**, then moved to **Elis** to join the **Elian school**. **Athenaeus** (IV.168) tells a story of their student days in **Athens**—summoned to the **Areopagus** to explain how they could spend all their time on philosophy with no visible means of support, they brought in a miller who said that he paid them to thresh grain at night for two drachmas. The Areopagites were so surprised that they awarded them 200 drachmas.

Diogenes Laertius (II.126, 137, 138) says that they moved **Phaedo's** school to **Eretria** where they had a somewhat complicated domestic arrangement.

See also [PHLIUS](#).

ASCLEPIADES THE CYNIC

(4th CE.) Julian mentions Asclepiades visiting him at **Antioch** in 362 (*Orations* VII.224D). **Ammianus Marcellinus** tells how Asclepiades accidentally burned down the temple of Apollo in Antioch by leaving candles burning (XXII.13.3).

ASCLEPIGENEIA

Ἀσκληπιγένεια. (fl. c. 430 CE.) Daughter of **Plutarch of Athens**, according to **Marinus** *Life of Proclus*, she received from her father instruction not only in classical philosophy but also in **Chaldean** mysteries and theurgy (**theourgia**), which she in turn taught to **Proclus**.

ASCLEPIODOTUS

Ἀσκληπιόδοτος. (1st BCE.) Student of **Posidonius**, he wrote a short treatise on the military tactics of the **Macedonian** phalanx that survives, available online at “Penelope.” **Seneca** tells us that he wrote a work known in Latin as *Quaestionum Naturalium Causae* (*Naturales Quaestiones* VI.17, 22).

ASCLEPIODOTUS OF ALEXANDRIA

(Late 5th CE.) **Neoplatonist**, he studied with **Proclus** in Athens. Later, he moved to **Aphrodisias**, where he maintained a philosophical school and married Damiane. There he taught **Damascius**, who writes some critical things about him, at least partly because Asclepiodotus did not seem to have enough respect for **Orphic** and **Chaldean** lore. When Damiane had difficulty conceiving, they visited the shrine of Isis at Menouthis in Egypt; a baby resulted, but the local Christians said that it had been bought from a priestess, and used the affair as a reason to destroy the shrine. There is an entry for him in the **Suda**, as well as references in Damascius’ *Life of Isidore*.

ASCLEPIUS

Ἀσκληπιός. The Greek **God** of healing and medicine (**iatrikē**). Asclepius was credited with founding the guild of ancient physicians. Throughout antiquity temples of Asclepius were favored goals for pilgrimages by people in ill health. The most famous Asclepeion was at **Epidauros**; another was on **Cos**, associated with **Hippocrates**.

At least by the Hellenistic era, and possibly earlier, the Greek deity was identified with the Egyptian deity Imhotep. In that guise Asclepius plays an important role in several of the treatises included in the Hermetic **corpus** (see [HERMES TRISMEGISTUS](#)).

When **Socrates** says to **Crito** at the end of the *Phaedo* that they must sacrifice a cock to Asclepius, it is not entirely clear whether he has only the Greek deity in mind.

See also [IATROS](#), [IATRIKĒ](#).

ASCLEPIUS OF TRALLES

Ἀσκληπίος. (465 CE–?). Student, in **Alexandria**, of **Ammonius son of Hermias**; his notes from two courses taught by Ammonius survive: on **Aristotle's *Metaphysics*** (*Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca* VI.2) and on **Nicomachus' *Elements of Arithmetic*** (L. Tarán, 1962).

ASŌMATON

Ἀσώματον. Without body (*sōma*), disembodied, incorporeal. **Plato** clearly believed that the Forms (*eidē*) are incorporeal, and that souls (*psychai*) can be separated from body and be incorporeal, but he rarely used the word *asōmaton*. One place where it does occur is in ***Sophist* 246ff.**, in the passage called the **Battle of Gods and Giants**; the “Giants” are those who claim that only that which is bodily is real, while the “Gods” hold that some incorporeal things exist.

Aristotle is committed to the existence of *asōmata* (***Metaphysics* I.8**), though he is not very explicit about what the incorporeals are. Judging from ***Physics* IV**, one would conclude that at least place and time are incorporeal. For the **Epicureans**, the only incorporeal is empty space or the void; the **Stoics** list four “incorporeals”: ***lekta*** (sayables), ***kenon*** (void), ***topos*** (place), and ***chronos*** (time). Some Stoics claimed that there are no incorporeal entities.

ASPASIA

(c. 469 BCE–?) Ionian-born mistress of Pericles, she was given much credit, and blame, for introduction of Ionian ideas, and young women, into **Athens**, and for advising Pericles. In the ***Menexenus***, **Socrates** credits her with teaching him oratory, and with writing both Pericles' famous funeral oration and the alternative version included in that **dialogue**.

See also [WOMEN IN ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY](#).

ASPASIUS

(c. 80–150 CE.) **Peripatetic** commentator on **Aristotle**. His commentary on ***Nicomachean Ethics* I, II, IV, VII, and VIII** is extant and published in CAG 19.1, and translated by D. Konstan 2001; it is the earliest extant commentary on Aristotle. **Boethius** says that Aspasius did commentaries on most of Aristotle's works, and mentions in particular ***On Interpretation***, ***Physics***, ***Metaphysics***, ***Categories***, and ***Nicomachean Ethics***. **Porphyry** says that these commentaries were used in the school of **Plotinus**, and that Aspasius also wrote commentaries on **Plato**.

ASSENT

Synkatathesis. In **Stoic** epistemology, one gives one's assent to a reasonable perceptual presentation; this is a matter of accepting the presentation as veridical.

ASSOS

Town on the Ionian coast now known as Behramkale, 39°30'N 26°20'E, Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #769. When **Aristotle** left the **Academy** he went to visit Hermias, the local ruler under Persian supervision; he was joined by several of his friends, and for a short time it was the center for **Peripatetic** investigation. Aristotle married the niece or adopted daughter of Hermias. The Persians reasonably suspected Hermias of getting too cozy with the **Macedonians**; Aristotle and entourage fled to Lesbos, and Hermias was killed. **Cleanthes**, second **Scholarch** of the **Stoa** (from 261 BCE), was from **Assos**.

ASTĒR, ASTRON

Ἀστήρ, ἄστρον. Star. Judging from later **doxographers**, the **pre-Socratics** tended to have a variety of opinions about the stars. For one thing, there was a difference of opinion about whether the stars (fixed stars, as distinguished from planets) were all located on the inside surface of one great sphere surrounding the rest of the astronomical entities, with the **earth** (or solar system) in the center, or were scattered at different distances through an indefinitely large space. The former was the majority opinion in antiquity, including both **Plato** and **Aristotle**; the latter was the view of the **atomists**, and may have been the view of **Anaximander**.

Another difference of opinion concerns whether the stars are living divine beings or inanimate material entities. The author of the *Epinomis*, ascribed to Plato, and Aristotle in **Metaphysics** XII, subscribe to the "living deity" theory; **Anaxagoras** along with the atomists gets credit for the inanimate theory.

See also [ASTRONOMY](#).

ASTROLOGIA

Ἀστρολογία. As a Greek term, this word at first simply means "**astronomy**"; there is a disambiguating Greek term, *astromanteia*, that signifies the art of foretelling the future by observation of the stars. Still, after the time of **Aristotle** (more or less) until quite modern times, it is rather difficult to distinguish "astronomy" from "astrology," since a major source of income for people who studied the stars was the provision of predictions supposedly based on their studies. We should note that the Hellenes gained a great deal of their knowledge

of astronomical phenomena from the **Egyptians**, Babylonians, and other peoples of North Africa and the Middle East, and for those cultures the motivations for investigation were often as much astrological as anything else.

Both **Cicero** and **Sextus Empiricus**, for two, recognized that the pretenses of astrological predictions did not make sense.

See also [BARDESANES OF EDESSA](#); [FIRMICIUS MATERNUS, JULIUS](#); [MANILIUS, MARCUS](#); [OURANOS, OURANIA](#); [PTOLEMY, CLAUDIUS](#); [SYMPASCHEIN, SYMPATHEIA](#); [THRASYLLUS OF MENDES](#).

ASTRONOMY

Much ancient speculation was inspired by contemplation of the sun, moon, stars, and planets. A fairly complex astronomical theory can already be attributed to **Anaximander** (see Couprie et al., 2002). Even **Heraclitus** and **Parmenides**, better known for other issues, are cited by ancient **doxographers** for their astronomical views. Heraclitus says, “The limit of East and West is the Bear; and opposite the Bear is the boundary of bright Zeus” (f. 120). Parmenides says of the moon, “Shining by night with borrowed light, wandering round the **Earth**,” “Always straining her eyes to the beams of the sun” (f. 14 and 15).

Plato’s *Timaeus* reflects **Pythagorean** astronomical views. **Eudoxus of Cnidus**, an associate of Plato in the **Academy**, made serious studies attempting to explain the movements of the planets; his astronomy is, in part, reflected in **Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* XII**. **Heraclides of Pontus**, Aristotle’s younger contemporary, suggested that Earth rotates and that Venus and Mercury orbit the sun.

Aristarchus of Samos (310–230 BCE), at the Library of Alexandria, wrote *On the Sizes and Distances of the Sun and the Moon*. Hipparchus of Nicaea increased the accuracy of those distances rather considerably and calculated the length of the year to an accuracy within 6.5 minutes. **Claudius Ptolemy** of Alexandria synthesized all previous astronomy in his work known as the *Almagest*. See J. Evans, *History and Practice of Ancient Astronomy*, 1998.

See also [ASTROLOGIA](#); [CLEOMEDES](#); [EPINOMIS](#); [EUDOXUS OF CNIDUS](#); [MOUSIKĒ, TA MOUSIKA](#); [SOSIGENES OF ALEXANDRIA](#); [SOSIGENES THE PERIPATETIC](#); [THEON OF SMYRNA](#).

ASTY, ASTOS, ASTĒ

ἄστυ, ἄστος, ἄστή. Town, free person belonging to a

town. This term is used for any urban area, and for people who belong to that urban area. Thus *asteios* means “urban, civilized.” This is in contrast to *polis*, *politēs*; a *polis* is in principle a *walled city*, and a *politēs* in principle has a relationship to the government of that place.

ATARAXIA

Ἀταραχία. Freedom from disturbance, tranquility of the soul (*psychē*). *Tarachē* is a disturbance. Among Greek philosophers, *ataraxia* was widely supposed to be true *eudaimonia*. This thesis was attributed to **Democritus** by **Arius Didymus** (DK I.129), and is well attested for **Pyrrho of Elis**, the Skeptic, and **Epicurus**. The sentiment, if not the word, is also **Stoic**. For the Skeptics, *ataraxia* is achieved by suspension of judgment.

See also [SKEPTIKOS](#).

ATARNEUS

City in west-central Ionian coast, across from Lesbos, ruled by **Hermias**, friend of **Aristotle**. The site was deserted in the 1st century BCE. 39°05'29"N 26°55'17"E. Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #803.

ATAXIA

Ἀταξία. Disorder. Primarily used of lack of discipline in a military unit, since *taxis* is primarily military order. This word is applied by **Plato** to the social disorder that **Socrates** would find in **Thessaly**, were he to accept Crito's offer of an escape plan (**Crito** 53d), and by **Aristotle** to the supposed “anarchy” of a radical democracy (**Politics** V.3, 1302b28).

See also [DĒMOKRATIA](#).

ATHANATOS

Ἀθάνατος. Immortal, deathless. (*Thanatos* is death.) **Heraclitus** says, “Mortals are immortals (*athanatoi*) and immortals are mortals, the one living the other's death and dying the other's life” (f. 62).

In early Greek thought there are approximately four different kinds of theory that would allow for some sort of immortality. One common early Greek notion was that the **gods**, and some others specially favored by the gods, do not die, but most people do; that is behind the statement of Heraclitus in f. 62. A variant of that idea, known to at least some Greeks, was the **Egyptian** idea that some favored individuals could be bodily resurrected.

A second kind of theory proposed that some material principle, widespread in the universe, provides the basis of life and mind (*nous*). The *aēr* of **Anaximenes**, for example, would

provide a certain immortality, but not individual immortality.

Third, the **Pythagorean/Orphic** idea of *metempsychosis* offered individual immortality via rebirth in a new person (or animal or plant); this process of rebirth was seen (as it continues to be seen today in Buddhism, for example) as a consequence of the defects of the individual soul (*psychē*). **Empedocles** provides particularly poignant details of this sort of immortality.

Fourth, the mind (*nous*) of **Anaxagoras** or **Aristotle**, since unmixed with **matter**, appears to be “deathless.”

Socrates in the *Phaedo* provides several arguments for the immortality of the soul; the kinship of the soul with the Forms (*eidē*) is a particularly Platonic argument.

In later Greek philosophy the **Epicureans** totally rejected the idea of immortality, actually presenting the mortality of the soul as a kind of “gospel” in that one need not worry about possible punishment after death or in some other reborn life. Orthodox **Stoics** also did not believe in immortality of the soul. **Neoplatonists**, on the other hand, had no doubt about immortality at all.

ATHENAEUS OF ATTALEIA

(1st–2nd CE.) Founder of the pneumatist school of medicine, he developed a theory of causation of disease admired by **Galen**. His distinction between “preceding causes” and “antecedent causes” resembles part of **Stoic** theory.

Attaleia is now the resort city of Atalya in southwest Turkey, 36°54'N 30°41'E.

See also [PNEUMA](#); [PROËGOUMENON AITION](#).

ATHENAEUS OF NAUCRATIS

Ἀθηναῖος Ναυκρατίτης. (2nd–3rd CE.) Author of the 15-volume *Deipnosophistae*, mainly extant. Presented as a conversation at the dinner table, it is a vast storehouse of information about a great many aspects of the ancient world. It is available in a Loeb edition and partially available online.

Naucratis is in the Nile Delta (30°54'0"N 30°37'0"E) and was the first, and for many years the only, Greek colony/trading post in Egypt.

ATHENAGORAS

(c. 133–190 CE.) **Christian** who wrote a long essay to **Marcus Aurelius** defending Christianity as an alternative philosophical school, using many different philosophical sources in the defense. His works are available in *Ante-Nicene Fathers*, vol. 2, online.

ATHĒNAIŌN POLITEIA

Ἀθηναίων Πολιτεία. *Constitution of the Athenians*. Treatise by **Aristotle** or one of his students or associates describing the political history and arrangements of Athens. It was discovered in two papyrus versions in Egypt in the late 19th century. Aristotle is said to have commissioned the writing of perhaps 158 “constitutions” of **poleis** and other political entities all over the known world as part of his investigation that led to his treatise the **Politics**. This is the sole surviving example. Text and translation available on Perseus.

See also “[OLD OLIGARCH](#)” for an earlier description of the Athenian political system sometimes erroneously ascribed to Xenophon.

ATHENODORUS CANANITES

Ἀθηνόδωρος Κανανίτης. (c. 74 BCE–7 CE.) **Stoic** student of **Posidonius** and teacher of Octavian, the future emperor Augustus. After 44 BCE, he served for a time as advisor to Augustus; he is said to have recommended that when he was angry, Augustus should recite the alphabet before taking any action. Canana is near **Tarsus**; he is said to have returned to Tarsus where he may have known Saul/Paul. **Pliny the Younger** tells that when Athenodorus was in Athens he rented a house reputed to be haunted. Late one night a ghost in chains appeared to him and led him to a spot in the courtyard, then disappeared. Having the spot dug up, a decomposing body in chains was discovered; a proper burial having been arranged, the house was haunted no more (Pliny LXXXIII to Sura, available online).

ATHENODORUS CORDYLION

Ἀθηνόδωρος Κορδυλίων. (1st BCE.) **Stoic**, born in **Tarsus**. He was librarian at **Pergamon**, where, according to **Diogenes Laertius**, he cut out passages of books on Stoicism if he disagreed with them. Later he moved to **Rome**, where he lived with Cato the Younger, according to **Strabo**.

There were many people named “Athenodorus” in his time; “Cordylion” is not a location distinction but means either “cudgel” or the bump on the head you can get from being hit by a cudgel. Given his attested irascibility, he may have gotten the name by carrying a shillelagh.

ATHENODORUS OF SOLI

(3rd BCE.) **Stoic** student of **Zeno of Citium**, compatriot of **Chrysippus**, brother of the poet **Aratus of Soli**.

ATHENODORUS OF TARSUS

(1st BCE.) **Stoic** student of **Poseidonius**, taught in

Apollonia of Epirus, where the future Augustus studied with him. **Cicero** was also acquainted with him. Augustus put him in charge of **Tarsus**. He is also known as Athenodorus Calvus, or “the Bald.”

ATHENS

Ἀθῆναι. 37°58'N 23°43'E. Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #361. Although not the location where Greek philosophy began—that honor belongs to **Miletus**, and second prize to southern Italy and Sicily—by the mid-5th century, Athens was the center of Greek culture, mainly as a consequence of Athens' leadership against the Persian invasions of 490 and 480/79 BCE. Philosophically sophisticated **Sophists** from Ionia and Italy/Sicily arrived in Athens, and soon Athenians were taking the lead intellectually—**Archelaus**, **Socrates**, and **Plato**, for three. The establishment of permanent schools by **Antisthenes**, **Isocrates**, and Plato, and later by **Aristotle**, in the 4th century, solidified Athens' leadership, since now students were drawn from the whole Greek world, and beyond.

Although not an organized school, the **Cynics** seem to have been particularly drawn to Athens as a center of culture; the **Stoics** and **Epicureans** established their home base in Athens as well.

Athens' role as an intellectual center very largely outlived its role as a political powerhouse. With the invasion of **Sulla** in 86 BCE, Athens became totally dependent on **Rome** from a political perspective, but continued to be a leading educational center until 529 CE, when the last philosophical school was closed by order of the emperor **Justinian**.

See also [ACADEMY](#); [GARDEN](#); [LYCEUM](#); [STOA](#), [STOIC SCHOOL](#).

ATLANTIS

A mythical ancient land supposedly recounted by Egyptian priests to **Solon**, the story handed down to **Critias**, who retells it at the beginning of the ***Timaeus***. As a literary device, it provides an opportunity for Critias to (begin to) describe an ideal society in the *Critias*. To the extent that the story may have a quasi-historical basis, it may be based loosely on traditions remembering the high Minoan civilization brought to an end by the disastrous eruption of the volcanic island of Thera in the time frame of 1630–1600 BCE.

ATOM

See [ATOMON](#), [ATOMA](#).

ATOMISM, ATOMIST SCHOOL

Leucippus, **Democritus**, and the **Epicureans** believed

that the world divides into indivisible entities. The theory may be seen as a response to the **Eleatic** thesis that being is one, and thus that there is no real change. The atomists held that since being is many, change does indeed occur, fundamentally in terms of the relative positions of atoms to each other. Interestingly, **Plato** never names either Leucippus or Democritus, though he may refer to them obliquely sometimes as those who claim that nothing is real except that which one can lay one's hands upon.

Aristotle understands the atomists as the most consistent, and radical, of earlier materialists, and consequently refers to them frequently as proponents of one of the two major theories in opposition to his own, the other being the formalism of the **Pythagoreans** and Plato.

Atomism was taken over by **Epicurus** and his school and given a very complete expression by the Roman poet **Lucretius**.

See also [ASCLEPIADES OF PHLIUS](#); [HERO OF ALEXANDRIA](#); [MATTER](#); [METRODORUS OF CHIOS](#); [NAUSIPHANES OF TEOS](#).

ATOMON, ATOMA

ἄτομον. Atom, the uncuttable smallest bit of **matter** according to **Democritus** and other ancient atomists. Atoms are internally changeless, partless, ungenerated, and undestroyed. Complex entities are formed by many atoms sticking together in various ways. **Epicurus** presents his version of the atomic theory in the *Letter to Herodotus*, primarily. An extensive account is presented in **Lucretius**, *De Rerum Natura*.

ATTALUS

(1st CE.) **Stoic** teacher of **Seneca**. Seneca speaks of him very highly (*Epistles* 9, 63, 67, 72, 81, 108, 109).

ATTENTION

Aristotle distinguishes, in *De Anima* II.5, between a passive sense of perception, in which the sense organ is affected by a sense object, and an active sense—expressed in English by distinctions like that between “seeing” and “looking” or “hearing” and “listening.” In **Epicurean** epistemology, this active perceiving is called *epibolē*. The term “attention” is modern, apparently introduced by John Locke.

ATTEST

Epimartyrein. “Attestation” is a primary criterion (*kritērion*) of truth in **Epicurean** epistemology.

ATTICUS

Ἀττικός. (Late 2nd CE.) Leading **Platonist** in **Athens** after **Taurus**; possibly the first occupant of the chair of **Platonism** established by the emperor **Marcus Aurelius** in 176 CE. Although generally an orthodox middle Platonist, he did believe that the **Forms** are ideas in the mind of **God**, rather than independently existing entities. We have from him a radical attack on Aristotelianism, preserved by **Eusebius**, in the *Praeparatio Evangelica*. “Atticus” means “of Athens”; as a proper name it suggests some relationship to the Atticus family.

See also [HERODES ATTICUS](#).

ATTRIBUTE

In the sense of “predicate,” this is one of the ways that **Aristotle’s** *symbebēkos* is translated into English. The word *katēgoria* might in many cases be properly translated “attribute.” In Aristotle’s discussion of **definition**, he asserts that a proper definition has a *genos* and a *diaphora*. The correct *diaphora* would be an essential attribute.

AUGUSTINE, BISHOP OF HIPPO

(354–430 CE.) Saint (Aurelius) Augustinus was born in Tagaste (now in Algeria) and educated at Madaura and **Carthage**. He joined a group of **Neoplatonists** in Milan; according to his *Confessions*, his conversations there led him away from his interest in **Manicheanism**, and under the influence of his mother, he converted to **Christianity**.

His most famous works are the *Confessions* and the *City of God*, though his critique of **Academic Skepticism** in *Against the Academicians* has considerable philosophic interest as well. His extensive writings are available in the original Latin and in translation. See M. Mendelson, “Saint Augustine,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

See also [SKEPTIKOS](#).

AULOS

Ἀὐλός. An ancient Greek musical instrument with a single or double reed; the *aulos* was very commonly played in pairs, attached to the same mouthpiece. The closest thing to a classic *aulos* seen and heard today would be the chanter on a bagpipe, minus the bag of course; a double *aulos* is even closer to a bagpipe, since the performer can play a rudimentary duet. This entry is included because the *aulos* appears several times in philosophical texts, and English translators persist in translating it as “flute,” failing to make sense of the passages in question. In **Republic** III, 399d4, **Plato** bans the *aulos* from the ideal state, but turns around and

permits the panpipe, which sounds rather like a “flute.” But the *aulos* is a Dionysian instrument, regarded as suitable for Bacchic revels, *orgiastikē*, as **Aristotle** says at *Politics* VIII.7, 1342b. Aristotle also says, at *Nicomachean Ethics* X.5, 1175b3, that it is hard to do philosophy while listening to someone playing the *aulos*. Think bagpipe, not flute.

AULUS GELLIUS

(c. 125–after 180 CE.) Student of **Lucius Calvenus Taurus** and **Peregrinus Proteus**, friend of **Herodes Atticus** and **Favorinus**. He is best known as the author of *Attic Nights* (*Noctes Atticae*), a collection of notes on all sorts of subjects, preserving fragments of authors otherwise unknown. The J. Rolfe edition and translation is available in the Loeb series and partially available online.

AURELIUS, ANTONINUS MARCUS

(121–180 CE.) Emperor of **Rome** from 161 to 180, author of the work known as *Meditations*, an application of **Stoic** principles to the problems of his life, readily available. In 176 he established chairs of **Platonism**, Aristotelianism, and **Epicureanism** in Athens and delegated the task of picking the appropriate people to **Herodes Atticus**. See R. Kamtekar, “Marcus Aurelius,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

AUTARKEIA

Αὐτάρκεια. Self-sufficiency. (*Autos*, self; plus *arkein*, to be enough). Many Greek philosophers regarded *autarkeia* as a major life goal. As **Aristotle** puts it (*Nicomachean Ethics* I.7, 1097b7), “The complete good is thought to be self-sufficient.” Thus the theoretical life is regarded as the best, partly on the ground that it is most self-sufficient (*EN* X.7, 1177a27). On a more mundane level, **Democritus** tells us (f. 246), “Living in foreign lands teaches self-sufficiency: black bread and snow are the sweetest cures for hunger and pain.” That virtue (*aretē*), or the virtuous person, is self-sufficient is a normal part of Hellenistic and imperial ethical theories. **Epicurus**, *Letter to Menoeceus*, 130; for **Stoics**, **Diogenes Laertius** VII.127; **Plotinus**, *Enneads* I.4.3. Even in the New Testament we find the argument that **God** can provide for your *autarkeia*: Second Letter to the Corinthians 9:8.

AUTOMATON

Αὐτόματον. Self-moved. *To automaton* is, for **Aristotle**, a name for random events, those that happen *kata symbebēkos*. (See [ACCIDENT](#), [ACCIDENTAL](#).) In a related sense, Aristotle believes that some plants and animals are generated not by parents of the same species, but

“spontaneously.” He uses the word *automata* of such “self-generated” entities.

“Automata” in the modern sense, mechanical devices that appear to have the capacity of self-movement, occur as conceptual ideas in ancient philosophical texts. **Plato** refers to the idea that Daedalus constructed self-moving statues (***Meno*** 97d, ***Euthyphro*** 11b); Aristotle talks of the “marvelous self-moving puppets” (*tōn thaumatōn tautomata*) (***Metaphysics*** I.2, 983a14; ***Generation of Animals*** II.1, 734b10; ***Movement of Animals*** 7, 701b2). The self-moving puppets are used to illustrate the point that if there are many built-in potentialities, it takes only a small initial cause to bring about many large changes. Modeling of this kind has contributed to the development of scientific thought.

AUTOS, AUTĒ, AUTON

Αὐτός. Self. An individual person (or in the neuter, thing). Αὐτὸς ἑφα (*autos epha*) = “ipse dixit,” “he himself said,” famously used to introduce **Pythagorean** sayings and concepts. **Plato** often refers to the “Forms” with phrases like *to kalon auton*, “the good itself.”

AUXĒSIS

Αὕξησις. Growth. The opposite is ***phthisis***, φθίσις. How living things grow is a problem faced by some early Greek philosophers. **Heraclitus** says that the soul has a “self-growing *logos*” (f. 115); the phenomenon of growth seems to be a major inspiration of **Anaxagoras**’ theory of matter—how can we grow by eating bread? There must be bits of muscle, bone, and blood already in the bread (DK 59A46). Aristotle looks at the problem of growth both metaphysically (e.g., ***Physics*** IV.4, 211a15ff.) and biologically (e.g., ***Generation of Animals*** IV).

AUXILIARY (CAUSE)

See **SYNERGON (AITION)**.

AXIA

Ἀξία. Worth, value. Both **Plato** and **Aristotle** use this word both of the monetary “value” of something and of worth or value in less tangible respects. See, for example, ***Nicomachean Ethics*** IV.1, 1119b26. The **Stoics** tend to use it of moral worth particularly. The modern term “axiology” means the study of value; the most closely related classical word, *axiologos*, means “worth mentioning.”

AXIŌMA

Ἀξίωμα. That which is thought worthy; axiom, basic principle. The verb from which this noun is made means “to

deem worthy.” **Aristotle** (sometimes, rarely: **Posterior Analytics** I.10, 76b23–34) uses this word for a starting point for a demonstration; his usual word is *archē*. This usage of *axioma* was picked up by the **Stoics** (**Diogenes Laertius** VII.189: *Peri Axiomata* is the title of a book by **Chrysippus**, cf. SVF II.61), and from thence to modern philosophy.

AXIOTHEA OF PHLIUS

(c. 350 BCE.) **Academic**. Student of **Plato** and **Speusippus**. (**Diogenes Laertius** III.46, IV.2; **Themistius** *Orations* 23.295c; *POxy* 3656.)

See also [PHLIUS](#); [WOMEN IN ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY](#).

B

BABYLON

Βαβυλών. Ancient city on the Euphrates, south of the present Baghdad, in Iraq, 32°32'11"N 44°25'15"E. In **Politics** III.3, 1276a28, **Aristotle** says that it is too big to be counted as a **polis**—it had been taken three days before some of the inhabitants knew about it. A very ancient center of learning, several of the early Greek philosophers are thought to have acquired wisdom from that source. We note that it was, in particular, a center for Hebrew learning, since the Persians had transported the elite of Israel to that location. In later years the “occult” wisdom of the **Chaldean Oracles** was supposed to have arisen there (the Chaldeans were for a time the rulers of Babylonia, the territory ruled by Babylon). In the 2nd century BCE there are *two* philosophers, both named “**Diogenes**,” one a **Stoic**, the other an **Epicurean**, who are said to be either from Babylon or from **Seleucia** (the two locations are not terribly far apart). In the same time frame, **Archedemus** founded a Stoic school in Babylon.

BARDESANES OF EDESSA

(2nd–3rd CE.) Author of *The Book of the Laws of the Countries* critiquing **astrology** and defending free will. He is sometimes counted as a **Gnostic**, and often as a heretical **Christian**. See H. J. W. Drijvers, *Bardaisan of Edessa*, 1966.

There are two ancient cities named Edessa, one in Macedonia, 40°48'N 22°3'E (Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #535), the other in southeast Turkey, 37°9'N, 38°48'E, in the upper Mesopotamian region, an ancient city renamed by Seleucus I in 304 BCE. Bardasanes was from the second.

BASIL OF CAESAREA

(330–379 CE.) With **Gregory Nazianzus** and **John Chrysostom**, Basil is one of the three Cappadocian Fathers, regarded by the Eastern Orthodox Church with special respect. A student of **Origen**, Basil wrote what Christians take to be the definitive defense and explanation of the divinity of the Holy Spirit (*Hagion **Pneuma***). Basil is called “of Caesarea” because he served as bishop there. His works are mainly available online.

BASILIDES OF PIRAEUS

(2nd BCE.) **Stoic** who denied the existence of incorporeal entities (**Sextus Empiricus**, *Adv. Math.* VII.258). Piraeus is

the port of Athens.

See also [ASÔMATON](#).

BASILIDES OF SYRIA

Βασιλείδης. (c. 250–c. 175 BCE.) **Scholar** of the **Epicurean** school in **Athens** from about 205 BCE, after **Dionysius of Lamptraí**.

BATIS OF LAMPSACUS

(Early 3rd BCE.) Student of **Epicurus**, sister of **Metrodorus**, and wife of **Idomeneus**. When her son died, Metrodorus wrote a letter of consolation quoted by **Seneca** (*Epistles* XCVIII.9, XCIX.25).

See also [LAMPSACUS](#); [WOMEN IN ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY](#).

BATTLE OF GODS AND GIANTS

(*Gigantomachia*.) Philosophically, this refers to a passage in **Plato's** *Sophist* (245–251) where the **Eleatic** Stranger characterizes the philosophical struggle between radical materialists, who believe only in what they can handle with their hands (“Giants”) and those who believe in the Forms (“Gods”). The original reference is to a poetic theme found in Pindar and onward, and often represented in classical art, for example in a frieze on the Parthenon in **Athens**. The Giants challenged the supremacy of the Gods and lost.

See also [ASÔMATON](#).

BEAUTY

To kalon is often translated as “beauty” in **Plato** translations. Thus the famous “**Form** of the **Good**” is also the “**idea** of beauty.” The identification of “good” with “beauty” becomes especially close in the *Symposium* and *Phaedrus*, when **Socrates** interprets erotic attraction as ultimately aimed not at this individual person, but at the abstract “beauty itself” in which this attractive person participates or which he or she imitates in his or her body (*sōma*) and soul (*psychē*). For **Aristotle**, there are three things people attempt to attain: the *agathon*, the *kalon*, and the *hēdyn*. In at least some contexts he may mean “beauty” by *to kalon*.

See also [EIDOS](#), [EIDĒ](#).

BECOMING

In **Plato**, and some other ancient philosophers, becoming is contrasted with “**being**.” According to that perspective, there are two sorts of things that we can investigate, those that are involved in change, or “becoming,” and those that do not change at all and are (timeless) “being.” The fullest account of this relationship in Plato is in the *Timaeus*. **Aristotle**, in

contrast, tries to show how being (*ousia*, in terminology that he shares with Plato) is directly involved in becoming, how, for example, a living thing can both be an entity (*ousia*) and have come to be, and be the origin of other living things that come to be, in a process of *genesis* or generation, for example by sexual reproduction.

See also [GENESIS](#).

BEGINNING

See [ARCHĒ](#).

BEING

The closest equivalent to the word “being” in ancient Greek is *to on*, the present participle of *einai*, “to be” (**on**, **onta**). The first part of **Parmenides**’ poem has as its focus **esti**, the third-person singular of *einai*, and *to eon*, the equivalent of *to on* in Parmenides’ dialect. For Parmenides, “being” (*to on*) is one, timeless and changeless, and this, he says, is “the **truth**”; all talk about plurality and change is “opinion” (**doxa**), and not the truth about “being.”

Since *to on* and *ta onta* are, in ordinary Greek, often used as stand-ins for names of one or more individual things, other Greek philosophers looked for other locutions to talk about “Being” in ontologically loaded contexts. One of **Plato**’s favorite locutions to refer to the Forms (**eidē**) is *to ontōs on*, using the adverb made from the participle to intensify its meaning, literally, “the beingly being,” but typically translated into English as “the really real.” *Ontōs* was in common use to mean, roughly, “really” or “actually” or “in fact,” but combining it with the participle seems to be Plato’s coinage.

Plato also adopts the abstract noun built on the same participle, *ousia*, the stem *ont-* plus the abstract noun ending -*sia*. In ordinary Greek this word must have some of the resonance that “existence” has in ordinary English, but it is most often used, outside of philosophical contexts, to talk about property or wealth, or about important personal characteristics. In English translations of Plato’s **dialogues**, the word *ousia* is sometimes rendered “reality” and sometimes “Being,” while in English translations of **Aristotle** the word “being” fairly reliably translates “*to on*,” and *ousia* is typically translated “substance” or “entity” (see [OUSIA](#)).

Thus in those of Plato’s dialogues where the Forms play a role the distinction between being and becoming is equivalent to the distinction between Forms and phenomena (**phainomena**), or between object of knowledge (**epistēmē**) and object of opinion (**doxa**).

Aristotle does not use the locution *to ontōs on*; apart from his exceedingly widespread use of the word *ousia*, we may note the locution *to on hē on*, typically translated “being qua being,” and *to on haplōs* (“that which simply is”). More generally, Aristotle frequently talks of the many senses of “being”: in one way, “being” (*to einai*, the infinitive, or *to on*) has as many senses as the categories (i.e., 10), but there is also a distinction between potential and actual being, between essential and **accidental**, and an equation of being and truth.

The **Stoics** tend to use forms of the word ***hyparchein*** for both existence and predication.

See also ***KATĒGORIAI***; **METAPHYSICS, TA META TA PHYSICA**.

BELIEF

See ***DOXA***; ***PISTIS***.

BELONG

See ***HYPARCHEIN***; ***OIKEION***; **PREDICATE, PREDICATION**.

BENEFIT

See ***ŌPHELEIN, ŌPHELĒMA***.

BIA

Βία. Force. The dative form, βίῃ, means “by force”: in Plato (***Phaedrus*** 236d) this is opposed to “willingly” (*hekōn*), in Aristotle (***Physics*** IV.8, 215a1) to “naturally” (*kata physin*).

The adjective form, meaning forced, is *biaion*.

BION OF BORYSTHENES

Βίων Βορυσθενίτης. (c. 325–c. 250 BCE.) Released from slavery, he went to **Athens** and studied in several of the schools, including the **Academy**, where **Diogenes Laertius** locates him; but he is known for his **Cynical diatribes**. One example of a quotable saying, from **Cicero**: “It is useless to tear out your hair when you are grieving, for grief is not cured by baldness.” The fragments are collected by J. Kindstrand. “Borysthenes” is the classical name of the river now known as the Dnieper that flows through the Ukraine to the Black Sea.

BIOS

Βίος. Life. “The name of the Bow is ‘life’ but its work is death” (**Heracclitus** f. 48); the distinction depends on which syllable is accented (the bow is βίός). *Bios* is distinguished from ***zōē*** in that *zōē* is primarily “animal” life, while *bios* is simple survival, or a way of life (way of surviving). In a striking phrase, **Aristotle** says of the pre-quickening fetus that it “lives the life of a plant,” *zēn phytou bion*. At the other end of things, so to speak, Aristotle talks in the ***Politics*** of the “lives” of

different peoples, such as nomadic, agricultural, fishing, hunting, and so on. In the **Nicomachean Ethics** book I he focuses on the “best” kind of life, and now it is a comparison between the life devoted to maximizing pleasure, versus the life devoted to achieving fame and honors, versus the life of the mind (**nous**) (the life of moneymaking regarded only as a means to one of these). It is not surprising that the philosopher affirms that the theoretical life (*bios theoretikos*) is the best, and the community life (*bios politikos*) second best.

BLEND

See [KRAMA](#), [KRASIS](#); [MIGMA](#); [MIXIS](#); [SYNTHESIS](#).

BODY

See [SŌMA](#).

BOETHIUS

(Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius, c. 480–524/6 CE.) Boethius wrote *The Consolation of Philosophy* and quite a few theological and philosophical treatises. He took upon himself the task of translating into Latin and commenting on the works of **Aristotle** and other classical Greek philosophers, but had done only the **Categories** and **On Interpretation**, plus **Porphry's Isagoge**, when his translating career was brought to an abrupt end by his imprisonment on religious and political grounds, followed some time later by his execution at the hands of Theodoric the Great (454–526). We do have his studies of much of the rest of the **Organon**, perhaps on the way to translating them, including *Introductio ad syllogismos categoricos*, *De syllogismos categoricos*, *De hypotheticis syllogismis*, *De diuisione*, *In Topica Ciceronis comm.*, and *De Differentiis topicis*.

For the Latin West for the next several hundred years, direct knowledge of Aristotle's philosophy was to a large extent limited to the two short treatises that Boethius had translated. See John Marenbon, “Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

BOETHUS OF SIDON

(c. 70–10 BCE.) **Peripatetic** student of **Andronicus of Rhodes**, brother of Diodotus of **Sidon**. **Strabo** studied with him. He was a commentator on the *Categories*; his commentary was used by **Ammonius Hermiae**.

BOETHUS OF SIDON

(2nd–1st BCE.) **Stoic** student of **Diogenes of Babylon**. Against orthodox Stoic opinions, he denied that the cosmos is animate and denied the **ekpyrōsis**. The two people named Boethus of **Sidon** are, naturally, often confused with each

other.

BOLUS OF MENDES

(3rd BCE.) Sources indicate that he was influenced by **Pythagorean** philosophy and by **Democritus**. He wrote on **esoteric** topics and on **medicine**, using the work of **Theophrastus** on plants (cf. Columela VII.5).

See also [MENDES](#).

BOULAGORAS

(5th BCE.) **Pythagorean**, fourth leader of the school, succeeding **Mnesarchus** and succeeded by Gartydas of **Croton**. During his leadership the Pythagoreans were expelled from Croton around 450 BCE. (**Iamblichus**, *Vit. Pyth.*)

BOULĒSIS

Βούλησις. Wish. *Boulē* is the basic word, meaning will, determination, counsel, deliberation. In **Athens**, the *Boulē* was a select legislative body, a senate. **Plato** and **Aristotle**, especially, use the word *boulēsis* and the associate verb *boulesthai* for a “wish,” that is, a mentally framed desire for something that might actually be quite impossible (**Nicomachean Ethics** III.4, 1111b22).

BOULEUSIS

Βούλευσις. Deliberation. Also built on *boul-*, the verb *bouleuein* refers primarily to the activity of a deliberative body, like a *Boulē*. **Aristotle** makes the abstract noun into a technical term in his moral psychology in **Nicomachean Ethics** III.3, 1112a18ff.—our consideration of how to bring about a feasible goal. He defines “choice” (*proairesis*) as “either deliberative desire (*orexis*) or desiderative deliberation.”

See also [SYMBOULEUTIKOS](#).

BREATH

See [PNEUMA](#).

BRONTINUS OF METAPONTUM

Βροντῖνος. (6th BCE.) **Pythagorean**, friend and student of **Pythagoras**, he was either the husband or the father of **Theano**. Some **Orphic** poems were ascribed to him, and later some **Neopythagorean** works had his name attached to them. **Clement of Alexandria**, *Stromata* I.131; **Diogenes Laertius** VIII.42, 83; **Iamblichus**, *Vit. Pyth.* 267.

See also [METAPONTUM](#).

BRUTUS, MARCUS

(d. 42 BCE.) Known as assassin of Julius Caesar, Brutus was an enthusiastic student of philosophy. He was attracted to **Antiochus of Ascalon**; Antiochus' brother **Aristus** spent time

in Brutus' home. After the assassination of Caesar, Brutus studied in Athens with Theomnestus and **Cratippus of Pergamon**, but there was soon a three-way military contest between Octavian, Mark Antony, and Brutus; two battles of Philippi followed—Brutus lost the second and committed suicide.

BRYSON OF HERACLEIA

(c. 450–390 BCE.) **Sophist. Aristotle** criticizes him for his manner of squaring the circle (*Posterior Analytics* I.9, 75b40; *Sophistical Refutations* 11, 171b16–a4) and for his claim that there is no such thing as obscene language, on the ground that whatever words you use for something, the meaning is the same (*Rhetoric* III.2, 1405b9). Still, **Archimedes** adapted Bryson's methodology to calculate the value of π , and George Carlin, in 1972, made an argument similar to Bryson's in his "Seven Words You Can Never Say on Television." **Athenaeus** (XI.508) says that **Theopompus** claimed that **Plato** stole many of his ideas from Bryson. Both **Diogenes Laertius** and the **Suda** say that he was the teacher of various philosophers, but chronological difficulties indicate that there must have been another later Bryson (DL I.16, VI.85, IX.61; Suda, *Pyrrhon*, *Krates*, *Theodorus*).

See also [HERACLEIA PONTICA](#); [RHĒTORIKĒ](#).

BYZANTINE PHILOSOPHY

"Byzantine philosophy" is a name given, with somewhat fuzzy edges, to philosophy written by Christians, in Greek, within the territory of the Eastern Roman Empire. The beginnings of Byzantine philosophy are particularly difficult to determine, since in late antiquity there were for a time both pagan and Christian philosophers writing and teaching in **Athens** until that school was closed in 529 CE, in **Alexandria** until it was taken by the Arabs in 641 CE, and elsewhere. Some historians, somewhat facetiously, use the date of the great Hajj of Muhammad, 630 CE, as the line of demarcation between the ancient and medieval periods. That date does coincide with the reign of the emperor Heraclius, 610–641, who might be counted as the "first" of the "Byzantine" rulers, not least because he made Greek rather than Latin the official language of his realm.

Higher education continued in the Eastern Empire at the University of **Constantinople** and elsewhere, and philosophical texts were preserved in libraries and occasionally studied. The dominant philosophical tradition was certainly Christian **Neoplatonism**, but the texts of **Aristotle**

were also studied, especially under the sponsorship of the princess Anna Comnena (1083–1153). As Western European scholars took sufficient interest in ancient Greek philosophy to learn Greek and seek out texts, they found them in the libraries and schools of the Eastern Empire. William of Moerbeke (1215/35–c. 1286), for example, spent many years in Greece translating the works of Aristotle and others at the behest of Thomas Aquinas.

As the Turks took over more and more of the empire, scholars sought refuge in the West, often in Italy, bringing precious manuscripts with them. Many of those were soon edited and printed, thanks to Gutenberg's invention.

For access to the literature on Byzantine philosophy, see K. Ierodiakonou and B. Bydén, "Byzantine Philosophy," *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, and B. Tatakis, *Byzantine Philosophy*, 2003.

See also [BYZANTIUM](#).

BYZANTIUM

Βυζάντιον. Originally Byzantium seems to have been a colony of **Megara**, with many settlers coming from other places. **Aristotle** talks about struggle among the various elements (***Politics*** V.1303a33ff.). Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #674 gives details about Hellenic Byzantium. An early notable personage was **Theodorus of Byzantium**, rhetorician of the late 5th century BCE. After the emperor Constantine made it his (eastern) capital in 330 CE, the city became known as **Constantinople**. The Eastern Roman Empire has been called "Byzantine" since historians in the 17th century took up that practice. As capital of the Greek-speaking part of the Roman Empire it was instrumental in preserving Greek culture and learning. Taken by the Turks in 1453, it was renamed Istanbul.

See also [BYZANTINE PHILOSOPHY](#).

C

CAESAREA

Caesarea is halfway between Haifa and Tel Aviv in Israel, 32°30'08.08"N 34°54'30.33"E. **Eusebius of Caesarea** (c. 275–339 CE) came from there; **Basil of Caesarea** (330–379 CE) served as bishop there.

CALCIDIUS

(Sometimes written “Chalcidius.”) (c. 350 CE.) Calcidius translated a good bit of **Plato’s** ***Timaeus*** into Latin and did a commentary on the part translated. This was almost the only translation of a **dialogue** of Plato available in Latin in the earlier Middle Ages; **Cicero** had also done a partial translation or paraphrase of the *Timaeus*, also (partially) extant. See J. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists*, 1996, and B. Bakhouché, *Calcidius*, 2011.

CALLICLES

A character in **Plato’s** ***Gorgias*** (represented as a young adult who had studied with **Gorgias**) whom some have argued to have been a historical person. The ethical position that he defends has been taken as an anticipation, in some respects, of that of Friedrich Nietzsche.

CALLIPHON

Καλλιφῶν. (2nd BCE.) Probably **Peripatetic**, condemned by **Cicero** several times for making human good a mixture of virtue and bodily pleasure (*De Finibus* II.6, 11; IV.18; V.8, 25; *De Officiis* III.33; *Tusculanae Quaestiones* V.30, 31).

CALLIPHON OF CROTON

(6th BCE.) **Pythagorean** physician, personally associated with Pythagoras.

See also [CROTON](#).

CALLIPPUS OF CYZICUS

Κάλλιπος. (c. 370–c. 300 BCE.) **Academic**, student of **Eudoxus of Cnidus**. His astronomical calculations were used by **Aristotle** (*Metaphysics* XII.8, 1073b32). Cyzicus (Κύζικος) is today an archaeological site on the shore of the Sea of Marmara, in Turkey, 40.38°N 27.89°E, Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #747.

CALLISTHENES OF OLYNTHUS

Καλλισθένης. (4th BCE.) **Peripatetic**. Student and great-nephew of **Aristotle**, he became Alexander’s historian. Although his work is lost, it was often used by subsequent

ancient historians.

See also [OLYNTHUS](#).

CALLISTRATUS

Καλλίστρατος. (3rd–4th CE.) **Sophist**, author of *Ekphraseis*, or *Statuarum Descriptions*, descriptions of 14 statues by distinguished artists. Available in the edition by A. Fairbanks, in Loeb, with **Philostratus**, 1931.

CANON

See [KANŌN](#).

CARNEADES

Καρνεάδης. (214–129/8 BCE.) Born in **Cyrene**, he joined the **Academy** and became **Scholarch** during part of the Skeptical period. He was a member of the delegation representing **Athens** in **Rome** in 155 BCE. We know of his philosophy through **Cicero** and **Sextus Empiricus**. He was reputed to be adept at arguing both sides of issues. See J. Allen, “Carneades,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

See also [ACADEMY](#); [SKEPTIKOS](#).

CARNEISCUS

(c. 300 BCE.) **Epicurean**, student of Epicurus, he wrote an essay, *Philistas*, on the death of a friend. Fragments were discovered in the Villa of Papyri at Herculaneum; they include a polemic against **Praxiphanes**, a **Peripatetic** (*PHerc.* 1027).

CARPOCRATES

(2nd CE.) **Gnostic** who taught that souls are reincarnated repeatedly until they have experienced all that life has to offer. Irenaeus (*Against Heresies* I.25) and **Clement** (*Stromata* III.2) report that this led to considerable licentiousness among his followers.

CARTHAGE

Καρχηδών. Ancient city near the present Tunis, in Tunisia, 36°51'29"N 10°19'51"E. Although the Carthaginians were competitors of the Greeks in the ancient Mediterranean, there does seem to have been a fair amount of cultural interaction. Both **Plato** (e.g., **Laws** 1.637d, 2.674a) and **Aristotle** (**Politics** III.1, 1275b12; IV.7, 1293b18; V.7, 1307a5; V.12, 1316a34–b5) take an interest in the political arrangements in Carthage. **Clitomachus**, originally named Hasdrubel, moved from Carthage to **Athens** and became **Scholarch** of the **Academy**; **Herillus** became a leading **Stoic**. Later, **Augustine**, a North African, pursued some of his studies in Carthage.

CASSIODORUS, FLAVIUS MAGNUS AURELIUS

(5th–6th CE.) Student and colleague of **Boethius**. Having

had a significant career in politics, he turned to the monastic life, taking his library with him, establishing a tradition of the monastery as a center of erudition. See J. J. O'Donnell, *Cassiodorus*, online at Georgetown.edu.

CASSIUS LONGINUS

(c. 213–273 CE.) **Platonist**, student of **Ammonius Saccas** and **Origen** the Pagan in **Alexandria**, he taught **Porphyry** and others in **Athens**. During a visit to the East he became teacher and counselor to Zenobia, queen of Palmyra. He advised seeking independence from Rome; when Aurelian crushed the revolt, Longinus was executed. (An earlier Cassius Longinus was among the conspirators who assassinated Julius Caesar and was an **Epicurean**.)

THE CATEGORIES

(Treatise by **Aristotle**.) Κατηγορίαι. Latin, *Categoriae*. The first treatise in the Aristotelian **corpus**. Aristotle examines words that may function in **sylogistic** arguments, finding that subjects of sentences are normally *ousia* words, typically translated “substance” or “entity.” In a class-membership sentence, like “Socrates is an Athenian,” both subject and predicate are *ousia* words. Aristotle distinguishes nine more kinds of predicates, or “categories.”

Several late Greek philosophers wrote commentaries on this treatise, most importantly **Porphyry** in his *Isagoge*. Both this treatise and the *Isagoge* were translated into Latin by **Boethius**, whence they wielded a strong influence on the development of medieval Latin philosophy.

See also [KATĒGORIAI](#).

CATHARSIS

See [KATHARSIS](#).

CATIUS INSUBER

(1st BCE.) **Epicurean** who wrote a four-volume work popularizing the Epicurean philosophy. See **Cicero**, *Ad Fam.* XV.16. “Insuber” means that he was from the territory around the present city of Milan.

CAUSE, CAUSATION

See [AITION](#), [AITIA](#); [APOTELESMA](#).

CEBES OF THEBES

Κέβης. (c. 430–350 BCE.) Student of **Philolaus** and **Socrates**, Cebes is a major interlocutor in the *Phaedo*. **Xenophon** says that he was a frequent visitor to the courtesan Theodote in **Athens**. In the *Crito*, he is mentioned as one of the people willing to fund an escape by Socrates. A tablet, or *pinax*, was presented as his work in antiquity, but it must be a

later forgery of the 1st or 2nd century CE. It is a chart of a virtuous path to happiness (available online).

See also [THEBES](#).

CELSUS

(2nd CE.) **Platonist** anti-Christian polemicist. His work, written about 173 CE, is known primarily through the reply by **Origen**, *Contra Celsum*, written 248 CE. See J. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists*, 1996.

CELSUS, AULUS CORNELIUS

(Wrote 14–37 CE.) He composed an encyclopedia of which primarily eight books on medicine (*iatrikē*) survive. The introductory section is especially interesting for its discussion of the philosophical grounding of medicine; the entirety is of great interest to historians of medicine. It is available online at Lacus Curtius.

CEOS

Greek island Kea (Κέα) in the Cyclades, 37°37'N 24°20'E. The poet **Simonides**, the **Sophist Prodicus**, the **Peripatetic Aristo**, and the Alexandrian physician **Erasistratus** were all from this small island 60 miles southeast of Athens.

CEPHALUS OF SYRACUSE

(5th BCE.) Wealthy industrialist, begins the discussion with **Socrates** in the *Republic*.

See also [SYRACUSE](#).

CERCIDAS OF MEGALOPOLIS

(3rd BCE.) **Cynic** poet. A papyrus with fragments of several of his poems was discovered at Oxyrhynchus. The fragments are published in the Loeb volume with **Theophrastus**' *Characters*. See D. R. Dudley, *A History of Cynicism*². Megalopolis, 37°24'N 22°8'E, Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #282, is a city in the western Peloponnesus (Arcadia) founded in 368 BCE as a counterpoise to Sparta.

CERCOPS

Κέρκωψ. (6th BCE?) One of the oldest **Orphic** poets, thought by **Clement of Alexandria** (*Stromata* I) and **Cicero** (*De Natura Deorum* 1.38) to be a **Pythagorean**. He is said to have written a poem called "The Descent into Hades" and a poem in 24 books called *Hieros Logos*, or *The Holy Word*.

CHAEREPHON OF SPHETTUS

Χαιρέφῶν. (c. 470/46–403/399 BCE.) Loyal friend and follower of **Socrates**, deceased by the time of the *Apology*. He went to **Delphi** and asked the **oracle** whether there was anyone wiser than Socrates, to which the oracle responded, "No." In the *Charmides*, Chaerephon greets Socrates on his

return from military campaign; in the **Gorgias**, Chaerephon accompanies Socrates and is blamed for his being late.

Aristophanes represents Chaerephon as Socrates' assistant in the *Clouds*, appearing to be thin and malnourished. He also appears in the *Wasps* and *Birds*. **Xenophon**, in the *Memorabilia*, notes that Chaerephon was a true friend of Socrates.

Sphettus is a deme of Athens.

CHALCEDON

Χαλκηδών. 40°59'0"N 29°2'0"E. Ancient city across the Bosphorus from **Byzantium**. It is now part of the city of Istanbul.

Apollonius of Chalcedon, **Dionysius** of Chalcedon, **Herophilus** of Chalcedon, **Thrasymachus** of Chalcedon, and **Xenocrates** of Chalcedon are some of the philosophically noteworthy people from this place.

CHALDEAN ORACLES

(2nd CE.) A (fragmentary) collection of verses assembled by **Julian the Theurgist**, perhaps with contributions by his father, **Julian** the Chaldean. Julian claims that the basis of the work is material that came from Babylonia (known alternatively as Chaldea), and some have subsequently attributed the materials to **Zoroastrian** sources (Babylonia was then under Persian rule), but modern scholarship finds the contents to be more typical of Alexandrian speculation. Julian was a contemporary of **Numenius**, and there are many similarities between the fragments of the *Oracles* and the text of Numenius. **Porphry**, **Iamblichus**, and **Proclus** wrote (no longer extant) commentaries on the *Oracles*, and some Byzantine writers also took an interest, for example Michael Psellus and Pletho. For more, see R. Majercik, *The Chaldean Oracles*, 1989.

CHAMAELEON

Χαμαιλέων. (c. 350–c. 275 BCE.) **Peripatetic** from **Heracleia Pontica**, a student of **Aristotle**. He wrote essays on several of the Greek poets, including Anacreon, Sappho, **Simonides**, Thespis, Aeschylus, Lasus, Pindar, and Stesichorus, on the *Iliad*, and on comedy, probably also on Hesiod. **Athenaeus** quotes the work on comedy. He also wrote *On the Gods*, *On Satyrs*, *On Pleasure*, *On Drunkenness*, and a *Protreptic*. Only fragments are preserved.

CHANCE

See [SYMBEBĒKOS](#), [SYMBEBĒKOTA](#); [TYCHĒ](#).

CHANGE

See [ALLOIŌSIS](#); [GENESIS](#); [KINĒSIS](#); [METABOLĒ](#).

CHARA

Χαρά. Joy. In the **Cratylus** (419c), **Socrates** says that it is a “good movement of the soul’s flow.” **Aristotle** lists *chara* among the emotions (*pathē*) but rarely uses the word, except to describe sexual orgasm (**Generation of Animals** I.18, 724a1). The word is used especially by the **Stoics** to mark a distinction between their views and those of the **Epicureans**, who made pleasure (*hēdonē*) the centerpiece of their moral psychology. New Testament writers follow the Stoic usage, frequently using *chara* and rarely *hēdonē*. Yet another word for pleasure is **terpsis**.

CHARACTER

For “character” as applied to a person, see **ĒTHOS**. For “character” as a letter of the alphabet, see **STOICHEION**, **STOICHEIA**.

CHARIOT; CHARIOTEER

In the **Phaedrus**, **Socrates** describes the immortal soul (*psychē*) as a chariot with a charioteer driving two horses, one noble, representing the “spirited” part of the soul, the other ignoble, representing the “appetitive” part of the soul. The charioteer is of course reason. This vivid image may have its roots in the introductory section of the poem of **Parmenides** and reappears in **Proclus**.

See also **OCHĒMA**.

CHARISMA

Χάρισμα. A New Testament word meaning the gift of God’s grace, derived from that standard Greek word for favor, grace, *charis*, χάρις. In the **Rhetoric** II.7, **Aristotle** defines *charis* as “helpfulness to someone in need, not in return for anything, nor for the advantage of the helper himself, but for that of the person helped.”

CHARMADAS

(164/3–c. 95 BCE.) **Academic**, student of **Clitomachus** in **Athens**, fellow student and friend of **Philo of Larissa**. He taught in Athens around 110 BCE. **Cicero** says that he was remarkably eloquent (*De Oratore* i.45–47, 82–84; ii.360).

CHARMIDES

(Dialogue by **Plato**.) Χαρμιδης. **Socrates**, newly returned from military campaign, meets the handsome young aristocrat (in fact, Plato’s uncle) at a wrestling school. Charmides is reputed to have, among his virtues, that of **sōphrosynē** (temperance). Socrates explores with Charmides several possible accounts of *sōphrosynē*, including the claim that it is self-knowledge both of oneself, and of itself, leading to several

paradoxes. Charmides would go on to have his property confiscated in 415 BCE for his part in profaning the Eleusinian mysteries, and to being associated with the 30 Tyrants, 404–403. He died in the Battle of Munichia at the hands of the returning democratic exiles. See T. & G. West, *Charmides*, 1986.

CHARONDAS OF CATANA

(6th–5th BCE.) Reputed to be a student of **Pythagoras** (**Iamblichus**, *Vit. Pyth.*), he became a legislator; substantial fragments of a work on laws attributed to him survive, though those are likely to be considerably later. **Aristotle** refers to him several times in the *Politics*. In II.12, Aristotle says that there is not much distinctive about his legislation except that he instituted denunciation for perjury (1274b5); “his laws are more exact and more precisely expressed than even those of our modern legislators.” He is a good example of a legislator from the middle class (IV.11); he imposes larger fines on the rich, smaller on the poor.

Catana (Κατάνη) is a city on the east coast of Sicily at the foot of Mount Etna, 37°30'0"N 15°5'25"E, Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #30.

CHIOS

Χίος. Fairly large (325 square miles) Greek island off the Ionian coast, 38°24'N 26°1'E, Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #840. **Isocrates** is said to have founded a school of rhetoric here (**Cicero**, *De Oratore* 2, 13.22). Notable philosophers and others who came from Chios are the **Stoic Aristo of Chios**; the **Sophist Euthydemus**, who tangles with **Socrates**; **Ion of Chios**, a poet and **Pythagorean**; **Licymnius**, a rhetorician; **Metrodorus of Chios**, an atomist and Skeptic; and **Erasistratus**, the great **Alexandrian** anatomist.

See also [RHĒTORIKĒ](#).

CHOICE

See [HAIRETON](#); [PROAIRESIS](#), [PROHAIRESIS](#).

CHŌRA

Χώρα. Place; space. In *Timaeus* 52, **Plato** identifies the receptacle (**hypodochē**) with “space.” The implication of the passage seems to be that space pre-exists, in some sense, the appearance of phenomena (**phainomena**) in space. In *Physics* IV.1, **Aristotle** argues for “place” (**topos**) rather than “space”; that is, there is no pre-existing or independently existing continuum; it is the existence of spatiotemporal entities that define whatever “places” exist. Still, he does continue to use the word *chōra* in the everyday sense of

“space,” even of astronomical “space” (e.g., **Meteorology** I.7, 345a9). Both **Epicureans** and **Stoics** use *chōra* for “space” in their physical writings. In a political setting, *chōra* is the territory of a *polis* outside the city walls.

See also **PHYSIS; HISTORIA PERI PHYSEŌS**.

CHŌRIS, CHŌRISTON

Χωρίς, χωριστόν. Separate, separable. A big issue for **Plato**’s theory of Forms (**eidē**) is that they are said to be “separate” (*chōris*) from the things of which they are Forms. **Parmenides** 130ff. explores the implications of this idea. It is also true that for Plato the soul (**psychē**) is “separable” from the body (**sōma**) (**Phaedo** 67d). The **Phaedrus** presents a charming image of souls separated from body going on a tour, guided by a deity, of the Forms, separated from the phenomena (**phainomena**).

Aristotle does not buy it (for Forms, **Metaphysics** XIII.11, 1086b9; for souls, **De Anima** I.3, 407b15ff.), but he does have a “separability” problem of his own, namely the mind (**nous**). Aristotle deals with that by making a distinction between separability “*kata topon*,” or spatially, versus separability “*kata logon*,” or conceptually. Since the mind does not occupy space, it cannot be spatially separable, only conceptually (**De An.** III.4). But then could not Plato use the same argument for the Forms?

CHRISTIANITY

The story of the relationship between ancient Greek philosophy and the development of the Christian religion is long and complex. The Christian religion arose in the context of a struggle among the Jewish people between those who wanted to stick closely to tradition and those who embraced various elements of the Greek culture that surrounded them, especially since the conquests of **Alexander of Macedon**. The audience of Jesus was primarily the less educated, less international members of the Jewish community, and his message does not reflect Greek philosophical conceptualization.

But after the crucifixion, the apostles reached out first to the Jewish diaspora, symbolized by the story of Pentecost, and then to non-Jews. That dissemination quickly involved addressing current philosophical movements. That address is neatly symbolized by Paul’s sermon on the **Areopagus** (Acts 17:16–34); the effects on the development of early Christian teaching can be seen in the Gospel of John and in many of the epistles. Paul often seems to be aware of addressing his

message to people who were already, to one degree or another, followers of an **Epicurean** or **Stoic** way of life. Indeed, we know that he spent a fair amount of time with Festus, the philosophically sophisticated brother of the great Roman Stoic **Seneca**.

It took a little longer for the Greek-speaking philosophical community to take significant notice of Christianity. **Philo of Alexandria** demonstrated how to bring together Judaic and Greek conceptualizations: the philosophical sensibilities that he brought to the task were predominantly Platonic in inspiration, and as Christians became philosophers or philosophers became Christian, it was most often a form of **Platonism** that formed the transitional vehicle.

The most important Christian philosopher of antiquity was **Augustine**, but there are many others: **Origen**, Pseudo-**Dionysius**, and **Boethius**, to mention a few.

As Christianity gained political ascendancy, tensions mounted between the demand for conformity to the accepted teachings of the religion on the one hand and the tradition of free inquiry and the tendency of the philosophers toward Skepticism on the other. For three or four centuries after the Hajj, the Islamic world was a better place to study philosophy than the Christian.

See also [HYPATIA OF ALEXANDRIA](#); [JUDAISM](#); [SIMPLICIUS](#); [SKEPTIKOS](#).

CHRISTODORUS OF THEBES (EGYPT)

Χριστόδωρος. (Early 6th CE.) Epic poet from Egypt, significant portions of his work are preserved in the *Greek Anthology* of verse, published by W. R. Paton in Loeb, 1916. There are references to philosophers in his poetry, particularly in his *On the Disciples of the Great Proclus*, where he says that Agapius was the last, but also the first.

See also [THEBES](#).

CHRONOS

Χρόνος. Time. Some early writers synthesize this word with *Kronos*, the father of Zeus (cf. **Diogenes Laertius** I.119). This synthesis may be operating in the fragment of **Anaximander**, “they give justice and reparation to each other according to the ordinance of *chronos*” (DK B1). The **Pythagoreans** and **Plato** supposed time to exist independently of the physical world, a separate regulator of change (**Timaeus** 37ff.). Plato also identifies a cosmic time intrinsic to regular processes; for **Aristotle**, that concept of time was sufficient. Time is a consequence of the circular

movements of the astronomical bodies (**Physics** 218–233); it is the numbering of motion (*Phys.* 219). **Plotinus** returns to a (purified) Platonic conception, asserting the priority of **eternity** (*aiōn*) and making time the process of souls (*psychai*) changing from one condition to another.

CHRYSANTHIUS OF SARDIS

(4th CE.) Student of **Aedesius** at the school of **Iamblichus**, he tended toward the mystical aspects of **Neoplatonism**. Turning down the invitation of Julian to participate in the revival of Hellenism, he remained as high priest in Lydia. **Eunapius**, a relative of Chrysanthius' wife Meite, writes that he was respected by Christians and pagans alike; Eunapius took care of him in his old age. See Eunapius online for more about Chrysanthius.

See also [SARDIS](#).

CHRYSIPPUS OF SOLI

Χρύσιππος ὁ Σολεῦς. (280/76–208/4 BCE.) Chrysippus was the third **Scholarch** of the **Stoic** school, after **Cleanthes**. He also studied in the **Academy** and was known as a master of dialectical argument. He wrote a very great deal, but no complete treatises survive, only extensive fragments, especially as quoted by **Plutarch** and **Galen**. Many of the Stoic concepts, definitions, and arguments cited elsewhere in this dictionary ultimately stem from the work of Chrysippus. (**Diogenes Laertius** VII.179ff.) See J. Kirby, "Chrysippus," *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

See also [SOLI](#).

CHRYSOSTOM, JOHN

(347–407 CE.) Famous **Christian** preacher of the late 4th and early 5th centuries. "Chrysostom" is an honorary title, meaning "golden-mouthed." He tended to avoid **allegorical** interpretations. A series of eight sermons, gathered under the title *Against the Judaizers*, has historically been a favored lode from which to mine (possibly out of context) anti-Semitic comments. Translation available at www.ccel.org.

CICERO, MARCUS TULLIUS

(106–43 BCE.) Roman politician and man of letters, Cicero was the most important conveyer of Greek philosophy into the Latin tradition. When very young, he studied with **Phaedrus** the **Epicurean**; when he was about 19, he heard **Philo of Larissa**, **Scholarch** of the **Academy**, while Philo was visiting **Rome**; then **Diodotus**, a **Stoic**, lived with his family, and Cicero studied with him. After 79 BCE, Cicero lived in **Athens** for a period of time, studying with **Antiochus of**

Ascalon and others, and visited **Rhodes**, where he met the Stoic **Posidonius**.

Cicero actively pursued a political career, though he found time while active in politics to produce three works on rhetoric and politics: the *De Oratore*, the *De Re Publica*, and the *De Legibus*. In 46 BCE he withdrew from political life and turned to (mainly) philosophical writing. *On Stoic Paradoxes*, *Academica*, *De Finibus*, *Tusculan Disputations*, *The Nature of the Gods*, *On Divination*, *On Fate*, *Topics*, and *On Duties* all come from a period of about two years between the ascension of Julius Caesar to power in 46 and his assassination in 44. At that point Cicero went back into the political arena, leading to his own assassination in 43.

Much of the Latin vocabulary of technical philosophical terms was invented by Cicero; English-language philosophical vocabulary is in turn largely indebted to those Ciceronian translations. Furthermore, because Cicero was so much a part of the normal academic curriculum in Western Europe and America for such a long time, Cicero's formulations of philosophical issues and conceptualizations often seem to be the natural or intuitive understandings. For a more extensive discussion of his philosophy, see E. Clayton, "Cicero," *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. For access to translations of Cicero's works online, go to www.attalus.org.

See also [CRATIPPUS OF PERGAMON](#); [ECLECTIC](#); [ESSENCE](#); [KATHĒKONTA](#); [LUCRETIUS](#); [MANTIKĒ](#); [PANAETIUS OF RHODES](#); [RHĒTORIKĒ](#); [STOA](#), [STOIC SCHOOL](#).

CILICIA

Κιλικία. Territory on the south coast of Turkey, near the "corner" where the Mediterranean coast turns from west–east to north–south. **Crates of Mallus** and **Simplicius** were natives of this land.

CITIUM

Κίτιον. A city on the southern coast of Cyprus, the biblical Kittim and modern Larnaca. It was destroyed by earthquakes in the 4th CE. The Stoic **Zeno** and his student **Persaeus** came from this city; its inhabitants at that time were primarily Phoenician in origin. 34°55'N 33°38'E.

CLEANTHES OF ASSOS

Κλεάνθης, (?331/0–230/29 BCE.) Second **Scholarch** of the **Stoa**, from 261. Cleanthes studied with **Zeno**; he is best known for his *Hymn to Zeus*. During his lifetime he was in competition with **Aristo of Chios**, who was less orthodox than

Cleanthes, and was strongly supported by his student and successor **Chrysippus**. (**Diogenes Laertius** VII.168–176.) See E. Asmis, “Myth and Philosophy in Cleanthes’ *Hymn to Zeus*,” *Greek Roman and Byzantine Studies* 47 (2007): 413–429.

See also [ASSOS](#).

CLEARCHUS OF SOLI

Κλέαρχος. (4th–3rd BCE.) **Peripatetic**, traveled extensively to the East, as far as Afghanistan, and wrote on a large variety of topics. Today he is mainly known for a passage in **Josephus**, *Contra Apion* I.22, where Clearchus is represented as discussing Judaism with **Aristotle**, who seems to have met a Hellenized Jew whose views and habits are taken (at least via Josephus) as typical of the whole people. When in a polemical mode, Josephus is not always reliable, and we have no way of knowing the reliability of Clearchus or even the context whence this passage occurs, so it would be hasty to draw much in the way of conclusions from this bit. Clearchus appears also to be the source of the report that **Plato** believed that he was the son of Apollo. (**Plutarch**, *Quaest. Conv.* 717b–e; **Apuleius**, *De Platone* I.1; **Diogenes Laertius** III.2.)

See also [SOLI](#).

CLEINIAS OF TARENTUM

Κλεινίας. (4th BCE.) **Pythagorean**, friend of **Plato**. He is said to have calmed his anger by playing his lyra; when fellow Pythagorean Prorus of **Cyrene** had lost his property in a revolution, Cleinias apparently sailed to Cyrene and bailed him out. A text attributed to Cleinias is preserved at the end of **Iamblichus’** *Life of Pythagoras* in the Thomas Taylor edition.

See also [TARENTUM](#).

CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA

(d. 205 CE.) (Titus Flavius Clemens.) **Christian** theologian and philosopher. His *Stromata* or *Stromateis* (“Miscellany”) is an important source of quotations (“fragments”) of earlier philosophers. Clement is persuaded that “philosophy is the handmaid of theology,” so he feels very free to use more or less random quotations to back up Scripture. The *Stromata* is available online at <http://newadvent.org/fathers>.

See also [ALEXANDRIA](#).

CLEOMEDES

(1st CE?) **Stoic** astronomer, author of *On the Circular Motions of the Celestial Bodies*.

Relying heavily on work by **Posidonius**, Cleomedes energetically attacks **Epicurean** ideas about astronomy. Translation available in A. C. Bowen and R. B. Todd, *Cleomedes' Lectures on Astronomy*, 2004.

CLEOMENES

Κλεομένης. (c. 300 BCE.) **Cynic**, student of **Crates of Thebes**, teacher of Timarchus of Alexandria and Echeclus of **Ephesus**, the teacher of **Menedemus**. In his work *Pedagogues* he says of **Diogenes of Sinope** that his friends wanted to ransom him from the pirates who had captured him; he said that they were simpletons, “for lions are not the slaves of those who feed them, but those who feed them are at the mercy of the lions. Fear is the mark of the slave, while wild beasts make human beings afraid of them” (**Diogenes Laertius** VI.75, 95).

CLINIAS OF TARENTUM

See [CLEINIAS OF TARENTUM](#).

CLINOMACHUS OF THURII

Κλεινόμαχος. (4th BCE.) **Megarian**. **Diogenes Laertius** II.112 says that he was the first to compose treatises on the principles of **dialectic**. The **Suda** says that he was the student of **Euclides of Megara** and taught **Bryson**, the teacher of **Pyrrho**. Θούριοι was a city in southern Italy, 39°43'2"N 16°29'44"E, Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #74.

CLITOMACHUS OF CARTHAGE

Κλειτόμαχος. (187–110 BCE.) Originally named Hasdrubal, he came to **Athens** to study with **Carneades**. He became **Scholarch** around 127/6; when Crassus visited Athens he attended Clitomachus' lectures. Clitomachus was succeeded by **Philo of Larissa**. An **Academic Skeptic**, nothing survives of his writings, but **Cicero** cites them often enough (*De Oratore* I.11; *Tusculanae Questione* III.22; *Academica* II.6, 31, 32, 92).

See also [CARTHAGE](#).

CLITOPHON

(Dialogue attributed to **Plato**.) Κλειτοφῶν. Clitophon makes a brief appearance in the **Republic**, defending a position more relativistic than that of **Thrasymachus**, a kind of legal positivism (I.340b). In the (very short) *Clitophon*, he praises **Socrates** for his protreptic speeches, but criticizes him for not actually teaching virtue. He prefers to turn to Thrasymachus for instruction. The dialogue is very odd in that it ends without Socrates' reply, or any **elenchus** of Clitophon's obvious misunderstandings of Socrates' teaching. See M.

Kremer, ed., *Plato's Cleitophon*, 2004.

COGNITION

See [DIANOIA](#); [KATALĒPSIS](#); [NOĒSIS](#), [NOĒMA](#),
[NOĒTON](#); [NOUS \(NOOS\)](#).

COHESION (LOGICAL)

See [SYNARTĒSIS](#).

COLLECTION

See [SYNAGEIN](#), [SYNAGŌGĒ](#), [SYNAKTIKOS](#).

COLLISION

See [ANTIROPĒ](#).

COLOTES OF LAMPSACUS

Κολῶτης Λαμψακηνός. (c. 320–268 BCE.) **Epicurean**, one of the most famous students of Epicurus. **Menedemus of Lampsacus** was one of his students. He wrote a treatise, “That it is impossible to live according to the teachings of the other philosophers,” and dedicated it to Ptolemy Philopator. In response, **Plutarch** wrote a **dialogue**, “That Epicurus actually makes a pleasant life impossible,” and a work, “Against Colotes.” (These are in volume 15 of the Loeb Plutarch *Moralia*.) Some fragments of Colotes were found in the Villa of Papyri at Herculaneum—these are “Against Plato’s Lysis” and “Against Plato’s Euthydemus” (*PHerc.* 208; *PHerc.* 1032).

See also [LAMPSACUS](#).

COLUMELLA

(Lucius Junius Moderatus Columella.) (4–70 CE.)

Important Latin author on agriculture. His extant works are *De re rustica* and (partial) *De arboribus*, available online. He is included here because he sometimes cites Greek philosophers in his works.

COMMANDING FACULTY

See [HĒGEMONIKON](#).

COMMON SENSE

Aisthēsis koinē. See [AISTHĒSIS](#).

COMPLETE CAUSE

Aition Autotelēs. See [AITION](#), [AITIA](#).

COMPOSITE

See [SYNTHETON](#).

CONCEPT

See [ENNOĒMA](#); [ENNOIA](#).

CONCLUSION

See [EPIPHORA](#).

CONCOMITANCE, CONCOMITANT

See [PARAKOLOUTHĒSIS](#), [PARAKOLOUTHOUN](#).

CONSTANTINOPLE

Κωνσταντινούπολις. When Constantine became emperor he made **Byzantium** his capital and built it up as a “New **Rome**.” Before long it became known as “the City of Constantine” and became an intellectual center for the eastern part of the empire. **Proclus** was born here; from the time of Constantine many leading thinkers moved to Constantinople, advising an emperor or opening a school. As capital of the Eastern Roman Empire, the city and its institutions were instrumental in preserving classical literature and learning from the end of “antiquity” until the Renaissance.

See also [BYZANTIUM](#).

CONTEMPLATION

See [THEŌRIA](#), [THEŌREIN](#).

CONTINUITY

See [SYNECHEIA](#).

CONVINCING

See [PITHANOS](#).

CORINTH

Κόρινθος. City dominating the isthmus of Corinth, the major route between the northern part of mainland Greece and the Peloponnesus, 37°56'N 22°56'E, Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #227. Two people named **Xeniades** with connections to ancient philosophy came from Corinth; **Thrasymachus** the **Megarian** was a Corinthian, as well as **Demetrius the Cynic**. And of course St. Paul wrote two letters to the **Christians** in Corinth.

CORISCUS OF SCEPSIS

Κορίσκος Σκήψιος. (4th BCE.) Brother of Erastus of Scepsis, father of **Neleus of Scepsis**, studied with **Plato** in the **Academy** where he became a friend and associate of **Aristotle**. Aristotle very frequently uses him as an example, particularly of individual persons having some predicate—in the case of Coriscus, being musical (*Posterior Analytics* I.24, 85a24ff., and many other places), dark (*Eudemian Ethics* II.1, 1220a19), and good (*EE* VII.6, 120b25). He and his brother set up a school in **Assos**. Neleus acquired Aristotle’s library, which apparently spent some time in the basement of the family home in **Scepsis**.

CORNUTUS, LUCIUS ANNAEUS

(1st CE.) **Stoic** from Leptis Magna, in Libya. Cornutus spent most of his time in **Rome**, where he taught rhetoric, until he was banished by Nero. (See Persius’ *Fifth Satire*, available through archive.org.) He wrote a book on rhetoric, a critical commentary on **Aristotle’s Categories**, and a book *On*

Properties (**Porphyry**, *In Cat.* 86.21–22; **Simplicius**, *In Cat.* 62.25–26). The major text that remains of his work is *Theologiae Graecae compendium*. The Latin text is available at openlibrary.org; there is an Italian translation by I. Ramelli, 2003.

See also [ALLĒGORIA](#); [RHĒTORIKĒ](#).

CORPUS

Latin for “body,” this word is applied, for example, to the “body” of the extant works of ancient authors. Thus the extant works of **Aristotle** are known as the Corpus Aristotelicum, the extant works of **Hippocrates** are known as the Corpus Hippocraticum, and so on.

COS, KOS

Κως. Home of **Hippocrates**, the great physician, and perhaps **Epicharmus**. It is a fairly small Greek island off the southwest coast of Turkey, 36°51'N 27°14'E, Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #497.

COSMOS (KOSMOS), COSMOLOGY

Κόσμος. The original sense of *kosmos* is “good order” (e.g., **Homer**, *Od.* 8.179). It is also used to refer to ornaments and decorations, particularly of women (*Il.* 14.187). The **pre-Socratics** applied the word to the world order. **Heraclitus**, f. 30, says, “This *kosmos*, the same for all, was made by neither men nor gods, but always has been, is, and will be, ever-living **fire**, igniting by measures and extinguishing by measures.”

Cosmology, or the study of the universe as a whole, is often a part of ancient philosophy, from **Anaximander** through the **Pythagoreans** and **Plato**’s *Timaeus*, through **Aristotle**’s *De Caelo* and *Metaphysics* XII, to the **Stoics** and **Lucretius** the **Epicurean**.

Greek cosmologists may be divided into those who thought of the universe as spatially and temporally unlimited and those who thought of it as limited. Anaximander and the atomists seem to be on the “unlimited” side, **Empedocles**, **Anaxagoras**, Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics on the “limited.” Anaximander speaks of “all the *kosmoi* and *ouranoi* within them,” and that everything comes from “the unlimited.” The atomists explicitly think of an indefinitely large number of atoms (*atoma*) in an indefinitely large space; whatever order there might be is in a sense **accidental** and illusory.

Those who opt for a limited universe also have some principle or origin of the order in the universe. For Empedocles, the opposed principles of “love” and “strife” bring about opposed “orders” in which the elements are all

separated out, or all combined together into an organic whole. For Anaxagoras, Mind (**nous**) sets up a “whirl” that works a bit as a centrifuge, separating out materials that somehow belong together. The early **Pythagoreans** seem to have expected to find mathematical principles at work in the universe as unifiers and orderers.

The Pythagorean lead was followed by Plato in the *Timaeus*; there we learn of an ordering deity, the **Demiourgos**, who looks at the Forms (**eidē**) and creates the visible universe out of geometrically defined materials, putting order into disorder, life into the lifeless, and mind (**nous**) into the mindless. It is not entirely clear whether Plato is truly committed to an actual creation—certainly he did not believe in a creation out of nothing—but the universe as it exists turns out, in the *Timaeus*, to be a single living **being** whose regular movements define time (**chronos**).

Structurally, the *Timaeus* cosmos is geocentric, with the heavenly bodies moving in circles. The major circles are the “Circles of Same and Different,” motions in the celestial equator and the ecliptic. The account of the motion of the planets is tantalizing but truncated (*Tm.* 36c, 38c).

While Aristotle agrees with Plato that the visible universe is a single and unique entity, he does not think of it as an “imitation” of eternal and transcendent Forms, though the source and principle of its movement, the unmoved mover (**akinēton kinoun**), is eternal and transcendent. For Aristotle, the cosmos, taken together with the unmoved mover, is the ultimate reality.

Aristotle’s universe is also geocentric, with the sun, moon, and planets described as “moving themselves” in circular orbits, although in order to account for the “peculiarities” of the motion of the planets from a geocentric perspective, it was necessary to posit multiple rotating spheres in which the center of one sphere is on the surface of another. In *Metaphysics* XII, Aristotle suggests that there are perhaps 55 such self-moving (rotating) spheres to account for the motions of the heavenly bodies; this arrangement appears to have been calculated by **Eudoxus**.

For the Stoics, the order of the universe is the direct consequence of the immanence of **God** and the mind of God throughout the universe at all levels of complexity. There is a certain identity between God and the cosmos—God may be spoken of as the Mind of the universe, and the cosmos as the body of God.

The Stoics also believe in a great cycle of time in which the entire universe periodically turns to fire (the **ekpyrōsis**) and starts over again.

COURAGE

See [ANDREIA](#); [ARETĒ](#).

CRANTOR

Κράντωρ. (c. 336–276/5 BCE.) From **Soli**, Cyprus, he studied in the **Academy** with **Xenocrates** and **Polemon**. He managed to get **Arcesilaus** away from **Theophrastus** to join the Academy. Crantor's interpretation of **Plato's Timaeus** was influential with later Platonists. According to **Proclus**, he took the **Atlantis** story as historical rather than allegorical. Also, Crantor did not take the creative activity of the **Demiourgos** as having occurred at a specific moment in time, but as something continuous. **Plutarch** relied heavily on Crantor for his interpretation of the generation of the **World Soul** in the *Timaeus*. Apparently Crantor's essay *On Grief* was admired and imitated by **Cicero** and **Plutarch**. (**Diogenes Laertius** IV.24–27.)

CRATES OF ATHENS

Κράτης. (d. c. 265 BCE.) **Academic** philosopher, colleague and lover of **Polemon**, and his successor as **Scholarch**. His most famous students include **Arcesilaus**, who succeeded him as Scholarch, **Theodorus the Atheist**, and **Bion of Borysthenes**. (**Diogenes Laertius** IV.4.)

CRATES OF MALLUS

(2nd BCE.) **Stoic**, ran a literary school and was director of the **Pergamon** library, possibly a teacher of **Panaetius of Rhodes**. His most famous work was a commentary on Homer; he also wrote commentaries on **Hesiod**, Euripides, **Aristophanes**, and probably other ancient authors. **Strabo** tells us that he constructed a globe of the earth, and gives us some description of that globe (Strabo I.2.24, II.5.10).

Mallus (Μαλλός) was a city in **Cilicia**, on the Mediterranean coast, 36°45'N 35°30'E, Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #1009.

CRATES OF THEBES

Κράτης. (c. 368–288 BCE.) **Cynic**, follower of **Diogenes of Sinope**. He is noted for his Cynical marriage to **Hipparchia** and for being a teacher of **Zeno of Citium**. Some fragments of his writings remain. (**Diogenes Laertius**, *Life of Crates* VI.87ff.)

See also [THEBES](#).

CRATIPPUS OF PERGAMON

Κροῦπιππος. (1st BCE.) **Peripatetic** who taught at **Mytilene** and **Athens**. Taught M. Marcellus, **Cicero**, and Cicero's son, and associated with Pompey and eventually Julius Caesar. Cicero regarded himself as Cratippus' friend and obtained Roman citizenship for him. Still, the only views that he reports of Cratippus have to do with divination (*De Divinatione* I.3, 32, 50, 70, 71; II.48, 52).

See also [PERGAMON](#).

CRATYLUS

(Dialogue by **Plato**.) Κρατύλος. **Socrates** discusses the nature of language with **Cratylus** and **Hermogenes**. Hermogenes defends a "conventionalist" perspective and Cratylus a "naturalist" view. Much of the dialogue contains rather fanciful etymologies that add up to a kind of defense of naturalism, but then Socrates points out that etymology does not guarantee truth—Hermogenes was not actually generated by Hermes, for example. While the radical change in which Cratylus believes makes stable meaning difficult, the Forms ultimately guarantee meaning. See D. Sedley, "Plato's Cratylus," *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

See also [GRAMMATIKĒ \(TECHNĒ\)](#); [ONOMA](#); [RHOĒ](#).

CRATYLUS OF ATHENS

(Probably born in the mid-5th century.) Cratylus represented himself to be a follower of **Heraclitus**, but judging by what we learn of Cratylus from **Plato** and **Aristotle**, there are some significant differences. Plato's **dialogue** the **Cratylus** focuses on the tension between natural and conventional theories of language, tending to indicate that Cratylus was concerned about the inadequacies of language in conveying information about the sensory world. For one thing, Cratylus is represented as saying that Heraclitus was wrong to say that you cannot step into the same river twice—you cannot step into the *same* river even *once*. For another, Aristotle says that Cratylus eventually gave up talking altogether and just wagged his finger. Aristotle tells us that Plato studied with Cratylus and was persuaded by him of the inadequacies of language for talking about sensory experience (**Metaphysics** IV.5 1010a10–15).

The theory of perception presented in the first part of the **Theaetetus** may well owe a good deal to Cratylus' teachings.

See also [KINĒSIS](#).

CRESCENS

(2nd CE.) **Cynic** who attacked the **Christians**; we know of him mainly from the counterattacks. Living in Rome, he

charged the Christians of being “atheists” on the ground that they did not have statues of deities nor did they perform sacrifices. Tatian claims that Crescens tried to have him and Justin Martyr put to death (*Address to the Greeks* 19); 150 years later, **Eusebius** claims that Justin’s martyrdom was indeed brought about by Crescens (*Church History* IV.6).

CRETE

Κρήτη. The largest of the Greek islands, Crete had been the home of the Minoan civilization. In classical times, its political arrangements were sometimes admired by philosophers; **Plato’s** ***Laws*** is set in Crete perhaps as a kind of homage; **Aristotle** notes both good and bad features of Cretan government in ***Politics*** II.10.

See also [AENESIDEMUS](#).

CRINIS

Κρίνις. (2nd BCE?) **Stoic** cited by **Epictetus** (*Discourses* 3.2.15); **Diogenes Laertius** quotes from his *Dialectic Art* a description of a **sylogism** (DL VII.71).

CRITERION OF TRUTH

See [ALĒTHEIA](#); [KRITĒRION](#).

CRITIAS

(Dialogue by **Plato**.) Κριτίας. Second in a planned trilogy beginning with the ***Timaeus***, **Critias of Athens (1)** uses the image of the mythical **Atlantis** to (begin to) describe an ideal society. A famously incomplete work, it ends with Zeus summoning all the gods, “And when he had gathered them all together, he said”

CRITIAS OF ATHENS (1)

(c. 520–429 BCE.) He appears in **Plato’s** ***Timaeus*** and ***Critias***, where he would have been a very old man (over 90).

CRITIAS OF ATHENS (2)

(c. 460–403 BCE.) He appears in **Plato’s** ***Charmides*** and ***Protagoras***, as well as in **Xenophon**. Critias (2) was both a writer of elegant **poetry** and prose and a bloodthirsty member of the 30 Tyrants—leading to his death at the hands of the democrats. He tends to be counted as a **Sophist** although, unlike most Sophists, he did not teach. A number of fragments of his works remain. See J. Dillon & T. Gergel, *The Greek Sophists*, 2003, pp. 217–266.

CRITO

(Dialogue by **Plato**.) Κρίτων. **Socrates** in prison is offered the opportunity to escape by his old friend Crito. He explains to Crito why he must refuse the offer, most crucially because he has incurred an obligation to obey the laws of Athens, even in

this instance, since he has not been able to persuade the jury to let him go. See R. Weiss, *Socrates Dissatisfied*, 2002.

CRITO OF ALOPECE

(5th BCE.) Friend of **Socrates**, appears in **Plato's** *Euthydemus*, *Phaedo*, and of course the *Crito*. He was present at the trial of Socrates (*Apology*). **Xenophon** also includes him among Socrates' closest friends (*Symposium*, *Memorabilia*).

CRITOLAUS OF PHASELIS

(2nd BCE.) **Scholarch** of the **Lyceum**, member of the delegation of **Athenian** philosophers to **Rome** in 155 BCE. Phaselis (Φασηλῖς) is an archeological site on the south coast of Turkey, 36°31'25"N 30°33'08"E, Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #942.

CRONIUS

Κρόνιος. (2nd CE.) **Neopythagorean**, contemporary of **Numenius of Apamea**. **Porphyry** says that he tried to explain Homer philosophically (*De Antr. Nymph.* 10), and **Nemesius** that he wrote a work *On Reincarnation*.

CROTON

Κρότων. Latin, **Crotone**; Italian, *Crotone*. city in Calabria, southern Italy, on the Ionian Sea, 39°05'N 17°07'E, Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #56. **Pythagoras** established his society here after leaving **Samos**; several philosophers possibly associated with his society are said to be from Croton, including **Alcmaeon** and **Philolaus**. **Milo** the wrestler, cited by **Aristotle** for appropriately eating more than most people (*Nicomachean Ethics* II.5, 1106b3), hailed from Croton. After the Pythagoreans had been in political ascendancy for a number of years, the non-philosophical people of Croton revolted, burned down the Pythagorean school, and exiled its members.

CUT

See [TEMNEIN](#), [TOMĒ](#).

CYNIC

Kynikos (κυνικός) literally means “doglike.” **Diogenes of Sinope** (c. 410–c. 323) acquired the nickname for his shameless public behavior. Some say that Diogenes studied with **Antisthenes** (445–365), the associate of **Socrates**, and thus that Antisthenes deserves credit as founder of the Cynic manner of philosophizing. But Diogenes is the one whose behavior was regarded as “doglike.” He favored a life according to nature and pursued that by living as simply as possible.

While Cynicism is mainly about a way of life, it has repeatedly influenced the history of philosophy. Diogenes' most famous student was **Crates of Thebes** (368–288), who in turn was a teacher of **Zeno of Citium**, the founder of the **Stoic** school. The Stoics retained some Cynical elements in their philosophy, especially allegiance to a “life according to nature.”

Many people claimed to be Cynics, or influenced by the Cynics, throughout antiquity—its anarchic stance provided a convenient counterpoint to emperors from **Alexander of Macedon** to the end of the Roman Empire.

The most famous female Cynic was **Hipparchia**, who fell in love with Crates and shared his austere and public life.

See also [AGATHOBULUS OF ALEXANDRIA](#); [ASCLEPIADES THE CYNIC](#); [CERCIDAS OF MEGALOPOLIS](#); [CLEOMENES](#); [CRESCENS](#); [DEMETRIUS THE CYNIC](#); [DEMONAX OF CYPRUS](#); [HERACLIUS](#); [HORUS](#); [MENEDEMUS THE CYNIC \(OF LAMPSACUS\)](#); [MENIPPUS OF GADARA](#); [METROCLES OF MARONEIA](#); [MONIMUS OF SYRACUSE](#); [OENOMAUUS OF GADARA](#); [ONESICRITUS OF ASTYPALAEA](#); [PANCRACTES OF ATHENS](#); [PEREGRINUS PROTEUS](#); [PHILISCUS OF AEGINA](#); [SALLUSTIUS OF EMESA \(OR SALLUSTIUS OF SYRIA\)](#); [SECUNDUS THE SILENT](#); [TELES OF MEGARA](#); [THEAGENES OF PATRAS](#); [THEOMBROTUS](#).

CYRENAIC SCHOOL

Aristippus of Cyrene (435–355), a follower of **Socrates** also influenced by **Protagoras**, returned to his native city and founded a school that remained in the family for perhaps 100 years. His daughter **Arete** directed the school after his death, and her son **Aristippus** the younger followed her. The Cyrenaic school seems to have been primarily concerned with moral psychology; they share a commitment to one form or another of hedonism, believing that the maximization of pleasure would bring about happiness or *eudaimonia*. After the founding and spread of **Epicureanism**, the two schools eventually became indistinguishable from each other.

See also [CYRENE](#); [HĒDONĒ](#), [HĒDYN](#).

CYRENE

Κυρήνη. 32°49'30"N 21°51'29"E. Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #1028. Greek colony in North Africa (today, Libya—213 km east of Benghazi). Home of **Aristippus**, student of **Socrates** and founder of the **Cyrenaic school**, and his successors. It was also the home of **Theodorus**, the teacher of **Theaetetus**;

Eratosthenes; Lacydes; Carneades; and the music theorist Ptolemais.

D

DAIMŌN, DAIMONION

Δαίμων, δαίμόνιον. In classical Greek religious belief, a *daimōn* was most often a personal divine **being**, appointed to look out for an individual person; the belief is critiqued for example by **Heraclitus** when he says *ēthos anthrōpōi daimōn*, a person's character is his *daimōn*. The most famous *daimōn* or *daimonion*, as he prefers to say, is that of **Socrates**, referred to several times in **Plato's dialogues** and discussed at some length in **Xenophon**, *Mem.* I.1, 4.

In later centuries, semi-divine beings in other religious traditions, such as Persian and **Egyptian**, are interpreted as *daimones*, so that by the time of **Plutarch** (*De Def. Orac.* 414–417) there is a fairly complex hierarchy. **Christian** religious imperialism made *daimones* into demons and took over a good deal of the hierarchy but called these entities “**angels**.”

DAMASCIUS OF DAMASCUS

(c. 462–after 538 CE.) Damascius was the last **Scholarch** of the **Neoplatonic** school of **Athens**. Originally a teacher of rhetoric, he studied philosophy with the successors of **Proclus**, **Marinus**, and **Isidore**, and was the teacher of **Simplicius**. When **Justinian** closed the school of Athens in 529, Damascius went into exile in Persia along with Simplicius and others. He apparently moved to **Alexandria** in 532. Many fragments and some complete works survive, notably *On First Principles*, a commentary on the **Parmenides**, and a (fragmentary) *Life of Isidore*, also known as the *Philosophical History*.

Damascus is a city in Syria, in the southwest part of the country, not terribly far from either Lebanon or Israel, 33°30'47"N 36°17'31"E. **Nicolaus of Damascus** was an early (1st BCE) philosopher from this city.

See also [RHĒTORIKĒ](#).

DAMIS

(1st–2nd CE.) **Philostratus** writes in his *Life of Apollonius of Tyana* that Damis became the disciple of Apollonius and kept a diary of his teacher's words and actions. This diary, Philostratus says, came into the possession of the empress Julia Domna (170–217 CE), who assigned him the task of writing a biography of Apollonius. Readers of the *Life* will have to judge for themselves how much of this (or of the

rest of Philostratus' tales) they should believe.

DAMO

Δαμῶ. (c. 500 BCE.) **Pythagorean**, said to be the daughter of Pythagoras and **Theano** and sister of **Telauges** (**Diogenes Laertius** VIII.42–3; **Iamblichus**, *On the Pythagorean Life* 146). It is said that Pythagoras left her his writings, which she refused to sell but passed to her daughter Bitale. On the other hand, it is not clear that Pythagoras wrote anything—perhaps all his teaching was oral.

DAMON OF ATHENS

(Mid-5th BCE.) Damon was a student of **Prodicus** and (according to the ***Athēnaiōn Politeia***) friend and advisor to Pericles. He was best known as a musical theorist. **Plato** speaks approvingly of his work, for example at ***Republic*** III, 400b, and ***Laches*** 180d.

DAMON OF SYRACUSE

(4th BCE.) According to **Cicero** (*De Offic.* III.45), **Diodorus Siculus** (X.4), and several other ancient sources, Damon and his friend, known alternatively as “Pythias” or “Phintias,” were **Pythagoreans** located in **Syracuse**. Pythias/Phintias was accused of plotting against Dionysius I (432–367) and sentenced to death. “P” asked to be permitted to return home (presumably **Croton**) to settle his affairs; the king refused. Damon offered to take his spot while he was gone, and the king agreed, on condition that were P not to return, Damon would be executed in his place. Execution day arrived, no P; but just as the sentence was about to be carried out, P returned, saying that he had been captured by pirates and thrown overboard; swimming to shore, he came to Syracuse as fast as possible to save his friend. Dionysius pardoned them both.

DARDANUS OF ATHENS

Δάρδαρος. (c. 160–85 BCE.) **Stoic** student of **Diogenes of Babylon** and **Antipater of Tarsus**. According to **Cicero**, he was one of the leaders of the Stoics around 95 BCE (*Academica* II.69).

DATING THE COMPOSITION OF ANCIENT WRITINGS

When one asks of an ancient text, when was this written? the answer can be fairly complex. If we can determine, with some degree of confidence, who wrote it, then the next question would normally be, when did that author live? If we can answer that question, for most texts, we are satisfied with that degree of precision. However, when we have a significant body of work, we may wonder in what order the works were

written, since it is possible to construct hypotheses about the philosophical development of an author. In the case of **Galen** or **Cicero**, we have indications from the author himself about when various treatises were written, but **Plato** and **Aristotle** give us few indications about the order of composition of their works.

Since Plato's **dialogues** reveal a range of philosophical approaches and positions, it has been tempting, at least for the past 200 years, to speculate about his philosophical development as revealed in his writings (see the **Plato** entry). But Plato is also a great literary stylist, and it has been demonstrated that great literary stylists develop their writing style over time. W. Lutosławski did a careful analysis (by hand!) in 1897 (*The Origin and Growth of Plato's Logic*); by the second half of the 20th century, computers made this sort of investigation significantly less time consuming. L. Brandwood, *The Chronology of Plato's Dialogues*, 1990, and G. R. Ledger, *Re-Counting Plato*, 1989, provide two fairly persuasive applications of the stylometric technique.

But what about Aristotle? Somewhat oddly, to the extent that the **corpus** has been investigated with stylometric analysis, the results seem to make no sense at all. See A. Kenny, *Essays on the Aristotelian Tradition*, 2001, chap. 10, "The Stylometric Study of Aristotelian Writings." At best, stylometry might help to determine whether a particular treatise could have been written by Aristotle, though even there it seems unreliable.

Most of the manuscripts that have come down to us are copies, usually copied several times over in the course of the centuries, so even if we can tell when a particular copy was made, that says little to nothing about the date of composition. In a few cases we have very ancient manuscripts, scraps of papyrus stuffed into mummies of pets in Egypt, or carbonized remainders from a funeral pyre, as the **Derveni** text, or buried by a volcanic eruption as in Pompeii and especially Herculaneum. That gives us a sure *terminus ante quem*, at least.

DAVID

Name attached to several 6th-century CE works of philosophy, including lecture notes for an introduction to philosophy and a commentary on **Porphry's** *Isagoge*. There is a commentary on the **Categories** also attributed to **Elias**. Although the name might indicate that "David" was a **Christian**, some of the opinions expressed in his writings are

not very orthodox. See C. Wildberg, "David," *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

DE ANIMA

(Treatise by **Aristotle**.) Περὶ Ψυχῆς. *On the Soul*. Abbr. *De An*. Discussion in three books of the nature of life. The first book looks at previous theories, finding that some locate the principle of life in self-motion, others in perception (**aisthēsis**). **Pre-Socratic** materialism is found to be deeply problematic, but so is the **Pythagorean**-Platonic separability of soul and body. The second book offers a series of definitions of "soul," including "first actuality of a natural organic body with the power of life," and looks briefly at the range of life functions, from nutrition and reproduction through mobility and sensing. The third book generates an account of mind (**nous**) from a study of perception and suggests the possibility of an alternative account of mind through a study of self-movement.

The *De Anima* is in one way an introduction to the **History**, **Parts**, and **Generation of Animals**, as well as the shorter biological and psychological books, for those look at the nature of life in all its variety in more detail. In another way, it is a foundation for the moral psychology of the **Nicomachean** and **Eudemian Ethics**. See C. Shields, "Aristotle's Psychology," *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

DE CAELO

(Treatise by **Aristotle**.) Περὶ Οὐρανοῦ. *On the Heavens*. Abbr. *Cael*. Aristotle argues that the celestial bodies must be composed of a **fifth element**, **aithēr**, and that they naturally move perpetually in circles. The universe is a finite sphere, there is only one universe, and it is everlasting. Aristotle discusses the idea of up and down, forward and back, left and right, in a spherical universe. The **earth** too is a sphere, immobile at the center of the universe; it is composed of earth, **water**, **air**, and **fire**. The third and fourth books are concerned with the properties of the terrestrial elements. Aristotle deals with **cosmological** issues also in **Physics** VII and VIII and in **Metaphysics** XII. Some questions that we would regard as "astronomical" are treated in the **Meteorologica**, particularly comets, the aurora borealis, and the Milky Way. There is a further "astronomical" treatise included in the **corpus**, but not by Aristotle, **On the Universe** (*De Mundo, Peri Kosmou*). See A. C. Bowen & C. Wildberg, eds., *New Perspectives on Aristotle's De Caelo*, 2009.

See also [GENERATION AND CORRUPTION](#);
[METABASIS](#); [OURANOS](#), [OURANIA](#).

DEDUCE

See [SYNAGEIN](#), [SYNAGŌGĒ](#), [SYNAKTIKOS](#).

DEDUCTION

See [SYNAGEIN](#), [SYNAGŌGĒ](#), [SYNAKTIKOS](#).

DEDUCTIVE

See [SYNAGEIN](#), [SYNAGŌGĒ](#), [SYNAKTIKOS](#).

DEFENSE OF PALAMEDES

Display piece of oratory by **Gorgias**, using the character from the Trojan Wars as an opportunity to demonstrate how to defend someone in court. He argues that Palamedes had neither motive nor opportunity to commit the crime of which he was accused by Odysseus. See Dillon & Gergel, *The Greek Sophists*, pp. 84ff. There also exists a text ascribed to **Alcidamas**, representing itself as Odysseus' indictment of Palamedes (Dillon & Gergel, pp. 303ff.).

DEFINE

See [HORISMOS](#).

DEFINITION

See [HORISMOS](#); [LOGOS](#).

DEIXIS; DEICTIKOS SYLLOGISMOS

Δείξις, δεικτικὸς συλλογισμός. In **Aristotle**, *Prior Analytics* I, "demonstration," "demonstrative syllogism." Aristotle uses the word *deixis* to refer to a mode of argument in the *Rhetoric* (1408a26) and *Prior Analytics* I. In **Stoic** philosophy, the word might be translated as "demonstrative reference" or "indication." For the Stoics, a valid **syllogism** must have a "demonstrative reference" to something that actually exists.

See also [APODEIXIS](#).

DELIBERATION

See [BOULEUSIS](#).

DELINEATION

See [TYPOS](#), [TYPŌSIS](#).

DELPHI

Δελφοί. 38°29'N 22°30'E. Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #177. Delphi is the home of the Delphic oracle, who supposedly indicated that **Socrates** was the wisest man in Greece. Later, **Plutarch of Chaeronea** was a priest at Delphi. It is in the territory of Phocis, on the north side of the Saronic Gulf, the home territory of **Telecles**. At the foot of Mount Parnassus, it was particularly dedicated to Apollo, and host of the Pythian games.

DEME

Political subdivision of Athens and Attica. See [DĒMOS](#).

DEMETRIUS OF AMPHIPOLIS

Δημήτριος ὁ Ἀμφιπολίτης. (4th BCE.) Student of **Plato**, perhaps one of the executors of his last will.

See also [AMPHIPOLIS](#).

DEMETRIUS OF LACONIA

(Late 2nd BCE.) **Epicurean**, student of Protarchus (not the Protarchus of **Plato**'s *Philebus*; this one is otherwise unknown), contemporary of **Zeno of Sidon**, and teacher of **Philodemus** (**Diogenes Laertius** X.26; **Strabo** XIV.2.20).

Sextus Empiricus quotes his commentary on **Epicurus** (*Against the Professors* X.219–222); several of his works are partially preserved in papyri discovered at Herculaneum.

Laconia is the territory of **Sparta**.

DEMETRIUS OF PHALERON

(d. 280 BCE.) Demetrius was a student of **Aristotle** and **Theophrastus**. From 317 to 307, he was in charge of ruling **Athens** under the authority of Cassander; when Demetrius I (son of Antigonos) took Athens in 307, Demetrius of Phaleron went to **Alexandria**, where he became the founding intellectual leader of the **Museum and Library** under Ptolemy I. When Ptolemy Philadelphus came to the throne in 285, Demetrius went into exile again. Phaleron is a port of Athens near the Piraeus.

DEMETRIUS THE CYNIC

Δημήτριος. **Cynic** from **Corinth**, in **Rome** during the reigns of Caligula, Nero, and Vespasian (37–71 CE.) **Seneca** knew him well (*Epistles* 20.9, 62.3, 67.14, 91.19; *De Beneficiis* VII.1–2, 8–11; *De Providentia*; *De Vita Beata*). One quote: “The talk of the ignorant is like the rumblings that issue from the belly.”

DĒMIOURGOS

Δημιουργός. Literally, someone who works for the city; the implication is close to the idea of “civil engineer” in American English. **Aristotle** tends to use the word of a kind of ordinary craftsman, for example, at *Politics* 1325b41. In many places it was a name for a kind of city official, as in the bon mot of **Gorgias**, quoted at *Pol.* 1275b29, that pots are made by potters and Larissans are made by the *demiourgoi*. **Plato** uses this word to refer to the deity responsible for putting the **cosmos** in order, in the *Timaeus* and *Statesman*. Plato does not make the *Demiourgos* omnipotent; the world is not created out of nothing, but out of disorder (*Tm.* 30), and the *Demiourgos* makes the world as good as he can, given the undependable materials available. Further, mortal creatures

such as human beings were not created by the *Demiourgos*; that job was delegated to lesser deities (*Tm.* 41c).

Some later Platonists, influenced by **Stoic** or **Aristotelian** ideas, ascribed the arrangement of the world order to **logos** (e.g., **Philo of Alexandria**) or **nous** (**Plotinus**). In any case, the Platonic tradition is committed to some version of “intelligent design.”

See also [PRONOIA](#).

DEMOCRACY

See [DĒMOKRATIA](#).

DEMOCRATES

Δημοκράτης. This name is associated with a collection of moral maxims, called the *Golden Sentences*. Some of them are quoted by **Stobaeus**, and some are found under the name of **Democritus**. **Apollonius of Tyana** addresses his *Epistle* 88 to a Democrates. It is possible that the collection originates from a collection of sayings by Democritus.

DEMOCRITUS OF ABDERA

(460–370 BCE.) Born in northern Greece, Democritus associated with **Leucippus** and studied with Persian teachers before traveling to **Egypt** and other parts of the Middle East, according to our ancient sources. His many writings are all lost, except for fragments and reports of his teaching. Perhaps the best sources are **Aristotle** for his criticisms of Democritus’ physical theory, and the frank admiration and imitation of **Epicurus** and Epicureans such as **Lucretius**, who doubtless preserves much of the wisdom of Democritus in his *De Rerum Natura*. Democritus believed that everything is made out of atoms (**atoma**) or “**beings**,” separated by empty **space**, or “nothing.” We too are conglomerations of atoms. Our perceptions (**aisthēseis**) of the world are consequences of atoms of various kinds colliding with our sense organs; our interpretations of those collisions are “conventional.” “By convention (**nomos**) sweet, by convention bitter, by convention hot, by convention cold, by convention color, but in reality, atoms and void” (DK 68B9). See S. Berryman, “Democritus,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

See also [ABDERA](#).

DĒMOKRATIA

Δημοκρατία. “Rule by the people.” In classical Greece, “democracy” meant *direct* popular rule by the (male) citizens. Thus a viable democratic state was limited in size to the number of people who could assemble on a regular basis. In ancient democracies, most government positions were

assigned by lot, for relatively short terms (one year was common); military leaders and others requiring specialized knowledge were elected by the assembly and were subject to instant recall by the assembly. **Plato** disliked this form of government; for one thing, the Athenian democracy executed **Socrates**. **Aristotle** combined democratic institutions with aristocratic institutions in his favored form of government. **Alexander** and his successors liked to say that they encouraged *dēmokratia* in the *poleis* under their control, meaning that they encouraged extensive participation in local government, even though representatives of the central government had the capacity of overruling local decisions. The ***Athēnaiōn Politeia*** is a good if succinct source for the history of Athenian democracy; see M. H. Hansen, *The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes*, 1987.

DEMONAX OF CYPRUS

Δημόναξ. (c. 70–170 CE.) **Cynic**. Our only independent source for Demonax is his student **Lucian's** *Life of Demonax*. Born in Cyprus, he studied with **Agathobulus**, **Demetrius**, and **Epictetus** and moved to **Athens**. According to Lucian, he gained the love and respect of everyone there. When asked which philosophers he preferred, he responded, “**Socrates** I revere, **Diogenes** I admire, **Aristippus** I love.” Cyprus (Κύπρος) is a large island in the eastern Mediterranean.

DEMONSTRATION

See [APODEIXIS](#); [DEIXIS](#); [DEICTIKOS SYLLOGISMOS](#).

DĒMOS

Δῆμος. In one sense, a district or territory; very commonly seen as a political subdivision of Athens, in this sense spelled “deme” in English texts. Thus **Socrates** is sometimes referred to as “Socrates of Alopeke,” since he belonged to the deme of Alopeke. In another sense, the *dēmos* is the “people,” especially the common people; thus *dēmokratia* is rule by the people.

DERVENI PAPYRUS

A charred papyrus roll found in a tomb in Derveni, Macedonia (in the suburbs of Thessaloniki), in 1962. It is a philosophical and allegorical interpretation of some **Orphic** poems written in the late 5th BCE; this copy was made around 340 BCE. The author has been influenced by several currents in **pre-Socratic** philosophy, perhaps most by **Anaxagoras**. We might also compare **Euthyphro**, the religious fanatic interviewed by **Socrates**. See Gábor Betegh, *The Derveni Papyrus*, 2004.

See also [ALLĒGORIA](#).

DESIRE

See [EPITHYMIA](#); [ERŌS](#); [HORMĒ](#); [OREXIS](#); [THYMOS](#).

DETERMINISM

Aristotle argues against logical determinism in *On Interpretation* 9; the **Stoics** appear to have believed in a universal physical or natural determinism. It has been argued that Epicurus was the first to recognize a “free will problem” (S. Bobzien, “Did Epicurus Discover the Free-Will Problem?,” *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 19 (2000): 287–337). In late antiquity the discussion turned on the existence or reality of “fate,” *heimarmenē*.

See also [ANAGKĒ](#), [ANANKĒ](#); [AITION](#), [AITIA](#).

DEVELOPMENT

Apogegenēmenon, an **Epicurean** term for an emergent property of a concatenation of atoms (*atoma*). From the verb ἀπογίγνομαι, which implies a process of generation in which something becomes something else entirely (or perishes).

DEXIPPUS

Δέξιππος. (Early 4th CE.) Dexippus was a **Neoplatonist**, a student of **Iamblichus**. Part of his commentary on **Aristotle's Categories** survives, tr., J. Dillon, 1990.

DIAGORAS OF MELOS

Διαγόρας ὁ Μήλιος. (5th BCE.) **Sophist** mainly known for his reputation as an atheist. **Aristophanes** mentions him in *The Clouds* (423 BCE). Among his provocative acts were revealing the secrets of the Eleusinian mysteries and chopping up a wooden statue of Heracles to boil his turnips (“The Thirteenth Labor”). When someone pointed out all the votive offerings of thanks from those who had been saved from shipwreck by the gods, he asked where were the offerings of those who sank. In 415 he was involved in a suit about impiety and exiled himself (**Diodorus Siculus** xiii.6). Note also that his home island, **Melos**, had been cruelly dealt with by the Athenians in 416. A reward of a silver talent was offered for his dead body, and two talents for bringing him back alive. Escaping the bounty hunters, he died in **Corinth**.

DIAIRĒSIS

Διαίρησις. Division, distinction. **Plato** examines the relationship between Forms (*eidē*) by means of a process that he calls “collection and division.” While we see an application of the method at **Phaedrus** 265b, it takes over almost completely in the **Sophist** and **Statesman**. **Aristotle** finds that the practice of *diairēsis* demonstrates the incoherence of the

theory of Forms, since if we divide the genus (**genos**) “animal” into “horses” and “human,” how many Forms do we have? One (“animal”)? Two (“horse,” “human”)? Or three? And how many Forms does Socrates participate in, qua human? One, two, or more? (**Metaphysics** VII.13, 1039a.) Of course, Aristotle’s own frequent use of *diairēsis* resulting in genera and species would not be susceptible to the same criticism, since the real existents, the **ousiai**, are the individual animals (for example) which may belong to as many classes as one likes, since those are just predicates. He provides some recommendations on how to carry out *diairēseis* most effectively in **Posterior Analytics** II.13 and compares his method with the Platonic as applied to biology in **Parts of Animals** I.2–4.

The **Stoics** applied the method of division to the definition of terms, a practice developed from the Platonic and Aristotelian uses, but for them focused on language in itself.

DIALECTIC, *DIALEKTIKĒ*

Διαλεκτική. The basic definition of “dialectic” is “discussion by question and answer.” According to **Aristotle**, **Zeno of Elea** made dialectic a philosophical method (**Diogenes Laertius** IX.25), but it was very much extended by **Socrates**. In its basic form, the philosophical method of dialectic starts from premises offered by one’s opponent and argues that those premises lead to unacceptable, even self-contradictory, conclusions. Thus Zeno, in order to demonstrate that “being is one,” starts from the premise “there are many beings (*polla estin*)” and argues that on any interpretation of *polla estin*, the thesis is incoherent. Thus for Zeno it seems to be a method of indirect proof. For Socrates, dialectic is a standard part of the **elenchus**, or examination of the views of his interlocutor. When confronted with someone who claims ethical knowledge of some kind, he asks them (usually) for a definition of holiness (**Euthyphro**), virtue (**aretē**) (**Meno**, **Protagoras**), temperance (**Charmides**), or the like and proceeds to show that the definer has other views that are inconsistent with that definition. It is not always easy to tell what positive view Socrates might be aiming at, or even if he has one. In that sense, the Socratic dialectic often appears to be exploratory or heuristic if not simply combative or eristic.

In the **Republic**, **Plato** proposes dialectic as an important part of the education of the future philosopher-ruler; it is still heuristic, but there is an expectation that dialectic will indeed lead to knowledge (**epistēmē**) of the Forms (**eidē**) (**Rep.** VI,

511c–e, in the Line passage). In the **Phaedrus**, **Sophist**, **Statesman**, and **Philebus**, dialectic is identified with the method of “collection and division,” which often appears to be a proposal that knowledge is to be gained by taxonomic investigations.

Aristotle examines dialectical method at length in the **Topics**, focused on potential uses of dialectic, especially rhetorical uses. But in comparison with “philosophy,” a typical Aristotelian assessment occurs at **Metaphysics** IV.2, 1004b25: “Dialectic is merely critical where philosophy claims to know, and sophistic is what appears to be philosophy but is not.” He says that because in his view philosophy aims at the construction of demonstrative **sylogisms** based on well-established premises, while dialectic is a critical examination of generally accepted opinions. Ironically, Aristotle’s own methodology is very frequently dialectical, starting from a critical examination of **endoxa**; **Nicomachean Ethics** VII is a good example.

While **Epicurus** appears to have rejected dialectic (DL X.31), the **Stoics** put a good deal of emphasis on dialectic. **Alexander of Aphrodisias**, in his commentary on the **Topics**, says that the Stoics define dialectic “as the science of speaking well, taking speaking well to consist in saying what is true and what is fitting, and regarding this as a distinguishing characteristic of the philosopher, use it of philosophy at its highest. For this reason, only the wise man is a dialectician in their view.” **Chrysippus**, especially, is said to have been highly skilled in dialectic.

There is an ongoing ambiguity concerning the relationship between “dialectic,” “sophistry,” and philosophy. In **Metaph.** IV.2, 1004b25, Aristotle says, “Dialectic is merely critical where philosophy claims to know, and sophistic is what appears to be philosophy but is not.” Doubtless both Dialecticians and Sophists would take issue with that claim!

DIALECTICAL SCHOOL

The term “Dialectical school” is applied to several philosophers who emphasized the use of dialectical arguments; these people used to be attributed to the **Megarian school**, but recent scholarship has, to some extent, distinguished the two groups. **Diodorus Cronus** and **Philo the Logician** are the leading members of the Dialectical school. Synchronous with the establishment of the **Stoic** school, the logical studies of the Dialectical school influenced the development of Stoic logic. See S. Bobzien. “Dialectical

School,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

See also [DIALECTIC](#), [DIALEKTIKĒ](#); [LOGIKĒ](#).

DIALOGUE; *DIALOGOS*

Διάλογος. Literary and philosophical genre of composition featuring two or more people in conversation with each other.

Plato perfected the **Socratic** dialogue, representing Socrates in a conversation with many other people throughout the Platonic **corpus**. Several of the other people around Socrates also wrote Socratic dialogues, including **Phaedo** and **Aeschines**, but the only other named student of Socrates whose dialogues survive is **Xenophon**. Later members of the **Academy**, including **Aristotle**, seem to have written dialogues as a philosophical exercise. Several dialogues included in the Platonic corpus appear to have been written by people other than Plato himself.

Roman writers such as **Cicero** and **Seneca** wrote dialogues, as did **Plutarch of Chaeronea** (many). **Arrian**’s reports of the conversations of **Epictetus** should also be counted. Even at the end of antiquity (6th CE), **Aeneas of Gaza** wrote an extant dialogue on **Theophrastus**.

The dialogue form is particularly effective in showing how philosophical discussion may actually happen, in contrast to the more common form of treatises, which might be read as monologues.

DIANOIA

Διάνοια. Reasoning. (*Dia*, through; *noia*, thinking). In the Line passage, **Republic** VI, 510–511, **Plato** applies it to hypothetical-deductive reasoning, particularly as practiced by mathematicians. **Aristotle** tends to apply the word to thinking in general. **Metaphysics** VI.1, 1025b25: “*Dianoia* is either practical or productive or theoretical.” In the **Rhetoric** and **Poetics**, *dianoia* means the rational construction of an argument. See [POIEIN](#), [POIĒSIS](#), [POIĒTIKĒ](#); [PRAXIS](#), [PRAKTIKĒ](#); [THEŌRIA](#), [THEŌREIN](#).

The **Stoics** identify *dianoia* with the ***hēgemonikon***, or governing part of the soul (***psychē***). Sometimes *dianoia* can best be translated “understanding” or even “the rational faculty.”

DIAPHORA

Διαφορά. Difference. (*Dia*, through; *phora*, carry.) In **Aristotle**’s concept of definition (***horismos***), a species (***eidos***) is defined by providing the genus (***genos***) and the specific “difference.” It is important that the “difference” be a characteristic that is “essential” or causative of the nature of

the species in order that the definition be truly adequate. One of his examples of a good definition is “Thunder is the noise of fire being quenched in the clouds.” The genus would be “noise of fire being quenched” and the difference would be “in the clouds.” (**Posterior Analytics** II.8.)

See also [DIAIRĒSIS](#).

DIARTĒSIS

Διάρτησις. Disconnection, incoherence. According to the **Stoics**, one kind of logical fallacy is *diartēsis*. **Sextus Empiricus** gives an example: “If it is day, it is light, but wheat is sold in the market, therefore it is light.”

DIASTĒMA

Διάστημα. Interval, dimension, distance. Regularly used of musical intervals. According to the **Stoics**, time (see [CHRONOS](#)) is “the dimension of movement,” either of all movement, or of the movements of the heavens. *Diastaton* is that which is extended, or has extension, particularly in three dimensions, thus equivalent to “body” (*sōma*).

DIATHESIS

Διάθεσις. Disposition, character, state, defined in **Aristotle**, *Metaphysics* V.19, 1022b1, as “an arrangement of that which has parts, in respect either of place or of capacity or of kind.” According to the **Stoics**, virtue (*aretē*) is a *diathesis*, choiceworthy for its own sake (**Diogenes Laertius** VII.89). They use the word *diathesis* of characteristics that cannot be changed, or cannot be changed easily; so saying that virtue is a *diathesis* emphasizes its permanence, once acquired.

DIATRIBĒ

Διατριβή. Literally, “pastime.” Starting at least with **Plato**, the word gets the sense of a philosophical discourse (**Apology** 37d), especially a popular lecture presentation of philosophical theories. This usage is especially pronounced among the **Cynics** and **Stoics**, many of whom made a point of popularizing their teachings. In many cases, *diatribai* were copied down by students and survive—this is true for those of **Musonius Rufus** and of **Epictetus**, for example.

DICAEARCHUS OF MESSENE

Δικαίαρχος. (c. 350–285 BCE.) Dicaearchus was a student of **Aristotle** who gained a reputation as a mathematician, historian, geographer, and ethicist. He established the idea of the world as a globe with latitude and longitude and discussed various forms of music. His work has been collected and discussed in W. Fortenbaugh & E. Schutrumpf, 2001.

See also [MESSENE](#).

DIDYMA

Δίδυμα. Site sacred to Apollo on the Ionian coast, now southwest Turkey, 37°23'06"N 27°15'23"E; it was a dependency of **Miletus**. While it is natural to assume that individuals with "Didymus" as part of their name were twins (that's what the word means), it is possible for any of them that they may have had some relationship with the sanctuary at Didyma.

See also [ARIUS DIDYMUS OF ALEXANDRIA](#); [DIDYMUS THE GRAMMARIAN \(CHALCENTERUS\)](#).

DIDYMUS, ARIUS

See [ARIUS DIDYMUS OF ALEXANDRIA](#).

DIDYMUS THE GRAMMARIAN (CHALCENTERUS)

Δίδυμος χαλκέντερος. (d. 10 CE.) Extremely industrious scholar—"chalcenterus" means "bronze guts," aluding to his physical stamina for scholarly work. Later collections of marginal comments on classical works ("scholia") often include his comments, though it is not easy to tell which are his, especially since he seems to have normally copied from earlier sources without attribution.

DIELS-KRANZ

Hermann Diels & Walther Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, Weidmann 1952, reprinted 1966. Citations to this work are typically "DK" plus a number. This is the definitive collection of the "fragments" of the early Greek philosophers. Each philosopher has a number (e.g., **Heraclitus** is 22); for each philosopher there are two or more sections: A is for "testimonia," ancient statements about this person; B is for bits that the editors regard as (possibly) genuine quotations; C is for imitations of the philosopher's style, for example. So, for example, Heraclitus' "The way up and the way down are one and the same" is DK 22B60.

DIEZEUGMENON

Διεzeugμένον, passive participle of the verb διαzeugνυμι. This is a **Stoic** technical term for what we might, in English, call a "disjunctive proposition," **Chrysippus** II.5.71. An example would be "Either it is day, or it is night." In the **Laws** VI, 784b, **Plato** uses a form of this verb for (marital) divorce.

DIKANIKON

Δικανικόν. Forensic, judicial. At **Plato's** *Theaetetus* 201a, it is the art of lawyers. At **Aristotle's** *Rhetoric* I.3, 1358b7, it is one of the three sorts of rhetoric, that which is appropriate to the law courts.

DIKĒ, DIKAIOS, DIKAIOSYNĒ

Δίκη, δίκαιος, δικαιοσύνη. Justice. In **Homer**, *dikē* means something like “proper procedure,” the practice and judgment of kings, that which is right as opposed to compelled. A *dikaïos* person is observant of customs and rules, a well-ordered righteous person. *Dikaïosynē* is the abstract noun for justice.

By the time of **Herodotus**, “injustice” is roughly of two sorts: *pleonexia*, or getting more than one’s fair share, and *anomia*, not following proper procedure. Already in **Anaximander**, the *pleonexia* sense is operational in a philosophical setting: he says, of the things that come to be, “they give *dikē* and reparation to each other for their *adikia* according to the order of time.” **Heraclitus** has the procedural sense, f. 94: “The sun will not overstep his bounds; if he does, the Erinnyes, allies of *dikē*, will find him out.” One more **pre-Socratic** bit, from **Antiphon the Sophist** (from f. 44): “Justice (*dikaïosynē*) therefore is not violating the rules (*nomima*) of the city in which one is a citizen. Thus a person would best use justice to his own advantage if he considered the laws (*nomoi*) important when witnesses are present, but the requirements of nature (*physis*) important in the absence of witnesses.”

Plato explored the idea of justice in detail in the *Republic*; **Socrates** in the *dialogue* argues that there is a justice of the individual person, and a justice of the *polis*, analogous to each other. The *polis* is composed of productive people; protective people, or **guardians**; and rulers. The characteristic motivation of the productive people is *epithymia*, or appetite; the virtue (*aretē*) that enables them to be productive is *sōphrosynē*, or temperance. The characteristic motivation of the guardians is *timē*, or honor, and the virtue that enables them to gain honor is *andreia*, or courage. The characteristic motivation and virtue of the ruler is *sophia*, or wisdom; thus the **appropriate** ruler is the lover of wisdom, or *philosophos*. Justice, *dikaïosynē*, in the *polis*, **Socrates** argues, is all the classes of citizens doing their proper job according to their proper virtue. But what then is justice in the individual person? The soul (*psychē*) or human personality has each of these three parts: the appetite, the spirit, and the mind; when all three parts of the soul have the appropriate virtues: temperance, courage, and wisdom, then the person is *dikaïos*.

In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, **Aristotle** presents an account of justice that is more in line with the pre-Platonic traditions. That is, he distinguishes justice as fair shares from legality and

then establishes each on what he takes to be an appropriate footing. Starting from the **Pythagorean** idea of proportionality, he gives some structure to the idea of fair distribution, and like Heraclitus, he supposes that there is one universal law that is in a way the basis of legislated law (*EN* V.7).

The **Epicureans** argued that justice derived from social utility: “Justice was never anything in itself but a contract of not harming or being harmed” (Epicurus, *Principle Doctrines* 31). The **Stoics** understood justice as the art of distributing what is appropriate to each person, but as also part of natural law.

DINĒ

Δίνη. Vortex. Although such phenomena as eddies in rivers and tornados were commonly called *dinai*, for some of the **pre-Socratics** this physical phenomenon was a model for cosmological explanations. **Empedocles** B35 has a vortex that marks the transition between the rule of love and the rule of strife; **Anaxagoras** says that Mind (*nous*) gets the vortex going in the first place: “As these things are thus rotating and being separated off by both force and speed, the speed causes the force, and their speed is like the speed of nothing now found among humans, but altogether many times as fast” (f. 9); “And Mind ruled the entire rotation, so that it rotated in the beginning” (f. 12). Thus the “vortex” is the rotation of the astronomical bodies around the earth. **Plato**, **Aristotle**, and their successors tended to limit the application of *dinē* to terrestrial—or rather aquatic and meteorological—phenomena.

DIO CHRYSOSTOM

Δίων Χρυσόστομος. (c. 40–120 CE.) From Prusa, in Bithynia, Dio was an orator who became influenced by **Cynic** and **Stoic** philosophies, the latter thanks to **Musonius Rufus**. **Philostratus** says that he knew **Apollonius of Tyana** and **Euphrates**. Eighty of his discourses are extant. He was banned from **Rome** by Domitian, he was again in favor under Nerva, and he became a friend of Trajan. Since he traveled widely during his period of banishment, some of his discourses have valuable information about lesser-known parts of the empire around 100 CE. “Chrysostom” means “golden mouth.” His works are available online at Lacus Curtius. Prusa, now Bursa, is in northwest Turkey, 40°11'N 29°03'E.

DIO OF ALEXANDRIA

Δίων. (1st BCE.) **Academic**, friend of **Antiochus of Ascalon**, he was sent by the citizens of **Alexandria** to **Rome** to complain about their king, Ptolemy XII Auletes. On arrival in Rome he was poisoned. (**Cicero**, *Academica* IV.4; *pro*

Caelio 10, 21; **Strabo** XVII.)

DIODORUS CRONUS

Διόδωρος Κρόνος. (Late 4th to early 3rd BCE.) Diodorus was a **dialectical** philosopher from **Iasos** in Caria. He was a teacher of **Philo the Logician** and **Zeno of Citium**, founder of the **Stoic** school. Diodorus is known for his “master argument,” an argument that appears to support a deterministic thesis, or fate. See David Sedley, “Diodorus Cronus,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. “Cronus” is a nickname, meaning (more or less) “old fogey.”

DIODORUS OF ADRAMYTTIUM

Διόδωρος. (1st BCE.) According to **Strabo** (XIII.66) he was an **Academic**. Commanding an army under Mithridates, he had all the senators of Adramyttium executed. After the fall of Mithridates, charges were brought against him and he starved himself to death. See **Adramyttium**.

DIODORUS OF TARSUS

(4th CE.) Originally from **Antioch**, he studied in **Athens** and entered a monastery, where he wrote works critical of classical philosophy (according to **Suda**); later he became a **Christian** bishop of Tarsus, writing theological treatises, some of which survive, available online at Documenta Catholica Omnia.

See also [TARSUS](#).

DIODORUS OF TYRE

Διόδωρος. (fl. 118 BCE.) **Peripatetic**, succeeded **Critolaus** as **Scholarch**. Because Diodorus said that the greatest good consists of the combination of virtue with the absence of pain, **Cicero** denied that he was a real Peripatetic (*De Oratore* I.11; *Tusculanae Quaestiones* V.30; *De Finibus* II.6, 11; IV.18; V.5, 8, 25; *Academica* II.42).

See also [TYRE](#).

DIODORUS SICULUS

Διόδωρος Σικελιώτης. Wrote a massive universal history during the period 60–30 BCE. Most of the surviving portions are available in translation online at Lacus Curtius and Perseus. Several collections of fragments of the later books exist; these have now been synthesized in the Lacus Curtius online publication. For certain periods, especially the early Hellenistic period, this is the best general history source available. “Siculus” means that he was from somewhere on the island of Sicily; in fact he says that he was born in Agyrium, today Agira, in the interior of the island, 37°39'N 14°31'E, Hansen & Nielson 2004 #7.

DIODOTUS

Διόδοτος. (1st BCE.) **Stoic** friend of **Cicero**, lived in Cicero's house. Though he went blind, he continued to teach, even geometry. Died 59 BCE, leaving Cicero his property (*Brutus* 90; *De Natura Deorum* I.3; *Tusculan Disputations* V.39; *Letters to Atticus* II.20).

DIOGENES LAERTIUS

Διογένης Λαέρτιος. (fl. 200 CE.) Diogenes is the author of *The Lives and Opinions of the Philosophers*, the only extant ancient history of philosophy. Diogenes tends to group philosophers by "schools," tracing student-teacher relationships back to founders. His account of each philosopher is about as good as whatever source he happens to be using at the moment, though he tends to throw in a bit of his own rather bad poetry from time to time. His life of **Zeno of Citium** includes an excellent summary of early **Stoic** philosophy; his life of **Epicurus** includes extensive quotations from the works of Epicurus not otherwise available. One test of his reliability is to compare what he says about **Plato** and **Aristotle** with their works. Diogenes' summary of Plato's philosophy, while very different from what modern writers would say, is not too bad; he probably had some decent general introduction to go on, something like **Alcinous**, for example. For Aristotle his summary is considerably less perceptive and less complete, but nevertheless does give us an idea of how Aristotle was understood by non-specialists in that period. Another test of his reliability is to compare what he says about **Socrates** with what Plato tells us about Socrates. What Diogenes tells us about the trial of Socrates, for example, is both inconsistent with the **Apology** and internally inconsistent, leading us to conclude that it is hazardous to rely very much on what Diogenes says; on the other hand, most of the time we do not have any alternative source, so we have to accept Diogenes, but with a large grain of salt.

Although some think that "Laertius" is a toponym (from a town in Cilicia), prevailing opinion has it that it is a nickname, after Laertes, the father of Odysseus. The text and translation of Diogenes Laertius are readily available online at Perseus, in the Hicks translation (Loeb, 1925). References to Diogenes' work are abbreviated "DL," followed by a book number in Roman numerals and paragraph in Arabic numerals.

DIOGENES OF APOLLONIA

(Mid- to late 5th BCE.) The views of Diogenes were parodied in **Aristophanes'** *Clouds*. Like **Anaximenes**, he

made air (**aēr**) the first principle; he argues that air is also the principle of life and intelligence, against the implied dualism of **Anaxagoras**. **Aristotle** quotes his description of the system of blood vessels (*Historia Animalium* III.2, 511b30–512b10).

Theophrastus wrote a report of his writings, the source of several of the fragments that we have. There is disagreement about which Apollonia—the town Sozopol in what is now Bulgaria, or the town Selia on the south coast of Crete. I favor Sozopol, 42°25'N 27°42'E, Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #682. See J. Dockstader, "Diogenes of Apollonia," *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

DIOGENES OF BABYLON

See [DIOGENES OF SELEUCIA \(OR BABYLON\)](#) ([EPICUREAN](#)).

DIOGENES OF OENOANDA

(2nd CE.) Oenoanda (τὰ Οἰνόανδα) is an ancient site in south-central Turkey (36°48'33"N 29°32'59"E) where a massive inscription of **Epicurean** philosophy was found in 1884. The inscription was set up in the 2nd CE, and Diogenes is the author. The reconstruction of the inscription has been one of the major sources of information about Epicureanism in the Christian era. See M. F. Smith, ed., *Diogenes of Oinoanda: The Epicurean Inscription*, 1993.

DIOGENES OF SELEUCIA (OR BABYLON) (STOIC)

(c. 228–140 [or earlier] BCE.) Diogenes was a student of **Chrysippus** and of **Zeno of Tarsus** and was the fifth director of the **Stoic** school; he taught **Panaetius** and others. In 156/5 BCE, he was a member of the delegation of philosophers from **Athens to Rome** and thus helped introduce Stoicism to this fertile soil for its further growth and development. **Cicero** often cites him as an authority. Frequently confused with the Diogenes in the next entry.

See also [BABYLON](#); [SELEUCIA](#).

DIOGENES OF SELEUCIA (OR BABYLON) (EPICUREAN)

(d. 146 BCE.) **Athenaeus** (*Deipnosophistae* V.211) says that he lived at the court of King Alexander Balas in Syria. Athenaeus says that Diogenes asked for a crown and robe so that he could represent himself as the priest of virtue; the king agreed, but Diogenes gave the gifts to a female singer he was in love with. The king had her come in wearing the gifts, to the general amusement of his guests. When Antiochus succeeded Alexander Balas, Diogenes was executed.

See also [BABYLON](#); [SELEUCIA](#).

DIOGENES OF SINOPE

(c. 410–c. 322 BCE.) Diogenes was the original “**Cynic**,” so called because of his “doglike” behavior, living according to nature, shamelessly. Rejecting civilized life, he attacked all political and social conventions; all sexual, racial, and class distinctions; and all kinds of intellectual speculation, all claims to authority. He wrote a *Politeia*, apparently something of a spoof of **Plato**’s ***Republic***, and supported all forms of human equality. It is no surprise that he is the subject of numerous stories, some of them appreciative, others critical. See J. Piering, “Diogenes of Sinope,” *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

Sinope is a city on the Black Sea coast of Turkey, 42°02'N 35°09'E, Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #729.

DIOGENES OF TARSUS

(2nd BCE.) **Epicurean** noted by **Diogenes Laertius** and **Strabo**. We have only the titles of a few of his works—*Select Lectures*, *Epitome of Epicurus’ Ethical Doctrines*, and *On Poetical Problems*. Strabo XIV.5.15; DL VI.81; X.26, 118, 119, 136, 138.

See also [TARSUS](#).

DION OF SYRACUSE

(4th BCE.) Included here because of his close friendship with **Plato**, who repeatedly supported Dion in his attempt to gain power in **Syracuse**. His life has been chronicled by **Plutarch**, *Parallel Lives*, available in volume 6 of that work in the Loeb edition, or online, and by Cornelius Nepos, available online at Tertullian.org.

DIONYSIUS OF CHALCEDON

(fl. 320 BCE.) **Megarian**, he was the first to use the name **Dialecticians** for a group within the Megarian school (**Diogenes Laertius** II.106). Aristotle refers to a “Dionysius the Sophist” in ***Topics*** VI.10, 148a27, who defines “life” as “a movement of a creature sustained by nourishment, congenitally present with it.” Aristotle thinks that the definition is defective because it won’t work for both plants and animals. In a treatise in the Aristotelian **corpus**, *Physiognomy* 3, 808a16, there’s a description of the “effeminate” individual, “for all the world like Dionysius the Sophist.” He might be the last of the Sophists until the Second Sophistic, in the 1st century CE.

Dionysius is said to have taught **Theodorus the Atheist** (DL II.98).

See also [CHALCEDON](#).

DIONYSIUS OF CYRENE

(c. 150 BCE.) **Stoic** and mathematician. Student of **Diogenes of Babylon (Seleucia)** and **Antipater of Tarsus**. Probably the person attacked by **Philodemus** in *On Signs* for saying that the sun must be very large because it emerges slowly from behind an obstruction.

See also [CYRENE](#).

DIONYSIUS OF LAMPTRAI

(3rd BCE.) **Epicurean**, succeeded **Polystratus** as **Scholarch** at **Athens** c. 219 BCE; died c. 205 and was succeeded by **Basilides**. Lamptrai is a **deme** of Athens.

DIONYSIUS THE AREOPAGITE

Διονύσιος ὁ Ἀρεοπαγίτης. The original Dionysius was converted by Paul (Acts 17:34) and, according to church history, became a bishop and was martyred in 95. Much later (5th or 6th CE), a **Christian Neoplatonist** writer represented his own philosophical work as having been produced by that earlier martyr. Thus, the philosopher is often referred to as “Pseudo-Dionysius.” His surviving work comprises four treatises and 10 letters. The treatises are *On Divine Names*, *On the Celestial Hierarchy*, *On the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy*, and *Mystical Theology*. His influence on Christian theology, though significant in the West, is far more important on Eastern Orthodox writers. See K. Corrigan & L. M. Harrington, “Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite,” in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

See also [AREOPAGUS](#); [PROCLUS](#).

DIONYSIUS THE RENEGADE

Διονύσιος ὁ Μεταθέμενος. (c. 330–c. 250 BCE.) From **Heracleia**, he began as a student of **Heraclides (Academy)**, **Alexinus (Dialectitian)**, and **Menedemus (Eretrian)**, and then of **Zeno of Citium**, who converted him to **Stoicism**. Later in life, according to **Diogenes Laertius’ Life**, afflicted with terrible eye pain he joined the **Cyrenaics**. Diogenes Laertius mentions the titles of several of his works, none of which survive (VII.166–167).

DIOTIMA OF MANTINEIA

In **Plato’s Symposium**, **Socrates** gives a speech about the nature of love, claiming that what he says was learned from the Priestess Diotima. Most readers have assumed that this was a mere literary trope, that Diotima was fictional and that all of the ideas presented in this speech are in fact Plato’s, put into the mouth of Socrates. Others have, not unreasonably, supposed that Diotima really existed and that Socrates might actually have learned something from her. In

any case it is significant that in response to a conversation that has focused mainly on male homosexual relationships, Plato's Socrates chooses to represent a woman as the source of the true understanding of love.

See also [MANTINEIA](#).

DIOTIMUS

Διότιμος. (c. 100 BCE.) **Stoic. Diogenes Laertius** tells us that he accused **Epicurus** of being depraved, and forged letters purporting to be from Epicurus to prove it (DL X.3). Presuming that **Athenaeus** XIII.611 is onto the same story, he was convicted of forgery on a suit by Zeno the Epicurean and executed. See **Clement of Alexandria**, *Stromata* II.21.

DISCONNECTION

See [DIARTĒSIS](#).

DISCOURSE

See [LOGOS](#).

DISJUNCTIVE PROPOSITION

See [DIEZEUGMENON](#).

DISORDER

See [ATAXIA](#).

DISPOSED

Pōs echein (πῶς ἔχειν) is one of the **Stoic** categories; the term would be literally translated "having how." "Disposed" is a conventional translation of the phrase.

See also [KATĒGORIAI](#).

DISPREFERRED

See [APOPROĒGMENA](#).

DISSOI LOGOI

Δισσοὶ Λόγοι. An anonymous **Sophistic** text included in the manuscripts of **Sextus Empiricus**, first published in 1570 under the name *Dialexeis*. The phrase *Dissoi Logoi*, or "Double Arguments," appears repeatedly in the text, lending support to the current title. Scholars think that the work was written sometime between 400 and 380 BCE. The general trend of argument in the treatise is that words like "good" and "bad," "beautiful" and "ugly," "just" and "unjust," and "true" and "false" differ in meaning according to the person and circumstances in which they are used. The treatise thus illustrates Sophistic relativism very clearly. At the same time, the author does take stands opposing selection of officials by lot, claiming that the person skilled in **dialectic** is the best statesman, and recommending the cultivation of a good memory. R. Kent Sprague published a translation in *Mind* 1968; it is now readily available on the Web. See Dillon &

DISVALUE

See [APAXIA](#).

DIVINATION

See [MANTIKĒ](#); [THEOURGIA](#).

DIVINE

See [DĒMIOURGOS](#); [GOD](#), [GODS](#); [THEOS](#), [THEIOS](#), [THEOLOGIA](#).

DIVISION

See [DIAIRĒSIS](#).

DOCTRINE

See [DOGMA](#).

DOGMA

Δόγμα. Teaching, opinion, that which seems correct to someone. *DOGMATIKOS*. Δογματικός. Doctrinaire, opinionated. **Aristotle** uses *dogma* apparently as a synonym for **doxa**, not so odd, given that they are both derived from the verb *dokein* (δοκεῖν), to seem. In **Physics** IV.2, 209b15, Aristotle refers to the *agrapha dogmata*, **unwritten teachings**, of **Plato**, on the subject of **space** and **time**. In Hellenistic philosophy, **Epicureans** and **Stoics** were proud of their *dogmata*, while **Pyrrhonian** Skeptics were equally proud of avoiding all *dogmata*.

See also [SKEPTIKOS](#).

DOMNINUS OF LARISSA

Δομνῖνος. (c. 420–c. 480 CE.) Fellow student with **Proclus** of **Syrianus**. According to **Marinus**, they disputed about the principles of **Platonism** (**Damascius**, *Life of Isidore*). The **Academy** in **Athens** chose Proclus' interpretation, and Domninus went back to Larissa. He is said to have taught **Asclepiodotus** until Asclepiodotus became insufferably argumentative. Domninus is the author of *Manual of Introductory Arithmetic*. Rejecting the approach of **Nicomachus**' *Introduction to Arithmetic*, this work returns to the Euclidian methodology. Domninus is believed to have written *How a Ratio Can Be Taken out of a Ratio*, also extant.

See also [LARISSA](#).

DOULOS, DOULEIA

Δούλος, δουλεία. Slave, slavery. Ancient Greek (and Roman) society used slave labor to a very significant extent. People became slaves by capture in wartime, or by pirates who sold their captives. Some became slaves as a consequence of economic destitution. The children of slaves were of course slaves themselves. **Plato** was sold as a slave

but was bought and freed by an admirer; **Phaedo** was a young slave who was bought and freed by **Crito** at the request of **Socrates**. In the *Meno*, Socrates demonstrates the power of *anamnēsis* by getting Meno's slave to "recollect" the **Pythagorean** theorem. **Epictetus** was born into slavery but was freed by his **Stoic** master. **Lucian** imagines a slave market where it is philosophers who are for sale.

Alcidamas the **Sophist** claimed that "God has made everyone free; nature has made no one a slave," but most ancient philosophers accepted the institution of slavery as either natural or necessary or both. Plato seems to think that it is wrong to enslave fellow Greeks, but normal to enslave *barbaroi*. While he says very little about slaves in the *Republic*, the *Laws* repeatedly deal with issues concerned with slavery. Perhaps most famously, **Aristotle** defends the institution of slavery as "natural" in *Politics* I on the ground that there are some people who are incapable of running their own lives, and thus need the direction of someone with *phronēsis*. See P. Garnsey, *Ideas of Slavery from Aristotle to Augustine*, 1996.

DOXA

Δόξα. Opinion, expectation, derived from the verb δοκεῖν, expect, imagine, seem. **Parmenides'** Goddess distinguishes between the **truth** and the "opinions (δόξας) of mortals in which is no true belief (πίστις)" (f. 1, line 30). For **Plato**, belief about the perceptible world is *doxa*, contrasted with the *epistēmē* available to those who make **dialectical** contact with the Forms (*eidē*). In the **Sun-Line-Cave** passage of the *Republic*, *doxa* is distinguished into *pistis* and *eikasia*, a confidence based on some understanding of the material nature of the perceived object versus conjecture based on attention to the appearances alone. In the *Theaetetus*, the hypotheses that knowledge might be "true opinion" (*alēthē doxa*) or "true opinion plus an account" (*logos*) are discussed and both are refuted, but at the same time, *doxa* is accorded a positive epistemic role, fleshing out the outline provided in the *Republic*.

For **Aristotle**, we have *doxa* of contingent facts and *epistēmē* of necessary facts. For **Epicurus**, *doxa* is a movement akin to but different from *aisthēsis*; *doxa* can go beyond the evidence of the senses and thus be erroneous. Parallel to, and somewhat separate from, these epistemological uses of the term is the sense of "repute"; in the Septuagint and New Testament, *doxa* sometimes has the

sense of praise, honor, or glory.

Greek philosophical usage accounts for the epistemic states of *doxa*, *pistis*, and *eikasia* somewhat differently than English-language usage deals with “opinion,” “belief,” and other related terms. Opinions and beliefs are primarily regarded as subjective and expressible in language; a *doxa* or *pistis* is normally in relation to some object, not necessarily expressed or even expressible in language. Plato’s argument in the Line passage in the ***Republic*** is not simply that we have different degrees of confidence, but that there are different epistemic objects that relate to the different epistemic states.

See also [DOGMA](#); [ENDOXIA](#).

DOXOGRAPHY

Several ancient writers collected the opinions of various philosophers, giving generally brief and often comparative descriptions of their views. Some of these texts are our only evidence for the opinions of some of the ancient thinkers, or the only evidence for a significant portion of their work. See J. Mansfeld, “Doxography of Ancient Philosophy,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

See also [AETIUS](#); [ARIUS DIDYMUS OF ALEXANDRIA](#); [CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA](#); [DIOGENES LAERTIUS](#); [HIPPOLYTUS, BISHOP OF ROME](#); [STOBAEUS, JOHN \(JOHN OF STOBI\)](#); [THEOPHRASTUS OF ERESOS](#).

DREAM

See [ON DREAMS](#); [ONEIROS](#).

DYAS

Δυάς. Dyad. In **Pythagorean** philosophy, the principle of duality (see **Aristotle**, ***Metaphysics*** I.5, 986a). According to Aristotle, **Plato** and his followers generate numbers from the one and the “indefinite dyad” (*Metaph.* XIV.3, 1090b). In ***Physics*** III, 206b, Aristotle seems to take the “indefinite dyad” of Plato to be straight-line infinite extension.

DYNAMIS, DYNAMEIS

Δύναμις, δυνάμεις. Power, potentiality, capacity. In early Greek literature, the word is applied to personal strength, then to military power. In the **Hippocratic corpus**, *dynamis* is also used of physical capacities, particularly those of medical significance. At ***Theaetetus*** 185c, for example, **Plato** explicitly moves the significance of a *dynamis* from a physical ability to a mental ability; also in the *Theaetetus*, in describing the theory of perception (***aisthēsis***) at 156, he distinguishes active and passive *dynameis* present in the perceptual process. That is an idea that **Aristotle** developed significantly. Combining

the idea of active and passive *dynameis* with the theory of the four causes (*aitia*), **matter** may be identified with the passive potentialities, the capacity of undergoing change, and an entity may serve as a source of change (*archē kinēseōs*) in virtue of its active powers. In general, for Aristotle, if appropriate active and passive powers meet, an activity (*energeia*), or at least some sort of change (*metabolē*) will result.

In *Parts of Animals* II.1, Aristotle argues that the so-called **elements** (**earth, water, air, and fire**) are really compounded of elemental “powers”: earth is cold and dry, water cold and fluid, air warm and fluid, fire hot and dry. Thus the elements can really change into each other; each is “matter” for the other.

For the **Stoics**, however, each element has just one power: fire is hot, air is cold, water is wet, and earth is dry; really, there are just two *dynameis*, active and passive, ultimately identifiable as **God** and matter.

In the meantime, the religious traditions had adopted the word to apply to the powers of God and divine beings. If natural **science** can show us how to use the natural powers inherent in material things, then why cannot divine science teach us how to control the supernatural powers inherent in divine things?

See also [ADUNAMIA](#); [DYNATON](#).

DYNATON

Δυνατόν. Strong, able, powerful—possessing *dynamis*. In a somewhat different sense, the word is used for “possible” as distinguished from “necessary.” In this sense, it is a synonym of *endechomenon*; see **Aristotle**, *Posterior Analytics* I.6, 74b30.

E

EARTH; *GĒ*

Γῆ. In addition to the solid ground that we stand on, “earth” is, beginning with **Empedocles** at least, one of the four “elements” (see *STOICHEION*, *STOICHEIA*) of which everything is constructed. At *Metaphysics* I.8, 989a5, **Aristotle** notes that none of the monistic natural philosophers make “earth” the most basic element, though perhaps they should, as do most common people.

Almost all ancient cosmologies, starting with **Anaximander**, agreed that the earth is in the center of the universe, with sun, moon, and stars revolving around it. Aristotle made that into a principle of explanation of what we call “gravity”: it is the nature of earth to move toward its natural place, the center of the universe, and the nature of water to move to its natural place, on top of the earth, air on top of that, and fire above the air.

Plato’s Pythagorean physics in the *Timaeus* asserts that atoms (*atoma*) of earth are cubes; one wonders whether observation of salt crystals contributed to that hypothesis. See *PHYSIS*; *HISTORIA PERI PHYSEŌS*.

By the time of Plato, at latest, educated Greeks were well aware that the earth is a sphere. In that time, **Hicetas** the Pythagorean, and others, explained the diurnal movement of the fixed stars to the earth rotating on its axis. In the 3rd century BCE, **Eratosthenes** actually calculated the circumference of the earth fairly accurately, and in the 2nd, **Crates of Mallus** wrote instructions for how to construct a sphere representing the earth.

ECHECRATES OF PHLIUS

(Early 4th BCE.) **Phaedo** narrates the story of **Socrates’** last day to him. **Phlius** was a small town in the mountains of the Peloponnesus where **Pythagoreans** fleeing persecution in southern Italy had taken asylum. Echecrates is said (by **Aristoxenus**) to be one of the last of the “early” Pythagoreans; after him and a few of his friends, the movement is supposed to have died out. See C. Huffman, “Pythagoreanism,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

ECHEIN

ἔχειν. Literally, “to have,” “to be in some condition.” One of **Aristotle’s** 10 categories (see *KATĒGORIAI*); see

Categories 15b18 for a list of examples. *Pōs echein* and *pōs echein pros ti* (how it is, and how it is in relation to something) are two of the four **Stoic** categories.

ECLECTIC

This term is applied to philosophers of the Hellenistic and Roman periods who seem to have selected their teachings from several of the schools of philosophy. **Panaetius** and **Posidonius**, both of the **Stoic** school, are regarded as eclectics because they were not rigidly dogmatic in their Stoicism; similarly, **Carneades** and **Philo of Larissa**, **Academics**, are regarded as eclectic because not dogmatically **Platonist**. **Cicero** was an eclectic par excellence—it is impossible to pin him down as a faithful follower of any of the classical schools. **Seneca** too, though generally Stoic, often expresses agreement with another school.

In a sense, many of the Platonists, **Neoplatonists**, and **Neopythagoreans** from the time of **Philo of Alexandria** onward were eclectic in a new way, blending religious doctrines and commitments with the teaching of classical schools.

EDUCATION

See [PAIDEIA](#).

EFFICIENT CAUSE

Aristotle distinguishes four “causes” (*aitia*): matter (*hylē*), mover (*kinoun*), form (*eidos*), and end (*telos*); his standard phrase for the second is *archē kinēseōs*, or source of movement. But sometimes movement results in something being “made,” in which case the moving cause is also a “making” cause, *poiētikon* (**Generation of Animals** I.21, 729b13). So in the medieval Latin commentaries, the general sense is *causa movens*, while if there is a new entity that comes to be, the source of its coming-to-be is a *causa efficiens*. *Efficiens* is Latin for *poiētikon*. In Aquinas, for example, the existence of **God** is demonstrated both as first “moving” cause (of any change whatever) and as first “efficient” cause (of the coming-to-be of entities). Subsequently the locution “efficient cause” came to be used of all moving causes, though this usage is etymologically inaccurate.

See also [AITION](#), [AITIA](#); [ARCHĒ](#).

EGYPTIAN ORIGINS OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY

In some circles there has been a certain vogue to claim that Greek philosophy was derived from prior Egyptian thought. In favor of that idea, we may note that both **Thales** and **Pythagoras** are reputed to have spent some time in

Egypt, as well as **Democritus**, **Eudoxus** (an associate of **Plato**), and possibly Plato himself. Further, **Isocrates** says in his *Busiris* that philosophy came from Egypt (the context is, however, a bit fanciful). On the other hand, it is hard to discern exactly what philosophical concepts or practices really could have been learned from the Egyptians, in view of the fact that surviving Egyptian texts from the period before Thales, as interesting as they may be in other respects, are at best marginally philosophical in character. Of course once Greek civilization established its beachhead at **Alexandria** at the end of the 4th century BCE, a good deal of cross-fertilization of ideas could and did occur, leading on the one hand to the great philosophical synthesis of **Plotinus**, and on the other to such things as **Gnosticism** and the **Hermetic corpus**.

EIDŌLON

Εἰδῶλον. Insubstantial image, as at **Plato**, *Sophist* 266b, or illusion, as at Plato, *Phaedo* 66c. **Aristotle** uses it of dream images, *Div. Somn.* 464b. **Epicurus** uses the word *eidōlon* to refer to the set of atoms (*atoma*) leaving the perceived object and coming to the eyes (*Letter to Herodotus* 46ff.), thus a “substantial” image.

EIDOS, EIDĒ

Εἶδος, εἶδη. Form, shape, kind, species. Noun built on the verb *idein*, to see. In **Homer** and generally in the poets, *eidos* is “form” or “shape,” particularly of a human being. In general 5th-century BCE usage, *eidos* also means “kind” or “species.” **Plato** adopted the word as one of his two standard words for the Forms (the other is *idea*). In the *Euthyphro* (5–6), **Socrates** proposes that “holiness” is an *eidos* that makes everything that is holy, holy. That usage is adopted and developed in *Phaedo* 103e, and many other places. What *eidē* are there, according to Plato? Holiness and all other ethical concepts are clearly *eidē*. Further, Plato gives many examples of mathematical *eidē*. *Phaedo* 101b–c talking of largeness and smallness, one and two, is typical. Plato clearly thinks that there are *eidē* of natural kinds (e.g., *Sophist* 266b), and even of artificial kinds, if we take seriously passages like *Republic* X, 597b, where **God** makes the archetypical bed. Problematically, Plato is led to assert Forms of relations (e.g., “equality” in *Phaedo* 74aff.) and of negations (ugly, bad, unjust, etc., *Rep.* 476a, for example). Putting it another way, one can find examples in the dialogues that appear to commit Plato to the belief that there are *eidē* of items in all of **Aristotle**’s 10 categories.

One supposes that Plato is led to that because he is convinced that the forms are necessary for the **being**, knowability, and sayability of anything in the phenomenal world, so there must in principle be Forms for anything that is, is known, or can be truly said. Still, there is clearly a hierarchy of Forms that lies behind much of what Plato says in the dialogues. In the *Republic*, the Good is the “sun” that illuminates all the other forms; in the *Phaedrus*, the **charioteer** sees some forms and not others; in the *Timaeus*, the **Demiourgos** looks at a structured set of forms to create the universe. The occupants and structure of the world of Forms must have been a lively topic in the early **Academy**, since we get reports of quite different accounts attributed to **Speusippos** and **Xenocrates**.

Aristotle accepted the use of the word *eidos* as picking out a natural kind, but rejected the notion that the *eidos* could exist independently of the individual material members of that kind. The word works in tandem with the word **genos**; in any analysis of kinds of things, the larger class is a *genos*, and the subgroups of the *genos* are *eidē*. In a definition, according to Aristotle, there is a *genos* term and a **diaphora**, difference.

EIKASIA

Εἰκασία. In the **Sun-Line-Cave** passage in **Plato’s Republic**, the epistemic condition corresponding to the lowest part of the line, and thus to the prisoners in the cave, is said to be *eikasia*. Since this is also said to be the epistemic condition of most people most of the time, there is some discussion concerning what, precisely, Plato means to say about this condition by using this word. While the word is obviously related to **eikōn**, it has a pre-Platonic life with the sense “conjecture, guesswork.” We might also note that we are told that **doxa** is divided into **pistis** and *eikasia*: we might parse this distinction by saying that beliefs are either well grounded or poorly grounded, with *eikasia* denoting the second. In the same vein, at *Meno* 98, **Socrates** uses the verb form (*eikazein*) to refer to opinions that might wander off, like the statues of Daedalus, if not tied down by an **appropriate logos**.

Aristotle occasionally uses the verb with the meaning “conjecture,” for example at **Nicomachean Ethics** II.6, 1106b30, where the **Pythagoreans** “conjecture” that evil belongs to the class of unlimited, and good to the limited.

EIKŌN

Εἰκών. Image. In **Plato’s** mode of thinking in terms of

mimēsis, the “imitation” of the real entity is an *eikōn*. The cave dwellers, in the **Sun-Line-Cave** passage in the **Republic**, are in an epistemic state of **eikasias**; all they are aware of is images, imitations. Of course any representational art that begins from these images is one more step away from reality (*Rep.* X). But at a higher level, so to speak, the visible world is the *eikōn* of the intelligible world (**Timaeus** 30), and time is the moving *eikōn* of eternity (*Tm.* 37d).

EKPYRŌSIS

Ἐκπύρωσις. Conflagration. (*Ek*, out; *pyrōsis*, burning.) According to the **Stoics**, the entire universe periodically all turns to **fire** and then starts over again. The fire that it turns into is at the same time **God**; that is, in the *ekpyrōsis*, the entire universe is literally one living rational being; that being then recommences the process of creating a varied universe.

EKSTASIS

Ἐκστασις. Literally, “displacement.” (*Ek*, out; *stasis*, standing.) **Aristotle** uses it for physical displacements, normally; a psychological sense appears in the biological context (**Parts of Animals** II.4, 650b30ff.), where bulls and boars are *ekstatikos*, “excitable.” At least once Aristotle uses the word to talk of insanity, at **Categories** 10a1 (*ekstasis manikē*). The word occurs fairly frequently in the New Testament, for example, Luke 5:26, usually to mean something like “amazement.” In **Plotinus**, it is used of the ultimate mystical union (**Enneads** VI.9.11).

ELEA

Ἑλέα. *Velia* in Latin and Italian. Town in Campania, Italy. Home of **Parmenides** and **Zeno**, and of their school. 40°09'34"N 15°09'15"E. Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #54 as Hyele.

ELEATIC SCHOOL

The noted members of the Eleatic school are **Parmenides of Elea**, **Zeno of Elea**, and **Melissus of Samos**. Sometimes **Xenophanes of Colophon** is cited as at least a precursor of the school, if not directly a teacher of Parmenides. We may add a fictional member of the school, the “Eleatic Stranger,” who appears in **Plato’s** **Sophist** and *Statesman*. The Eleatic school is notable for its uncompromising argumentation that **being** is one and that change and multiplicity are illusory.

ELEMENT

See [STOICHEION](#), [STOICHEIA](#).

ELENCHUS

Ἐλεγχος. Examination, refutation, rebuttal. In the context

of Greek philosophy, it is used primarily of **Socrates'** method of questioning. Typically the people with whom Socrates discusses commit themselves to believing some proposition, very often the definition of some personal quality, or at least a characterization of such a quality; by persistent questioning, these people come to admit also to believing something inconsistent with that original proposition. In some cases Socrates' interlocutors propose amended hypotheses, which are again in turn "examined" and again are shown to be inconsistent with other beliefs of the interlocutor. The entire process may be construed either as an examination of a belief or chain of beliefs, or as an examination of the person himself: for example, the *elenchus* of **Meno** in the *Meno* or of **Protagoras** in the *Protagoras* is not just an examination of possible understandings of the meaning of the word "virtue" (*aretē*) but also an examination of the character of Meno or of Protagoras himself.

ELEUTHERIA

Ἐλευθερία. Freedom or liberty, as opposed to slavery.

See also [DOULOS](#), [DOULEIA](#).

ELEUTHERIOTĒS

Ἐλευθεριότης. Liberality, generosity; the virtue (*aretē*) of acting like a free person as opposed to slavishly. **Aristotle**, *Nicomachean Ethics* IV.1, 1119b22ff.

ELIAN SCHOOL

School of philosophy founded by **Phaedo of Elis**; it was succeeded by the **Eretrian school** at the time of **Menedemus**, who moved the school from Elis to **Eretria**. Since Phaedo was a disciple of **Socrates**, the school is assumed to be roughly "Socratic" in character. The Elian school should not be confused with the **Eleatic school**, based in Elea, in southern Italy. Elis is in the western Peloponnesus.

See also [ELIS](#).

ELIAS

(6th CE.) Name associated with a commentary on **Porphyry's** *Isagoge*, a commentary on **Aristotle's** *Categories*, and some comments on Aristotle's *Prior Analytics*, produced, as it seems, in **Alexandria**. See C. Wildberg, "Elias," *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

ELIS

Ἐλῖς. Town in western Greece, home of **Phaedo** and the philosophical school that he founded, the **Elian school**. Other philosophers from Elis include **Hippias the Sophist**, **Alexinus**, and **Pyrrho the Skeptic**. Olympia, home of the Olympic

Games, is within its territory. 21°20'N 37°55'E. Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #251.

EMESA

Ἐμεσα. Now Homs, a city in Syria, 34°43'51"N 36°42'34"E. The novelist **Heliodorus**, the philosophical Christian bishop **Nemesius**, and the **Cynic Sallustius** all came from Emesa.

EMPEDOCLES OF ACRAGAS

Ἐμπεδοκλῆς. (c. 492–432 BCE.) Empedocles wrote two poems (or one poem with two parts), *On Nature* and *Purifications*. We have over 150 fragments of his **poetry**. Starting from **Pythagorean** and **Eleatic** insights, Empedocles claimed that there are four material elements (*stoicheia*)—**earth, water, air, and fire**—and two cosmic forces that act on those elements: love (*philia*) and strife (*neikos*). When strife gains absolute ascendancy, the four elements are separated out into concentric spheres; as love gains ascendancy, the elements join together to form organic unities, including living beings; in the total ascendancy of love, the **cosmos** is just one great spherical living being. Both the extreme conditions are unstable, and indeed the processes of coming to be and passing away that we observe in the world are local examples of this cosmic cycle. Empedocles applies his ideas to a wide range of natural phenomena, including, prominently, his observations of physiological processes.

Empedocles' religious ideas seem to be essentially **Pythagorean**, asserting that human beings have the souls (*psychai*) of fallen **angels** (*daimones*) that are paying for some obscure sin by living repeated lives in many life forms. Since human souls can inhabit animal bodies, and even some vegetables, Empedocles believes that the consumption of meat is a sin for which we pay by even more cycles of rebirth, and that we should also avoid bay leaves and beans.

The theory of the four elements is generally taken to be, in part, a response to **Parmenides**, since they are characterized as in themselves permanent and unchanging, as Parmenides asserted **being** to be. Empedocles goes on to try to explain how complex beings, including (especially) living things, are constructed of the four elements. Part of that story is a kind of abbreviated evolutionary account which proposes that some Forms that have been generated have perished, leaving what we see today. See R. Parry, "Empedocles," *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

See also [ACRAGAS](#); [STOICHEION](#), [STOICHEIA](#).

ENANTIA

Ἐναντία. Opposites. Several different ancient Greek physical theories supposed that change involved some tension or alternation between opposite characters. **Heraclitus** is an obvious example: “Things taken together are whole and not whole, brought together and brought apart, in tune and out of tune, out of all things there comes a **unity** and out of unity all things” (f. 10). The **Pythagoreans** constructed a list of oppositions, cited by **Aristotle** in *Metaphysics* I.5 thus:

Unlimited		
Odd		
Clarity		
Right		
Male		
Motion		
Straight		
Lightness		
Good		
Long		

Empedocles had “love” (*philia*) and “strife” (*neikos*); **Plato** in the *Timaeus* makes the “circles of the same and different” part of the fundamental **cosmology**. For Aristotle, the lowest level of **matter** is not really **earth, water, air, and fire**, but the pairs of opposites that characterize those elements: hot and cold, fluid and solid (*Parts of Animals* II.1, 646a17).

In Aristotle’s logic, *enantia* are contrary propositions, as at *On Interpretation* 17b4.

See also [ANTIPHASIS](#), [ANTIPHANAI](#); [DYAS](#); [SQUARE OF OPPOSITION](#); [STOICHEION](#), [STOICHEIA](#).

ENARGEIA

Ἐνάργεια. The self-evidence of perceived facts in Epicurean philosophy: **Epicurus**, *Letter to Herodotus*, 82. The “transparent clarity” of immediate perception (*aisthēsis*) is already noted by **Socrates** at *Theaetetus* 179c6, without conceding that it is knowledge (*epistēmē*). The **Stoics** and later **Academics** also note the “self-evidence” of some perceptions; whether one should take that self-evidence as tantamount to some sort of knowledge was a matter for discussion through the Hellenistic period.

ENCOMIUM OF HELEN

Ἐγκώμιον Ἑλένης. A surviving display speech of **Gorgias**, praising Helen of Troy, defending her against the criticisms that had been leveled at her. The goal of the exercise is of course to demonstrate the power of **Sophistic** rhetoric. See

Dillon & Gergel, *The Greek Sophists*, pp. 76ff.

See also [DEFENSE OF PALAMEDES](#); [RHĒTORIKĒ](#).

END

See [TELOS](#).

ENDECHOMENON

Ἐνδεχόμενον. Possible. (*En*, in; *dechesthai*, to be accepted.) In one sense, whatever is necessary is also possible (cf. **Aristotle**, *Prior Analytics* I.3, 25a36), but in another sense the “possible” is contrasted with the “necessary.”

See also [DYNATON](#).

ENDOXA

Ἐνδοξα. Accepted opinions. **Aristotle** often begins the study of a topic by summarizing the *endoxa*, with the apparent goal of critiquing those he must, and incorporating into his position as many as he can. “*Endoxa* are opinions that seem true to all or to the majority or to the wise” (**Topics** 1, 100a). The procedure is a kind of **dialectical** argument that is in some ways similar to that used by Plato, for Plato’s **dialogues** often begin with some statement of common opinions. But there is a difference of emphasis, since Plato is most often concerned to refute the opinions stated at the beginning, and Aristotle explicitly expects to find something reliable derived from the history of human thought. After Aristotle, collections of opinions are often used in a Skeptical way: given that so many wise people have thought such disparate and indeed contradictory things, perhaps we are best off suspending our belief entirely.

See also [DOXA](#).

ENERGEIA

Ἐνέργεια. “Activity,” or “**actuality**,” made into a technical term by **Aristotle**, defined in detail in **Metaphysics** IX.6–9. The word is based on **ergon**, meaning “work” or “function.” For Aristotle, a process, such as life, that is valuable in itself is an *energeia*, an actualization of potentials for such an activity to occur. **Dynameis**, potentials or powers, are passive or active; if an active power works on the **appropriate** passive power, an *energeia* results. Aristotle gives many examples of this form of analysis: if the active power present in the male semen comes into contact with the passive potentiality present in a developing chicken egg, the activity of embryological development of a chick results. If an active carpenter chooses to work with a pile of passive lumber, the activity of housebuilding may result. The *energeia* participates in the end

(*telos*).

See also [ENTELECHEIA](#).

ENKRATEIA, ENKRATĒS (EGKRATEIA, EGKRATĒS)

Ἐγκράτεια, ἐγκρατής. Self-control, a self-controlled person, often opposed to *akrasia*, *akrates*. In **Republic IV**, 430–431, **Socrates** argues that self-control is an incoherent concept, on the ground that the person controlling and the person controlled are presumably one and the same, while the idea of “control” is intrinsically binary. Presumably a truly unitary personality would simply do the right thing, effortlessly. By implication, however, *akrasia* is possible, if one’s personality is divided and at war with itself.

Aristotle discusses *enkrateia* specifically at **Nicomachean Ethics** VII.1–11. He distinguishes it from temperance, *sōphrosynē*, in that the *sōphrōn* habitually chooses correctly concerning bodily pleasures, presumably with no great effort once the good habits are established, while the *enkratēs* overcomes temptation in order to act correctly with regard to those same pleasures.

ENNEADS

The writings and teachings of **Plotinus**, as recorded, edited, and arranged by **Porphyry**. There are six books, each divided into nine tractates: thus the name “enneads,” which means “nines.” These numbers, as well as their product, 54, doubtless had esoteric meaning for Porphyry. The *Enneads* of Plotinus are readily available online.

ENNIUS, QUINTUS

(239–c. 169 BCE.) Foundational Latin poet, he anticipated **Lucretius** in including a good many philosophical ideas in his works. The *Epicharmus* puts speculation about the physical universe into a more or less theological setting; the *Euhemerus* is a poetic argument that the Olympian gods are (were) simply great human beings who have been thus commemorated. The fragments have been published together with the fragments of Caecilius, another Latin poet of the same epoch, in three Loeb volumes, available online.

ENNOĒMA

Ἐννόημα. Concept. (*En*, in; *noēma*, thought.) **Aristotle** uses the term in **Metaphysics** I.1, 981a6, as a product of experience. In **Stoic** epistemology, there is a distinction between *ennoia* and *ennoēma*: the *ennoēma* is particular; the *ennoia* is general.

ENNOIA

Ἐννοία. Concept or idea; literally, something in the mind

(**nous**). (*En*, in; *noia*, thinking.) In **Plato**, the usual word for this is *noēma* (see [NOËSIS](#), [NOËMA](#), [NOËTON](#)). **Aristotle** uses both words. *Ennoia* becomes a technical term in **Stoic** philosophy, where “common concepts” or *koinai ennoiai* are an important criterion (**kritērion**) of truth, a fundamental part of the epistemological system.

See also [ENNOËMA](#).

ENSTASIS

Ἐνστάσις. Objection. “A proposition contrary to a proposition” (**Aristotle**, *Prior Analytics* II.26, 69a37). In *Topics* VIII.10, 161a1ff., Aristotle distinguishes four kinds of *enstaseis*: (1) showing why the opponent’s point is false, (2) attacking the person, (3) attacking the person’s question, and (4) using up the available time. In the *Rhetoric* II.25, 1402a32, he states a different set of four—attacking the opponent’s statement, putting forth something similar, putting forth a statement contrary to it, or quoting previous decisions.

ENTELECHEIA

Ἐντελέχεια. Word invented by **Aristotle** suggesting the actual presence of an end—a Greek could understand the word as “having an end in it.” There is a closely similar word, already in use before Aristotle’s time, *endelecheia*, with a “d” instead of a “t,” meaning “continuity” or “persistence,” and Aristotle is doubtlessly using that connotation as well. One of the more famous places where Aristotle applies the word is in his definition of the soul (*psychē*) as “the first *entelecheia* of a natural organic body” (*De Anima* II.1), going on to explain that the soul is the actual presence of capacities (*dynameis*) of performing life functions.

See also [ENERGEIA](#).

EPAGŌGĒ

Ἐπαγωγή. Literally, bringing up, proposing, and thus to a method of persuasion. (*Epi*, on top of; *agōgē*, a leading or persuading.) In **Plato**, *Statesman* 278a, for example, it means a way of educating someone. **Aristotle** makes it something of a technical term, which we translate normally as “induction.” “*Epagōgē* is a passage from particulars to universals.” Comparing “induction” to “deduction,” Aristotle says that “induction is more convincing and clear; it is more readily learnt by the use of the senses, and is applicable generally to the mass of people, but deduction is more forcible and more effective against contradictory people” (*Topics* I.12, 105a10). The quick justification of induction in Aristotle’s thought is, “The universal is present in the clearly known **particular**.”

(See [KATHOLOU](#).) Plato sometimes uses the word **synagōgē** for a process rather similar in some respects to Aristotelian induction.

EPAISTHĒSIS

Ἐπαίσθησις. Sensory recognition. **Aisthēsis** is perception; the prefix *epi-* suggests something on top of perception. The **Epicureans** argued that perception can be reliable; the fact that we “recognize” items in our sensory field without any need to reason about it is one indication of that reliability.

EPHESUS

Ἐφεσος. 37°56'28"N 27°20'31"E. Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #844. An ancient Greek city on the Ionian coast, home of **Heraclitus**. In the Hellenistic period, when the former port area had silted in and become marshy and unhealthy due to malaria, it was relocated to higher ground. The city was noted for its temple of Artemis until its destruction by an earthquake and the Goths in the Roman period. It was also noted for the library of Celsus, instrumental in preserving ancient texts during the **Byzantine** period. Due to continued silting, the architectural remains are today several miles inland.

See also [ARTEMIDORUS OF EPHESUS \(OR DALDIS\)](#); [MAXIMUS OF EPHESUS](#).

EPH' HĒMIN

Ἐφ' ἡμίν. Up to us, in our power. A very common locution in Greek, it is not problematized until someone wonders whether *anything* is “up to us,” or is everything determined by causes originating outside ourselves. For example, **Aristotle**, in **Nicomachean Ethics** III.2, 1111b30, says that choice (**proairesis**) has to do with the things that are “up to us.” Although the **Stoics** are rigid determinists, they also say that when the causal chain goes through us, the consequences are “up to us,” “in our power.” As **Epictetus** puts it (I.1.7), it is a matter of how we use our impressions, how we think about things. See R. Sorabji, *Necessity, Cause and Blame*, 1980.

EPIBOLĒ

Ἐπιβολή. In **Epicurean** epistemology, focus of **attention** on the perceptual given; attention. This concept functions a bit as a fourth criterion (**kritērion**) of truth (**alētheia**), in addition to sensations, preconceptions (**prolēpseis**), and feelings.

EPICARMUS (OF KOS?)

Ἐπίχαρμος. (Between 540 and 450 BCE.) He is said to have studied with **Pythagoras**. **Aristotle** (**Poetics** 5, 1449b5) writes that he and Phormis invented comic plots. Aristotle also

quotes lines from his plays in the course of arguments, for example at **Nicomachean Ethics** III.5: "None would be evil, none are unwilling to be blessed." **Plato** mentions him in the **Gorgias** (505e) and **Theaetetus** (152e), where he is called "the top man of Comedy." **Diogenes Laertius** (III.9) says that Plato borrowed a good deal from Epicharmus.

There are a great many fragments of his works; they have been gathered and edited by L. Rodriguez-Noriega.

Kos (**Cos**) was the home of **Hippocrates**, the physician; it is a fairly small Greek island off the southwest coast of Turkey, 36°51'N 27°14'E, Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #497.

EPICETETUS

Ἐπικτήτος. (c. 50–135 CE.) Born into **slavery** in Hieropolis, Phrygia, Epictetus learned **Stoic** philosophy from **Musonius Rufus**. Freed from slavery, he set up his school in Nicopolis. His student **Arrian** copied down his major teachings in a book called the *Encheiridion* (Handbook) and many of his **diatribes**, available in a largish volume called, in English, *Discourses*. These works are readily available. See A. A. Long, *Epictetus*, 2004. Nicopolis is in **Epirus**, northwest Greece, 39°00'30"N 20°44'01"E.

EPICURUS AND EPICUREANISM

Ἐπικουρος. Epicurus was born about 341 and lived in **Samos** and various places in Ionia, including **Teos**, where he studied with **Nausiphanes**, an **atomist** and **Skeptic**. About 307 he moved to **Athens** and purchased the home and **Garden** where his friends and followers gathered; he died in about 270. Of his many writings, three complete *Letters* survive, and two collections of his sayings, as well as numerous fragments, and some papyrus from Herculaneum, probably from the library of Philodemus, an Epicurean philosopher. Otherwise, the major sources for the philosophy of Epicurus are the biography in **Diogenes Laertius** X; the great poem of **Lucretius**, *De Rerum Natura*; and the inscriptions of **Diogenes of Oenoanda**.

The immediate followers of Epicurus included (among others) **Hermarchus**, **Metrodorus of Lampsacus (2)**, and **Polyaenus**, who also wrote texts available in antiquity. The school included several **women**, and Epicurus tried to make his teachings accessible to everyone, regardless of level of education or culture.

Epicurus was an **atomist** in his physical theory, following the teachings of **Leucippus** and **Democritus**, but adding the idea of the **swerve**, that atoms (*atoma*) would occasionally

move randomly rather than predictably. The “gospel” of Epicurus is that there is no life after death, consequently no punishment or suffering after death, so the best we can do is to concentrate on making our present life as happy as possible. Epicurus was both a psychological and ethical hedonist. See D. Konstan, “Epicurus,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

See also [LEONTION](#); [LEONTIUS OF LAMPSACUS](#); [IDOMENEUS OF LAMPSACUS](#); [POLYSTRATUS](#); [TETRAPHARMAKOS](#).

EPIDAUROS

Ἐπίδauρος. The Asklepeion at Epidaurus was the most famous ancient healing center. People slept in its large sleeping hall, hoping to have a dream indicating the possible cure of whatever ailed them. It is also noted for its fine theater. 37°38'N 23°8'E. Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #348.

See also [PAMPHILE OF EPIDAUROS](#).

EPIDEIXIS

Ἐπίδειξις. Demonstration. *EPIDEIKTIKOS*. Ἐπιδεικτικός. Demonstrative. *EPIDEIKNUMI*. Ἐπιδείκνυμι. To show or exhibit. **Gorgias**, in the *Palamedes*, uses the verb to introduce evidence in support of his case. **Socrates**, in the *Apology* (24a7), uses it to introduce his cross-examination of Meletus; **Plato** uses forms of the verb quite often, for example of Euclides “showing” the written version of the *Theaetetus* to Terpsion (*Tht.* 143a7). In the *Posterior Analytics* (I.24, 85a27), **Aristotle** says that a universal proof (*apodeixis*) “shows” something in a way, using the verb. In *Rhetoric* I.3, 1358b7, “epideictic” (*epideiktikos*) is one of the three sorts of oratory, that of praise or censure of someone.

EPIEIKEIA

Ἐπιείκεια. Reasonableness, equity; defined by **Aristotle**, *Nicomachean Ethics* V.10, 1137a32ff., as “the just, but not the legally just but a correction of legal justice” where the universality of the law does not deal correctly with individual cases. The word is used somewhat ambiguously of equitable states of affairs and of equitable people. In **Plato**, *Laws* V, 735a, it is just “reasonable.”

EPIGRAMMA

Ἐπίγραμμα. Epitaph, short poem, epigram. (Written upon.) Ancient philosophers often quote poetry, including epigrams; in addition, some epigrams are attributed to philosophers. The *Greek Anthology* includes several attributed to **Plato**, for example, “Some say there are nine **Muses**. How

thoughtless! Look at Sappho of Lesbos; she makes a tenth” (IX.506). **Aristotle** refers to several, for example the Delphic epigram, “Most noble is that which is most just, best is health, but pleasantest to win that which we love” (**Nicomachean Ethics** I.8, 1099a25). **Chrysippus**, judging from remaining fragments, packed a great many quotations of poetry, including epigrams, into his writings; this practice continued and perhaps increased in later writers.

See also [POETRY](#).

EPIMARTYREIN

Ἐπιμαρτυρεῖν. Attest, bear witness to. In **Epicurean** epistemology, true opinions are those that are “attested” and uncontested by self-evidence.

EPINOMIS

Ἐπινόμις. Dialogue sometimes attributed to **Plato**, otherwise to **Philip of Opus**. It is a kind of appendix to the **Laws** in which the participants in the *Laws* reconvene at a later time to discuss the nature of wisdom (**sophia**). After a quick review of the “lesser” forms of wisdom, the study of mathematics and especially astronomy, the abode of divine beings, is regarded as the highest form of wisdom. Whoever the author, the theory clearly moves beyond that of the **Timaeus** and comes closer to that of **Aristotle** in **Metaphysics** XII.

EPIPHORA

Ἐπιφορά. Term used by **Chrysippus** to denominate the conclusion of a **sylogism**. The word means, roughly, that which is carried in, in addition.

EPIRUS

Ἠπείρος. This is territory now shared by Albania and Greece; it was the location of the school of **Epictetus**, and later the home of **Priscus of Epirus**, a 4th CE **Neoplatonist**. It had been the realm of Pyrrhus of Epirus who waged war against Rome and gained “Pyrrhic victories” in 280 and 279 BCE, temporarily defeating the Romans, but losing so much of his army that he was not able to continue the war.

EPISTÊMĒ

Ἐπιστήμη. Knowledge, particularly knowledge of necessarily true propositions, derived from the verb *epistasthai*, to stand upon. The **pre-Socratics** do not usually use the word *epistēmē*; they prefer **sophia**, **gnomē**, or **gnōsis**. One place where the verb form occurs is **Heraclitus** f. 41: “Wisdom is one thing: it is to know (*epistasthai*) the thought that steers all things through all things.” **Stobaeus** cites

Democritus as saying (f. 181), “Thus a person becomes simultaneously courageous and right-thinking in virtue of understanding and knowledge (*epistēmē*) of correct action.” In **Plato**, *epistēmē* is regularly about the Forms (*eidē*), whether in the *Meno*, *Phaedo*, *Republic*, *Sophist*, or *Timaeus*. In the *Theaetetus*, the hypotheses that *epistēmē* is the same as perception (*aisthēsis*), true opinion (*alēthē doxa*), or true opinion with an account (*logos*) are all refuted.

For **Aristotle**, *epistēmē* is about the causes, represented in syllogistic deductions (*Posterior Analytics*). In *Metaphysics* VI, Aristotle says that *epistēmē* may be distinguished into practical, productive, and theoretical, and theoretical knowledge may be distinguished into mathematical, physical, and theological. In translations of Aristotle, *epistēmē* is often and reasonably translated as “**science**.”

Zeno the Stoic, according to **Cicero** (*Academica* II.145), spread out his fingers of one hand and said, “An impression is like this”; then he brought his fingers together a little and said, “Assent is like this.” Then, making a fist, he said that this was *katalēpsis*; and bringing his other hand and wrapping it strongly around his fist, he said that this was *epistēmē*, and that only the wise man possesses it.

EPITHYMIA

Ἐπιθυμία. Appetite, desire. (*Thumos*, strong emotion; plus *epi*, toward.) For **Plato**, the *epithymētikon*, or desiderative part of the soul (*psychē*), is characteristic of the productive classes in the *Republic*, and the relevant virtue (*aretē*) is temperance (*sōphrosynē*). For **Aristotle**, *epithymia* is the *orexis* for pleasure.

EPOCHĒ

Ἐποχή. Suspension of judgment. (An *oxē* is a support or vehicle; thus *epochē* is on a support, suspended.) The recommendation that one suspend judgment in order to live more happily characterizes **Pyrrhonian Skepticism** (**Diogenes Laertius** IX.61–62). The **Academic Skeptics** would, I think, suspend judgment even about that proposition.

See also [SKEPTIKOS](#).

EQUITY

See [EPIEIKEIA](#).

ERASISTRATUS

Ἐρασίστρατος. (From Iulis on Ceos.) (c. 315–240 BCE.) Erasistratus was a physician, said to have connections with the **Peripatos**. For example, his teacher **Metrodorus** was the husband of **Aristotle**’s daughter Pythias. He practiced

medicine (*iatrikē*) both in **Antioch** and in **Alexandria**. **Pliny the Elder** claims that Erasistratus was the grandson of Aristotle, via Aristotle's daughter Pythias; if that is true, then he would have been the son of Metrodorus who is otherwise reported to be his teacher, and brother of Aristotle the younger. Erasistratus is attested to have dissected human cadavers, and **Celsus** says that he vivisected condemned criminals provided by the Alexandrian court. Erasistratus took special interest in the nervous and circulatory systems; his dissections advanced the understanding of both, although he thought that the nerves were hollow (with psychic *pneuma* inside them) and that the arteries had "vital" *pneuma* in them. Although **Galen** criticized him, he also followed much that Erasistratus said.

Iulis was a small *polis* on the island of **Ceos**, now known as Kea, 37°37'N 24°20'E. It is about 60 miles southeast of Athens. Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #491 (Ioulis).

ERASTUS OF SCEPSIS

Ἐραστός. (4th BCE.) Brother of Coriscus, student of **Plato**, friend of **Aristotle**. The brothers accompanied Aristotle to **Assos**, quite close to their hometown.

See also [SKEPSIS](#), [SCEPSIS](#).

ERATOSTHENES

Ἐρατοσθένης. (c. 276–194 BCE.) Originally from **Cyrene** (Libya), he studied with **Zeno of Citium** (perhaps), **Aristo of Chios**, and **Arcesilaus of Pitane**. An early work looked at the mathematical foundation of **Plato's** philosophy. Although he is supposed to have written on a large range of subjects and composed respectable **poetry**, he is best known as a geographer; he accurately calculated the circumference of the **earth**. **Strabo** (1.2) is however critical of his work.

Eratosthenes wrote several chronological works; one of them stabilized Hellenic chronology by compiling a list of Olympic victors with the years of their victories. Eratosthenes was head of the Library in **Alexandria** after **Apollonius of Rhodes**, from about 247.

ERESOS

Ἐρεσός. Town on the island of Lesbos, 39°10'7"N 25°55'53"E. Home of **Theophrastus** and **Phanias**. Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #796.

ERETRIA

Ἐρέτρια. Town in Euboea, across a narrow strait from the northern part of Attica, 38°24'N 23°48'E, Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #370. Home of the **Eretrian school**, and particularly of

Menedemus.

ERETRIAN SCHOOL

The Eretrian school was a continuation of the **Elian school**, founded by **Phaedo of Elis**, transferred to **Eretria** by **Menedemus** and **Asclepiades of Phlius**. The school is assumed to have been **Socratic**, in some sense.

ERGON

Ἔργον. Work, function. **Heraclitus** f. 48: “The name of the bow is life (**bios**), but its *ergon* is death.” **Aristotle** distinguishes different senses: the activity, and the goal (**Eudemian Ethics** II.1, 1219a13ff.). So the *ergon* of the art of medicine (**iatrikē**) is both the process of curing and the ultimate state of health. In other cases the activity *is* the goal, as seeing, contemplating, and indeed living. *Ergon* is the basis for Aristotle’s technical term **energeia**.

ERIS

Ἔρις. Strife, with **philia** (friendship), one of the **Empedocles**’ two cosmic motivating principles, though he somewhat more frequently uses the word **neikos** for strife. In **Heraclitus**, *eris* is one of the words for the opposition of opposites, f. 80: “We must know that war is common to all and strife (*eris*) is justice, and that all things come into being through strife necessarily.”

ERISTIC

Ἐριστική. *Eristikē*. Verbal competition aimed at victory, not necessarily understanding. **Plato** and **Aristotle** distinguish “eristic” from “**dialectic**,” accusing some **Sophists** of willfully using patently bad arguments competitively. Plato’s **Euthydemus** and Aristotle’s **Sophistical Refutations** both present many such arguments.

ERŌS

Ἔρως. Love or desire—especially sexual; personified as the **God** of love. **Parmenides**: “First of all the gods she contrived *Erōs*” (f. 13). Two of **Plato**’s most famous **dialogues** focus on understanding *erōs*, the **Symposium** and the **Phaedrus**. Plato’s true or best *erōs* is a desire for union with the beautiful that leads those with more enlightened souls (**psychai**) to seek the Forms (**eidē**). Inferior *erōs* leads to an attempt to satisfy physical desires, particularly sexual. Plotinus also speaks of *erōs* as motivating union with the one: *Enneads* I.6.

See also [PHILIA](#).

ESOTERIC PHILOSOPHY

See [EXŌTERIKOI LOGOI](#).

ESSENCE

“*Essentia*” is **Cicero**’s translation of **Aristotle**’s phrase, *to ti ēn einai*, τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι. The Greek phrase literally means something like “the what it would be to be (something)” or “the to be what is.” Cicero’s translation takes the infinitive *esse* of the Latin verb meaning “to be” and its participle *ens*, getting *essens*, and adds the abstract ending *-tia* to make an abstract noun meant to convey the sense of Aristotle’s phrase. (The Greek **ousia** is formed somewhat similarly, out of the participle equivalent to “**being**” plus the abstract ending.)

Aristotle defines *to ti ēn einai* at **Metaphysics** VII.4, 1029b14, as “that which is said about each thing per se (*kath’ hautō*).” At 1029b27, he says, “Suppose the name of something is ‘cloak’. What is the to be for a cloak? [τί ἐστι τὸ ἱματίῳ εἶναι] This would be nothing other than what is said of it per se.” So stating the essence, or “the what it is to be x,” would be to give the definition; it picks out the species or **eidōs** of a **genos**. Thus, if “thunder” is defined as “the noise of fire being quenched in the clouds,” that set of words conveys the essence of thunder; it tells you what thunder is (**Topics** I.5, 102a3). In **Metaphysics** VII.4–6, Aristotle distinguishes between essential and non-essential properties: if Roger is human, then it belongs to Roger’s essence that he is a language user; but the shade of his skin is not part of Roger’s essence, although it is part of his *ousia* as an individual thing.

See also [TI ESTI](#).

ESTI

Ἔστι. “Is,” the third-person singular of the verb *einai*, “to be.” It is the word of truth that the Goddess brings to **Parmenides** (f. 2, 3).

See also [OUSIA](#); [TI ESTI](#).

ETERNITY

See [AIŌN](#).

ETHER

See [AITHĒR](#).

ETHICS

Aristotle, inventor of the word “ethics” (see [ETHIKĒ ARETĒ](#)), says that “in the time of **Socrates**, people turned from inquiry into nature, and philosophers turned to political studies and the useful virtues” (**Parts of Animals** I.2, 642a30). An overly strong reading of that statement would suggest that there was no “moral philosophy” before the late 5th century BCE. Of course there was some, but in terms of degree of emphasis, it is fair to say that there was a philosophical shift.

Heraclitus, the **Pythagoreans**, and **Empedocles** all had things to say about how one ought to live; even more, the poets often had much to say about the good life—or the bad life, depending on the poem and the poet.

But in a way, Aristotle is right, in that philosophical *discussion* of morality largely begins “in the time of Socrates,” and most especially with the challenge to traditional morality posed by the **Sophists**, and with Socrates’ counterattack.

Ancient philosophers, from that time on, often focused primarily on how one ought to live one’s life; the **Epicureans** taught that living apart from the world, undisturbed, was the path to happiness; the **Stoics** obeyed the dictates of cosmic reason in their lives.

ETHIKĒ ARETĒ

Ἠθική ἀρετή. Moral virtue. The phrase is **Aristotle’s**, distinguishing excellences of character and habit from physical health on the one hand and virtues of skill and intelligence on the other. He emphasizes courage (**andreia**) and temperance (**sōphrosynē**), but includes the virtues of liberality (**eleutheriōtēs**), magnificence (**megaloprepeia**), proper pride (**megalopsychia**), **appropriate** ambition, even-temperedness, sociability, honesty, wittiness, and tact in his discussion in **Nicomachean Ethics** IV. Aristotle also distinguishes (in *EN* V) several personal qualities centered around justice: being a “just” person both in the sense of fair and in the sense of law abiding (see **DIKĒ**, **DIKAIOS**, **DIKAIOSYNĒ**) and equitableness (**epieikeia**).

Plato discusses some of these virtues, without calling them “ethical,” in various **dialogues**. The **Laches** focuses on courage, the **Charmides** on temperance, the **Republic** on both of those plus justice. It is interesting to note that Aristotle has nothing to say about “piety” or **hosiotēs**, the topic of Plato’s **Euthyphro**.

See also **ĒTHOS**.

ĒTHOS

ἦθος. Ethos; character. **Heraclitus** f. 119: “*ēthos anthropōi daimōn*,” “For a human being, character is destiny.” Virtue **ethics**, whether **Socratic**, **Aristotelian**, or **Stoic**, is in a sense about “character”—“*ēthikos*,” as in the title of Aristotle’s **Nicomachean** and **Eudemian** “**Ethics**,” is the adjective form of the noun. In Aristotle’s **Poetics**, *ēthos* is the crucial element of “character,” without which there is no drama. **Zeno the Stoic** is quoted as saying, “*Ēthos* is the spring of life from which actions individually flow” (*SVF* I.50).

EUBULIDES OF MILETUS

Εὐβουλίδης. (4th BCE.) **Megarian** philosopher, successor of **Euclides** as head of the school. He is credited with formulating the “Liar” paradox, the “Bald Man” paradox, and several others of the sort. (**Diogenes Laertius** II.108, 109, 111.)

See also [MILETUS](#).

EUCLID OF ALEXANDRIA

Εὐκλείδης. (fl. c. 300 BCE.) Geometer, supposed to be the author of the *Elements*, *Sectio Canonis*, *Phenomena*, *Optics*, and *Data*. These works were fundamental for the study of mathematics for more than 2,000 years. Euclid is thought to have been a **Peripatetic** in his philosophical leanings. The *Elements* are readily available. See I. Mueller, *Philosophy of Mathematics and Deductive Structure in Euclid's Elements*, 1981.

See also [ALEXANDRIA](#); [MATHĒMA](#), [MATHĒMATA](#); [TA MATHĒMATIKA](#).

EUCLIDES OF MEGARA

(c. 450–380 BCE.) Student of **Socrates**, founded a school in **Megara**. Euclides is in the “frame” **dialogue** of the *Theaetetus*; he claims that he wrote down the dialogue as Socrates told it to him. He is listed as present in the *Phaedo*. **Diogenes Laertius** says (III.6) that **Plato** and other associates of Socrates visited Euclides after the death of Socrates. Diogenes also says that Euclides rather liked **Parmenides'** philosophy (DL II.106). In *Metaphysics* IX.3, 1046b30ff., **Aristotle** refutes a doctrine of the “Megarians” that looks rather **Eleatic** in inspiration. **Ichthyas** and **Eubulides of Miletus** were his successors in the school.

See also [MEGARIAN SCHOOL](#).

EUDAIMONIA

Εὐδαιμονία. Happiness; etymologically, the condition of having a good **angel**, widely regarded as the ultimate goal of human existence. **Democritus** B171 gives a good summary of the popular philosophical understanding:

Happiness does not dwell in flocks of cattle or in gold. Happiness, like unhappiness, is a property of the soul (*psychē*). And it is right that men should value the soul rather than the body (*sōma*); for perfection of soul corrects the inferiority of the body, but physical strength without intelligence does nothing to improve the mind. Men find happiness neither by means of the body nor

through possessions, but through uprightness and wisdom.

The conclusion of **Plato**, *Republic* I, against **Thrasymachus**, is that it is the just person who is happy (*Rep.* I, 354); that thesis is, in a sense, defended throughout the rest of the *Republic*. In *Nicomachean Ethics*, **Aristotle** defines *eudaimonia* as “virtuous activity of the soul” and makes it the goal of human existence, as if everyone, at least in principle, agreed with that thesis. He also believes that a *polis* may, in principle, be itself *eudaimon*. For the **Stoics**, *eudaimonia* is not the end of life (that would be virtue itself), but a concomitant of the virtuous life). For the **Epicureans**, happiness is the maximization of pleasure (*hēdonē*) and minimization of pain (*lypē*).

EUDEMIAN ETHICS

Ἠθικὰ Εὐδημεία. Abbr. *EE*. (Treatise by Aristotle.) One of two major treatises on **ethics** by Aristotle, the *Eudemian Ethics* shares three of its central books with the *Nicomachean Ethics*. In most respects the two works are very consistent with each other; some of the differences include the primacy of the theoretical life in the *Nicomachean Ethics* as opposed to a life of all the **virtues** in the *Eudemian*; the *Eudemian* has more emphasis on gentleness and less on pride; and the treatment of friendship is more altruistic in the *Eudemian*. Stylistically the three common books more nearly resemble the *Eudemian* style—some scholars argue that this means the *Eudemian Ethics* was written first and the *Nicomachean* is an incomplete revision; a few scholars think that the *Nicomachean* is the earlier version. For a discussion of the issues, see A. Kenny, *Aristotle on the Perfect Life*, 1996.

EUDEMUS OF RHODES

Εὐδήμος. (Late 4th BCE.) A student of **Aristotle**, he founded an Aristotelian school in **Rhodes**. He seems to have taken copies of (many of) the books in the **Lyceum** library; according to ancient accounts, those copies may be one of the ultimate sources of much of the Aristotelian **corpus** we have today. His major contributions were in logic, mathematics, and the history of these and related fields. **Alexander of Aphrodisias** and other later authors cite him rather frequently; for example, he is thought to have argued that “existence” is a predicate. He was credited with the *Eudemian Ethics* at one time, but it is now thought that this was simply the version of Aristotle’s *Ethics* present in the library of Eudemus. See I.

Bodnar & W. Fortenbaugh, *Eudemus of Rhodes*, 2002.

EUDORUS OF ALEXANDRIA

(1st BCE.) Eudorus was a **Platonist**, a contemporary of **Arius Didymus**. He wrote a *Concise Survey of Philosophy*, apparently arranged by subject matter rather than chronologically; significant pieces and reports of his writings are preserved by **Stobaeus**. According to **Strabo** (*Geographica* 17) he also wrote a book on the Nile. His interest in **Pythagorean** thought anticipates the flourishing of **Neopythagoreanism** over the next several centuries; his anti-Aristotelian stands also anticipate the views of many subsequent Platonists. See J. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists*, 1996.

EUDOXUS OF CNIDUS

Εὐδόξος ὁ Κνίδιος. (c. 408–355 BCE.) In antiquity he was counted as a **Pythagorean**. He studied with **Archytas** in **Tarentum** and traveled to **Egypt** to study mathematics and **astronomy**. He also studied with **Plato**; he is reported both to have had his own school and to have been associated with Plato in the **Academy**. His mathematical discoveries are reported (and included) in **Euclid**; his astronomical explanations influenced those of **Aristotle** in *Metaphysics* XII. Aristotle also attributes to him a hedonistic ethical theory (*Nicomachean Ethics* X.2, 1172b; cf. **Diogenes Laertius** VIII.86–87). Cnidus (Knidos) is an ancient Greek city on the southwest Turkish coast, 36°41'09"N 27°22'30"E, Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #903.

See also [MATHĒMA](#), [MATHĒMATA](#); [TA MATHĒMATIKA](#).

EUENUS (EVENUS) OF PAROS

Εὐήνος. (5th BCE.) In the *Phaedo* (60d), **Socrates** recommends that he follow him (into death) as soon as possible, getting the discussion going. He is also mentioned in the *Apology* (20b) and *Phaedrus* (267a). At *Nicomachean Ethics* VII.10, 1152a32, **Aristotle** quotes these lines from him:

I say that habit's but long practice, friend,
And this becomes men's nature in the end.

Although he charged for teaching, Socrates never calls him a **Sophist**; he seems to have respected him.

Paros is an island in the midst of the Greek Cyclades, 37°5'N 25°9'E. It was also the home of the poet Archilochus, notably, and is the source of very fine white marble. Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #509.

EUGENIUS OF PAPHLAGONIA

(3rd–4th CE.) **Aristotelian** working in Constantinople, writing commentaries on Aristotle. He was the father of **Themistius**, who wrote an oration about him when he died. Paphlagonia was a territory on the Black Sea coast of what is now Turkey. See R. J. Pinella, *The Private Orations of Themistius*, 2000.

EULOGOS

Εὐλογος. Reasonable, sensible, probable. (*Eu-*, good; plus *logos*.) The adverbial form, *eulogōs*, εὐλόγως, also occurs frequently enough. At **Phaedo** 62d, **Cebes** agrees that it is “reasonable” that we are the possessions of God; **Aristotle** uses the word very often, for example at **Nicomachean Ethics** I.6, 1096b5, where he says that it is “reasonable” for the **Pythagoreans** to put the One into the column of goods.

EUNAPIUS OF SARDIS

Εὐνάπιος. (c. 346–after 414 CE.) Eunapius was the author of *Lives of the Philosophers and Sophists*, a book of biographies of **Neoplatonists** beginning from **Plotinus**, contemporary rhetoricians (**Sophists**), and a few physicians with a philosophical or rhetorical education. Eunapius, a committed pagan, provides an interesting perspective on the interaction between **Christianity** and paganism in the intellectual world of the 4th century CE. The W. C. Wright translation is available in the Loeb series, and online.

See also [RHĒTORIKĒ](#); [SARDIS](#).

EUPATHEIA

Εὐπάθεια. (*Eu-*, good; plus *path-*, emotion; plus an abstract ending.) The state of having positive feelings about something (**Aristotle**, **Nicomachean Ethics** VIII.9, 1159a21); the condition of having innocent emotions, in **Stoic** philosophy.

EUPHANTUS OF OLYNTHUS

Εὐφάντος. (fl. c. 320 BCE.) **Megarian**, student of **Eubulides of Miletus**, he taught Antigonos I “One-Eyed,” king of **Macedonia**. He wrote well-received tragedies and *On Kingship*, addressed to Antigonos, as well as a history of his epoch (**Diogenes Laertius** II.110, 141).

See also [OLYNTHUS](#).

EUPHRAEUS

Εὐφράϊος. (4th BCE, d. c. 342/1.) Student of **Plato** who became politically active. The (probably spurious) Letter 5 of Plato tells about this political activity; Demosthenes in his *Third Philippic* praises Euphraeus’ actions. **Athenaeus** also talks about him (*Deipnosophistae* XI.506d–4, 508d–e).

EUPHRATES

Εὐφρόρες. (c. 35–118 CE.) **Stoic**, cited by **Philostratus** (*Lives of the Sophists* I.7; *Vit. Apoll.* II.13), Stephanus of **Byzantium** (*Epiphaneia*), and **Eunapius**. When **Pliny the Younger** was serving in Syria (around 81 CE), he became friendly with Euphrates and gives a detailed account of him (*Epistles* I.10). **Epictetus** (III.15, IV.8) and **Marcus Aurelius** (X.31) also took note of him. He seems to have been more of a philosophical showman than a deep thinker.

EURIPIDES

Εὐριπίδης. (c. 486–406 BCE.) Athenian dramatist closely associated in the public mind of his time with his contemporary **Socrates**. **Diogenes Laertius** II.5 suggests that Euripides studied with **Anaxagoras** and **Damon**. In any case it is fairly obvious that Euripides exploits the philosophical discussions of his day in his plays. See D. J. Conacher, *Euripides and the Sophists*, 1998.

EURYTUS

Εὐρυτος. (c. 400 BCE.) **Pythagorean** student of **Philolaus**. **Diogenes Laertius** III.6 says that **Plato** visited him and Philolaus in Italy after the death of Socrates. **Aristotle** says, “This is how Eurytus decided what was the number of what (e.g., of man, or of horse), by imitating the figures of living things with pebbles, as some people bring numbers into the forms of triangle and square” (*Metaphysics* XIV.5, 11092b10ff.). **Alexander of Aphrodisias** *Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics*, 837.9–19, provides more detail—it looks like Eurytus would make a mosaic image, then count the stones.

EUSEBIUS OF CAESAREA

(c. 275–339 CE.) **Christian** apologist and church historian; his account of the conflict between Arians and Athanasians is particularly informative. His *Preparation for the Gospel* is a detailed refutation of **Porphyry’s** *Against the Christians*. He was a major contributor to the formulation of the canonical Christian Bible. Most of the works of Eusebius are available online.

See also [CAESAREA](#).

EUSEBIUS OF MYNDUS

(4th CE.) **Neoplatonist**, described by **Eunapius** as a link in the “**Golden Chain**.” Student of **Aedesius** of Pergamon, he cared more about logic than about **magic** and theurgy (**theourgia**). Myndus was located on a peninsula on the Ionian coast, now occupied by the Turkish village of Gümüslük,

EUSTATHIUS OF CAPPADOCIA

Εὐστάθιος. (4th CE.) **Neoplatonist** and **Sophist**, student of **Iamblichus** and **Aedesius**, Eustathius is chronicled by **Eunapius**. The emperor Constantius II sent him as ambassador to Persia, where he decided to remain. According to Eunapius, his wife **Sosipatra** was even more talented. Their son **Antoninus** also became a philosopher. Cappadocia is a region in the center of Turkey, 38°39'30"N 34°51'13"E.

EUTHYDEMUS

(Dialogue by **Plato**.) Εὐθύδημος. **Socrates** recounts to **Crito** a discussion he had had with two **Sophist** brothers, **Euthydemus** and Dionysodorus. The brothers demonstrate their **eristic** skills first with Clinias, then with Ctesippus, and finally with Socrates himself, showing how to argue both sides of any question, often with clearly fallacious arguments. When Dionysodorus argues, "You have a dog, that dog is the father of puppies, so since the dog is yours and a father, he is your father" (summary of 298), readers often dismiss the dialogue as a big joke, but the dialogue does present a comparison of Socratic and Sophistic methods of teaching, and some of the arguments do raise, without sensible resolution to be sure, important epistemological and ontological issues. See R. S. W. Hawtrey, *Commentary on Plato's Euthydemus*, 1981.

EUTHYDEMUS OF CHIOS

Sophist, appears in **Plato's** **dialogue** named after him, with his brother Dionysodorus. **Aristotle** cites him a couple of times for Sophistic arguments that do not appear in the dialogue.

See also [CHIOS](#).

EUTHYPHRO

(Dialogue by **Plato**.) Εὐθύφρων. On his way to the king archon to respond to the charges brought against him, **Socrates** meets a very religious man, Euthyphro, who is bringing charges against his father for causing the death of a servant on his estate. Socrates asks him to explain the meaning of piety, **hosiotēs**, to him, so that he can defend himself against the charge of impiety. Euthyphro says first that it is doing as the gods do, though the traditional stories of the gods make that account improbable; he then suggests that it is doing what the gods love, to which Socrates responds by asking whether the pious is pious because the gods love it, or do they love it because it is pious.

And if piety is a part of **justice**, what part is it? Euthyphro

suggests caring for the gods, service to the gods, a knowledge of how to engage in trade with the gods. All of these attempts fail, and Euthyphro hurries away. See R. E. Allen, *Plato's "Euthyphro" and the Earlier Theory of Forms*, 1970.

EUTOCIUS OF ASCALON

(5th–6th CE.) **Platonist**, teacher of **Olympiodorus** and **David**. Primarily a mathematician, there are several surviving commentaries on Apollonius (mathematician) and **Archimedes**. He also seems to have written a (lost) commentary on **Porphyry's** *Isagoge*. He seems to have been, for a time, director of the **Alexandrian** school.

See also [ASCALON](#).

EVANDER

Εὐάνδρος. (3rd–2nd BCE.) **Academic**, he was the student and successor of **Lacydes**, joint **Scholarch** in **Athens** with **Telecles**. Evander and Telecles were already joint Scholarchs during the long final illness of Lacydes. **Hegesinus** succeeded them. (**Diogenes Laertius** IV.60.) **Iamblichus** mentions several **Pythagoreans** named Evander.

EVENUS

See [EUENUS \(EVENUS\) OF PAROS](#).

EVERLASTING

See [AIDIOS](#).

EVIL

See [KAKOS](#), [KAKĒ](#), [KAKON](#).

EXISTENCE

See [HYPARCHEIN](#); [OUSIA](#).

EXŌTERIKOI LOGOI

Ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι. Literally, “exterior accounts.” **Aristotle** uses the phrase several times, and scholars have puzzled over what precisely it means. What or whose *logoi* would those exterior *logoi* be? In two **Nicomachean Ethics** passages (I.13, 1102a26; VI.3, 1140a3) it would be easy to take the reference to be to non-Aristotelians or to non-specialists in philosophy; at **Politics** III.6, 1278b30, and VII.1, 1323a21, the reference is clearly to Aristotle's own popular presentations. Similarly at **Metaphysics** XIII.1, 1076a28, it makes more sense to suppose that he is referring to his own “external *logoi*.” Are any of the works that survive in the **corpus** Aristotelicum *exōterikoi logoi*? Some scholars of Aristotle would respond, “Probably not.”

A possible source of confusion for those who are not familiar with the Greek language is the use of the phrase *esōterikoi logoi* by **Galen**, some **Stoics**, and some

Neoplatonists. This phrase means “*interior* accounts.” “*Exō-*” means “outside”; “*esō-*” means inside. Probably the phrase was coined to contrast “exterior” and “interior” accounts—naturally enough, if Aristotle says in the ***Ethics*** and ***Politics*** that there are some other works that are “exterior,” the works in which that locution occurs must be “interior” (**Lucian**, *Vit. Auct.* 26). From there it is an easy step to calling teachings that are kept secret from the general public, like oral teachings of the **Pythagorean** school, “esoteric,” as **Iamblichus** does. The **Gnostic** and **Hermetic** movements were in principle esoteric in that sense since they tended to keep their teachings within the school.

See also **UNWRITTEN TEACHINGS**.

EXPERIENCE

See **AISTHĒSIS**.

EXPERTISE

See **TECHNĒ**.

EXPLANATION

See **AITION**, **AITIA**.

EXPRESSION (LINGUISTIC)

See **LEXIS**.

EXTENSION

See **DIASTĒMA**.

EXTREMITY

See **AKRA**, **AKRON**.

F

FACULTY (OF THE SOUL)

See [DYNAMIS](#), [DYNAMEIS](#).

FALSE

See [PSEUDOS](#).

FAMILIAR

See [OIKEION](#); [PAR' HĒMIN](#).

FATE

See [ANAGKĒ](#), [ANANKĒ](#); [HEIMARMENĒ](#).

FAVORINUS OF ARLES

(c. 80–160 CE.) **Sophist** and **Skeptic**. He associated with **Plutarch**, **Herodes Atticus**, **Demetrius the Cynic**, Cornelius Fronto, **Aulus Gellius**, and the emperor Hadrian. He was a rival of Polemon of Smyrna. Banished by Hadrian, he was brought back by Antoninus Pius and spent the rest of his life as a teacher in **Rome**. His (fragmentary) works have been collected and published by E. Amato in the Budé series. Arles is a city in France on the Rhone River, not too far from where it empties into the Mediterranean.

FEELING

See [PATHOS](#), [PATHĒ](#).

FIGMENT (OF IMAGINATION)

See [PHANTASMA](#).

FIGULUS, PUBLIUS NIGIDIUS

(d. 45 BCE.) Friend of **Cicero** who attempted to revive **Pythagorean** philosophy and **magic**. He may be credited with anticipating the **Neopythagorean** movement, which really got rolling about 100 years after his death.

FINAL CAUSE

See [TELOS](#).

FIRE

See [PYR](#); [STOICHEION](#), [STOICHEIA](#); [TECHNIKOS](#).

FIRMICIUS MATERNUS, JULIUS

(4th CE.) First a **Stoic** author of a book on astrology (available online; J. Rhys Bram, *Ancient Astrology Theory and Practice*), he converted to **Christianity** and wrote an attack on pagan religion using **Cicero**. See *The Error of Pagan Religions*, tr. C. A. Forbes, 1970.

FIRMUS CASTRICIUS

(3rd CE.) Friend of **Porphyry**, student of **Plotinus** and **Amelius**. Porphyry addressed *On Abstinence from Animal*

Food to him, trying to persuade him to come back to the vegetarian fold.

FIRST MOVER

See [ARCHĒ KINĒSEŌS](#); [PRŌTON KINOUN](#).

FIRST PHILOSOPHY

See [PRŌTĒ PHILOSOPHIA](#).

FORM

See [IDEA](#); [MORPHĒ](#). For a brief discussion of **Plato's** theory of Forms, see [EIDOS](#), [EIDĒ](#).

FORMAL CAUSE

Aristotle distinguishes four “causes” (*aitia*) or modes of explanation: matter (*hylē*), mover (*kinoun*), form (*eidōs*), and end (*telos*). The formal cause corresponds to the answer of the question, “What is it?” Although he sees some of the ideas of his predecessors as anticipations of his theory of the formal cause, he is quite definite that none of them really “got it.” Two anticipations are particularly instructive, those of **Democritus** and **Plato**. Democritus says that everything is made of atoms (*atoma*); the differences between things at the gross level are consequences not only of differences in shape of the atoms of which they are composed but also in the way that they are arranged and connected to each other (*Metaphysics* I.4, 985b14–19). That sort of explanation might work at the molecular level, but it does nothing for entities of a higher degree of complexity.

Plato, in contrast, has “Forms” (*eidē*) at whatever level one might need for explanation, but from an Aristotelian point of view he perversely separates them from the entities they are meant to explain. If we ask, “What is Dobbin?” the right answer cannot refer to something located elsewhere than in Dobbin.

If we say that Dobbin is a horse, that is its *eidōs*. If we ask, “What’s a horse?” the answer could be placing that sort of entity within a larger class and telling how this sort of **being** differs from other sorts within that class. So we might say that “horse” is a “solid-hoofed maned animal,” from which we could reasonably conclude that Dobbin has solid hooves and a mane. Further pursuit along this line could lead us in anatomical, zoological, ecological, or even agricultural directions, but ultimately it all refers back to Dobbin. So, to pursue this example further, Aristotle tells us that horses are viviparous quadrupeds, herbivores with consequent peculiarities in dentition; that there are interesting differences between horses and related species. He adds details about

their mating, and generally about their reproduction, and so on. But all of these details refer back to what we know about individual horses.

Aristotle believes that his theory of the formal cause is original also because it is at the same time a teleological theory. That is, Aristotle starts from the assumption that the existence of entities and the continued existence of species is a good thing. Thus, the characteristics of Dobbin that are most important are those that enable Dobbin to continue to survive and to reproduce. So the formal cause of any living being includes whatever capacities it has that enable it to survive and reproduce, the soul, or *psychē*.

Very often people explain Aristotle's theory of the four causes by using the example of a statue—the matter is marble, the mover is the sculptor, the form is the shape of Apollo, the end is to be a beautiful thing. While the example is not totally wrong, it is not truly Aristotelian either, since Aristotle focuses primarily on *living* things, characterized by hierarchical orderings of complex arrangements of material. So the horse (to continue with that example) is a complex arrangement of tissues and organs with emergent properties that make it a horse rather than a cow, for example.

See also [GENOS](#); [OUSIA](#).

FREEDOM

See [ELEUTHERIŌTĒS](#).

FREEDOM FROM DISTURBANCE

See [ATARAXIA](#).

FRIENDSHIP

See [PHILIA](#).

FUNCTION

See [ENERGEIA](#); [ERGON](#).

G

GADARA

Γάδαρα. Now an archeological site in the extreme northwest corner of Jordan, where the borders of Jordan, Syria, and Israel meet, near the modern town of Umm Qais, 32°39'22.94"N 35°40'40.61"E. **Meleager of Gadara**, the noted poet; **Menippus of Gadara**, Mealeager's colleague; **Oenomaus of Gadara**, a **Cynic**; and **Philodemus of Gadara**, an **Epicurean** whose work (charred) was preserved in Herculaneum, all came from this town.

GAIUS THE PLATONIST

(2nd CE.) Middle Platonist, teacher of **Albinus**, who wrote a (lost) nine-volume summary of Gaius' lectures on **Plato**. **Porphyry** says that his works were read in the school of **Plotinus** (*Life of Plotinus* 14). See J. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists*, 1996.

GALEN OF PERGAMUM

Γαληνός. (129–after 210 CE.) “The best physician is also a philosopher” (title of a treatise by Galen). Son of a successful architect who sent him to philosophers to be educated, Galen began as a “student of **Gaius**” (a well-known Platonist) at age 14. At 16 or 17 he took up medicine (*iatrikē*) in addition and continued his philosophical education with **Albinus**, another Platonist, in **Smyrna** (modern Izmir) along with his medical studies. From 152 to 157 CE, he studied in **Alexandria**, returning to **Pergamon** to become the resident physician of the gladiatorial school. In 162, when he was in his early thirties, Galen moved to **Rome**, where he rapidly made a name for himself as much by his combative public confrontations with the medical people most in favor at the time as by his medical practice. Four years later, Galen left Rome for a time but apparently was recalled by the emperor **Marcus Aurelius**, who may well have been attracted by Galen's interests, since Marcus believed that the best *emperor* is also a philosopher. Although Marcus wanted Galen to accompany him on campaign, Galen persuaded him that he should remain in Rome and serve as physician to the heir, the future emperor Commodus. He continued to serve as physician to Commodus during his reign, and lived on, probably mainly writing, during the reign of the emperor Septimius Severus.

We know all this (and much more) about Galen because we have a great many of his writings, more than of any other classical Greek writer, and because some of his writings are autobiographical. Even though he tells us that a good many of his philosophical writings were destroyed in a fire at the Temple of Peace in Rome in 191, we can certainly learn a great deal about his philosophical views from the thousands of his pages that we still possess.

Galen's contributions to philosophical thought need to be discussed in relation to two somewhat distinct parameters: the philosophical schools and the medical "sects" of the 2nd century. One of Galen's primary goals was to develop an adequate theoretical foundation for medical practice. He had to adapt and to adopt whatever he needed from the philosophical traditions available to him and then to construct a theory that would be able to withstand the criticisms coming from alternative positions held by other physicians of his time.

The predominant philosophical schools (or tendencies) of the 2nd century were **Platonism**, **Aristotelianism**, **Stoicism**, **Epicureanism**, and **Skepticism**. The medical sects (or tendencies) were Empiricist, Methodist, and Dogmatic (or Rationalist). There is no simple correspondence between the philosophical groups and the medical groups, and Galen, despite his various protestations, can be shown to have drawn significantly from all of the philosophical schools and all the medical sects. He is most explicit about having drawn from **Plato** philosophically and **Hippocrates** medically. Galen bases that connection on the positive references to Hippocrates in Plato's writing (*Protagoras* 311b; *Phaedrus* 270c; and, by implication, *Charmides* 156e), and on his belief that the medical parts of the *Timaeus* are consistent with the teachings of the **Hippocratic corpus**.

There is a large dose of Aristotelianism in Galen's synthesis, inevitably, since **Aristotle's** biological works are a great deal more extensive and detailed on matters touching on medicine than Plato's *Timaeus*. Galen, like Aristotle, never tires of saying "nature does nothing in vain" when explaining the functional relationships of the parts of the body. Indeed one could argue that at the level of natural teleology the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle are not all that opposed to each other, that the distinctions between them turn on issues like the ontological status of the Forms (*eidē*) and the immortality of the soul (*psychē*), issues that Galen generally avoids as not directly relevant to establishing a philosophical

foundation for medicine. Possibly the most obvious disagreement between Galen and Aristotle concerns the function of the heart, since Aristotle made that organ the center of sensation, movement, and cognition, and Galen delighted in demonstrating experimentally that animals continued to respond to stimuli for a time after their heart was removed, but not at all with their brain removed. Of course Galen had to thank the physicians of Alexandria who discovered the nervous system for this point, but he continued to meet philosophers who had not yet understood the significance of that discovery.

Galen is even more bitingly critical of Stoic philosophy, particularly of **Chrysippus** (in *Opinions of Hippocrates and Plato*, notably), but here too we may find influences, mainly unacknowledged. For example, in “On the Passions of the Soul” and “On the Errors of the Soul,” Galen gives what amounts to a straightforwardly Stoic analysis of “sickness of soul.”

As for the Epicureans and Skeptics, among the philosophers, it is more convenient to see how their doctrines played out among the medical schools of thought. The “Dogmatic” school of medicine was really characterized by their primary opponents, the “Empiricists.” Essentially the Empirical movement in medicine was based on a blanket criticism of medicine as it was practiced in antiquity—the Empiricists held that practicing medicine on the basis of a general philosophical theory of the causes of diseases and of their treatments was unjustified and insupportable, that one should base the practice of medicine solely on experience, never on theory. The Empiricists characterized every medical practice that relied on theory as “Dogmatic” or “Rationalist,” in effect pretty much all medical writers since Hippocrates. To be sure, one can distinguish both “Empiricist” and “Rationalist” tendencies even within the Hippocratic corpus: the *Epidemics* are mainly “Empiricist,” not offering any causal hypotheses, just describing; while treatises like *On Ancient Medicine* and *Airs Waters Places* are obviously “Rationalist” or “Dogmatic.” In its expression in Galen’s day, Empiricism was a kind of skepticism about medical knowledge; philosophical Skeptics doubted all the traditional philosophical explanatory schemata, and medical Skeptics doubted all the traditional medical explanatory schemata.

Galen notes with amusement that Empiricists use the treatment modalities devised by Rationalists, once they have

seen them work effectively, and Rationalists use the treatment modalities devised by Empiricists, once they have seen them work effectively. The worst sort of medicine, according to Galen, would be one that rejected empirical investigation without having an adequate rational understanding of health and disease; at least the Empiricist will be able to treat those conditions with which he has had adequate experience.

The third medical school, Methodism, is attributed in its inception to a physician who is characterized as philosophically an Epicurean, Asclepiades of Bythynia, from the 1st century BCE. The Methodist approach was based, in principle, on Epicurean **atomism**, and to that extent resembled a “Dogmatic” approach, but the crucial distinction of Methodism from the other schools was its insistence on paying attention specifically to the disease and devising a standardized treatment (a “method”) for treating identifiable diseases.

Galen took over the four-element (*stoicheion*) theory, going back to **Empedocles**, that the world is composed of **earth, water, air** and **fire**, or (as Aristotle would have it) of four elementary powers, hot and cold, fluid and solid, and applied it in as subtle and nuanced a way as he was capable of developing. It finds a physiological expression in the theory of the four “humors” that Galen claims to have found in Hippocrates: blood, phlegm, black bile, and yellow bile. Health is a balance of these fluids in the body, disease an imbalance. That is perhaps the most “Dogmatic” aspect of his medical philosophy; otherwise, Galen repeatedly emphasizes careful observation, anatomical and physiological study, and a general recourse to purposive explanations. Galen was a diligent student of formal and informal logic, often using his linguistic skill to score points against his adversaries; he expected physicians to use logic and scientific methodology in trying to understand the illnesses with which they were confronted and in developing treatment plans. Philosophically, perhaps his greatest contribution was to the development of a theoretical foundation for medicine, and more generally to the development of a scientific method and theory of knowledge.

Galen’s influence in the ancient Greco-Roman world was at first not predominant; for some time, other medical writers also gained the attention of physicians and the reading public. But by about 350, Galen’s synthesis had gained quite general acceptance. Thus it is not surprising that many of his works were translated into Arabic (primarily by Hunayn Ibn Ishaq)

and inspired the “canon” of Ibn Sina. Indeed, some of his works are known today only in their Arabic translation. The use of Galen by medical people continued more or less unabated in the Greek-speaking Eastern Empire into Byzantine times, which doubtless accounts for the fact that we have as many manuscripts as we do of his work.

Although some of Galen’s works were known in Latin translation in the early Middle Ages, his influence became much greater with the transmission of Arabic and **Byzantine** medicine to Western Europe after about 1000 CE. For centuries thereafter, Galen’s medical philosophy was nearly always seen as a major player in discussions of the understanding of health and disease; his more general philosophical opinions have most often been ignored or rejected—not always as biting as by Maimonides, who called him “ignorant of most things about which he speaks except the medical science.”

See also [KARDIA](#); [LOGIKĒ](#).

GARDEN

Nickname of the **Epicurean** school, parallel with **Stoa** and **Peripatos**. The name does convey a sense of the school’s goal of tranquility. It gained that name from the fact that the school was physically located in the home of Epicurus, and the home was surrounded by a garden. Epicurus bought the property in Athens, between the Dipylon Gate and the **Academy**, in 305 BCE; it was handed down to his successors, though we do not know for how long.

We may note that the places properly called “**Lyceum**” and “Academy” were in fact largely public gardens; the structures that we hear about, whether *gymnasia* or *peripatoi*, were adjacent to tree-shaded areas. **Plato** had, in addition, a private garden (*kēpos*) in the vicinity of the Academy public space.

GAZA

Γάζα. The major city in the Palestinian “Gaza Strip,” 31°31’N 34°27’E. In late antiquity it was a prosperous city with a diverse population. A Christian Neoplatonist, **Aeneas of Gaza**, was a noted philosopher from this place. Others include **Procopius of Gaza** and **Ulpian of Gaza**.

GĒ

Γῆ. See **EARTH**.

GENERATION AND CORRUPTION

(Treatise by **Aristotle**.) Περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς. Latin, *De Generatione et Corruptione*. Abbr. *GC*. Following the

Physics and **De Caelo**, and preceding the **Meteorologica**, **GC** tackles problems not yet adequately addressed, from Aristotle's perspective. How do new entities come into being, and how do they cease to exist? How do entities grow and change? Aristotle sees the answers provided by **Democritus** and by **Plato** in the **Timaeus** as the most worth considering, though he quickly argues that those solutions are still inadequate. His answer turns on the nature of "**matter**" as the locus of potentiality, and the ways that the possibilities inherent in a given material may be actualized. In the second book he examines the theory of the elements; critiquing his predecessors, he argues that earth, water, air, and fire may transform into each other, and will continue to do so indefinitely. It is not clear from this treatise, however, whether or not Aristotle has committed himself to prime or first matter. See F. de Haas & J. Mansfeld, eds., *Aristotle On Generation and Corruption, Book I, Symposium Aristotelicum*, 2004.

See also [HYLĒ](#).

GENERATION OF ANIMALS

(Treatise by **Aristotle**.) Περί γενέσεως ζῴων. Latin, *De Generatione Animalium*. Abbr. *GA*. Aristotle needs to illustrate the generation of new entities in accord with the theoretical analysis offered in **On Generation and Corruption**. Sexual generation of animals is clearly the prime example of ontogenesis, but how does it happen? How do the observed facts fit the metaphysics? Aristotle argues that in general the female provides the **matter**, the male the moving cause and a significant contribution of **form**; in viviparous species (roughly, mammalia), the matter is the menstrual fluid, and in oviparous, the egg. Embryological development is explained teleologically—each stage is "for" what the embryo eventually becomes. Aristotle rejects pangenesis, the theory that resemblance to parents is to be explained by hypothesizing that bits of all parts of the parents' bodies come together in the process of generation, as well as the pre-formationist theory, that there is a homunculus present in the male semen, in favor of the idea that the menstrual fluid (for example) and the semen have the powers (**dynameis**) necessary to bring about the development of a new individual, a theory later called epigenesis. Aristotle notably deploys the idea of a special information-carrying material, **pneuma**, present in the semen and asserts that in beings with minds, **nous** enters "from outside."

Book III explores the differences in reproduction of non-viviparous animals, including the idea of the spontaneous

generation of some insects. Book IV discusses the reasons for resemblance (and lack of resemblance) of offspring to their parents. Book V largely continues this discussion, particularly with regard to such things as eye color and hair color.

Because Aristotle's account is based largely on observation it could provide a valuable starting point for the beginnings of modern embryology in the work of Fabricius and Harvey in the 17th century. See J. Lennox, "Aristotle's Biology," *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, and Michael Boylan, "Aristotle: Biology," *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

GENESIS

Γένεσις, **Anaximander** f. 1: "From that from which things have their *genesis*, to that again is their destruction, according to what must be." *Genesis* is "coming into **being**." After **Parmenides** had denied that genesis could exist (*agenēton*, f. 8, line 3; *genesis* has been driven far off, line 27), subsequent Greek philosophers tried to determine how *genesis could* occur. The materialist solution was that the elements (**stoicheia**) could be rearranged—whether **earth, water, air, and fire (Empedocles)** or the **atoms**—to make new complex entities, with no "real" **becoming**, since the elements remained what they were. **Socrates**, at **Phaedo** 96, takes up the issue of *genesis* in the context of a discussion of the immortality of the soul (**psychē**), but we mainly learn of his dissatisfaction with the materialist line of thought. In the **Timaeus**, however, **Plato** attempts a full-scale account of *genesis* in the phenomenal world, depending on **Pythagorean** mathematical models, on the figure of the creative **Demiourgos**, and the introduction of the receptacle (**hypodochē**) that provides a matrix for the appearance of phenomena without any permanent being at the level of the phenomenal world. Thus the Parmenidean ontology turns out for Plato to be true of the Forms (**eidē**) and not applicable to the phenomena, which belong to the second part of Parmenides' poem.

For **Aristotle**, this was not a satisfactory solution. For him, the paradigmatic examples of "beings" (**ousiai**) are the universe as a whole and living things, whose being is life and thus simultaneously process. So being and becoming are not mutually exclusive, as they were for Plato, but are both true of the same things. For Aristotle, *genesis* is primarily the coming-into-being of new entities. In any process of *genesis*, there is a pre-existing material that has the potentiality of becoming that

which is generated and a source of movement and change that has in itself somehow the form that will come to be in this material; the process of generation is “for the sake of” that which is generated, and also in a sense for the species of which it is a member.

Thus the bricks and lumber can be made into a house by the builder who has in mind a plan of construction, for the sake of shelter. A chicken egg has the possibility of developing into a new chick, if fertilized by the rooster which contributes a source of movement and a crucial element of form for the sake of the existence of the new chick, and the species chicken.

From an Aristotelian perspective, *genesis* is distinguished from other sorts of change by the fact that it results in the existence of a new *ousia*. Any philosophical position that holds that all *ousiai* are permanent, and none are generated, in effect denies that *genesis* occurs: that would be true of both **Platonism** and **atomism**, from Aristotle’s point of view.

GENOS

Γένος. The basic sense of this word is “offspring,” “descent,” or more generally a hereditary group of some kind. The word was appropriated as a classificatory term without genetic significance, as “square” belongs to the *genos* of “plane figure” (**Aristotle**, *Metaphysics* V.28, 1024b1). So in a proper Aristotelian definition, the *genos* is the larger class to which the **eidos** being defined belongs. In this example, “square” is the *eidos*, “plane figure” is the *genos*. The relationships between *eidos* and *genos* vary readily up and down; that is, we might define “dog” as “domesticated canine,” where “dog” is the *eidos* and “canine” is the *genos* (and “domesticated” the *diaphora*). But we can also say that “Laconian hound” is an *eidos* of the *genos* “dog,” or that “canine” is an *eidos* of the *genos* “viviparous quadruped.”

In the ***History of Animals***, Aristotle sometimes talks of “very large (*megista*) *genē*” of animals, but generally these lists are not exhaustive and not always consistent—for example, at *HA* I.6, he mentions birds, fishes, and cetaceans, then shellfish, soft-shells, and shell-less mollusks, and insects. Returning to what we would call vertebrate animals, he mentions viviparous and oviparous. Later he distinguishes “animals with blood” (essentially our “vertebrates”) from “animals without blood” (invertebrates, more or less) at *HA* II.15, 505b26. Aristotle does not have taxonomy as a major goal; rather, the classifications of animals that he does present are constructed as a convenience for exposition of

characteristics shared by a number of different sorts of animals.

The **Stoics** apply the word *genos* yet more broadly, so that the largest *genos* is whatever exists (and the smallest *eidos* is the individual entity). They also seem to take the categories as genera of **being** and reduce the number of categories to four.

See also [KATĒGORIAI](#).

GIGNESTHAI

Γίγνεσθαι. To come into being, to be born, to be produced. See [GENESIS](#).

GNŌMĒ

Γνώμη. One of the words for the faculty by which one knows or opines; thought, judgment, opinion. This word is especially prominent in **pre-Socratic** texts: for example, in **Anaxagoras**, Mind (**nous**) has *gnōmē* of all things (B12). **Democritus** says that there are two kinds of *gnōmē*, “legitimate and bastard.” The “bastard” *gnōmē* is that of the senses; the “legitimate” is the one that reveals to us atoms (**atoma**) and the void (DK 68B11).

In **Plato**, the word is relatively rare, and it tends to mean “opinion” in a non-technical sense. **Aristotle** defines *gnōmē* in the **Rhetoric** (II.21) as “a general statement about questions of practical conduct”; it is thus translated “maxim” at this place in the Oxford Aristotle. In the **Nicomachean Ethics**, at VI.11, *gnōmē* is defined as “the right discrimination of the equitable.” A person of *gnōmē* is said to be forgiving because equitable.

GNŌMŌN

Γνώμων. Carpenter’s square, pointer of a sundial, mathematical gnomon. **Diogenes Laertius** (II.1) says that **Anaximander** introduced the gnomon sundial into Greece. The **Pythagoreans** noted that if you put a shape like a carpenter’s square around a square, you get the next square number—and ran with it.

GNŌRIMOS, GNŌRIMON

Γνώριμος, γνώριμον. Well known; intelligible.
GNŌRIMŌTERON. Γνωριμώτερον. Better known.
GNŌRIMŌTATON. Γνωριμώτατον. Best known. This adjective can refer to “well-known” people; **Aristotle** especially tends to use the neuter form of well-known facts. He often distinguishes between things that are better known “in themselves” or “by nature” or “by reason” and things that are better known “to us.” Good **sylogisms** have premises that are “better known” than the conclusions; the definite is “better known” than the

indefinite—the comparative form is much the most common.

GNŌSIS

Γνώσις. Knowledge by acquaintance; cognition.

Heraclitus says, “People are deceived about the *gnōsis* of obvious things” (f. 56). **Plato** uses this specific noun relatively rarely, although he does use it of knowledge of the beautiful itself at **Republic** V.476c2. **Aristotle** says that all animals share in some kind of *gnōsis*, because they all have the faculty of perception (*aisthēsis*) (**Generation of Animals** I.23). In the New Testament, *gnōsis* often appears with the sense of “spiritual knowledge,” for example, at First Letter to the Corinthians 1:5. In later Greek writers, it is used especially of esoteric knowledge.

See also [GNŌSTIKOS](#).

GNOSTICISM

Modern scholars have grouped together several philosophical-religious movements of late antiquity under this general heading. General features of these movements include emphasis on self-understanding, a dualistic worldview, and a religious intensity. See H. Jonas, *The Gnostic Religion*; E. Moore, “Gnosticism,” *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

See also [ARTEMIDORUS OF EPHESUS \(OR DALDIS\)](#); [HERMES TRISMEGISTUS](#); [JULIAN THE THEURGIST](#).

GNŌSTIKOS

Γνωστικός. Cognitive. **Plato**’s **Eleatic** Stranger uses this word in the *Statesman* (258e ff.) to refer to “theoretical” as distinguished from “practical” knowledge. This adjective is not normally used to describe esoteric knowledge in ancient texts, although it would be a natural extension from *gnōsis*.

GOD, GODS

Classical Greek religion is notoriously polytheistic and for the most part anthropomorphic. The Olympian deities are well known: Zeus, Hera, Apollo, Ares, Aphrodite, Athena, Poseidon, and Demeter, and there are many more divinities that appear in **Hesiod** and elsewhere. At the same time several of the earliest Greek philosophers strongly criticized the traditional religion. **Xenophanes** charged that not only do the gods vary to resemble the ethnic groups that portray them, “but if oxen and horses and lions had hands or could create works of art like those made by people, horses would draw pictures of gods like horses, and oxen of gods like oxen, and they would make the bodies in accordance with the form that each species itself possesses” (B15). So Xenophanes argues that there is one supreme deity, not anthropomorphic at all.

Similarly, **Heraclitus** says, "They talk to these statues as if one were to hold conversation with houses, in ignorance of the nature of both gods and heroes" (B5); "One alone is wise, unwilling and willing to be called by the name of Zeus" (B32). We are told that **Anaxagoras** was put on trial for impiety, perhaps because he said that at least some heavenly bodies are rocks (on the basis of examining a meteorite), but we also know that he puts Mind (**nous**) in the place of a cosmic deity and seems to leave no place for the traditional gods.

Protagoras is quoted saying that he has nothing to say about the gods, because the question is too large and life is too short. **Socrates** was of course convicted and executed on a charge of not respecting the gods of Athens.

We see in **Plato** and **Aristotle** and in most Hellenistic philosophers a kind of uneasy truce between a philosophically driven monotheism and the traditional and popular polytheism that continued to dominate the popular imagination in the Greek and, later, the Greco-Roman world. Philosophical monotheism stems from the thought that if the universe is a **unity**, it must have one ultimate causative principle. Plato repeatedly talks about the "**Demiourgos**," in modern terms, the "Intelligent Designer." Aristotle famously argues for the existence of an unmoved mover (**akinēton kinoun**), adding a tag line from **Homer**: "The rule of many is not good, one ruler let there be." The **Stoics** have a system that depends upon the unity and omnipotence of God; **Neoplatonists** have a supreme principle that is a One that is beyond **being**. At the same time, Plato has the *Demiourgos* create the traditional Greek deities (in the **Timaeus**) and has lots to say about the gods (plural) throughout the dialogues, including that we ought to worship them (this especially in the **Laws**). Aristotle argues explicitly in **Metaphysics** XII that not only is the unmoved mover divine, but so are the movers of the celestial entities, the primum mobile, the planets, the sun, and the moon. He even seems to save a place for the traditional deities, at least in the political sphere.

While the **Epicureans** recognize the existence of the traditional gods, they do not play any important explanatory role in the Epicurean picture of the universe. While the Stoics might sometime seem to be pantheists, one of the most famous Stoic texts is **Cleanthes'** "Hymn to Zeus," and that seems to be both within orthodox Stoicism and within the mode of expression expected in a polytheistic culture. On the other hand, apart from a passing reference to "the gods" in the

next to last line, the entire poem looks like it would be acceptable in a Jewish, **Christian**, or Islamic context, with the substitution of “God,” “Adonai” or “Allah” for “Zeus.”

Perhaps starting with Stoicism, but surely with dual-culture philosophers like **Philo of Alexandria**, the Hellenic concept of God came up against the Semitic concept of God, and each influenced the other during the confrontation of **Judaism** and Christianity on the one hand, and Greco-Roman patterns of thought on the other, until the ultimate victory of the monotheists over all forms of polytheism in the Mediterranean world.

See also [THEOS](#), [THEIOS](#), [THEOLOGIA](#).

GOLDEN CHAIN

Marinus, in his *Life of Proclus*, describes the succession of **Platonists** as a “Golden Chain” of teacher and student passing along the true doctrine; it is also the derivation of the system from first principles. The image comes from the *Iliad* VIII.18.

GOOD

See [AGATHON](#); [KALON](#).

GORGIAS

(Dialogue by **Plato**.) Γοργίας, **Socrates** and **Chaerephon** arrive at the home of Callias where **Gorgias** and **Polus**, famous rhetoricians, are visiting; also present is **Callicles**, who seems to be studying with Gorgias and Polus. Chaerephon and Socrates try to get Polus and Gorgias to define the art of rhetoric. Gorgias defends the position that it is the art of persuasion, and particularly persuasion concerning justice. However, Gorgias does not claim to teach his students what justice is. Polus then intervenes, asking Socrates to say what *he* believes rhetoric to be; Socrates responds that it is a “knack” for giving audiences pleasure. Just as we may contrast dietetic medicine with pastry baking, or gymnastics with cosmetics, so we may contrast the true political art with oratory: the one knows how to improve the soul or body; the other produces an imitation. When Polus replies that oratory gives the adept the possibility of controlling events, whether justly or not, Socrates argues that the unjust person is always worse off than the just person, that doing injustice is worse than suffering it. Callicles intervenes to say that it is right for the strong to have the greater share, that the weak make laws to try to control the strong. A greater share of what? asks Socrates. Of pleasure, responds Callicles. But a person who aims only at pleasure will be insatiable. Of course some

pleasures are healthy, when a person is truly nourished, for example, rather than simply titillated. And there are better and worse states of the soul—the person with a soul in the best condition is better off than a person with a soul in a worse condition. Socrates ends the dialogue with a myth of the judgment of souls after death.

One of Plato's objectives with the *Gorgias* is to show how value-neutral rhetoric, and education generally, ends in producing amoralist students. See S. Benardete, *The Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy: Plato's Gorgias and Phaedrus*, 1991.

See also [RHĒTORIKĒ](#); [SOPHISTĒS](#), [SOPHISTAI](#); [SOPHISTIKĒ TECHNĒ](#).

GORGAS OF LEONTINI

(485–373 BCE.) Gorgias is regarded as one of the leading early **Sophists**, though he prided himself on being a teacher of rhetoric and not a “philosopher.” His show speeches “Encomium of Helen” and “Defense of Palamedes” are extant. He appears several times in **Plato's dialogues**, especially in the dialogue named for him, but is also mentioned in the *Phaedrus* (261c), where he is given credit for rhetorical innovations. **Aristotle** too often refers to his contributions in rhetoric—in *Sophistical Refutations* 34 he describes Gorgias' teaching methods, and throughout *Rhetoric* book III he cites Gorgias' rhetorical innovations. In the *Politics* III.2 he quotes Gorgias as saying that just as mortars are what are made by mortar makers, so Larissans are made by the Larissan magistrates, for that is their trade.

Sextus Empiricus gives us a very interesting summary of the arguments presented in a treatise called “On What Is Not.” He defended the following theses: “Nothing exists”; “If anything were to exist, one could not know it”; and “If one did know something, one could not communicate it to anyone else.” It is possible that this is directed very specifically against the book of **Melissus**. Perhaps once Gorgias had shown that **Eleatic dialectic** could be turned against itself, he lost faith in the possibility of reliable conclusions from philosophical argument and turned instead completely to the art of rhetorical persuasion.

For the translation of Gorgias' works, see Dillon & Gergel, *The Greek Sophists*; for discussion, see C. F. Higgins, “Gorgias,” *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

Leontini is inland a bit from the east coast of Sicily, 37°17'N 15°00'E, Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #33.

See also [RHĒTORIKĒ](#).

GRAMMATIKĒ (TECHNĒ)

Γραμματικὴ τέχνη. Writing, the art of writing. At the beginning of Greek philosophy, the process of writing was a relatively novel phenomenon in the Greek world; the development of philosophy shows the signs of being a participant in the transition from oral to literate culture. The teachings of **Thales**, **Pythagoras**, and **Socrates** were transmitted originally only in oral form; **Plato's dialogues** are designed to preserve many of the characteristics of face-to-face oral dialogue.

The **Sophists** often focused on techniques of writing, for example the meanings of words, and the different kinds of linguistic expressions. **Aristophanes' Clouds** gives a good, if perhaps comically exaggerated, impression of the sorts of "grammatical" concerns of the Sophists. **Plato** reflects those preoccupations, sometimes to satirize them, sometimes to use them for his own purposes. The **Phaedrus**, from 258 to the end, reviews the linguistic interests of the Sophists, and transforms them; the **Cratylus** is full of etymologies.

Aristotle makes the study of language fundamental for the study of philosophy, beginning in the **Categories** with an analysis of predicates, and in **On Interpretation**, with a study of declarative sentences. He often returns to grammatical studies, for example in the *Rhetoric* and *Poetics*.

Theophrastus seems to have pushed the analysis of written language a bit further (see fragments 681ff. in Fortenbaugh, ed., *Theophrastus*).

The **Stoics**, particularly **Diogenes of Babylon (Diogenes Laertius VII.55–59)**, advanced the study of written language, a practice taken up by the Alexandrian school, and later the Romans, including **Cicero** and others.

In late antiquity, there was a recognition that regulation of the written language and making that regulated language normative tended to preserve a unity and hegemony of the educated elite; while Attic Greek and Classical Latin eventually were no longer common spoken tongues, it is to the credit of the ancient grammarians that acquaintance with the formal structure of these languages is still recognized as one way that a scholar may demonstrate erudition.

See also [RHĒTORIKĒ](#).

GREGORY NAZIANZUS

Γρηγόριος ὁ Ναζιανζηνός. (329–389 CE.) Trained as a rhetorician, he became bishop of **Constantinople** and wrote

defending the Trinity and specifically the divinity of Jesus Christ. His works are available online. Nazianzus was a small town in Cappadocia.

See also [RHĒTORIKĒ](#).

GREGORY OF NYSSA

(c. 335–394 CE.) **Christian** theologian, brother of **Basil of Caesarea**. He applied **Neoplatonic** concepts to the defense of Christian concepts—for example, he used the principle of the identity of indiscernibles to defend the Trinity and was the first Christian theologian to argue for the infinity of **God**, on approximately Plotinian grounds (the limitlessness of the One).

GUARDIANS; *PHYLAKES*

Φύλακες. The “protective” class in **Plato’s *Republic***; motivated by honor (*timē*), their characteristic virtue (*aretē*) is courage (*andreia*). Much of books II through V of the *Republic* is devoted to outlining the education and other arrangements concerning the guardians.

GYGES’ RING

Γύγης. In **Plato’s *Republic*** book II, Glaucon tells the story of Gyges the Lydian, who found a ring that gave him invisibility at will. With the help of the ring, Gyges killed the current king of Lydia, married the queen, and became king. (**Herodotus** I.8–12 tells the story without the ring, but with the queen’s involvement.) The point of the story in the *Republic* is to ask whether a person would act morally if he were completely sure that he could get away with whatever he wanted to do.

GYMNASION

Γυμνάσιον. “Gymnasium.” Fundamentally, a structure designed for physical exercise, as the word continues to be used in English today, but extended to mean, roughly, “school,” especially a school for *epheboi*, ephebes, teenagers. In **Athens**, the three major gymnasia were the **Academy**, the **Lyceum**, and the Cynosarges. In the 5th century BCE, all three were favored venues for the **Sophists**, looking for likely students. In the 390s, **Antisthenes** established himself in the Cynosarges, **Isocrates** established his school in his own home, **Plato** took over the Academy, and **Aristotle** eventually took over the Lyceum. Two additional gymnasia were built in Athens toward the end of the 3rd century BCE: the Diogeneion and the Ptolemaion; the latter included a public library.

Apparently the *gymnasia* continued to be used for other purposes, including physical education, while used by rival schools for philosophical education, until all of them in Athens were destroyed or severely damaged by **Sulla** in 86 BCE.

Greek cities did continue to have gymnasia; in Rome the first appears to have been built by Nero, and another later on by Commodus; a gymnasium has been identified in the ruins of Pompeii.

GYMNOSOPHISTAI

Γυμνοσοφισταί. The Greek name for the Hindu wise men of their day; the word means “naked **Sophists**.” **Pyrrho of Elis** is reliably said to have encountered them when traveling with the army of **Alexander of Macedon**. It is possible that there were philosophical contacts between **India** and Greece before Pyrrho—at its height, the Persian Empire included parts of both the Greek and Hindu/Buddhist worlds. But after the conquests of Alexander, contacts were usually much easier, and the evidence shows that they increased. **Plutarch**, *Life of Alexander*, 64–65, describes Alexander’s interchange with several gymnosophists.

See also [ONESICRITUS OF ASTYPALAEA](#).

H

HABIT

See [HEXIS](#).

HAGNON OF TARSUS

(2nd BCE.) Student of **Carneades**, rhetorician, he wrote *Prosecution of Rhetoric*, denying that rhetoric is an art (Quintilian replies II.17.15). **Athenaeus** (XIII.602D–E) recounts his information that “among the Spartans girls before marriage are treated like *paidikois*,” that is, sex objects for older men. **Plutarch** (XII.375, 968D) recounts his story of a clever elephant who showed how his keeper was cheating him on his food.

See also [RHĒTORIKĒ](#); [TARSUS](#).

HAIRETON

Αἰρετόν. In **Epicurean** and **Stoic** philosophy, “choiceworthy.” **Plato** once or twice uses this word in the sense of (in fact) “chosen” or “pursued” (***Phaedo*** 81b7), but **Aristotle** fairly frequently uses it with the modal emphasis “worthy of pursuit,” for example, ***Nicomachean Ethics*** I.7, 1097a31.

HAMARTĒMA, HAMARTIA

ἁμαρτήμα, ἁμαρτία. Error, failure, fault. In ***Nicomachean Ethics*** V.8, 1135b18, a *hamartēma* is between an **accident** and an act of injustice. It is wrongdoing that stems from ignorance, but the wrongdoer should have known better. It is an accident when the person who did the action could not have known the relevant fact, and it is an act of injustice if the person knew it was wrong but did it anyway. A *hamartia* is very generally a “mistake,” or any of the ways one can go wrong in failing to act virtuously (***EN*** III.7, 1115b15). In the **Stoics** and New Testament, this word is translated “sin,” a good deal stronger. Some interpretations of Aristotle’s ***Poetics*** see the *hamartia* of the hero as a “tragic flaw,” perhaps influenced by Stoic and **Christian** ideas; it is not obvious that Aristotle saw the hero’s mistakes that way.

HAPHĒ

ἅφή. Touch, the sense of touch, the point of contact between bodies. For a materialist, touch is the primary sense; **Democritus** (consistently) makes all the senses variations of touch, since all of the senses operate by coming into contact with atoms (***atoma***). **Plato**, in contrast, models his

epistemology on vision—the **sun-line-cave** story is all about vision, bodily and intellectual, as is the **Phaedrus** chariot ride. **Aristotle** tends to put the senses on a more or less equal basis by arguing that all of them require a **medium** that conveys the sensible form between sensed object and sense organ; in the case of touch, the medium is the flesh. But at the same time, the sense of touch is the “most necessary,” the only one that belongs to all animals, primarily sensitive of the basic qualities of **matter**: hot and cold, fluid and solid (**De Anima** II.11).

At **Generation and Corruption** I.6, 322b29ff., Aristotle discusses the necessity of moving causes to be in *contact* with objects moved.

HAPPINESS

See [EUDAIMONIA](#).

HARMONIA

Ἀρμονία. Although we readily understand this word in its modern sense, originally it meant simply a connection or link. **Heraclitus**, f. 51, says, “People do not know how what is at variance agrees with itself. It is a *harmonia* of opposite tension, like that of the bow and the lyre.” According to **Aristotle**, and to later writers such as **Iamblichus**, the **Pythagoreans** believed the world to be “numbers and harmonies” (**Metaphysics** I.5, 986a2–12); Aristotle took them to be saying, furthermore, that the motion of the sun, moon, and planets generate what we would call a harmonious sound (**De Caelo** II.9, 290b12ff.). In **Plato**’s **Phaedo** (85), **Simmi**as proposes the idea that life is (nothing but) a “harmony” of the parts of the body. Although Simmi

as is described as a Pythagorean, this cannot be a Pythagorean theory in this form, since as **Socrates** demonstrates in the dialogue, the harmony theory is inconsistent with the idea of an immortal and transmigrating soul (**psychē**). The harmony theory is also inconsistent with the idea that the soul is a source of movement; thus both Socrates and Aristotle reject it on that ground (**Phaedo** 93; **De Anima** I.4, 407b34). Of course denying that life *is* a harmony in no way detracts from the idea that life should have harmonious attributes. As **Cicero** puts it in **De Fin.** 3.17.22, “harmony of conduct” is part of the highest end for a human being.

HEART

See [KARDIA](#).

HECATAEUS OF ABDERA

Ἡκαταῖος. (c. 350–290 BCE.) Hecataeus wrote on **Homer**

and **Hesiod**, about the “Hyperboreans” (far northern people) and “The Philosophy of the **Egyptians**,” all lost except fragments. He seems to have been associated with **Democritus**, his fellow Abderite and near contemporary.

See also [ABDERA](#).

HECATAEUS OF MILETUS

Ἡκαταῖος. (c. 550–490 BCE.) Traveler and geographer, he wrote a book called *Description of the World* and produced a map of the world representing an advance on that of **Anaximander**. A fair number of fragments survive, especially information about **Egypt**, including some descriptions of Egyptian animals (not always very accurate). **Herodotus** uses much of his information, while also criticizing.

See also [MILETUS](#).

HECATO OF RHODES

Ἡκάτων. (1st BCE.) **Stoic** student of **Panaetius**.

Diogenes Laertius gives us titles of six books by him: *On Goods*, *On Virtues*, *On Passions*, *On Ends*, *On Paradoxes*, and *Maxims* (VII.103, 101, 127, 125, 90, 110, 87, 102, 124, 26, 172, and VI.4, 32, 95). **Cicero** (*De Officiis* III.15) adds *On Duties*. **Seneca** refers to him in his *De Beneficiis* and in *Epistle* IX.6 quotes him: “If you want to be loved, love.”

See also [RHODES](#).

HEDEIA

(4th–3rd BCE.) Member of the original circle of **Epicurus**. Notable for her name, which means approximately “pleasing.” Sources suppose that she had been a courtesan before entering the **Garden**. There are several names of **women** associated with Epicurus that anti-Epicureans delighted in recounting—Nikidion, Mammarrion, Boidion. See P. Gordon, *The Invention and Gendering of Epicurus*, 2012.

HĒDONĒ, HĒDYN

Ἡδονή, ἡδύνη. Pleasure, the pleasurable. *Hēdys*, *hēdyn*, is the adjective meaning sweet, pleasant. Consequently *to hēdyn* is “the pleasant,” one of the three natural objects of pursuit, along with the noble (**to kalon**) and the good (**to agathon**), according to **Aristotle**. *Hēdonē* is an alternative noun form. **Heraclitus** f. 111: “Sickness makes health pleasant and good, hunger satiety, hard work rest.” In the **Protagoras** (353c ff.), **Socrates** argues that courage (**andreia**) is a form of wisdom on the ground that a wise person will be able to carry out a hedonic calculus that will recommend the courageous act; some have felt that this and some other passages indicated that the historical Socrates may have been some form of

hedonist. In the **Gorgias**, in contrast, Callicles defends a form of hedonism that holds that pleasure (*hēdonē*) occurs as a consequence of “replenishment,” a thesis that Socrates is able to reduce to ridicule by arguing that on that showing, the happiest person is some sort of sieve. In other dialogues, Socrates argues that the desire for pleasure attaches the soul (**psychē**) to the body (**sōma**) and interferes with the activity of the mind (**nous**) (e.g., **Phaedo** 64d ff.). The settled **Platonic** position on pleasure appears to be that pleasure is a “process” (**kinēsis**), and no process is really good in itself. At **Philebus** 65ff., a ranking of “goods” puts the measured first, the beautiful (**kalon**) second, reason (**nous**) third, knowledge (**epistēmē**) and the arts fourth, pure pleasures fifth.

Meanwhile, **Aristippus** and the **Cyrenaic school** were defending a hedonistic position. **Eudoxus**, a colleague of **Plato** in the **Academy**, also defended a form of hedonism. **Aristotle** was inspired to discuss pleasure twice in the **Nicomachean Ethics**, once in the latter part of book VII and the other in the first part of Book X. While the two accounts are subtly different, we can say that Aristotle holds that pleasure is a part of the happy life, though not the whole of it. Pleasure, he believes, arises through good functioning of human capacities, and that good functioning itself contributes to happiness, with or without the accompanying pleasure.

As is well known, the **Epicureans** focused on the maximization of pleasure and minimization of pain (**lypē**). The **Stoics** make a distinction between *hēdonē* and **chara**, or “joy,” claiming that “pleasure” is an irrational **pathos**, while **chara** is rational (DL 7.116). The distinction seems to depend on just what it is that you are enjoying.

HĒGEMONIKON

Ἡγεμονικόν. In **Stoic** philosophy, the “directive” aspect or power of the soul (**psychē**). A *hēgemōn* is a leader. Consider the image of the soul in the **Phaedrus**: there are a **charioteer** and two horses; obviously the charioteer is the “leader” (cf. **Phaedrus** 252). The Stoics talk a lot about the various aspects of the *hēgemonikon*, including the obvious idea that **God** is the *hēgemonikon* of the entire universe.

HEGESIAS OF CYRENE

Ἡγησίας. (fl. 290 BCE.) **Cyrenaic** student of **Paraebates** and colleague of **Anniceris**; **Diogenes Laertius**, *Life of Aristippus*, locates him in the Cyrenaic succession (II.85). **Cicero** (*Tusculan Questions* I.34) says that he wrote a book called *Death by Starvation* that led to his being banned from

teaching in Alexandria. It has been speculated that he may have been influenced by Buddhist missionaries to **Cyrene** and **Alexandria**.

HEGESINUS OF PERGAMON

Ἡγησίνοος. (c. 160 BCE.) **Academic**, successor of **Evander** and predecessor of **Carneades** as **Scholarch** of the **Academy**. Nothing else is known about him.

See also [PERGAMON](#).

HEGIAS

Ἡγίας. (5th–6th CE.) **Neoplatonist** student of **Proclus** in **Athens**. When **Marinus** became **Scholarch** on the death of Proclus, Hegias opposed him and his pupil **Isidore** on doctrinal matters. Isidore became Scholarch on the death of Marius but soon moved to Alexandria. Hegias may have become Scholarch for a time. At any rate, **Damascius**, who was a student in the school at the time, disliked what he took to be an overemphasis on religious matters (*Life of Isidore*). Eventually Damascius became Scholarch. Also relevant: *Marinus' Life of Proclus* 26.

HĒI

ἦ. Qua, a distinctly Aristotelian usage, as at Nicomachean Ethics I.6, 1096b2: qua human beings, people don't differ from each other. Aristotle uses this adverbial pronoun form to mark attention to essential, rather than accidental, attributes. One of the characterizations of the study that we call Metaphysics is the study of *to on hēi on*, typically translated “**being** qua being.”

HEIMARMENĒ

Εἱμαρμένῃ. Fate. The word is actually the perfect passive participle of the verb *meiromai*, to allot or distributed; thus it means, basically, that which has been allotted, and is related to the word **moira**, also translated “fate.” **Socrates** says, “like a tragic actor,” that it is his *heimarmenē* day just before he drinks the hemlock in **Phaedo** 115a. Cf. **Aristotle** *Poetics* 16, 1455a11, speaking of characters in a play who had figured out their “fate,” that they were going to die. The **Stoics** put a lot of emphasis on *heimarmenē*, essentially because they are **determinists**, so they identify “fate” with the reason (**logos**) of the **cosmos** and **God** (*SVF* II.264ff.). **Alexander of Aphrodisias**, a leading Aristotelian, wrote a book, *Peri Heimarmenes*, essentially critiquing the Stoic concept of fate.

See also [AITION](#), [AITIA](#); [ANAGKĒ](#), [ANANKĒ](#).

HELIODORUS OF ALEXANDRIA

(5th CE.) **Neoplatonist**, son of **Hermias** and **Aedesia**,

brother of **Ammonius**. Aedesia took them to **Athens** to study with **Proclus**; they returned to **Alexandria**, where they both taught. **Damascius** recounts all this (*Life of Isidore*).

HELIODORUS OF EMESA

(4th CE.) Author of the extant novel *Aethiopica*. Included here because the author occasionally alludes to bits of classical philosophy, and some have sought to give it a philosophical interpretation. The novel, in somewhat archaic English, is available online at Elfinspell.

See also [EMESA](#).

HEN

“Ev. One. From the time of **Parmenides**, who asserted the absolute **unity of being**, Greek philosophy was concerned with finding the proper location for the idea of unity. A major objective of **Plato**’s theory of Forms (*eidē*) is to find a unity as an object of thought that makes meaningful the multiplicities of the phenomenal world. The larger part of Plato’s *Parmenides* is occupied with a **dialectical** examination of the relationship between one and many, being and nonbeing. Plato, perhaps following a **Pythagorean** suggestion (**Aristotle**, *Metaphysics* I, 986a), seems to have made “the One” a primary ontological principle and identified it with the Good (*agathon*) (*Metaph.* XIV, 1091b); his early successors in the **Academy** seem to have followed that lead. Aristotle distinguishes several senses of unity in *Metaph.* V.6 and X.1 and argues that the Pythagorean-Platonic position on the One depends on failing to make the necessary distinctions (*Metaph.* I.9, 992b).

For **Plotinus**, the One is “beyond being” and without qualification (*Enneads* VI.9.3).

HENAS, HENADOS

Ἐνας, ἐνάδος. Henad, **unity**. At *Philebus* 15a, **Plato** uses this word to say that a human being, an ox, the beautiful, and the good are all “unities.” How many “unities” are there? There is a tension between unity and multiplicity. Although the word is rare in the interim, late **Neoplatonists** (**Proclus**, **Damascius**) picked up on this locution and built it into their systematic **metaphysics**.

See also [HEN](#).

HERACLEIA PONTICA

Ἡράκλεια Ποντική. City on the Black Sea coast east of the present Istanbul, 41°17'5"N 31°24'53"E. It was the home of **Bryson the Sophist**, **Chamaeleon the Peripatetic**, and **Dionysius the Renegade**. Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #715.

HERACLIDES LEMBUS

Ἡρακλείδης Λέμβος. (2nd BCE.) **Diogenes Laertius** tells us that he wrote epitomes of **Sotion's** *Successions of Philosophers*, *Satyrus' Lives*, and **Hermippus' Lawgivers** (V.79; VIII.7, 40; IX.26; X.1). His excerpts of **Aristotle** provide fragments of some lost works (*Heraclidis Lembi; Excerpta Politiarum*, ed. and trans. M. R. Dilts, 1971). He was an Egyptian civil servant during the reign of Ptolemy VI Philometor. “Lembus” is not a place denominator but rather has as its first sense the sort of boat now known as a dinghy. It must be a nickname.

HERACLIDES OF PONTUS

Ἡρακλείδης ὁ Ποντικός. (c. 388–c. 310 BCE.) Student and colleague of **Plato** in the **Academy**, where he associated significantly with **Aristotle**. Heraclides failed in his bid to become **Scholarch** at the death of **Speusippus**. There are significant fragments of his astronomical and physical treatises, and of his work on the **Pythagoreans**. See H. B. Gottschalk, *Heraclides of Pontus*, 1980. Pontus is the region on the south shore of the Black Sea, today the northern region of Turkey.

HERACLITUS OF EPHESUS

Ἡράκλειτος ὁ Ἐφέσιος. (c. 500 BCE.) We have fairly extensive fragments of Heraclitus partly because his writings were so quotable, and partly because he was extensively quoted by **Hippolytus**, bishop of **Rome**, in aid of his attack on a heresy called Donatism that Hippolytus thought resembled the philosophy of Heraclitus. Heraclitus focused on principles of **unity** in change, expressed in an “account,” the **logos**. Heraclitus often expresses himself in paradoxical or ambiguous ways, giving him the reputation of being “obscure.” Unity in change is symbolized by Heraclitus most vividly by the image of “ever-living fire,” for a flame exists only because change is happening. Ever-living fire is also associated with the soul (**psyche**), for a “dry soul is wisest and best.” See C. H. Kahn, *The Art and Thought of Heraclitus*, 1979; D. Graham, “Heraclitus,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

See also [EPHESUS](#).

HERACLIUS

Ἡράκλειος. (4th CE.) **Cynic**, object of **Julian's** critique in Oration 7. Heraclius recited a fable that Julian found offensive, but he did not counterattack until later, when he argued that Cynics should avoid fables, as they should avoid pretense and deception.

HERAISCUS OF ALEXANDRIA

(5th CE.) Brother of **Asclepiades of Alexandria**, uncle of Horapollon, stayed away from **Alexandria** for many years (to avoid persecution by the **Christians**); when he returned, he was arrested and tortured. Released, he hid out until his death; he was one of the last Egyptians to be mummified. See **Damascius**, *Philosophical History*.

HERILLUS OF CARTHAGE

Ἡρίλλος. (3rd BCE.) **Stoic**, student of **Zeno of Citium**, noteworthy in his city of origin. **Diogenes Laertius** VII.37 provides a very brief vita. Whereas Zeno recommended life in accordance with nature, Herillus advocated life in accordance with *knowledge* of nature. Marcovich, in his 1999 edition of *Diogenes Laertius*, has **Chalcedon** rather than Carthage.

See also [CARTHAGE](#).

HERMAGORAS OF AMPHIPOLIS

Ἑρμαγόρας ὁ Ἀμφιπολίτης. (3rd BCE.) **Stoic** student of **Persaeus**, wrote *The Dog-Hater* (*Cynic-Hater*), *On Misfortunes*, a book about egg divining, and *On Sophistry*, which accused Platonists of being **Sophists**. Nothing survives.

See also [AMPHIPOLIS](#).

HERMARCHUS OF MYTILENE

Ἑρμαρχος. (330s–250s BCE.) Co-founder of the **Epicurean** school, successor of Epicurus as its leader. He wrote works critical of **Plato**, **Aristotle**, and **Empedocles**; *Against Empedocles* is the source of most fragments. He defended killing animals for socially useful purposes. He was succeeded by **Polystratus**. (**Diogenes Laertius** X.17, 24.)

See also [MYTILENE](#).

HERMES TRISMEGISTUS

Ἑρμῆς ὁ Τρισμέγιστος. “Thrice-greatest Hermes,” or Thoth, to whom many of the so-called Hermetic texts are attributed by their authors. There are 17 Greek-language treatises in the collection called the **Corpus Hermeticum**, a Latin treatise called the **Asclepius**, a significant number of fragments in **Stobaeus**, three texts in Coptic found at Nag Hammadi, a text in Armenian, and some technical (magical) treatises. The earliest treatises, specifically some of the technical treatises, may date to the 3rd century BCE, but the philosophical treatises seem to have appeared in the second CE.

The Hermetic treatises represent themselves as **Egyptian**, although most of them seem to have been written in Greek; they emanate from an Egyptian religious tradition with ties to the religious movements known as **Gnostic**.

The goal of the philosophic Hermetic texts is to gain knowledge of **God** and of the universe in order to become one with God. There is an inner source of knowledge; cultivating that inner source leads to liberation of the spirit. See B. Copenhagen, *Hermetica*, 1995; G. Fowden, *The Egyptian Hermes*, 1993.

HERMIAS (HERMEIAS)

(5th–6th CE.) **Neoplatonist**. Hermias studied Neoplatonic philosophy in **Athens** with **Syrianus** and moved to **Alexandria**, where he revitalized the Alexandrian philosophical school. Husband of **Aedesia**, he was father of **Ammonius** and **Heliodorus of Alexandria**. Ammonius and **Olympiodorus** continued his teaching, instructing, among others, **John Philoponus**, a **Christian** commentator on **Aristotle**. He wrote a surviving commentary on **Plato's** *Phaedrus*, as yet untranslated into English. For Hermias' life, see **Damascius**; for the commentary, see M. J. B. Allen, "Two Commentaries on the Phaedrus: Ficino's Indebtedness to Hermias," *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 43 (1980): 110–129.

HERMIAS OF ATARNEUS

Ἑρμίας ὁ Ἀταρνεύς. (4th BCE.) **Academic**. He was a student of **Plato**, along with **Aristotle**; he became ruler of **Atarneus** and **Assos** as part of the Persian Empire. On the death of Plato, Aristotle and several other Academics visited him. The Persians seem to have thought that he was getting too cozy with the Macedonians and moved to pressure him militarily and the Macedonians did not counter. Aristotle and company left for **Lesbos**. Hermias was assassinated by Mentor, a Greek working for the Persians. Aristotle married Hermias' niece and wrote an over-the-top poetic eulogy of Hermias.

HERMINUS

Ἑρμῖνος. (2nd CE.) **Peripatetic**, is said to have written commentaries on most of **Aristotle**. **Simplicius** says that he was the teacher of **Alexander of Aphrodisias**. Alexander cites Herminus' work on Aristotle's **sylogistic** (*On the Prior Analytics*); **Boethius** frequently cites him, naming his commentaries *On Interpretation*, *Analytics*, and *Topics*.

HERMIPPUS OF SMYRNA

Ἑρμιππος. (Mid-3rd BCE.) **Peripatetic** author of a very influential *Lives*, cited by many subsequent biographers. It included the earliest known biography of **Aristotle**, and many other philosophers up to and including **Chrysippus**. He is one

of the important sources for **Diogenes Laertius**. The fragments have been edited by J. Bollansée.

See also [SMYRNA](#).

HERMODORUS OF SYRACUSE

Ἑρμοδῶρος. (4th BCE.) Member of **Plato's Academy**, he possibly followed Plato back from **Syracuse** after one of Plato's visits. His biography of Plato, although lost, was one of the sources for later writers on Plato. He seems to have emphasized Plato's ties to **Pythagoreanism**. See J. Dillon, *The Heirs of Plato*, 2003.

HERMOGENES OF ALOPECE

Ἑρμογένης. (c. 445–after 392 BCE.) He appears in **Plato's Cratylus**, was present in the *Phaedo*, and is credited with being the source of much of the information used by **Xenophon** about the last part of **Socrates'** life. According to **Diogenes Laertius**, Plato associated with him and **Cratylus** after the death of Socrates; Diogenes claims that he was an enthusiast of **Parmenides**, but there is little independent confirmation of that. Alopece is of course Socrates' deme.

HERMOGENES OF TARSUS

Ἑρμογένης ὁ Ταρσεύς. Late 2nd CE rhetorician and representative of the Second Sophistic. He wrote a significant number of works at an early age, including a study of rhetorical styles. The most thorough collection and study of his work is M. Patillon, *Hermogène. L'art rhétorique*. 1997.

See also [SYRIANUS](#).

HERMOTIMUS OF CLAZOMENAE

(6th BCE?) **Aristotle** says (*Metaphysics* I.3, 984b19) that he anticipated **Anaxagoras** (also a Clazomenan) in expressing the priority of Mind (*nous*) in the universe as cause of change. **Sextus Empiricus** groups him with other early dualists (*Adv. Math.* ix.; *Ad Phys.* i. 7). **Lucian** (*Encom. Musc.* 7) says that he was a **Pythagorean**. There are legends about the soul of Hermotimus wandering around separately from his body (**Tertullian**, *De Anima*; **Pliny**, *Hist. Nat.* vii.42; Lucian; and others). For Clazomenae, see [ANAXAGORAS OF CLAZOMENAE](#).

HERO OF ALEXANDRIA

Ἡρώων ὁ Ἀλεξανδρεὺς. (c. 10–70 CE.) **Aristotelian** or **atomist** inventor and mathematician. A significant number of his works are extant, including some that describe precisely how to produce some rather remarkable machines. For example, he described a working steam engine some 1,700 years before steam engines were put to industrial use. A

translation of his work is available online. The series *Ancient Discoveries* on the History Channel often features his devices.

See also [ALEXANDRIA](#).

HERODES ATTICUS

Ἡρώδης ὁ Ἀττικός. (c. 101–177 CE.) Very wealthy Athenian who had studied philosophy and rhetoric and took up a life combining public service and teaching under Hadrian. Antoninus Pius brought him to **Rome** as the tutor of **Marcus Aurelius**. He was instrumental in the establishment of the Aurelian chairs of philosophy in **Athens** and was a part of the Second Sophistic, along with **Philostratus** (Philostratus book II; **Aulus Gellius** I.2.).

The theater that he had constructed on the south slope of the Acropolis in Athens is still used for theatrical performances.

“Atticus” refers to the fact that Herodes was born in Marathon, a village in Attica.

See also [RHĒTORIKĒ](#); [SOPHISTĒS](#), [SOPHISTAI](#); [SOPHISTIKĒ TECHNĒ](#).

HERODICUS (OF BABYLON)

Ἡρόδικος. (2nd BCE.) Student of **Crates of Mallus**. More of a literary historian than philosopher, when he discovered that **Plato** had banned Homer from the ideal city, he wrote attacks on both Plato and **Socrates**. (**Athenaeus** V.222.)

See also [BABYLON](#).

HERODOTUS OF HALICARNASSUS

Ἡρόδοτος. (c. 484–c. 425 BCE.) Historian of the Persian Wars. He names **Thales** and **Pythagoras** and often cites ideas that we can find also in various **pre-Socratic** philosophical writers. The text of Herodotus was well known to the classical philosophers who often rely on him, usually without attribution. Herodotus is the most reliable extant source for attempting to trace non-Greek sources for ideas that flourish in the context of early Greek philosophy. See A. Ward, *Herodotus and the Philosophy of Empire*, 2008.

Halicarnassus (Ἀλικαρνασσός), 37°02'16"N 27°25'27"E, was originally just a small island off the Carian coast, but it grew onto the opposite mainland, Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #886. It is the location of the famous Mausoleum; it is now the Turkish city of Bodrum.

HERODOTUS OF TARSUS

(1st–2nd CE.) **Skeptic**, student of Menodotus of Nicomedia and teacher of **Sextus Empiricus** (**Diogenes Laertius** IX.116).

See also [TARSUS](#).

HEROPHILUS OF CHALCEDON

(c. 330–260 BCE.) **Medical** writer in **Alexandria**; along with **Erasistratus**, he carried out dissections of cadavers and studied the nervous system and human reproduction. See H. von Staden, *Herophilus: The Art of Medicine in Early Alexandria*, 1989.

See also [CHALCEDON](#).

HESIOD

Ἡσίοδος. (fl. 700 BCE.) A poet from Boeotia, he wrote the extant *Theogony*, or *Birth of the **Gods***, and *Works and Days*, a practical poem about farming and about justice and injustice. *Theogony* was seen by ancient philosophers as a kind of precursor to the philosophical tradition in that it made a serious attempt to give reasonable explanations of a wide range of phenomena. Even though the rhetoric is “religious” or “theological,” a kind of conceptual structure emerges from the relationships of the deities, who are often really nothing but various abstract concepts personified. One example among many possible: “Deadly night holds in her hands sleep, the brother of death.” Hesiod is available online. See R. Gotshalk, *Homer and Hesiod, Myth and Philosophy*, 2000.

Boeotia (Βοιωτία) is the region directly north of Attica; its largest city is **Thebes**.

HETERON

ἑτερον. “The other,” otherness, difference. In **Plato**’s ***Sophist*** and ***Timaeus***, the “other” is a major ontological principle: the **World Soul** is composed of existence, sameness, and difference (*Timaeus* 35a). In **Plotinus**, “The Other” is the principle of production of **matter** (***Enneads*** II.4.5).

HEXIS

ἑξις. This is an abstract noun built on the verb **echein**, to have. In a general sense, a *hexis* is a “having” (***Metaphysics*** V.20, 1022b4). In the context of moral psychology, a *hexis* is a disposition to act in a certain way, should the occasion arise; a habit. In ***Nicomachean Ethics*** II.5, 1105b19ff., **Aristotle** distinguishes *pathē* (emotions), *dynameis* (capacities), and *hexeis* (dispositions) on his way to arguing that ethical virtue (*aretē*) is a *hexis* rather than either of the other two.

The **Stoics** thought that virtue is a *diathesis*, rather than a *hexis*. They used the word *hexis* to refer to the supposed power of *pneuma* to “hold” things, particularly things like stones and logs, together; thus this word is typically translated

“tenor” when it occurs in Stoic contexts. They do use *hexis* in psychological or moral contexts, but for denominating non-moral dispositional characteristics, like being able to play a musical instrument or being good in sports.

HICETAS

Ἰκέτας. (c. 400–335 BCE.) **Pythagorean** from **Syracuse**. He was one of those who believed that the daily movement of the fixed **stars** is caused by the rotation of the **earth** around its axis, according to **Theophrastus**, as cited by **Cicero** in *Academic Questions* II.39.

HIEROCLES (IN STOBÆUS)

Ἱεροκλῆς. (Early 2nd CE.) **Stoic**, cited several times by Stobæus (4.671ff.), and mentioned by **Aulus Gellius** (*Attic Nights* IX.5.8). A papyrus discovered in 1901 has been shown to be part of his work on **ethics**—the bits that we have discuss **oikeiōsis** in relation to animal instincts. The bits in Stobæus are concerned with the **kathēkonta**, or **appropriate** actions. See I. Ramelli, *Hierocles the Stoic*, 2009.

HIEROCLES OF ALEXANDRIA

(5th CE.) **Neoplatonist**, student of **Plutarch of Athens**. His commentary on the *Golden Verses of Pythagoras*, an introduction to philosophy, and some fragments of his work *On Providence* are extant. **Aeneas of Gaza** and Theosebius were two of his students. He is seen as part of the transition in Neoplatonism between **Iamblichus** and **Proclus**. See **Damascius**; D. Fideler, ed., *Pythagorean Sourcebook*, 1987.

HIERONYMUS OF RHODES

Ἱερώνυμος. (3rd BCE.) **Peripatetic**, cited fairly frequently for historical information about earlier philosophers and for contributions to **Aristotelian ethics**. See **Diogenes Laertius** I.26; II.14, 105; IV.41; V.68; W. Fortenbaugh & S. White, *Lycos of Troas and Hieronymus of Rhodes*, 2004.

See also [RHODES](#).

HIMERIUS

(c. 315–386 CE.) **Sophist** and rhetorician. We have 24 of his orations, and fragments of 12 others. He served as **Julian**’s secretary during the last year of the emperor’s life; he then established a school in **Athens**—among his students were Gregory Nazianzus and Basil, bishop of Caesarea. See Robert J. Penella, *Man and the Word: The Orations of Himerius*, 2007.

See also [RHĒTORIKĒ](#).

HIPPARCHIA OF MARONEIA

(b. 340–330 BCE.) A **Cynic**, sister of **Metrocles of**

Maroneia and married to **Crates**, as recounted in **Diogenes Laertius** 6.96–98. Hipparchia is one of the better-known **women** philosophers in the ancient Greek philosophical world, not least because she shared Crates’ austere and public lifestyle. According to the **Suda**, she wrote a book critiquing **Theodorus the Atheist**.

Maroneia (Μαρωνεία) is in the eastern end of Macedonian Thrace, 40°54'N 25°31'E, Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #646.

HIPPASUS OF METAPONTUM

Ἰππᾶσος. (First half 5th BCE.) **Pythagorean**, credited by Aristotle for making fire the primary element (**Metaphysics** I.3, 984a7). **Iamblichus** tells us that Hippasus claimed credit for (or publicized) the inscription of the dodecahedron in the sphere, and was “lost at sea” (drowned?) as a result (*Life of Pythagoras* 247). He may be responsible for the distinction between **akousmatikoi** and **mathēmatikoi** among the followers of Pythagoras. (**Diogenes Laertius** VIII.84.)

See also [METAPONTUM](#).

HIPPIAS

Ἰππίας. The name of two **dialogues** ascribed to **Plato**; the shorter one (“*Hippias Minor*”) is well attested, the longer one not.

The *Hippias Minor* (Ἰππίας ἐλάττων) is ascribed to Plato by **Aristotle** (**Metaphysics** V.29, 1025a6) and **Cicero** (*De Oratore* III.32). **Hippias** claims that Achilles is represented as the “best and bravest” of the Greeks, and Odysseus as the “wiliest” because he is so skillful at lying. **Socrates** argues that Achilles is a more skillful liar than Odysseus since he persuades Odysseus that he is really going to sail away, though he has no intention of doing so. In general, the good person can do injustice voluntarily, the bad person only involuntarily. Both Socrates and Hippias are puzzled about this conclusion.

The *Hippias Major* (Ἰππίας μείζων) represents a meeting between Socrates and Hippias not long after Hippias has been successfully lecturing in **Sparta** on “beautiful things” (*kala*). But what, asks Socrates, is “beauty” (*to kalon*)? Hippias answers, somewhat surprisingly, “a beautiful woman.” But of course there are many beautiful things that are not women. Hippias goes on, again surprisingly, that beauty is gold, because when gold is added to anything it is more beautiful. But for some things gold is not useful—a wooden spoon is better for stirring soup. Hippias’ third try: “It is most beautiful to be rich and healthy, and honoured by the Greeks, to reach old age, and,

after providing a beautiful funeral for his deceased parents, to be beautifully and splendidly buried by his own offspring (285e).” But Achilles and Heracles died before their (immortal) parents and were not buried by their offspring. So Socrates proceeds to carry on the discussion with himself, suggesting in turn that the beautiful is (a) the appropriate, (b) the useful, (c) the favorable, and (d) that which gives pleasure to sight and hearing. He finds none of those definitions acceptable. Hippias concludes that it is *kalon* to be an effective public speaker. For analysis of the dialogue, see Ivor Ludlam, *Hippias Major*, 1991. Scholarly consensus is leaning toward accepting the dialogue as authentic, in view of the stylometric analysis of G. R. Ledger, *Re-counting Plato*, 1989, 156–157, showing that the style is more similar to that of Plato than to that of anyone else.

HIPPIAS OF ELIS

Ἱππίας. (c. 470–385? BCE.) **Sophist**, a generation younger than **Protagoras**. He is notable for his claim to have mastered all the arts, so that he appeared at the Olympic Games decked out entirely in clothing and adornments of his own manufacture. **Plato** wrote two **dialogues** named after him; Hippias also appears in the *Protagoras*, in something of a conciliatory role. Plato regularly mentions mathematics in connection with him, so he is likely the Hippias who invented the quadratrix, used for trisecting an angle; he also tried to square the circle with it, according to **Proclus** (DK 86b21). See Dillon & Gergel, *The Greek Sophists*, pp. 118ff.

See also [ELIS](#); [MATHĒMA](#), [MATHĒMATA](#); [TA MATHĒMATIKA](#).

HIPPO (HIPPON)

Ἱππῶν. (Late 5th BCE.) Hippo was a physical philosopher who seems to have revived some of the viewpoints of **Thales**. **Aristotle** calls him “superficial” (*De Anima* I.2, 405b2) for saying that the **soul** is **water**, and calls his thinking “cheap” at *Metaphysics* I.3, 984a3.

HIPPOBOTUS

(2nd to 1st BCE.) Historian of philosophy frequently cited by **Diogenes Laertius**. He distinguished nine schools of philosophy but included neither the **Eleatics** nor the **Cynics**.

HIPPOCRATES OF COS

Ἱπποκράτης. (c. 460–370 BCE.) The founder of a school of medicine (*iatrikē*) in Cos, Hippocrates was already famous in his lifetime, as we learn from **Plato**’s *Protagoras* and *Phaedrus*. Eventually he was credited with the composition of

more than 50 medical works known today as the “**Hippocratic corpus**.” He could not possibly have been the author of all of them, not least because they are stylistically and conceptually incompatible with each other. Still, he may have been the author of some of the works in the corpus; candidates might include *On Ancient Medicine*, *Airs Waters Places*, and *On the Sacred Disease*. The author or authors of these works, and of some of the other treatises in the collection, was/were aware of the philosophical trends of the 5th century BCE and used them to encourage a more “empirical” approach to understanding health and disease than had been common before his/their day. Later, **Galen** took many of the treatises to be authentically by Hippocrates himself and argued that the medical theories of Hippocrates and the physical theories of **Plato** in the *Timaeus* were in concert with each other, and essentially correct. See M. Boylan, “Hippocrates of Cos,” *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

See also [COS](#), [KOS](#).

HIPPOCRATIC CORPUS

Collection of about 60 early medical writings ascribed to **Hippocrates**. Some of them are quite philosophical in ways comparable to the philosophical positions of the “**pre-Socratics**” and **Sophists**. Of particular philosophical interest we may note *On Ancient Medicine*, *On the Sacred Disease*, *On the Nature of Man*, *On Regimen*, and *Airs Waters Places*, for just a few examples. W. H. S. Jones edited and translated four volumes in the Loeb edition, ending in 1931; those are now available online. More recently six additional volumes have been published. Otherwise, the (complete) 19th-century French of Émile Littré is available online. For more on the philosophical interest of Hippocrates and the corpus, see M. Boylan, “Hippocrates,” *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

HIPPOLYTUS, BISHOP OF ROME

(170–236 CE.) Author of *Refutation of All Heresies*, one of the major sources of fragments of **Heraclitus** and some other **pre-Socratics**. His extant writings are quite extensive, more than any other pre-Constantinian church father. See C. Osborne, *Rethinking Early Greek Philosophy: Hippolytus of Rome and the Presocratics*, 1987.

HISTORIA

Ἱστορία. Investigation, inquiry. Although it is true that **Herodotus** calls his work about the Peloponnesian War a *Historia* (7.96), **Aristotle**’s account of the structure and habits of animals is a *Historia*, and **Theophrastus**’ description of the

various sorts of plants is a *Historia* as well. At **Phaedo** 96a, **Socrates** talks of his early temptation to pursue *historia peri physeōs*, or “investigation about nature,” a phrase that we are tempted to translate “natural **science**.” The sense “systematic investigation” still appears in modern medical usage, when physicians take a “history” of the patient’s symptoms.

HISTORY OF ANIMALS

(Treatise by **Aristotle**.) Περί τῶν ζῴων ἱστορία. Latin, *Historia Animalium*. Abbr. *HA*. Literally, “Investigations about Animals.” In nine books (a tenth book sometimes included is regarded as spurious), this work gathers a great deal of information about many species of animals. The first book is a survey of the ways that animals differ from each other—in respect to their parts, their way of life, where they live, how they move, their behavioral habits, and their mode of reproduction. Book II continues a description of the noteworthy differences between species. Book III describes organs of reproduction, blood vessels, skeletons and sinews (muscles), membranes, blood and other bodily fluids in animals with red blood (roughly, chordate). Book IV turns to noteworthy parts of mollusks, testaceans, crustaceans, and insects. The latter part of the book begins an examination of the organs of perception. Book V is a fairly detailed investigation of the modes of reproduction across the animal kingdom, taken up again in the *Generation of Animals*. It is noteworthy that Aristotle includes an accurate account of the peculiar method of copulation of octopi, not observed again until the 19th century. Book VI begins with a discussion of the development of birds in eggs and the spawning of fish, and goes on to mating behavior of various quadrupeds. Book VII focuses on human reproduction. Book VIII discusses various interesting features of animal behavior, particularly in regard to how they get their food. Book IX describes competition between species and generally evidence of animal intelligence. The Loeb edition is in three volumes, the first two by A. L. Peck, the third by David Balme.

HOLON

Τὸ ὅλον. Whole, organic **unity**, universe. On the one hand, from the beginning of Greek philosophy, a “*holon*” is typically an organic unity composed of parts; on the other, also from the beginning of Greek philosophy, *to holon* is the universe as a whole. Those senses come together in the famous fragment of **Xenophanes**, that there is one **God** that “sees as a whole, thinks as a whole, hears as a whole” (f. 24), more or less identical with the universe (**Aristotle**

Metaphysics I.5, 986b10). According to **Parmenides** (8.38), fate has chained **being** “so that it remains whole and immovable.” But with the **atomist** response to the **Eleatic** philosophy, only the atoms (**atoma**) appeared to remain as “wholes”; the wholeness of living things, say, was compromised, let alone the wholeness of the **cosmos**. The **dialectic** of whole and part is explored in detail in the second part of **Plato’s Parmenides**. **Aristotle** distinguishes several senses of *holon*: he recognizes the usage of this word for the entire universe (*Metaph.* XII.10, 1075a11); he often emphasizes organic unities—indeed, he uses the related word **synolon** for the combination of **matter** and form (**eidos**) that is a **particular** entity (**ousia**). For anything that is claimed to be a whole of parts, the question is, what is the cause of the unity? *Metaph.* VII.17, 1041b. But the universe has a cause (**aition**), the first mover, so the universe too is a unity (*Metaph.* XII.10).

HOMER

Ὅμηρος. Author of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, written down about 750 BCE. Starting at least with **Heraclitus**, and continuing through **Plato**, Homer’s poems are an indispensable backdrop and foil against which ancient philosophy develops. “Homer deserves to be expelled from the contest and flogged,” Heraclitus f. 42; **Xenophanes** f. 11, Homer sometimes describes the **gods** as immoral; in the **Republic**, **Plato** develops an extended argument why children should not be taught Homer in school. **Aristotle** is more tolerant of the Homeric epics, and **Stoics** such as **Chrysippus** tend to quote large chunks of Homer in support of their arguments. See R. Gotshalk, *Homer and Hesiod, Myth and Philosophy*, 2000.

HOMO MENSURA

This Latin phrase points out the statement of **Protagoras** that “human beings are the measure” of all things. Is each individual the measure of all things, as **Plato** takes Protagoras to mean in the **Theaetetus**, or are human beings collectively, perhaps as social groups, the measure of what is and is not? Judging from the representation of Protagoras in the **Protagoras**, he is more likely to have believed the social interpretation than the individualistic interpretation.

HOMOIOS

Ὅμοιος. Similar, like. There is a persistent tendency for Greek philosophers to believe that “like is known by like”; thus there is a search for aspects of the knower that are similar to the objects perceived and known. **Empedocles** is very explicit,

saying that we know the elements in virtue of the fact that we are composed of them. **Aristotle** jokes that according to Empedocles, **God** is less intelligent than human beings, since God does not have any strife in his makeup, and thus cannot know strife, but we can (*Metaphysics* II.4, 1000a32). Still, in **Plato** the possibility of interpreting the world appears to turn on the prior presence in the soul (*psychē*) of recollectable knowledge (*epistēmē*) of the Forms (*eidē*) to which the events in the world are similar. This leads, in Plato, to the expectation that objects in the phenomenal world are “similar” in some respect to the Forms (see *MIMESIS*), which in turn leads to various antinomies explored in the *Parmenides*. Also for Plato, “similarity” is a major category of the understanding. See, for example, *Theaetetus* 185d, where the mind (*nous*) contributes to judgments of “existence, similarity and difference, one and many, identical and non-identical.” We should also note that in the *Timaeus*, the **World Soul** is composed of “cycles of similar and different.”

Aristotle finds several senses of “similar” (e.g., *Metaph.* X.3, 1054b3ff.). There are differences in degree or quantity, or in the number of shared **attributes**, for example. And in the *Ethics*, he finds that many (not all) friendships are based on “similarity” of the friends.

The **Epicureans** posited “similarity” (*homoiotēs*) as a method for gaining knowledge; to critics, that looked rather like a hasty generalization.

HOMOIŌSIS

ὁμοίωσις. Literally, a process of making similar. **Plato**, at *Theaetetus* 176b, says that we should do our best to escape this **earth** and go to heaven, and that is done by becoming like **God**, *homoīōsis theōi*. **Plotinus** picks up this idea at *Enneads* I.6.6: “The Soul’s becoming a good and beautiful thing is its becoming like to God.”

HOMOLOGIA, HOMOLOGOUMENOS

ὁμολογία, ὁμολογούμενος. Agreement, agreeing. The **telos** of life in **Stoic ethics** was “living in agreement with **Nature**.” (*Homo-*, like; *logia*, rationality.)

HOMŌNYMOI

ὁμόνυμοι. If a word is used of two different things and the definition of the word varies between those uses, those things are called *homōnymoi* according to **Aristotle** in *Categories*. This usage is a bit different from the usual English usage, in which the “homonym” is primarily the word rather than the things picked out by the word.

HONOR

See [TIMĒ](#).

HONORABLE

See [KALON](#).

HORAPOLLON

Ὡραπόλλων. (5th CE.) Son of **Asclepiades of**

Alexandria. According to **Damascius**, he bravely endured torture when the authorities were looking for **Isidore of Alexandria**. Although this is not mentioned by Damascius, he may be the author of the extant treatise on hieroglyphics; see G. Boas, ed., *The Hieroglyphics of Horapollo*, 1993.

HORISMOS

Ὅρισμός. Definition. *HORIZEIN*. ὀρίζειν. To delimit, define. A *horos* is a boundary or limit; in fact the word *horos* is sometimes used of a limiting term in a **syllogism** or the like, or even a definition. So *horismos* is the process of delimitation. The metaphysical significance of definition is explored by **Aristotle** in *Metaphysics* VII.10, 1034b20ff., for example. In a famous passage at the beginning of the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle says (987b) that **Socrates** concerned himself not with the whole of nature but sought the universal about ethical things, “fixing thought for the first time on definitions (*horismoi*).”

HORMĒ

Ὅρμη. Noun derived from *ornumi*, to rouse, stir up, awaken, excite. Readily translated as “drive” or “instinct” (it occurs in this sense several times in both **Plato** and **Aristotle**, but not as a key technical term), *hormē* became a fundamental concept in **Stoic** moral psychology—the title “*peri hormēs*” is attested for several Stoic philosophers. All living things have a basic *hormē* for self-preservation; in most circumstances this is not problematic, but if *hormē* comes into conflict with **reason**, that causes problems, and if a *hormē* is excessive, it becomes a **pathos**. That, for the Stoics, is to be avoided.

HORUS

(4th CE.) **Cynic**. Born in Egypt, he was victorious as a boxer in the **Antioch** Olympic Games in 364. Turning to Cynic philosophy, he appears in **Macrobius**’ *Saturnalia* and was a friend of **Symmachus**. (**Libanius**, *Ep.* 1278, 1279; Macrobius, *Sat.* I.7.3; VII.7.8, 17.14, et al.; Symmachus, *Ep.* II.39.)

HOSIOTĒS

Ὅσιότης. Piety, holiness. This “virtue” (**aretē**) is examined by **Socrates** in **Plato**’s *Euthyphro*. Socrates was tried and convicted for “impiety” on the putative grounds that he did not believe in the **gods** of the state but had introduced new and

alien **daimones**. The *hosion* is that which is sanctioned by divine law, so apart from Plato's discussion of the word, *hosiotēs* would normally mean a disposition to obey divine law.

The relationship between philosophy and religion in Greek thought has been complex from the start. Classical Greek religion, as a polytheism, tended to be more tolerant of differences in religious opinion than many monotheistic faiths, and that opened a space for several of the earlier philosophers to introduce innovations—the **metempsychosis** of **Pythagoras**, the austere fiery **logos** of **Heraclitus**, and the swirl-inducing Mind (**nous**) of **Anaxagoras** are readily remembered.

Although **Protagoras** professed to have nothing to say about the gods, on the ground that the question is too big and life is too short, and several philosophers were reputed to be “atheists,” it is doubtless fair to say that the quasi-theological metaphysical speculations of Plato and **Aristotle**, the intensely theocentric philosophical synthesis of the **Stoics**, and the strongly mystical tendencies of philosophers of many schools in late antiquity resulted in a general presupposition in the ancient world that philosophers were, on the whole, a pious if often unorthodox lot.

See also [CHRISTIANITY](#); [JUDAISM](#); [ORPHIC RELIGION](#); [THEOS, THEIOS, THEOLOGIA](#); [THEOURGIA](#); [ZOROASTRIANISM](#).

HOU HENEKA

Οὗ ἕνεκα. “On account of what,” one of **Aristotle**’s locutions for picking out final causes. (*Metaphysics* II.2, 994b9.)

See also [TELOS](#).

HYBRIS

Ὕβρις. Wanton violence, lust, outrage, insolence, injury done to another. In *Rhetoric* II.2, 1378b22, **Aristotle** defines *hybris* as shaming another simply for the pleasure of doing it. An example would be forcing someone to submit to anal intercourse (*Nicomachean Ethics* VII.6, 1148b30). **Socrates** in the *Phaedrus* recommends avoiding a certain kind of “lover” who is only interested in his own pleasure and thus tending toward *hybris*.

See also [HĒDONĒ](#), [HĒDYN](#).

HYLĒ

Ὕλη. Literally “lumber,” this is **Aristotle**’s preferred term for “**matter**,” whatever something is made out of. In fact “*materia*” is an excellent literal translation of *hylē* into Latin,

since “*materia*” means “lumber” in Latin. Aristotle believed that the **pre-Socratics**, the people he calls “*physiologoi*,” were proposing various alternative views of the material principle—**water, air, fire**; the four **elements**; atoms (*atoma*) and the void—but that you cannot have an adequate concept of matter until you have an adequate correlative concept of form, and that the *physiologoi* generally lacked. Outside seriously **Peripatetic** circles, the most likely equivalent word for “matter” is probably **sōma**, body.

A phrase that might give some trouble is *prōtē hylē*, or “prime (first) matter.” Material reductionists seduced by Aristotelian vocabulary but unconverted to Aristotelian ways of thought tend to think of “first matter” as the most fundamental level of matter, for example, the elements (**earth**, water, air, fire) or the atoms. But Aristotle, while allowing that that is one possible way that the phrase can be used, also insists on thinking of it as the “first” matter from the perspective of a **particular** entity, so for a bronze statue, the bronze is the “first matter.” (*Metaphysics* V.4, 1015a7) Thus in *Generation of Animals* I.20, 729a32, when Aristotle says that the menstrual fluid is a kind of *prōtē hylē*, he of course means *proximate* matter.

See also [HYPOKEIMENON](#); [STOICHEION](#), [STOICHEIA](#).
HYPARCHEIN

ὑπάρχειν. Be, belong. (*Hypo*, under; plus *archein*, begin, rule). This verb is used especially by the **Stoics** to denominate both existence and predication. These uses can be found in **Plato** and **Aristotle** as well, but the Stoics emphasize their correspondence theory of truth (*alētheia*) by applying this word.

HYPATIA OF ALEXANDRIA

ὑπάτια. (d. 415 CE.) An erudite **Platonist** teacher of philosophy and mathematics in **Alexandria (Egypt)**. Her father, Theon of Alexandria, is listed as the last director of the **Museum of Alexandria**; that shows which way things were going. Among her students were Herculianus, Olympius, and **Synesius of Ptolemais**. A pagan and on the wrong side in a political dispute, Hypatia was seized on the street by **Christian** monks and beaten to death. She has become a heroine and a symbol for women philosophers. See M. Dzielska, *Hypatia the Alexandrian*, 1995.

HYPEROUSION

ὑπερούσιον. Literally, “beyond **being**” (*hyper*, beyond; *ousia*, existence); transcendent. This is a **Neoplatonic** word,

particularly associated with **Proclus**. See, for example, *On the Theology of Plato* 3.21.

HYPHISTASTHAI

ὑφίστασθαι. Subsist. (*Hypo*, under; *histasthai*, to stand.)

In **Stoic** ontology, it is recognized that there some words with clear definitions that do not correspond with physical (material) entities. “Time” and “centaur” subsist rather than exist.

HYPODOCHĒ

ὑποδοχή. Receptacle. (*Hypo*, under; *dochē*, receptacle.)

Plato’s name for the space-time continuum in ***Timaeus*** 48e–52d. **Plotinus** makes the *hypodochē* a kind of **matter**, qua pure extension (***Enneads*** II.4).

HYPOKEIMENON

ὑποκείμενον. Literally, “underlying” (*hypo*, under; *keimenon*, lying), typically translated “substratum.” For **Aristotle**, it is that which persists through radical change (***Physics*** I, 190a–b). In ***Metaphysics*** VII.3, Aristotle considers the claim of *hypokeimenon* to be ***ousia***, on the ground that it is that of which everything else is predicated. But there is an ambiguity in the use of the word *hypokeimenon*, between the logical and the physical senses. Logically, the subject of predications “underlies” those predications; but if we abstract all the predications, what are we ultimately left with? Simply a logical placeholder. Similarly physically, the “ultimate substratum” “is of itself neither a **particular** thing nor of a particular quality nor otherwise positively characterized, nor yet negatively, for negations also will belong to it only by **accident**” (***Metaph.*** VII.3, 1029a25). So the substrate, and **matter**, cannot be *ousia*, because *ousia* must be separable and individual, and the ultimate substrate is surely neither.

See also [HYLĒ](#); [HYPODOCHĒ](#); [LOGIKĒ](#).

HYPOLAMBANEIN

ὑπολαμβάνειν. Suppose. **HYPOLĒPSIS**. ὑπόληψις. Supposition. (*Hypo*, under; plus *lambanein*, to take.) The **Stoics** use this term for belief that is not necessarily veridical, in contrast to ***katalēpsis***, which is supposed to be veridical.

HYPOTASIS

ὑπόστασις. Literally, “standing under” (*hypo*, under; plus *stasis*, standing). There is a whole range of metaphorical senses, from lying in ambush, to sediment, to a thick soup; philosophically, the word is used by various authors to refer to the subject matter of a disquisition, to the duration of time, to “reality.” This is the Greek word most closely related to the Latin “substantia,” whence we get “substance” in English.

Oddly, **Aristotle** does not use *hypostasis* in this sense, though the word “substance” has been foisted off as the most frequent translation of his word *ousia*. Aristotle generally uses the word *hypostasis* either for a support (e.g., of one’s feet) or for a sediment, some solid material that settles to the bottom. In **Neoplatonism**, *hypostaseis* are the most general ontological principles: the One, Mind (*nous*), and soul (**Plotinus**, *Enneads* II.9.1; **Proclus**, *Elements of Theology*, proposition 20).

HYPOTHESIS

ὑπόθεσις. Literally, something that is “put under.” (*Hypo*, under; plus *thesis*, that which is placed.) Widely used for all sorts of “proposals.” In the *Meno* (86e), **Socrates** describes (somewhat obscurely) a hypothetical method used by geometers and then suggests a parallel method for examining “virtue” (*aretē*) that involves the supposition that if virtue is knowledge (*epistēmē*), then it can be (or is) taught. In the *Phaedo* (100–101), Socrates again resorts to a hypothetical method that involves asserting a plausible hypothesis and examining its consequences until one finds that it leads to a contradiction. In the *Republic* (VII.533c, in the Line passage), **dialectic** is said to be the art that “eliminates hypotheses and proceeds to the first principle.” In the *Parmenides*, **Parmenides** describes the method of dialectic as examining both the hypothesis and its negation (136).

Aristotle uses the word hypothesis to refer to a fundamental presupposition; for example, he says that “the *hypothesis* of a democratic constitution is freedom” (*Politics* VI.2, 1317a40). He also often uses the word in a logical sense, either for a postulate (undemonstrated first principle) or for a proposition that is “proposed” for proof or refutation. Finally (in this rapid summary), in his discussion of **necessity**, hypothetical or conditional (*ex hypotheseōs*) necessity is contrasted with “simple” necessity (*Physics* II.9, 199b34; *Parts of Animals* I.1, 639b24).

IAMBlichUS OF CHALKIS

Ἰάμβλιχος. (c. 245–325 CE.) Iamblichus was a **Neoplatonist** philosopher who probably studied with **Porphry** and **Amelius**. In 304 he founded his own school in **Apamea** in Syria (really the continuation of the schools of **Numenius** and Amelius). His surviving works include part of his large work bringing together the evidence for **Pythagorean** philosophy (including *On the Pythagorean Life* and the *Protrepticus*), *On the **Egyptian** Mysteries*, *The Theology of Arithmetic*, and fragments of his commentaries on several of the works of **Plato** and **Aristotle**. Iamblichus put significant emphasis on the Pythagorean aspects of **Platonism**, including mathematical interpretations of fundamental ontological concepts. He also favored the practice of theurgy, religious rituals and practices intended to improve the relationship between human beings and the **gods**. Some of his students, for example **Dexippus**, continued to operate his school after his death. **Plutarch of Athens**, who reestablished instruction in Platonism in Athens, seems to have studied with the successors of Iamblichus in Apamea. Iamblichus' major works are readily available online. See G. Shaw, *Theurgy and the Soul: The Neoplatonism of Iamblichus*, 1995.

There were several Greek *poleis* named Chalkis, in Aitolia, Euboea (the largest and best known), and Aiolis, but the one that Iamblichus came from was in northwest Syria. The archeological site is known as Hadir Qinnasrin, 35°59'55"N 36°59'53"E.

See also [THEOURGIA](#).

IASOS

Iasos is now an archaeological site in southwest Turkey, 37°16'40"N 27°35'11"E, Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #891. **Lyco**, 4th BCE **Pythagorean**, and **Diodorus Cronus**, 4th–3rd BCE **dialectical** philosopher, came from there.

IATROS, IATRIKĒ

ἰατρός, ἰατρική. Physician; the art of medicine. The Greek words mean literally “healer” and “the art of healing.” From nearly the beginning of Greek philosophy, medicine and philosophy were often intertwined: **Empedocles**, for example, focuses his philosophy on healing both the body (**sōma**) and the soul (**psychē**); several of the treatises in the **Hippocratic**

corpus are as philosophical as they are medical—"On Ancient Medicine" and "On the Sacred Disease" are good examples. Indeed, **Socrates** cites his near contemporary **Hippocrates** with approval (***Charmides*** 156e; ***Phaedrus*** 270c; ***Protagoras*** 311b).

While **Plato** is sometimes a little suspicious of some medical practice, he often represents Socrates using medicine as an art analogous to philosophy (notably in the ***Gorgias*** and ***Republic***) and develops a theory of physiology and applies it to a rank of medical issues in the latter part of the ***Timaeus*** with so much success that **Galen**, hundreds of years later, would give it very high marks.

It has often been noted that **Aristotle's** father was physician to the Macedonian court; although Nicomachus died when Aristotle was very young, it may be that early experiences with a medical point of view contributed to Aristotle's consuming interest in biological phenomena and his extension of the biological perspective throughout his philosophical system. We may also point out that Metrodorus, third husband of Aristotle's daughter and father of his grandson, was a physician.

After the time of Aristotle, several individuals combined the roles of philosopher and physician, though none in antiquity with quite the distinction of Galen.

In subsequent centuries the model of the philosophical physician often led to remarkable revivals of classical learning in the guise of furthering medical therapy—Ibn Sina, Maimonides, Paracelsus, and Harvey are a few names that come immediately to mind.

See also [ANAXILAUS OF LARISSA](#); [ASCLEPIADES OF BITHYNIA \(OR PRUSA\)](#); [ERASISTRATUS](#); [HEROPHILUS OF CHALCEDON](#); [KATHARSIS](#); [MENON](#); [SEXTUS EMPIRICUS](#); [SORANUS OF EPHESUS](#).

ICHTHYAS

Ἰχθυῶν. (4th BCE.) Student of **Euclides of Megara** in the **Megarian** school. **Thrasymachus of Corinth** was his colleague. **Diogenes of Sinope** is said to have addressed a **dialogue** to him (**Diogenes Laertius** II.112, 113; **Athenaeus** VIII.335).

IDEA

Ἰδέα. Visible form. **Xenophanes** f. 15: "Yes, and if oxen and horses or lions had hands, and could paint with their hands, and produce works of art as people do, horses would paint the Forms (*ideai*) of the **gods** like horses, and oxen like

oxen, and make their bodies in the image of their several kinds.” **Protagoras** f. 4: “About the gods, I am not able to know whether they exist or do not exist, nor what they are like in form (*idea*); for the factors preventing knowledge are many: the obscurity of the subject, and the shortness of human life.” For **Plato**, this is one of the two most common words used to refer to “the Forms” (the other is *eidos*). It is not entirely clear why he uses one word and then the other; they have similar origin (both come from the verb *idein*, “to see”). **Aristotle** frequently uses the word in the sense of “visible form,” or as a synonym for *eidos*, which for him means kind or species; he also very commonly uses it to refer to Plato’s Forms, for example, in **Metaphysics** I.9, and in fact wrote a treatise, *Peri Ideōn*, attacking the theory of Forms in detail. For more discussion of Plato’s Forms and Aristotle’s species, see [EIDOS](#), [EIDĒ](#).

Another ancient book, also entitled *Peri Ideōn*, was written by the rhetorician **Hermogenes of Tarsus**, dealing with the elements of rhetorical style.

The modern English word “idea” is not a good translation of the Greek word *idea*; “form” is probably best. The ancient Greek equivalent of the modern “idea” would perhaps be *ennoia*.

IDIŌMA

Ἰδίωμα. Peculiarity, specific property, unique feature. For the **Epicureans** and **Stoics**, this word is applied to uniquely distinguishable perceptual experiences; it is later used in the context of discussion of rhetorical style.

IDION

Ἰδιον. That which belongs to the individual, private. **Aristotle** uses the word for characteristics that belong to a **particular species** as distinguished from other species in the genus (**genos**), **Topics** I.5.

IDOMENEUS OF LAMPSACUS

Ἰδομενεύς Λαμψακηνός. (c. 325–c. 270 BCE.) **Epicurean**. Friend and student of Epicurus. Married **Batis** of **Lampsacus**, sister of **Metrodorus**. He is said to have written many philosophical and historical works: a *History of Samothrace*, *On the Socratics* (some fragments survive), and a work treating of many notable Athenians used frequently by **Plutarch** in writing his *Lives* and cited by **Athenaeus**.

IMAGE

See [EIDŌLON](#); [EIKŌN](#); [MIMĒSIS](#); [PHANTASIA](#).

IMAGINATION

See [PHANTASIA](#).

IMITATION

See [MIMĒSIS](#).

IMMORTAL

See [ATHANATOS](#).

IMPASSIVITY

See [APATHEIA](#).

IMPRESSION

See [AISTHĒSIS](#); [TYPOS](#), [TYPŌSIS](#).

IMPULSE

See [HORMĒ](#).

INDEFINITE, INFINITE

See [AORISTON](#); [APEIRON](#).

INDEMONSTRABLE

See [ANAPODEIKTON](#).

INDIA, PHILOSOPHICAL INFLUENCES

The Vedas and early Upanishads predate the development of Greek philosophy; Gautama Buddha was a contemporary of **Pythagoras**, **Heraclitus**, and **Xenophanes**. At what point did the Greek philosophical tradition become aware of their colleagues in India, and what parts of the Indian tradition could have influenced their thought? For the Milesians, we can only point to tantalizing parallels—the plurality of universes in **Anaximander**, as in the Upanishads, the primacy of breath and air in **Anaximenes**, as in the Rig Veda—but we do not have enough information even to speculate about connections. In the case of Pythagoras, there are late texts (especially **Iamblichus**' *Life of Pythagoras*) that tell us that Pythagoras spent time in the Persian capital of Susa when the Persians had extended their empire into India, and of course Pythagoras' ideas about the soul (**psychē**) are very reminiscent of Indian concepts but seemed novel to the Greeks. In any case, relationships between Indian and Greek intellectual traditions in the period before the Persian Wars continue to be very speculative in the absence of significant evidence one way or the other.

During the period of conflict between Greeks and Persians, from about 490 BCE, travel to India was very difficult for Greeks, but as the level of conflict between Greeks and Persians diminished, facility of travel may have increased. Contacts between Greek and Indian philosophers could have occurred in the 4th century BCE, before the time of **Alexander**—the Persian Empire at its height included both Greeks and Indians, and some non-philosophers traveled to India in that

period. Definite philosophical contacts resumed with **Pyrrho of Elis** (c. 360–270 BCE), founder of the Skeptical line of philosophy, who traveled to India in the company of Alexander of Macedon and visited with philosophers known to the Greeks as ***gymnosophistai***. From the 320s BCE onward it was often possible for Greek intellectuals to visit any of the lands conquered by Alexander, or for intellectuals from those lands to visit the Greek-speaking world. King Ashoka (273–232 BCE) claims to have sent (Buddhist) missionaries to several places in the Greek world, for example (*Edicts of Aśoka*, 13th Rock Edict, tr., S. Dhammika).

One extremely interesting text extant in Pali is the “Milinda Pañha,” or “Questions of Menander.” Menander was a Greek who controlled a good bit of India (155–130 BCE); the work represents him in discussion with a Buddhist sage named Nagasena who might be the same as the famous Nagarjuna. The work represents Menander asking questions, sometimes along recognizably typical Hellenistic philosophic lines, and then at the end converting to Buddhism (this text is available online).

See also [AMMONIUS SACCAS](#); [ARRIAN OF NICOMEDIA](#); [MEGASTHENES](#); [ONESICRITUS OF ASTYPALAEA](#); [PLOTINUS](#); [SKEPTIKOS](#).

INDIFFERENT

See [ADIAPHORA](#).

INDIVIDUAL

See [HEN](#); [KATH' HEKASTON](#); [TODE TI](#).

INDUCTION

See [EPAGŌGĒ](#); [SYNAGEIN](#), [SYNAGŌGĒ](#), [SYNAKTIKOS](#).

INSTINCT

See [HORMĒ](#).

INTELLECT

See [NOĒSIS](#), [NOĒMA](#), [NOĒTON](#); [NOUS \(NOOS\)](#); [PHRONĒSIS](#).

INTELLIGIBLE

See [GNŌRIMOS](#), [GNŌRIMON](#).

INTUITION

See [NOUS \(NOOS\)](#).

ION

(Dialogue by **Plato**.) Ἴων. **Socrates** confronts Ion, a professional rhapsode, or performance artist, specializing in recitations of **Homer**. Ion claims that he can also explicate the thought of Homer better than anyone else, but that he does

not do **Hesiod** or Archilochus, for example. But if Homer is talking about medicine, for example, the best explicator would be a doctor, no? Then why is Ion so good at talking about Homer? Socrates suggests that there is a divine “magnetism” transferred from the Muse to the poet, then through the poet to the rhapsode, and then to the audience. It is a divine gift, and no one really understands it. Although Ion seems somewhat pleased by this story, he still wants to claim that his knowledge of Homer has given him special knowledge at least of military matters. Socrates reasonably wonders why then he is a rhapsode rather than a general. See C. Griswold, “Plato on Rhetoric and Poetry,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

See also [MOUSIKĒ](#), [TA MOUSIKA](#); [POETRY](#).

ION OF CHIOS

(c. 490/480–c. 420 BCE.) Author of many plays and poems; only fragments remain. There are also some fragments of a **Pythagorean** text, *Triagmos*, published in **Diels-Kranz**, #36. He has some lines on **Pherecydes**, for example, and emphasizes “threes” in the world.

See also [CHIOS](#).

IRENÆUS OF LYONS

(2nd CE.) **Christian** theologian, bishop of Lyons (France). His *Against Heresies* is a valuable source of information about **Gnosticism** and other intellectual movements of his time. The writings of Irenaeus are readily available online.

ISAGŌGĒ

Εἰσαγωγή. (*Eis*, into; plus *agōgē*, push.) “Introduction” to **Aristotle’s *Categories***, written by **Porphyry** and translated into Latin by **Boethius**, it was a major text for medieval Western European philosophy. It was also translated from Greek into Syriac and Arabic, whence it also influenced the development of Islamic philosophy. It is readily available online. The late Alexandrian commentator **David** wrote a commentary on this text, as did the Islamic philosopher Averroes.

ISIDORE OF ALEXANDRIA

(5th–6th CE.) Student of **Asclepiades of Alexandria**, **Heraiscus**, **Proclus**, and **Marinus**, he succeeded Marinus as **Scholarch** of the Platonic school in **Athens**; he was a teacher of **Damascius**, who wrote a biography of him; some fragments remain. Isidore was eased out of his position in Athens; he moved to **Alexandria** where, according to Damascius, he married the ill-fated **Hypatia**.

ISIDORE OF SEVILLE

(d. 636 CE.) Bishop of Seville, Spain. Often cited as “the last scholar of the ancient world,” Isidore composed a massive encyclopedia, in Latin, of the learning of antiquity available to him, the *Etymologies*. In many instances this work preserves information available nowhere else. An English translation of this work, and of two other works by Isidore, have been done by P. Throop.

ISOCRATES OF ATHENS

Ἰσοκράτης. (437–338 BCE.) Student of **Prodicus**, **Gorgias**, and possibly **Socrates**. His school, opened in his home in 392 BCE, anticipated in its organization the schools of **Plato** and **Aristotle**. Although he started as a rhetorician and his school is sometimes called “Sophistic,” he himself claimed that he was teaching *philosophia*. He clearly had a philosophy of education and of other practical areas. There is a fairly significant number of writings extant (three volumes in the Loeb series)—speeches that he wrote early in his career, for others to deliver; a critique of the **Sophists**; an essay called the *Busiris* in which among other things he claims that philosophy originated in **Egypt**; and his *Panegyric* and *Antidosis*, essays in which he defends his political perspective.

See also [RHĒTORIKĒ](#).

ISONOMIA

ἰσονομία. (*Iso*, equal; plus *nomos*, law.) Equality of political rights. **Plato** refers to *isonomia* between men and women as a characteristic of the democratic state (*Republic* VIII.563b).

J

JASON OF NYSA

Ἰάσων. (1st BCE.) **Stoic**, grandson on his mother's side of **Posidonius**, with whom he studied and succeeded as **Scholarch** in **Rhodes**. Nysa (Νῦσσα) was a city in Caria (western Turkey) created by synoicism by Antiochus I in the 3rd BCE. It became an important intellectual center in the 1st BCE; **Strabo** (64 BCE–24 CE) began his studies there. 37°54'06"N 28°08'48"E.

JEROME

(347–420 CE.) Eusebius Sophronius Hieronymus, translator of the Bible into Latin. One of his earliest works (380) was his *Chronicle*, a translation into Latin of part of the *Chronicon* of **Eusebius**, adding a section for the period from 325 to 379.

JOHN LYDUS

(490–565+ CE.) Author of three extant works valuable for their preservation of parts of earlier works now lost:

1. *De Ostentis* (Gr. Περὶ Διοσημείων), on the origin and progress of the art of divination;
2. *De Magistratibus reipublicae Romanae* (Gr. Περὶ ἀρχῶν τῆς Ῥωμαίων πολιτείας), especially valuable for the administrative details of the time of Justinian; and
3. *De Mensibus* (Gr. Περὶ τῶν μηνῶν), a history of the different pagan festivals of the year.

These have been edited and translated A. Bandy et al., 2013.

"Lydus" indicates that he was from Lydia (now southwest Turkey); he was a governmental official during the reigns of Anastasius and **Justinian**.

JOHN OF STOBI

See [STOBAEUS, JOHN \(JOHN OF STOBI\)](#).

JOHN PHILOPONUS

See [PHILOPONUS, JOHN](#).

JOSEPHUS; TITUS FLAVIUS

Ἰώσηπος. Jewish leader and writer of the 1st CE. He led Jewish forces against the Romans in the first Jewish-Roman war; defeated, he surrendered and became associated with the emperor Vespasian. He is the author of several extant works:

- *The Jewish Wars* (an account of the conflict

between Rome and the Jewish people in the 1st century)

- *Jewish Antiquities*
- *Against Apion (Contra Apion)*
- *Autobiography*

Although all are interesting and informative, probably the most “philosophical” is *Against Apion*, since it defends Judaism both as an ancient religion (several writers had argued that it was derived from other religious traditions) and as a valuable system of law and morality.

All of Josephus is available online at Christian Classics Ethereal Library.

JUDAISM

Some ancient authors devised fanciful chronologies and scenarios in an attempt to demonstrate that **Pythagoras** and/or **Plato** was familiar with the Torah, or even with Moses himself. We begin to see plausible interactions following **Alexander of Macedon**’s visit to Jerusalem following his conquest of Tyre and Gaza in 332 BCE (recounted somewhat fantastically by **Josephus** in *Jewish Antiquities* 11.317–345). Josephus (again) in *Contra Apion* I.22 says that **Clearchus** tells of an encounter between **Aristotle** and a Hellenized Jew. Theophrastus, as cited by **Porphyry** in *De Abstinencia* II.26, had some fairly clear ideas about Jewish animal sacrifice. **Megasthenes**, Seleucid ambassador to India around 300 BCE, apparently remarked on relationships between Indian and Jewish religion. **Aristoboulus the Peripatetic**, in perhaps the 2nd BCE, claimed philosophical priority for Judaism, beginning a theme that reappeared several times over the next several hundred years. The Hebrew Bible had been translated into Greek in the 3rd to 2nd BCE—according to legend, at the request of Ptolemy Philadelphus, for inclusion in the **Library of Alexandria**. But the first really solid connection between Greek philosophy and Judaism is in the person of **Philo of Alexandria**, who combined knowledge of both traditions with the desire to show that they were consistent with each other.

For the most part, the Jewish intellectual tradition tried to avoid contamination by Greek philosophy, and the Greek philosophical tradition responded by not paying much attention to the Jewish intellectual tradition.

However, there are a significant number of people mentioned in the ancient Greek philosophical tradition who were probably Jewish by origin—assimilation into the dominant culture is not an exclusively modern phenomenon.

For example, the several individuals from **Ascalon** were most likely Jewish.

In the medieval period, particularly in the Islamic lands, further synthesis of Jewish and Greek philosophical ideas did occur, but that is outside the scope of this dictionary; we may just mention Maimonides.

JUDGMENT

See [DOXA](#).

JULIA DOMNA

(2nd–3rd CE.) Wife of the emperor Septimius Severus and mother of Caracalla, she made the imperial court a center of culture. She encouraged **Philostratus** to write his biography of **Apollonius of Tyana**, and she supported the work of **Galen**.

JULIAN THE APOSTATE

(331–363 CE.) Flavius Claudius Iulianus, brought up **Christian**, converted to paganism; as emperor (361–363) he attempted to restore pagan practices in the empire. Before becoming emperor, he had studied **Neoplatonism** with **Maximus of Ephesus** and was particularly favorable to the theurgy (*theourgia*) of **Iamblichus**. His works have been collected in the Loeb series.

JULIAN THE THEURGIST

(fl. 173 CE.) He introduced the ***Chaldean Oracles*** to the world, having, as he says, saved them from a rainstorm in a military camp in 173 (thus the date). Julian claims that they derive from ancient pronouncements of the deities of Chaldea (Iraq), though modern scholars find them rather reminiscent of the **Neoplatonic** philosophy of **Numenius**, an older contemporary of Julian. Some say that the *Oracles* were composed by Julian the Theurgist's father, a person known as Julian the Chaldean. In any case they were destined to become rather popular with late **Neoplatonists**, and again in **Byzantine** times. See R. Majercik, *The Chaldean Oracles*, 1989.

See also [THEOURGIA](#).

JUSTICE

See [DIKĒ](#), [DIKAIOS](#), [DIKAIOSYNĒ](#); [DIKĒ](#), [DIKAIOS](#), [DIKAIOSYNĒ](#).

JUSTIN MARTYR

(c. 100–165 CE.) **Christian** apologist who argued that the “seeds” of Christianity were present in some of the pagan philosophers, the ***spermatikos logos***. His surviving writings are available online.

JUSTINIAN

Φλάβιος Πέτρος Σαββάτιος Ἰουστινιανός, emperor of the Eastern Roman Empire (Byzantine Empire), 527 to 565 CE. He attempted to recover the western portion of the empire; during his reign Roman law was codified. Zealously promoting Orthodox **Christianity** and repressing all alternatives, Justinian closed the **Neoplatonic** school of **Athens** in 529 CE, ending one continuous tradition of classical philosophy, though the school of **Alexandria** went on for another century as a Christian philosophical school. See J. Hannam, "The Emperor Justinian's Closure of the School of Athens," 2009, <http://jameshannam.com/Justinian.htm>.

See also [DAMASCIUS OF DAMASCUS](#); [SIMPLICIUS](#).

K

KAIROS

Καῖρός. Due measure, proportion; the exact or right time, opportunity. For rhetoricians, the right moment for pushing your advantage. **Aristotle** (*Nicomachean Ethics* I.6, 1096a26) calls *kairos* the good in the category of time. Cf. **Plato**, *Timaeus* 38b4: "This is not a good time to be meticulous." In the New Testament it means the right time for God to intervene in the world (cf. Mark 1:15).

KAKIA

Κακία. Vice, but in general the abstract noun formed from *kakos*, so "badness." **Plato's** **Socrates** readily contrasts *kakia* with *aretē* (e.g., *Meno* 78d); **Aristotle** indicates that vice is the habit of choosing the *wrong* action (cf. *Nicomachean Ethics* 7.4, 1148a3).

KAKOS, KAKĒ, KAKON

Κακός, κακή, κακόν. Adjective meaning bad, ugly, lowborn, cowardly, unskilled; evil. All these senses are common in non-philosophical Greek. The Goddess tells **Parmenides** (f. 1) that no *kakē moira*, evil fate, has brought him to her. *To kakon* (the bad) is opposed to *to agathon* (the good). Why does evil exist in the world? The **Pythagoreans** believed that evil was closely related to the *apeiron*, or indefinite; following that line of thought, in *Timaeus*, at 41c, **Plato** explains the imperfections of human beings by the fact that the fashioning of their bodies was delegated to lesser deities, and he attributes the imperfections of the perceptible world to the fundamental randomness that pre-existed the activity of the *Demiourgos* (48a). At *Laws* 10, 896e, however, the Athenian Stranger asserts that there is both a good **World Soul** and a bad World Soul, reminiscent of **Empedoclean** dualism between the two cosmic principles of *philia* and *eris*. **Aristotle** rejects this sort of dualism at *Metaphysics* IX.9, 1051a18ff: "The bad does not exist apart from bad things, for the bad is posterior to the potentiality (*dynamis*). And therefore we may also say that in the things that are from the beginning, i.e., in eternal things, there is nothing bad, nothing defective, nothing perverted." For Aristotle, there is no positive principle of evil; not even **matter** plays this role. **Plutarch**, in *On Isis and Osiris*, follows a dualistic line, asserting the existence of both good and evil deities; **Numenius** identifies

the principle of evil as “matter,” assuming the identification of the receptacle (*hypodochē*) of the *Timaeus* with Aristotle’s matter. This identification is fundamental for **Gnosticism**; it is rejected by **Plotinus**, who insists that evil is simply the absence of good (*Enneads* 1.8.11). **Proclus** asserts that evil in the world is brought about by bad choices (*De mal. Subst.*).

KALLIPOLIS

Καλλίπολις. “Beautiful city.” **Plato** uses this word just once, at *Republic* VII, 527c2, to refer to the ideal city of the *Republic*; it has become a convenient tag to refer to that utopia.

KALOKAGATHIA

Καλοκαγαθία. (*Kalos*, noble; plus *kai*, and; plus *agathos*, good.) The condition of having all the social virtues, proposed by **Aristotle** as a summative virtue (*aretē*) in *Eudemian Ethics* VII.15. In ordinary Greek a *kalokagathos* is what the British call “a perfect gentleman.”

KALON

Καλόν. Beautiful, noble, good. In general, *kalon* is used to designate that good which is desired for itself and not for the sake of anything else. **Agathon** sometimes has an implication of exchange value or utility. **Plato** tends to use *kalon* and *agathon* more or less interchangeably, whereas **Aristotle** tends to keep them distinct, as two different objects of choice, along with the third, the pleasurable (*hēdyn*). *To Kalon* is, in some of Plato’s **dialogues**, the highest existence, perhaps indistinguishable from *to Hen*, the One; later **Platonists**, especially **Plotinus**, focused on this aspect of Plato’s thought to form a basis for systematization.

KANŌN

Κανών. Canon, standard, measure. Used in geometry for a straight edge, the word was introduced into philosophical usage by **Democritus**, who applied the word to a book on logic or philosophy of language, as did **Epicurus** subsequently. Polyclitus the sculptor had written a book called *The Canon* stating the ideal proportions of body, and made a statue illustrating his ideas. Thus a canon is also an ideal standard or arrangement.

See also [KRITĒRION](#).

KARDIA

Καρδιά. Heart. For **Aristotle**, the location of the governing part of the soul (*psychē*), including thought. *Parts of Animals* III.4, 665b10ff.

KATALAMBANEIN

Καταλαμβάνειν. (*Kata*, down; plus *lambanein*, take.) In **Aristotle**, *Physics* II.4, 196a4, and other passages of the period it means “meet up with,” or the like, but **Chrysippus** (*SVF* 2.39) for example uses this verb to mean “grasp, understand, cognize.”

KATALĒPSIS

Κατάληψις. The abstract noun form of *katalambanein*. In **Stoic** epistemology, this is the act of “grasping” an impression; the standard translation is “cognition.” The Stoics distinguish between cognitive (*katalēptikon*) and non-cognitive impressions.

See also *ALĒTHEIA*; *KRITĒRION*; *PHANTASIA*.

KATAPHASIS, KATAPHATIKOS LOGOS

Κατάφασις, καταφάτικος λόγος. (*Kata*, down; plus *phasis*, saying.) Affirmation, affirmative statement, opposed to an **apophasis** or **apophatikos logos** (**Aristotle**, *Categories* 12b6).

KATĒGORIAI

Κατηγορίαι. In normal Greek, *katēgorizein* is to accuse someone of something. (*Kata*, down; plus *agoreuein*, to speak in public [in the agora].) **Aristotle** appropriates the word in order to talk about *predication*. The first treatise in Aristotle’s works as constituted since antiquity is on the **Categories**, or predicates of normal declarative sentences. Aristotle figures that normal sentences in Greek talk about things that there are (*ousiai*, typically translated “substances”), or kinds of *ousiai*. If you assert that something is a member of a class, you are in fact predicating something in the “category” of *ousia*; for example, “Fido is a dog” predicates dog of Fido. Aristotle distinguishes nine more sorts of predicates: quality (**poion**), quantity (**poson**), relation (**pros ti**); action (**poiein**) and passion (**paschein**) (for active and passive verbs); time (**pote**) and place (**pou**); possession (**hexis**); and disposition (**diathesis**). The last two make it pretty clear that the paradigmatic sentences are in fact about people, since “possession” is illustrated with “has a hat on” and “disposition” is illustrated with “is sitting.” Aristotle suggests that **being** has as many senses as there are categories (**De Anima** I.5, 410a13; **Metaphysics** V.7, 1017a24).

The **Stoics** reduced the number of categories to four: substratum (**hypokeimenon**), quality (*poion*), state (**pōs echon**), and relation (*pros ti pōs echon*). **Plotinus** also reviews the theory from an ontological standpoint (**Enneads** VI.1). See P. Studtmann, “Aristotle’s Categories,” *Stanford*

KATH' HEKASTON

Καθ' ἑκάστων. **Aristotelian** technical term for “individual,” literally “according to each,” contrasted with **katholou** (**Metaphysics** V.11, 1018b33).

See also [TODE TI](#).

KATHARSIS

Κάθαρσις. Purification, catharsis. **Aristoxenus** is quoted as saying, “The **Pythagoreans** practiced purification of the body by means of the medical art, and of the soul by means of music” (DK 1.468, 20). Medically, *katharsis* tends to mean ridding the body of something, whether by a laxative or emetic; a woman’s menstrual flow is also called a *katharsis*. In the **Phaedo** (67c), **Socrates**, talking to two Pythagoreans, says that the separation of the soul (*psychē*) from the body (*sōma*) in death is a *katharsis*. In the **Sophist**, 226ff., the **Eleatic** Stranger’s analysis of the different senses of *katharsis* leads to the conclusion that there is a cleansing of the soul by means of philosophical *elenchus*; in the context there is a rather coy comparison of Socratic practice, which could be described this way, and that of the **Sophists**, who are unlikely to want to rid their interlocutors of error. In **Politics** VIII.7, 1341b20ff., **Aristotle** discusses with approval the Pythagorean theory that music can cleanse the soul, criticizing Socrates of the **Republic** as too limited in the forms of music he accepts. Famously, Aristotle in the **Poetics** says that tragedy performs the function of the *katharsis* of pity and fear (6, 1449b25). Putting the two Aristotelian passages together, one may conclude that “purification” in this context is not exactly totally ridding the individual of the emotions in question, but rather restoring balance and direction among the emotions.

KATHĒKONTA

Καθήκοντα. In **Stoic** moral theory, *kathēkonta* are **appropriate** actions or proper functions, that is, moral duties. **Diogenes Laertius** VII.108 lists “honoring parents, brothers, and country, spending time with friends.” **Cicero**, *De Fin.* 3.60: “When a man has a preponderance of the things in accordance with nature, it is *kathēkon* to stay alive; when he has or foresees a preponderance of their opposites, it is *kathēkon* to depart from life.”

KATHODOS

Κάθοδος. “The road down.” Used of the descent of the soul (*psychē*). **Empedocles** f. 115 (W. E. Leonard translation):

There is a word of Fate, an old decree
And everlasting of the **gods**, made fast
With amplest oaths, that whosoe'er of those
Far spirits, with their lot of age-long life,
Do foul their limbs with slaughter in offense,
Or swear forsworn, as failing of their pledge,
Shall wander thrice ten thousand weary years
Far from the Blessed, and be born through time
In various shapes of mortal kind, which change
Ever and ever troublous paths of life.
For now Air hunts them onward to the Sea;
Now the wild Sea disgorges them on Land;
Now **Earth** will spue toward beams of radiant Sun;
Whence he will toss them back to whirling Air—
Each gets from other what they all abhor.
And in that brood I too am numbered now,
A fugitive and vagabond from heaven,
As one obedient unto raving Strife.

Similarly the **Pythagoreans** believe that the soul is incarnated as punishment for some unspecified sins; in **Plato's** version (e.g., ***Phaedo***, ***Phaedrus***), the soul is drawn down into the body (***sōma***) because of desires for bodily things.

See also [METEMPSYCHOSIS](#).

KATHOLOU

Καθόλου. As an adverb, “in general.” With the definite article, *to katholou* is a technical term in **Aristotle's** philosophy, generally translated “universal”: “I mean by universal that which is naturally predicated of several things; the individual is not” (***On Interpretation*** 7, 17a39). Aristotle continues: “human” is a universal, “Callias” is an individual.

KATORTHŌMA

Κατόρθωμα. Literally, that which is straight, correct. In **Aristotle**, ***Nicomachean Ethics*** II.6, 1106b31, it means to successfully act virtuously; this usage is very common in **Stoic** texts as a word for morally correct action. Other schools picked up on this terminology, granted that they thought it a bit easier to accomplish than did the Stoics.

KEISTHAI

Κεῖσθαι. Literally, to lie down; as one of **Aristotle's** 10 categories (***katēgoriaī***), “position.” His examples at ***Categories*** 2a1 are “is lying, is sitting.”

See also [THESIS](#).

KENON

Κενόν. Empty, void, vacuum. **Democritus** and **Epicurus** use this word for the “void” of space. **Aristotle**, and some other ancient philosophers, denied the existence of such a void (***Physics*** IV.6–9).

KINĒSIS

Κίνησις. Movement. This abstract noun is made from the verb *kinein*, to move or change. Cautionary note: one of the tricky things about Greek verbs is that in addition to active and passive voice, there is a “middle” which indicates that the subject of the verb does (whatever) for itself or on its own behalf. In the case of *kinein*, the middle and passive forms in the present are indistinguishable, so that *kineitai* means either “is moved” or “moves itself.”

Zeno of Elea’s paradoxes problematized *kinēsis* by presenting arguments that seem to show that movement cannot occur. **Atomism** is, for one thing, a response to those paradoxes.

Plato, according to **Aristotle**, was persuaded by the **Heraclitean Cratylus** that the sensory world is constantly in all sorts of movement and is consequently not intelligible (*Metaphysics* I.6, 987a32). We see the effects of that stance in the *Theaetetus*, where the combination of the positions of **Protagoras** and Heraclitus yields the **hypothesis** that “everything is movement,” *to pan kinēsis ēn* (*Tht.* 156).

Aristotle has a great deal to say about *kinēsis*, especially in the *Physics*. Movement is an actualization of a potentiality; some movements are toward an end, but in other cases, the movement is itself the **actuality** and end. In principle, *kinēsis* can occur in respect of any of the categories: thus change in *ousia* is either **genesis** or **phthora**; change in quality (*to poion*) is **alloiōsis**; change in place is **phora**; change in quantity is, for example, growth or diminution; and so on.

See also [KATĒGORIAI](#).

KINOUN, TO

Τὸ κινεῖν. Participle of the verb “to move,” *to kinoun* means “that which causes motion; mover.” That which is moved is called *to kinoumenon*. In **Aristotle**’s analysis of motion and change, there must be a source of movement, probably a series of intermediate “moved movers,” and something at the end of the process which is moved but does not move anything else. The ultimate source of all movement must be *to prōton kinoun akinēton*, the first unmoved mover. This is argued especially in *Physics* VIII and *Metaphysics* XII.

See also [AKINĒTON KINOUN](#); [ARCHĒ KINĒSEŌS](#); [PRŌTON KINOUN](#).

KNOWLEDGE

See [EPISTĒMĒ](#); [GNŌSIS](#); [NOĒSIS](#); [NOĒMA](#); [NOĒTON](#).

KOINŌNIA

Κοινωνία. Community. (Abstract noun built on *koinon*, common.) **Socrates** talking to **Calicles** in the *Gorgias* (508) says that where there is no *koinōnia* there is no friendship (*philia*): “Yes, Calicles, wise men claim that *koinōnia* and *philia*, orderliness, self-control (*sōphrosynē*), and justice (*dikaiōsynē*) hold together heaven and **earth**, **gods** and humans, and that is why they call it a “whole” (*holon*).”

Aristotle, more down-to-earth in the *Politics*, defines a “*polis*” as a “*koinōnia* of families and villages in a complete and self-sufficient life, i.e., a happy and honorable life” (III.9, 1281a1).

KOS

(Island) See **Cos**.

KOSMOS

See **COSMOS** (**KOSMOS**), **COSMOLOGY**.

KRAMA, KRASIS

Κράμα, κρᾶσις. Blending mixture. Everything that there is, is a *krasis* of the elements, according to **Empedocles** (f. 22). **Alcmaeon** said that “health is a proportionate *krasis* of the qualities” (DK 24B4); **Aristotle** distinguishes a *krasis* from a *synthesis* at *Generation and Corruption* 328a6. If the components are preserved in small particles, it is a *krasis*. In a *synthesis*, the elements are transformed and cannot be divided out, even theoretically. *Krama* is the **Epicurean** word for a “blend” of atoms (*atoma*) affecting our perception (*aisthēsis*). **Chrysippus** argues that a drop of wine would blend with the sea in such a way that that drop would extend through the entire ocean (SVF 2.473, 480).

See also **MIGMA**; **MIXIS**; **STOICHEION**, **STOICHEIA**.

KRITĒRION

Κριτήριον. Criterion, basis of judging. **Plato**, at *Theaetetus* 178b, says that when **Protagoras** says that “the human being is the measure,” it means that he has “the criterion within himself.” Similarly **Aristotle**, in *Metaphysics* XI.6, 1063b, talking about the same thesis of Protagoras, says that people perceive the same perceptible qualities similarly unless someone has a sense organ “perverted or injured.” In that case, the person with the sense organ intact must be the “criterion” of the quality. What should be the criterion or criteria of truth becomes a big topic of discussion in Hellenistic philosophy. **Epicurus** proposes sensations, preconceptions, and feelings as the criteria. The **Stoics** countered with the idea that only some impressions are cognitive. **Carneades** and the Academic Skeptics argued that there is *no* criterion of

truth, and thus we do not know the truth.

See also [ALĒTHEIA](#); [ENNOIA](#); [EPIBOLĒ](#); [SKEPTIKOS](#).

KYNIKOS

See [CYNIC](#).

L

LACHES

(Dialogue by **Plato**.) Λάχης. Two Athenian gentlemen are discussing the education of their young sons—should they sign them up for training in fighting in armor. Consulting with Laches and Nicias, leading Athenian military men, they are told that they should ask **Socrates**, since they think of him as the expert on educating the young. Socrates asks Laches and Nicias about the specific form of training; Laches is somewhat in favor of it, while Nicias thinks that it turns out to be useless in actual combat. The fathers ask Socrates to decide; he says that the most important thing is to consider the improvement of the souls of their sons, and particularly, in this case, the development of courage. Socrates asks Laches how he would characterize courage, and Laches responds that it is standing up to the enemy and not retreating; Socrates responds that there is also courage demonstrated in retreat (he should know; he himself demonstrated courage in the retreat at the battle of Delium). Laches suggests “steadfastness of the soul”—but that seems to include a great deal that one would not normally call “courage.” Nicias is brought into the discussion; he says that courage is knowledge of what is to be feared and what is not. But a doctor or a prophet could have that knowledge without thereby being courageous, and also animals seem to exhibit courage but cannot be said to have that sort of knowledge. Anyway, Socrates points out, the kind of knowledge that Nicias is talking about would encompass *all* virtues, not just courage. In the end, the two fathers agree to send their sons to Socrates for further education. See P. Woodruff, “Plato’s Shorter Ethical Works,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, and W. T. Schmid, *On Manly Courage: A Study of Plato’s Laches*, 1992.

See also [ANDREIA](#).

LACONIA

Λακωνία. The territory in which **Sparta** is located; it is also known as Lacedaemonia.

LACTANTIUS

(c. 240–320 CE.) Latin **Christian** apologist of the time of Constantine. His *Divine Institutes* is a rhetorical defense of Christian doctrine (not always completely orthodox) and attack on pagan beliefs, including philosophical. His critique reveals

the popular beliefs about the philosophical schools of his day. His works are available online.

See also [RHĒTORIKĒ](#).

LACYDES OF CYRENE

Λακῦδης. (3rd BCE.) **Academic Skeptic, Scholarch** of the **Academy** from 241/40 BCE. Student of **Arcesilaus**, Lacydes seems to have made Skepticism the official position of the school (**Diogenes Laertius** IV.60). He is said to be the first Scholarch to resign his post in favor of chosen successors, in this case **Evander** and **Telecles of Phocis**. He is said to have drunk himself to death soon after.

See also [CYRENE](#).

LAMPSACUS

Λάμψακος. Ancient city at the east end, north side, of the Hellespont, 40°20'48"N 26°41'57"E, Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #784. **Anaxagoras** moved to Lampsacus as a consequence of his trial in **Athens** for impiety, c. 434 BCE. He received high honors from them. Among the philosophers from Lampsacus we may count **Metrodorus of Lampsacus (1)** (5th BCE), **Strato of Lampsacus** (c. 335–269 BCE), Euaeon of Lampsacus (student of Plato), and several **Epicureans**: **Polyaenus** of Lampsacus (c. 340–278 BCE), **Idomeneus of Lampsacus**, **Colotes** the satirist, **Leontius of Lampsacus**, **Batis of Lampsacus**, the wife of Idomeneus and sister of **Metrodorus of Lampsacus (2)**, whose brother, also an Epicurean, was Timocrates of Lampsacus.

LANGUAGE, THEORY OF

See [LEXIS](#); [LOGOS](#); [ONOMA](#).

LAODICEA

Λαοδικεία. Ancient city located near the modern village of Eski Hissar in Turkey, 37°50'09"N 29°06'27"E. It was built up (261–253 BCE) by Antiochus II and named in honor of his wife; Antiochus III had transported many Jews from **Babylon** to Laodicea, so it became a center of Jewish learning. It later became an important early **Christian** center. **Philonides of Laodicea** (c. 200–c. 130 BCE) is a noted philosopher and mathematician who governed this city for the Seleucids.

LARISSA

Λάρισα. The major city in **Thessaly**, Greece, 39°38.5'N 22°25'E, Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #401. **Philo of Larissa** is the major philosopher from this place; it is also noted for the joke made by **Gorgias**, that just potters make pots, so the magistrates of Larissa make Larissans. A **Pythagorean** of the time of Augustus, **Anaxilaus**, came from

Larissa, as did **Domninus**, a colleague of **Proclus**.

LASTHENEIA OF MANTINEIA

Λασθένεια Μαντινική. (4th BCE.) **Academic**. Student of **Plato** and **Speusippus**, along with **Axiothea of Phlius**. (**Diogenes Laertius** III.46, IV.2; **Athenaeus** VII.279, XII.546; *POxy* 3656.)

See also [MANTINEIA](#); [WOMEN IN ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY](#).

LAW

See [NOMOS](#).

LAW OF NON-CONTRADICTION

In **Metaphysics** IV.3, **Aristotle** asserts a principle, or **axiom**, that he calls “most certain of all” (1005b17), “that the same attribute cannot belong and not belong to the same subject in the same respect.” He adds that “it is impossible for anyone to believe the same thing to be and not to be.” A little later he says that “opposite assertions cannot be true at the same time” (*Metaph.* IV.6 1011b13–20). Modern scholars take these to be three different formulations, calling them the “ontological,” “doxastic,” and “semantic”: the first formulation makes a claim about what there is, the second about what can be believed, and the third about what assertions can be simultaneously true. In one form of modern logical notation, the axiom might be represented either as $\neg(Fx.\neg Fx)$ or $\neg(p.\neg p)$.

Some such axiom is of course presupposed by arguments developed before Aristotle’s time—the arguments of **Parmenides** and **Zeno** depend upon it; **Socrates’ elenchus** often turns on making his interlocutors aware of a contradiction between two or more of their asserted beliefs. But Aristotle gets the credit for formulating the principle as such, though **Plato** does posit a version of the axiom at **Republic** IV, 436b: “It is obvious that the same thing will not be willing to do or undergo opposites in the same part of itself, in relation to the same thing, at the same time.”

The “doxastic” version of the principle may well be criticized—it certainly seems *prima facie* possible for the same person to hold inconsistent beliefs, as Socrates pointed out so many times with various interlocutors. Aristotle says that **Heraclitus**, who says a lot of paradoxical things, does not necessarily believe what he says (*Metaph.* IV.3, 1005b25). Some modern scholars, using a principle of charity, suggest that perhaps Aristotle means that one *ought not* believe contradictory propositions.

Some modern logicians argue that Aristotle’s two-value

logic (true/false) leads to paradoxes, and so defend a three-value logic—for example, true/false/unknown (or undecided), or even an n-value logic. See P. Gottlieb, “Aristotle on Non-Contradiction,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

See also [ANTIPHASIS](#), [ANTIPHANAI](#).

THE LAWS

(Dialogue by **Plato**.) Νόμοι. The *Laws* is Plato’s longest work, and it is also one of the last dialogues that Plato wrote. In the *Laws* Plato provides a comprehensive reflection on political life, law, and education, and he also provides arguments for the existence of a god (**theos**) that is synonymous with the intellect (**nous**) that supervises the cosmos and the **polis**. The dramatic setting of the *Laws* is **Crete**, and in the *Laws* a nameless, older Athenian Stranger journeys up a mountain with two older men, Kleinias, a Cretan, and Megillus, a Spartan, to the shrine and temple of Zeus.

The dialogue begins with a discussion of whether a god or some human being is responsible for the laws of Sparta and Crete, and it then proceeds to discuss many other aspects pertaining to legislation. In the course of their discussion, Kleinias reveals that he is actually part of a group of 10 Cretans that are charged with founding a city in Crete to be called “Magnesia.” This opportunity presents the occasion for the interlocutors to found their ideal *polis* in an actual context, thus giving the *Laws* a dramatic frame that emphasizes its practical concerns.

In the first two books of the *Laws*, the Athenian and his interlocutors discuss the nature of virtue (**aretē**), which is divided into its divine (prudence, moderation, justice, and courage) and human (health, beauty, strength, and wealth) aspects. Both the divine and human virtues are said to follow intellect (**nous**). The first two books also introduce the Athenian practice of wine drinking as a complement to the Spartan practice of gymnastics. Wine drinking introduces the theme of education (**paideia**), which is an important thread throughout the entire work. In book III of the *Laws*, the Athenian gives an account of the development of human history from prehistoric times to almost the present day, and this account is both interesting in its own right and for the light that it sheds on the nature of the Persian, Spartan, and Athenian regimes.

While the *Laws* deals with philosophical issues like virtue and education, the Athenian Stranger also delves into detailed accounts of the arrangement of governmental offices and

specific laws regarding education, farming, and warfare. The ideal number of citizens for Magnesia is 5,040 households, as this number admits of multiple divisors and is a good number insofar as the citizens will still be able to know one another. The *Laws* also makes the argument that law should be preceded by a “prelude” (*prooimion*) that explains why the law should be followed; legislators should proceed as good doctors who explain their advice, rather than “slave doctors” who just issue injunctions without explanations and move on to the next patient. Book IX of the *Laws* gives a detailed penal code for Magnesia that seeks to educate wrongdoers as well as punish them. Book X of the *Laws* is especially important, as it provides arguments for the existence of god, and it also links this providential god to the civic religion of the city. In book XII of the *Laws*, the Athenian introduces the “Nocturnal Council,” a body of magistrates, former magistrates, and citizens that is supposed to watch over the city as a head watches over the body.

While some scholars have noted the *Laws*’ lack of polish, this work provides Plato’s mature, synoptic view of political life as a whole, and it is, along with the ***Apology***, ***Republic***, and ***Statesman*** an essential part of Plato’s political philosophy. While the *Laws* presents an ideal state, it is, as the Athenian notes, a city for human beings, not a city of gods or the children of gods. This admission leads to the qualified acceptance of the family and property in the *Laws*, thus partly explaining the difference between the views of the *Laws* and the *Republic*.

(Thanks to Lew Cassity for this entry.)

See also [NOMOS](#).

LEKTON LEKTA

Λεκτόν, λεκτά. Literally, something said, or sayable. In **Stoic** philosophy, the ontological status of *lekta* is a most interesting issue: although the Stoics are in principle materialists, *lekta* are not material entities, yet they subsist somehow. *Lekta* are not simply what we call “propositions”; non-propositional “things said” are also *lekta*.

LEONTION

Λεόντιον. (c. 300 BCE.) **Epicurean**. Student of Epicurus, companion of **Metrodorus**, said to have been a courtesan (**Diogenes Laertius** X.5, X.23; **Athenaeus**, *Deipnosophistae* XIII.588, 593). **Cicero** says that she wrote arguments against **Theophrastus** (*De Natura Deorum* i. 33/93); Cicero was shocked, as was **Pliny** (*Nat. His. Praefat.* 29).

See also [WOMEN IN ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY](#).

LEONTIUS OF LAMPUSACUS

(3rd BCE.) Student of **Epicurus**; his wife **Themista** was also a student of Epicurus. They named their son Epicurus (**Diogenes Laertius** X). **Strabo** describes him and **Idomeneus** as outstanding citizens of **Lampsacus** (13.1.19). **Plutarch** (*Against Colotes* 3, 1108e–f) says that Leontius had written a letter telling how Epicurus honored **Democritus** for anticipating his philosophy.

LEUCIPPUS OF ABDERA

Λεύκιππος. (c. 480–400 BCE.) He is said to have written two books, *The Great World System* and *On Mind*. It is possible that Leucippus devised the atomic theory in response to the **Eleatic** philosophy that there is exactly one **Being** and no real change. By positing an indefinitely large number of “beings” in the Eleatic sense and allowing them to move in empty space in relation to each other, empirically discernible change becomes intellectually possible. See Sylvia Berryman, “Leucippus,” in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

See also [ABDERA](#); [ATOMON](#), [ATOMA](#).

LEXIS

Λέξις. Speech, style of speech, diction, word, expression, text. In **Aristotle**, *lexis* is the speech performance, or written expression, whereas *logos* is about the thought behind the utterance. He explores *lexis* at some length in the **Rhetoric** and **Poetics**. The distinction between *lexis* and *logos* is pursued by the **Stoics**, who are prepared to call a nonsense word like *blituri* a *lexis* but not a *logos* (**Diogenes of Babylon**; **Diogenes Laertius** VII.57).

LIBANIUS

Λιβάνιος. (c. 314–392 CE.) Originally from **Antioch**, Libanius studied rhetoric in **Athens** and taught in **Constantinople** and Nicomedia (a bit east of Constantinople). Friend of the emperor **Julian**, he is mainly important for his extensive extant **corpus** of letters and orations discussing intellectual issues of his time. For more, see R. Cribiore, *The School of Libanius*, 2007.

See also [RHÊTORIKĒ](#).

LICYMNIUS OF CHIOS

Λικύμνιος. Poet and teacher of rhetoric (student of **Gorgias**, and teacher with Gorgias of **Polus**) mentioned by **Plato**, **Phaedrus** 267, as definer of good diction. In the **Rhetoric** III.13, **Aristotle** says that several of the terms he invented are “pointless and silly.”

See also [CHIOS](#); [RHĒTORIKĒ](#).

LIFE

See [BIOS](#); [ZŌĒ](#), [ZŌON](#), [ZOOLOGY](#).

LIMIT

See [PERAS](#).

LOCOMOTION

See [PHORA](#). *Phora* means motion from one place to another; “locomotion” is sometimes used to translate this word in order to capture the distinction between this sort of motion and others that ancient authors might be mentioning.

LOGIC

See [KANŌN](#); [LOGIKĒ](#).

LOGIKĒ

Λογική. Logic. While the adjective *logikos* can mean simply possessed of the power of speech or reason (***anthrōpos*** is defined as *zōion logikon*), it gains, particularly in the feminine, the sense of a branch of intellectual endeavor focused on language, as distinguished from *physikē*, focused on nature, and *ethikē*, focused on morality.

In a sense, the **Eleatic** philosophers, **Parmenides** and **Zeno**, called attention most dramatically to logic by offering arguments that look like they are about the meaning of the verb “to be” or the relationship between **unity** and plurality, and quickly turn to conclusions about what must be (or not be) the case about the world. **Plato’s Socrates** also frequently turns logical arguments to important conclusions; for example, in ***Theaetetus*** (186d), when he shows that “knowledge is not in the experiences but in the process of reasoning (***syllogismos***) about them.”

Still, **Aristotle** is often credited with the creation of formal logic, specifically in the ***Prior Analytics***, where he offers a formal theory of validity. He distinguishes several kinds of reasoning—deductive, inductive, and dialectical—and in the course of his collection of works called the *Organon* presents a methodology for each.

At the same time, other schools of philosophy inspired by Socrates pursued investigations into logical method; we may mention particularly the **Megarian** and **Dialectical** schools in this connection. After the time of Aristotle, the **Stoics** developed logic in new ways: for example, they interpreted Aristotelian syllogistic premises (like “all human beings are mortal”) as conditionals (“if anything is a human being, then it is mortal”) and developed a kind of propositional calculus.

Galen eventually showed that Aristotelian and Stoic

logical systems are consistent with each other. See S. Bobzien, "Ancient Logic," *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

LOGISMOS

Λογισμός. Calculation, reasoning. Although the word is widely used of doing arithmetic, **Aristotle** extends it to cover rational activity in general (e.g., **Rhetoric** I.10, 1369b7).

LOGISTIKON

Λογιστικόν. In a narrow sense, the word means skilled in calculation (**Plato**, **Theaetetus** 145a), but both Plato and **Aristotle** apply the word to mean the rational part of the soul (**Republic** 439d; **De Anima** 432a25).

LOGOS

Λόγος. The word *logos* is perhaps the most used, and crucial, word in ancient Greek philosophy. Based on the verb *legein*, to speak, to say, or to count, in various contexts it may be translated as word, account, ratio, definition, proposition, discourse, language, and doubtless other things besides. The emphasis on *logos* begins perhaps with **Heraclitus** f. 1: "Although this *logos* always exists, people fail to understand it, both before they hear it, and when they first hear it. For everything happens according to the *logos*; people seem not to have experienced them when they try the word and works such as I present, dividing each thing according to its nature and telling how it really is. But other people do not notice what they are doing when they are awakened, just as they forget what they do when asleep." Already *logos* is ambiguous between the account that Heraclitus provides and the principles on which that account is presumably founded.

In **Plato**'s "Socratic" **dialogues**, *logos* may have any of its senses, but perhaps most often it refers to the whole discussion, or to a specific argument presented by one of the participants. At **Phaedo** 75B a close connection is made with knowledge (**epistēmē**): it is regarded as self-evident that the person who knows is able to provide a *logos* of what he or she knows. One might say that that is a major objective of **Socrates**' questionings, to get people to provide an adequate *logos* of what they claim to know. While one might, with **Aristotle**, want to say that Socrates is looking for a definition (see **HORISMOS**), what Socrates asks for is perhaps a bit broader than simply a definition.

In the **Theaetetus**, the last definition of *epistēmē* examined is "true belief plus a *logos*," and while no explanation of the meaning of *logos* in this context turns out to

be satisfactory, the reader is given the impression that we are, by the end of the dialogue, at least *approaching* a satisfactory account of knowledge. If we put that passage in conjunction with the **Sun-Line-Cave** passage in the *Republic*, we see that in the *Republic*, the top segment of the Line, called dialectic, is characterized by the person who practices this art being able to give a *logos* of the being (*ousia*) of each thing. We can then see where the *Theaetetus* definition falls short—the *logos* there was not of the *ousia*.

Of the many other Platonic places we might mention, let us stick to just one more: in the *Timaeus*, the accounting of the work of the **Demiourgos** is often called the works of *logos*, usually translated “reason,” in contrast with the works of necessity (*anagkē*), the part that tells of randomness and the irrational. The large third section of the *Timaeus* is called the cooperation of *logos* and *anagkē*. The *Demiourgos* models the world “after that which is changeless and is grasped by *logos*” (*Tm.* 29a).

Aristotle uses the word *logos* for a wide range of language-related items: language, word, speech, story, prose, talking, and so on; but it also takes on technical philosophical senses, as in Plato, and in some ways beyond the Platonic senses. For example, he very often uses *logos* to mean the verbal formula that expresses the **essence** of some species, that is, a real definition. Yet the expression “the *logos* of the *ousia*” seems often to have a wider signification for him than just definition.

The roughly definitional sense of *logos* easily slips into using it to mean something like concept or thought; *logos*, he says, is of the universal, while perception (*aisthēsis*) is of the **particular** (e.g., *Metaphysics* VII.10, 1035b35ff.). Thus he can say of the mind (*nous*) and body (*sōma*) that they are one in terms of location, but they can be separated *kata logon*, which we might translate as “conceptually” (*De Anima* III.4).

Logos is also used by Aristotle as a word for the rational faculty as such: the soul (*psychē*), he says, may be divided into the part that has *logos* and that which is *alogon* (e.g., *Nicomachean Ethics* I.13, 1103a28); the “rational” part may again be divided into that which obeys the *logos* and that which thinks the *logos* (e.g., *EN* I.6, 1098a3).

Many of these distinctions continued to be used by subsequent philosophers. The following are a few key places. The **Stoics** are cited for defining “*logos*” as “a meaningful sound sent out from **reason** (*dianoia*); articulate meaningful

sound" (*SVF* III.213ff.). But beyond that, the *logos* is the immanent ordering principle of the universe, an idea that they traced to Heraclitus (see above). The dissemination of the *logos* throughout the universe occurs by means of the *spermatikoi logoi*, the seeds of the *logos*.

Philo of Alexandria puts a great deal of emphasis on the notion of *logos*, making it the mediating principle between **God** and the world. There is a kind of proto-trinity in Philo's thought: God, *logos*, and **World Soul**. Unlike the Stoics, Philo ensures the transcendence of God by distinguishing God both from the life of the universe and from its inherent rationality.

This structure was not lost on the author of the Gospel of John, who writes, "In the beginning was the Logos, and the Logos was with God, and the Logos was God" (1:1), "And the Logos became flesh and dwelt among us, full of grace and truth" (1:14). So John identifies Jesus with the principle of rationality in the universe.

A final point: **Plotinus** goes at least one better than Philo by clearly distinguishing the *logos* from *nous* (mind) in *Enneads* III.16.

LONGINUS, CASSIUS

(c. 213–273 CE.) **Platonist** student of **Ammonius Saccas** and **Origen** the Pagan, teacher of **Porphyry**. He became counselor to Zenobia, Queen of Palmyra; when Zenobia's revolt against Rome was crushed, Longinus was executed, while Zenobia was taken back to Rome in chains to be exhibited in triumph by the emperor Aurelian. Fragments of his extensive writings have been collected by M. Patillon & L. Brisson, *Longin*, 2001, in the Budé series.

LOVE

See [ERŌS](#); [PHILIA](#).

LUCIAN OF SAMOSATA

Λουκιανὸς ὁ Σαμοσατεύς. (c. 120–180 CE.) Lucian was a **Sophist** and satirist who made philosophy a subject of comedy. His *Philosophers for Sale* imagines how various classical philosophers would behave were they put on the slave market. His *True Story* includes, among other fanciful adventures, a trip to the moon, thus anticipating "science fiction." His *Auction of Lives* (or *Auction of Wisdom*) introduces the word "esoteric" to the philosophic vocabulary. There are many other extant works (eight volumes in the Loeb edition), well worth reading.

Samosata (Σαμόσατα) was on the west bank of the Euphrates River in what is now Turkey; the ruins have been

flooded by the Atatürk Dam.

LUCRETIUS

(c. 90–c. 50 BCE.) Titus Lucretius Carus, Roman poet and **Epicurean**. His *De Rerum Natura* is the most complete and detailed ancient presentation of Epicurean atomism extant. **Cicero** may have had some role in bringing this work to the attention of the public. Lucretius has probably had his greatest influence since the 17th century, after rediscovery of his poem in the Renaissance. See D. Sedley, “Lucretius,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

LYCEUM

Λύκειον. In the 5th century BCE, the Lyceum was the location of a large wrestling school, named after the adjoining temple of Apollo Lykeios; it was a favorite hangout of **Sophists** and others (see **Plato**, beginnings of the *Euthydemus* and *Lysis*). **Isocrates** taught there in the earlier part of the 4th century. In 335, **Aristotle** acquired the building as a location for his school. He taught there until shortly before his death in 323. It gained the alternative name, the Peripatos, due to the covered walkways in the structure where Aristotle often taught while walking around (see [PERIPATETIC SCHOOL](#)).

The school continued to operate under successor **Scholarchs: Theophrastus, Strato of Lampsacus**, and **Lyco**, until sometime after 225, when Lyco left the school to the entire group of scholars rather than to one individual. In fact at that point it was in serious decline, since the **Museum of Alexandria** had proven to be a much livelier location for Aristotelian research. Some sources tell us that **Aristo of Ceos** succeeded Lyco; we know that **Critolaus** was the leading Peripatetic in 155 BCE, as he was a member of the Athenian embassy of that year to **Rome**. We hear that **Diodorus of Tyre** succeeded Critolaus, and Erymnus succeeded Critolaus, which takes us to about 100 BCE.

There were known Peripatetics during the 1st century BCE, but the Athenian school itself seems to have collapsed before 86 BCE, when **Sulla** attacked **Athens**. According to one story, **Apellicon of Teos** had acquired (possibly stolen) the library of the Lyceum, and Sulla shipped it off to Rome, where it was the basis of the edition of the **Corpus Aristotelicum** produced by **Andronicus of Rhodes** (**Plutarch**, *Life of Sulla* 26). **Cicero** spent nearly two years in Athens (79–77 BCE) and does not mention visiting the Lyceum; in his opinion the contemporary Peripatetics were indistinguishable

from Stoics.

A kind of revival of the Lyceum occurred in Athens when **Marcus Aurelius** funded a chair of Aristotelian philosophy, but the precise location of resulting instruction is not at all clear.

LYCO OF IASOS

Λύκων. (4th BCE.) **Pythagorean**. Attacked **Aristotle's** lavish lifestyle and wrote *On the Pythagorean Life*, emphasizing temperance (**Eusebius**, *Praep. Evang.* XV.2; **Athenaeus** II.47a, 69e; X.418f; **Diogenes Laertius** V.69).

Iasos (Ἰασός) was originally an island just off the Ionian coast, but it is now connected to the mainland of Turkey by a narrow isthmus, 37°16'40"N 27°35'11"E, Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #891.

LYCO OF TROAS

(d. 225 BCE.) Successor of **Strato of Lampsacus** as **Scholarch** of the **Lyceum**, apparently succeeded by **Aristo of Ceos**. See Fortenbaugh & White, *Lyco of Troas and Hieronymus of Rhodes*, 2004. "Troas" is a territorial name, for the area where ancient Troy had been situated, in northwest Turkey, Asian side.

LYCOPHRON

Λυκόφρων. (5th BCE.) **Sophist**, student of **Gorgias**. **Aristotle** refers to him several times: in *Physics* I.2, 185b28, Aristotle says that the **Eleatic** philosophy made him give up using forms of the verb "to be"; in the *Politics* (III.9, 1280b10) Aristotle says that he had a conventionalist theory of law, not untypical of Sophists. In the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle several times notices bizarre expressions used by Lycophron. In the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle notes that Lycophron defines "knowledge" as the "communion of knowing with the soul" (VIII.6, 1045b10).

LYPĒ

Λύπη. Bodily pain, opposed to bodily pleasure. **Anaxagoras** says that every perception (*aisthēsis*) is attended by pain (*lypē*), according to **Theophrastus** in *Physical Opinions*, f. 23. **Plato** discusses the relationship between pleasure and pain in *Philebus* 31c ff.; **Aristotle** in *Nicomachean Ethics* VII.12–15.

See also [HĒDONĒ](#), [HĒDYN](#).

LYSIAS

Λυσίας. (c. 445–380 BCE.) Athenian speechwriter; son of **Cephalus of Syracuse**, who on the invitation of Pericles had established an arms factory in Athens. **Plato's Republic** occurs in the home of Polemarchus, Lysias' older brother.

Polemarchus was executed by the 30 (404/3), but Lysias escaped; when the democracy was reinstated, Lysias returned, but much poorer, since his property had been confiscated. He made a living writing speeches; we have about 34 of them, available online at Project Gutenberg. Plato's **Phaedrus** begins with Phaedrus reading out a speech supposedly composed by Lysias for a man who is trying to seduce a boy by telling him that he is not in love with him.

See also [PHAEDRUS](#).

LYSIS

Λύσις. Solution, being free, deliverance. **Aristotle** uses this term for the solution of a problem, or the resolution of the plot in a play. At **Phaedo** 67d, **Plato's Socrates** uses it of the separation of the soul (**psychē**) from the body (**sōma**) at death.

LYSIS

(Dialogue by **Plato**.) Λύσις. Plato's dialogue on friendship. **Socrates** encounters four young men, two in their early teens and two in their late teens, in a wrestling school and discusses with them the meaning of their relationships actual and possible. See C. D. C. Reeve, "Plato on Friendship and Eros," *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

See also [PHILIA](#).

LYSIS OF TARAS

Λῦσις. (5th BCE.) **Pythagorean**. When the Pythagoreans in southern Italy were persecuted, he is supposed to have gone to **Thebes**, where he is said to have taught Epaminondas (Pausanias IX.13#1; **Aelian**, *Varia Historia* III.17; **Diodorus Siculus**, *Exc. De Virt. Et Vit.* 556; **Plutarch**, *De Gen Socr.* 8, 13, 14, 16; **Diogenes Laertius** VIII.7, 39, 42; Nepos, *Epam.* 2; **Iamblichus**, *Vit. Pyth.* 35).

Taras (Τάρων) is the ancient Greek name of **Tarentum**, an important Pythagorean center.

M

MACEDONIA, MACEDON

Μακεδονία. Ancient region including a large portion of northern Greece, the current Republic of Macedonia, plus parts of Bulgaria, Albania, Kosovo, and Serbia. The Kingdom of Macedonia became a major player in the aftermath of the Peloponnesian War; Amyntas III (ruled 393–370 BCE) played off Sparta and Athens against each other. His youngest son, Philip II (ruled 359–336), very largely expanded the kingdom. When he was assassinated, his son **Alexander** (ruled 336–323) conquered nearly all the lands known to the Greeks at that time. **Aristotle** was very much in the middle of all that—his father was court physician to Amyntas III; he himself engaged in diplomacy for Philip II and was tutor of Alexander. Following the death of Alexander the empire was divided up among his generals; Antipater became king of Macedonia. In the 2nd century BCE, there were a series of wars with Rome which resulted in Macedonia becoming a Roman province. During the Roman period, Thessaloniki became a major center—for example, the emperor Galerius in 297–307 CE made it his major center of activities.

MACROBIUS (AMBROSIUS THEODOSIUS MACROBIUS)

(fl. 395–423 CE.) Grammarian and **Neoplatonist**, author of *Saturnalia*, an extensive text explaining the origin and meaning of the festival that is now known as Christmas, and a commentary on **Cicero's** *Dream of Scipio*, influential in the medieval west. The *Saturnalia* is available in the Loeb series, 3 vols., ed. R. Kaster, 2011. *The Dream of Scipio* has been translated by W. H. Stahl, 1952, 1966.

MAGIC

Two Greek words are closely associated with this English word. The one is *mageia*, the theory and practice of the “Mages” or priests of the Persian deity **Zoroaster**. For example, **Theophrastus** uses this word as the practice of the Mages, and magic, in *Historia Plantarum* 9.15.7. The other word is *manganeia* (and various related words) meaning “trickery,” for example, **Plato**, *Laws* X, 908d. The form of “magic” most closely associated with the philosophical tradition is theurgy (*theourgia*).

See also [ANAXILAUS OF LARISSA](#); [FIGULUS, PUBLIUS NIGIDIUS](#); [HERMES TRISMEGISTUS](#); [MAXIMUS OF](#)

[EPHESUS](#); [OENOMAUUS OF GADARA](#); [SOSIPATRA](#).

MAGNA MORALIA

Τὰ ἠθικὰ μεγάλα. Abbr. *MM*. Ethical treatise included in the Aristotelian **corpus**. Scholarly opinion is divided as to whether this treatise is (a) by **Aristotle**, (b) by a well-informed member of the **Peripatetic school**, or (c) student notes taken when Aristotle was giving a course similar either to the **Eudemian** or the **Nicomachean Ethics**. See P. Simpson, *The Great Ethics of Aristotle*, 2014.

MAGNITUDE

See [DIASTĒMA](#); [MEGETHOS](#).

MAN, HUMAN BEING

See [ANTHRŌPOS](#).

MANIA

Μανία. Madness. In the **Phaedrus** (254a), **Socrates** distinguishes several sorts of *mania*; first, there is bad madness and good madness, and of the good madness there are four varieties: that of oracles and prophets; the sort that leads to purifications of long-standing plagues; the mad inspiration of poets; and the madness of the philosophical lover. Similarly in the **Symposium** (218a), **Alcibiades** talks about all the people around Socrates “sharing in the Bacchic frenzy of philosophy.” After **Plato**, philosophers tended to be a fairly sober lot, avoiding talk of philosophical madness. For example, Aristotle says that the person who stands on a high spot during a thunderstorm is crazy, not brave (**Eudemian Ethics** III.1, 1229b27). According to the **Stoics**, everyone but the wise person is insane (*SVF* III.166). The classic study is E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational*, 1951.

See also [MANTIKĒ](#).

MANICHEANISM (MANICHAEISM)

Religion founded by the Persian Mani (216–276 CE), strongly dualistic between “good” and “evil”; it combined **Zoroastrian**, **Christian**, and Buddhist ideas (and severely rejected Jewish ideas) and became extremely popular and widespread. **Augustine** was a follower for several years before becoming a **Platonist** and **Christian**. Augustine came to believe, with the Platonists, that “evil” is simply the absence of good, that there is no irreducible evil power in the universe. Orthodox and Roman Christians, and subsequently Muslims, did their best to eliminate Manicheanism. When they succeeded, the name became something of an insult to be thrown at one’s religious opponents.

Many Manichean sources are readily available online.

See also [ALEXANDER OF LYCOPOLIS](#); [JUDAISM](#).

MANILIUS, MARCUS

(1st CE.) Author of *Astronomica*, a long poem presenting **astronomy** and astrology with a **Stoic** slant. It is available in the Loeb series.

See also [ASTROLOGIA](#).

MANTIKĒ

Μαντική. Divination, prophecy. **Plato**, at *Phaedrus* 244c, relates the word etymologically to *mania*, or madness, suggesting that prophets and diviners are inspired but out of their minds. **Socrates** is represented as calling the messages from his *daimonion* “*mantikē*” (*Apology* 40a). At the same time, *mantikē* is sometimes represented as an art or craft (*technē*), for example, at **Aristotle**, *Politics* 1274a28.

Cicero, in *De Divinatione*, distinguishes the “inspired” form of divination from the “craft” variety; the “inspired” sort operates either through prophets as described by Plato, or by way of dreams (see [ONEIROS](#)); the technical sort uses the flight of birds or the entrails of sacrificial animals, for example, as indications of the future.

MANTINEIA

Μαντινεία. Ancient city in Arcadia, Peloponnesus, Greece, 37°37'N 22°23'E, Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #281. **Diotima**, **Socrates'** inspiration in the *Symposium*, was said to be from Mantinea, as was **Lastheneia**, a student of Plato and member of the **Academy**.

MARCUS AURELIUS

See [AURELIUS](#), [ANTONINUS MARCUS](#).

MARINUS OF NEAPOLIS

Μαρίνος ὁ Νεαπολίτης. (c. 450–500 CE.) **Neoplatonist**. Successor of **Proclus** as **Scholarch** of the Platonic school of **Athens**. His biography of Proclus survives and has been translated by K. S. Guthrie; it is a major source of information both about Proclus and about the people of the late 5th century. Born in what is now Nablus, he was a Samaritan or a Jew.

Nablus (Neapolis) is in the Palestinian West Bank, 32°13'13"N
35°16'44"E.

See also [AGAPIUS](#); [ASCLEPIGENEIA](#); [DOMNINUS OF LARISSA](#); [GOLDEN CHAIN](#); [HEGIAS](#); [ISIDORE OF ALEXANDRIA](#); [ZENODOTUS](#).

MARIUS VICTORINUS AFER

See [VICTORINUS](#), [MARIUS](#), [AFER](#).

MARTIANUS CAPELLA (MARTIANUS MINNEUS FELIX CAPELLA)
(Early 5th CE.) His one known work, *Satyricon*, or *De Nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii et de septem Artibus liberalibus libri novem* (On the Wedding of Philology and Mercury and of the Seven Liberal Arts, in Nine Books), was a favored inspiration of the organization of education in the medieval West. See W. H. Stahl & R. W. Johnson, *Martianus Capella and the Seven Liberal Arts* (2 vols.), 1971, 1977.

MATHĒMA, MATHĒMATA; TA MATHĒMATIKA

Μάθημα, μαθήματα; τὰ μαθηματικά. A *mathēma* is something that can be learned. *Ta mathēmata*, the plural, is especially applied to what we would call “mathematical” knowledge: arithmetic, geometry, and **astronomy** (**Plato**, **Laws** 817e), with the later addition of harmonics. **Aristotle**, at **Physics** II.2, 194a8, distinguishes abstract mathematical studies from mathematics in nature, which includes (for example) optics, harmonics, and astronomy. In that same context, he uses the phrase *ta mathēmatika* to refer to “mathematical” entities such as odd and even; point, line, and surface considered separately from bodies; and so on.

Mathematical knowledge was fundamental at the beginning of ancient Greek philosophy. **Thales** is credited with developing (or borrowing from elsewhere) the method of triangulating to calculate the distance of a ship at sea, or the height of a pyramid, for example. **Pythagoras** is said to have asserted a mathematical, specifically geometrical, understanding of reality, developed by his followers.

While **Egyptians** and Babylonians had a great deal of advanced understanding of mathematical principles, the ancient Greeks are usually given credit for the idea of a rigorous mathematical proof of theorems. The classic history of Greek mathematics is by T. Heath, originally published 1921, often reprinted, and available online.

MATHĒMATIKOI

Μαθηματικοί. Serious students, individuals who want to learn. **Iamblichus**, in his account of early **Pythagoreanism**, uses this word of the more scientifically and mathematically inclined of the master’s disciples. **Hippasus of Metapontum**, who may be supposed to be one of their number, seems to have distinguished *mathēmatikoi* from ***akousmatikoi***, hearers.

MATTER

It is well known that in **Aristotle**’s opinion most of the earliest Greeks whom we now call “philosophers” were interested primarily in figuring out what the world was made of.

Thus a quick Aristotelian summary of much of early Greek philosophy looks like this: **Anaximander**—the *apeiron*; **Thales**—water; **Anaximenes** and **Diogenes of Apollonia**—air; **Heraclitus**—fire; **Empedocles**—earth, water, air, and fire; **Anaxagoras**—“like-parts”; **Leucippus** and **Democritus**—atoms (*atoma*) and the void. Similarly **Plato**, according to Aristotle, imagined that the receptacle (*hypodochē*), or space, was that out of which everything is made. But in a sense, the idea of matter is itself an Aristotelian invention; that is, Aristotle took the word *hylē*, original sense “lumber,” and applied it to whatever anything is made out of. Our word “matter” comes from **Cicero**’s translation of *hylē* as *materia*, which also meant (before he used it this way) “lumber.”

For Aristotle, there are four basic sorts of questions that you can ask about anything. What is it? What is it made out of? How did it come to be what it is? What is it for? “*Hylē*” is the general answer to “What is it made out of?” For Aristotle, the *proximate* matter is a much more informative answer than a more remote level of material. For example, it is much more informative to say that the house is made of bricks and mortar, wood and nails, than to say that it is such and such a percentage of silicon, oxygen, carbon, iron, and so on, to put it into modern vocabulary. But even that is more informative than saying that it is made out of atoms (*atoma*) of various shapes and sizes (which are too small for us to observe) as the atomists suggest, or that it is made out of the possibility of the othering of perceptibility afforded by the space-time continuum, as Plato appears to suggest.

After Aristotle, both the **Epicurean** and **Stoic** schools were, in their different ways, thoroughly materialistic. The Epicureans were atomists; the Stoics were also reductionist. **Peripatetics** tended to be more reductionist than Aristotle himself. Only the **Platonists** remained deeply suspicious of explaining things in terms of what they were made out of.

See also [HYPOKEIMENON](#); [STOICHEION](#), [STOICHEIA](#).

MAXIMUS OF EPHEBUS

(c. 310–372 CE.) **Neoplatonist**. **Eunapius** writes about him in *Lives of the Sophists*; he is also mentioned by **Ammianus Marcellinus**, **Julian**, and **Libanius**. He studied in **Pergamon** with **Aedesius**; he is said to have broken a love spell cast on **Sosipatra**. Around 350 Maximus went to **Ephesus** to teach; there he met Julian—Maximus offered the emperor Julian what he wanted by way of **magic** and theurgy. When Julian died, Maximus continued to be favored during

Jovian's eight-month reign; but under Valentinian I and Valens, his enemies were emboldened, and he was convicted of crimes and imprisoned. When he got out, Maximus began teaching again. A new conspiracy led to his execution in 372. Maximus wrote a number of philosophical treatises, now lost.

See also [EPHESUS](#); [THEOURGIA](#).

MAXIMUS OF TYRE

Μάξιμος Τύριος. (Late 2nd CE.) **Middle Platonist**. Forty-one of his essays on various topics are extant. A central theme is the unity and supremacy of God. His work was translated by Thomas Taylor in 1804, and again by Michael Trapp in 1997. See J. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists*, 1996.

See also [TYRE](#).

MEAN

See [MESON](#), [MESOTĒS](#).

MEDICINE

See [IATROS](#), [IATRIKĒ](#).

MEDIUM OF PERCEPTION

Aristotle argues that the perceptible form must be transferred from the perceived object to the perceiving organ by means of a "medium" (*De Anima* II.7ff.). Light is transported instantaneously through the *aithēr*, air (*aēr*) or **water** is the medium for sound and smell; the flesh is the medium for taste and touch. There is a considerable discussion of the meaning of this theory; see V. Caston, "The Spirit and the Letter: Aristotle on Perception," 2004, available online at Caston's website.

See also [AISTHĒSIS](#); [MESON](#), [MESOTĒS](#); [METAXY](#).

MEDIUS

Some sources give this name for the third husband of Pythias, **Aristotle's** daughter; see [METRODORUS](#).

MEGALOPREPEIA

Μεγαλοπρέπεια. Magnificence, as a personal quality. In **Plato**, *Republic* VI, 486a, it is assumed to be a quality of the "true philosopher." In **Aristotle**, *Nicomachean Ethics* IV.2, 1122a19ff., it is applied to the **appropriate** expenditure of money by the wealthy person.

MEGALOPSYCHIA

Μεγαλοψυχία. "Great-souledness" or pride, as a personal quality. In *Nicomachean Ethics* IV.3, 1123a34ff., **Aristotle** struggles to convey a sense of the quality of an individual who is a paragon of the virtues and is appropriately aware of his greatness, but not excessively. Some of his description looks like an attempt to explain what later became known as

charisma. Of course there is a serious danger of someone going beyond the evidence, so to speak, in thinking of himself as a *megalopsychos*. In the *Second Alcibiades* (a dialogue not written by **Plato**), **Socrates** says that *megalopsychia* is a euphemism for stupidity (140c, 150c). See J. Stover & R. Polansky, "Moral Virtue and *Megalopsychia*," *Ancient Philosophy* 23, no. 2 (2003): 351–359.

MEGARA

Μέγαρα. Town about 20 miles west of **Athens**, Greece, 38°0'N 23°20'E, Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #225. Home of **Euclides**, student of **Socrates** and founder of the **Megarian school**. **Plato** is said to have taken refuge with them after the execution of Socrates. **Nicarete**, who became student and mistress of **Stilpo**, was from Megara.

MEGARIAN SCHOOL

Said to have been founded by **Euclides of Megara**, associate of **Socrates** and enthusiast of **Parmenides**. Others said to be associated with the Megarian school include **Stilpo**, **Diodorus Cronus**, **Philo the Logician**, **Eubulides of Miletus**, and others (see below). Several Sophistic paradoxes are associated with the name of Eubulides. **Aristotle** critiques the Megarian school at *Metaphysics* IX.3; the Megarians apparently denied potentiality, claiming that something *can* act only when it is actually acting. If the Megarians were followers of the **Eleatic** philosophy, that would be consistent with a denial of potentiality.

See also [APOLLONIUS CRONUS](#); [CLINOMACHUS OF THURII](#); [DIONYSIUS OF CHALCEDON](#); [EUBULIDES OF MILETUS](#); [EUPHANTUS OF OLYNTHUS](#); [ICHTHYAS](#); [NICARETE OF MEGARA](#); [PANTHOIDES](#); [PASICLES OF THEBES](#); [THRASYMACHUS OF CORINTH](#).

MEGASTHENES

Μεγασθένης. (c. 250–290 BCE.) Sent as an ambassador to **India** by the Seleucids around 300 BCE, Megasthenes recorded in considerable detail his observations of Indian civilization and culture. He remarks on similarities between Indian, Jewish, and Greek philosophies; **Clement**, in *Stromateis*, takes those remarks as asserting priority for Brahmins and Jews, though apparently Megasthenes does not make that claim. The fragments were collected in 1846 by E. A. Schwanbeck and translated in 1877 by J. W. McCrindle; that edition is available online.

MEGETHOS

Μέγεθος. Size, magnitude. **Zeno of Elea**'s paradoxes

include the dilemma, if there are many things, and they have magnitude, then the many things are potentially indefinitely divisible, so there is an infinite number of things; if there are many things, and they do not have magnitude, then nothing with a finite magnitude can be constructed of them.

Leucippus is not worried: he seems to have said that space (*to kenon*) is indefinite in terms of size (*megethos*), and the atoms (*atoma*) indefinite in terms of number (*plethos*).

In *Metaphysics* V.13, **Aristotle** says that a *megethos* that is continuous in one dimension is a length, a *megethos* that is continuous in two dimensions is breadth, and a *megethos* that is continuous in three dimensions is depth; if these are limited in extent, they are line, surface, and solid.

MEIGMA

Μεῖγμα. Mixture, compound. Alternate spelling for

MIGMA.

MELEAGER OF GADARA

Μελέαγρος. (1st BCE.) **Cynic?** Poet and collector of epigrams that form the original basis for the *Greek Anthology*. **Athenaeus** (*Deipnosophists* iv.157) and **Diogenes Laertius** (VI.99) classify him as a Cynic, with his compatriot **Menippus**. Like Menippus, he wrote satirical essays that popularized Cynical philosophy; these are lost, though 134 (mainly sensual) epigrams survive in the *Anthology*.

See also [EPIGRAMMA](#); [GADARA](#).

MELISSUS OF SAMOS

Μέλισσος. (Born before 470 BCE.) He commanded the Samian fleet that defeated the Athenian navy in 442 BCE, according to **Plutarch**, *Life of Pericles*. Melissus wrote a book supporting and in some ways extending the **Eleatic** philosophy of **Parmenides** and **Zeno**, asserting the **unity** and eternity of **Being** and the consequent illusoriness of the observed perceptible world. While Parmenides says that Being is “like a well-rounded sphere,” implying that it is finite in extent, Melissus asserts the spatial infinity of Being. **Aristotle** was very critical of Melissus (*Metaphysics* I.5, 986b25–27; *Physics* I.2, 185a9–12); we have fairly extensive fragments, preserved by **Simplicius**, that present a **dialectical** argument in support of the Eleatic position as Melissus understood it. These fragments are available online. Simplicius also presents a summary of the arguments presented by **Gorgias** in a book that looks to be a use of Melissus’ style of argument turned against him. If that is correct, the main lines of Melissus’ argument would be to show, first, that “Being *Is*”; second, that

“Being is the Object of Knowledge”; and third, that “Being is the Referent of Speech.” See [GORGIAS](#) for what he does with that. The most thorough account of Melissus is G. Reale, 1970.

See also [APEIRON](#); [SAMOS](#).

MELOS

Μέλος. (1) Bodily limb. (2) Musical phrase, melody; more generally, tuneful music. “*Melos*” is the musical element in the composition of a tragic drama at **Aristotle**, *Poetics* 1450a14; for **Plato** in the *Republic* (379a, etc.), τὰ μέλη (*ta melē*) are all the songs, poems, and so on to which the young are exposed.

See also [MOUSIKĒ](#), [TA MOUSIKA](#).

MĒLOS

Μήλος. Island in the Aegean, at the south end of the Cyclades, 36°41'N 24°25'E, Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #505.

Thucydides 17 recounts the remarkably **Sophistic** arguments that the Athenians gave the Melians before squashing them.

Diagoras, a Sophist native to the island, was reputed to be an atheist.

MEMORY

See [ANAMNĒSIS](#); [ON MEMORY AND RECOLLECTION](#); [TABULA RASA](#); [THEAETETUS](#).

MENDES

Μένδης. Mendes is the Greek name of a city in the Nile Delta in Egypt, 30°57'30"N 31°30'57"E. **Bolus** (3rd BCE) and **Thrasyllos** (1st CE) came from here.

MENEDEMUS OF ERETRIA

Μενέδημος. (c. 340–265 BCE.) He studied with **Stilpo** in **Athens** and at the **Elia school**, founded by **Phaedo**. Along with **Asclepiades**, he is supposed to have moved the school to **Eretria**. Like Phaedo, he is assumed to be “Socratic” in some sense. (**Diogenes Laertius** II.126.)

MENEDEMUS OF PYRRHA (LESBOS)

(Mid-4th BCE.) **Academic**, member of the Academy when **Speusippus** was **Scholarch**. When Speusippus died, he and **Heraclides** narrowly lost to **Xenocrates**. Menedemus left and set up a school of his own. (**Philodemus**, *Academicorum historia* vii; Philochorus, *Atthis* f. 224). Pyrrha was a *polis* on the island of Lesbos, Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #799. Destroyed by an earthquake in 231 BCE, much of the site is underwater.

MENEDEMUS THE CYNIC (OF LAMPSACUS)

Μενέδημος. (3rd BCE.) **Cynic**, studied with the **Epicurean Colotes of Lampsacus** (**Diogenes Laertius** VI.102). Diogenes’ story that Menedemus went around

dressed as a Fury has been challenged; it seems to be based on a story by **Menippus of Gadara**.

MENELAUS OF ALEXANDRIA

Μενέλαος. (c. 100 CE.) Mathematician and astronomer whose work *Sphaerica*, lost in Greek, is preserved in Arabic, and in Hebrew and Latin translations of the Arabic version. The Latin was done by Edmond Halley in the early 18th century, the Halley of Halley's comet.

MENEXENUS

(Dialogue by **Plato**.) Μενέξενος. **Socrates** meets Menexenus (who also appears in the **Lysis**) and is persuaded to recount a funeral oration for Athenians who had died in battle that he had heard from **Aspasia**, who, Socrates believes, had also composed the funeral oration delivered by Pericles, presumably the one preserved for us by **Thucydides**, 2.34–46. The dialogue would surely be regarded as inauthentic, because not a dialogue really at all, except that Aristotle refers to it at **Rhetoric** 1367b8 and 1415b31. It is blatantly anachronistic because at 244b–246a it talks about events that happened after the death of Socrates. Of course that section might have been added by members of the Academy.

Cicero reports that Athenians recited both the Pericles funeral oration as reported in Thucydides and the funeral oration in the Menexenus each year in honor of their war dead (*Orat.* 15).

The significance of this dialogue in the Platonic **corpus** has intrigued some scholars; see F. Trivigno, "The Rhetoric of Parody in Plato's *Menexenus*," *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 42, no. 1 (2009): 29–58.

MENIPPUS OF GADARA

Μένιππος. (First half 3rd BCE.) A **Cynic**, associated with **Crates**, Menippus wrote a good deal (now lost) that influenced later writers of satire, particularly **Lucian**. **Diogenes Laertius** gives a list of his works (VI.99–101).

See also [GADARA](#).

MENO

Μένων. **Socrates'** interlocutor in the dialogue named for him. Meno is a wealthy young aristocrat from **Thessaly**, student of **Gorgias**. Apart from his appearance in the dialogue, he is known for his participation in the mercenary army assembled by Cyrus the Younger in his attempt to take the throne of Persia away from Artaxerxes. **Xenophon**, also a member of that army, depicts Meno in a very negative way in

his *Anabasis* II.6, 21–27; some scholars, citing fragments of Ctesias' account of the events preserved by Photius, suggest that Xenophon might have exaggerated how evil Meno truly was.

MENO

(Dialogue by **Plato**.) Μένων. **Meno**, visiting Athens, asks **Socrates** whether virtue (*aretē*) is taught, or gained by practice, or nature, or some other way. Socrates responds that the Thessalians must be fortunate to know what virtue is. What is it? Meno responds with descriptions of the virtues of a man, woman, child, elderly person, and slave. But what is common to all these virtues? asks Socrates. Further questioning gets Meno to accept that justice, moderation, wisdom, and generosity, for example, are all virtues. What is common to them? Meno shows his aristocratic bias by saying that virtue is “wanting beautiful things and being able to acquire them.” But everyone wants beautiful things, and acquiring them is virtuous only if just, which is a part of virtue, so Meno's account is circular.

Meno accuses Socrates of being an electric eel that numbs its victim. Socrates responds by appealing to the idea of *metempsychosis* (transmigration of the soul) with associated *anamnēsis*, or recollection of things learned between lives. Calling for one of Meno's slaves, Socrates shows that he can rouse up in the slave “recollections” of mathematical principles that he was never taught in this life, specifically a special case of the Pythagorean theorem that the square on the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares on the other two sides of an isosceles right triangle.

But is “virtue” like that? Reverting to Meno's original question, is virtue teachable? If it is knowledge, then it is teachable. But who teaches virtue? Though the **Sophists** claim to teach virtue, no one present believes that they succeed in doing so. We may recall in this connection that **Gorgias**, Meno's rhetoric teacher, did *not* claim to teach virtue. Nor do the successful politicians of Athens succeed in teaching their own children virtue. To this, Anytus, Meno's host in Athens, responds that Socrates should be careful what he says; Anytus would become one of the accusers of Socrates in his trial. The dialogue ends with Socrates asserting that as things stand, virtue appears to be a gift of the gods. See D. Scott, *Plato's Meno*, 2009.

See also [RHĒTORIKĒ](#).

Μένων. (4th BCE.) Student of **Aristotle** who wrote an encyclopedic work on Greek medicine. His work is cited significantly in the 1st-century CE papyrus Anonymus Londinensis, an important source for the history of Greek medicine.

MĒ ON

Μὴ ὄν. Nonbeing. After the work of **Parmenides**, who said that you cannot talk about nonbeing because it is not there to be talked of, Greek thinkers had some trouble with negations. Or had fun, as did **Gorgias**. **Plato** deals with false (**pseudos**) propositions, which might be taken to be “about” nonbeing, by saying that both the subject and predicate exist (as Forms, **eidē**), but are not actually related as the sentence states (e.g., “Theaetetus is flying”). **Aristotle** pointed out that denying that some predicate belongs to some subject is in fact talking about something that exists, namely that subject; we do not need Forms for that, or even for the predicate, which is supposed to be a “**universal**” in one of the categories.

See also [BEING](#); [KATĒGORIAI](#); [ON](#), [ONTA](#).

MESON, MESOTĒS

Μέσον, μεσότης. Mean, middle, medium. *Meson* is the adjective; it can be made into a concrete noun with the addition of the definite article (*to meson*); *mesotēs* is the abstract noun. Among the “local” senses, there is a cosmic sense (the middle of the universe). **Parmenides** f. 12: “in the *meson* . . . is the Goddess who steers all things.” The **Pythagoreans** tend to use the word in a mathematical sense (as mathematical mean); they see the mean, or middle, as a “limit” and thus good. It is easy to go from that to a metaphorical sense, as in **Plato**, *Republic* X.619a5: “We must always know how to choose the *meson* and how to avoid either of the extremes, as far as possible, both in this life and in all those beyond it. This is the way that a human being becomes happiest.” **Aristotle** defines the “ethical virtue” as “the habit of choosing the action lying in the *meson* relatively to us, according to the right rule as determined by the person of practical wisdom.” The *meson* is also, for Aristotle, the “middle” term of a **sylogism**, the one that ties the first two premises together and yields the conclusion.

See also [METAXY](#).

MESSENE

Μεσσήνη. 37°10.5'N 21°55.2'E. Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #318. Ancient city in the western Peloponnesus, established as a *polis* in 369 BCE and subsequently supported by the

Macedonians. Two **Peripatetic** philosophers are noted as coming from Messene, **Dicaearchus**, born shortly after the founding of the polis, and **Aristocles**, who may have been a teacher of **Alexander of Aphrodisias**.

METABASIS

Μετάβασις. Transition, “going across.” **Aristotle** uses this word for the change of the elements into each other (*De Caelo* III.7, 305b27ff.); he also uses it, for example, in a passage on the continuity of living kinds:

Nature proceeds little by little from things lifeless to animal life in such a way that it is impossible to determine the exact line of demarcation, nor on which side thereof an intermediate form should lie . . . there is observed in plants a continuous *metabasis* to the animal. (*History of Animals* VII.1, 588b11)

The **Epicureans** use the word for “regress”; that is, they deny that there is a regress or reduction of physical magnitudes ad infinitum—there is no *metabasis* of the atoms (*atoma*) at a certain point. The **Stoics** use the word *metabasis* for arguments by analogy that emphasize the continuity of the cases.

See also [STOICHEION](#), [STOICHEIA](#).

METABOLĒ

Μεταβολή. **Aristotle**’s most general word for “change.” Change of **matter** into an **entity** is *genesis*, and destruction of an entity is *phthora*; qualitative change is *alloiōsis*; change in location is *kinēsis*; quantitative change may be growth or diminution. Sometimes Aristotle uses the word *kinēsis* in a broader sense, almost equivalent to *metabolē*. Aristotle’s general account of change begins in *Physics* V.1.

METAPHORA

Μεταφορά. Metaphor, transfer of sense. (*Phora*, carrying; *meta*, across.) **Aristotle** says that there can be a “transfer of sense” if we say that goodwill toward someone is “inactive friendship” (*Nicomachean Ethics* IX.5, 1167a10). He explores different sorts of metaphors in *Rhetoric* III.10–11, 1411a1ff., with plenty of lively examples, for example Pericles’ reference to the young men who had fallen in war “as if the spring were taken out of the year.”

METAPHYSICS, TA META TA PHYSICA

Τὰ μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ. This word was first used of **Aristotle**’s treatise, in 14 books, that he himself variously calls “First Philosophy,” “The Science of **Being** qua Being,” or “Theology.”

Since the prefix *meta-* in Greek can mean either “after” or “beyond” (i.e., superior to), some have said that the name refers in the first instance to the location of the scrolls on the shelf in the **Lyceum**. At any rate, this treatise provided the initial definition of this philosophical field of study. As analyzed by the Italian scholar Giovanni Reale, Aristotelian metaphysics includes four complementary sorts of study: ousiology, or the study of entities (**ousiai**); aitiology, or the study of causes (**aitia**); axiology, or the study of axioms (*axiomata*); and **theology**, or the study of **God** and the divine. From that perspective, ancient Greek philosophy was heavily involved in metaphysical investigation from the start.

Pre-Aristotelian documents that are crucially “metaphysical” in character include but are not limited to the poem of **Parmenides**, and **Plato’s** *Phaedo*, the **Sun-Line-Cave** passage in the *Republic*, the *Parmenides*, and the *Sophist* (for a start).

The Hellenistic philosophers did not pick up on the word “Metaphysics” as a field of philosophical study. For example, as the **Stoics** saw it, philosophers should be interested in logic (**logikē**), physics (**physikē**), and **ethics**. They did plenty of metaphysics but called some of it logic and some of it physics. The development of a distinct field of investigation called “metaphysics” probably owes most to the commentators on Aristotle’s writings. **Alexander of Aphrodisias** wrote the fundamental commentary on the *Metaphysics* from a **Peripatetic** perspective; subsequent ancient commentaries on the *Metaphysics* were written by **Neoplatonists**. For Western philosophy, the commentary on the *Metaphysics* by Averroes (Ibn Rushd), translated into Latin, played a role, as did the careful study and commentary by Thomas Aquinas. But that takes us out of the focus of this dictionary.

For access to the large literature on Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, see S. M. Cohen, “Aristotle Metaphysics,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, or R. Corazzon, *Theory and History of Ontology* website.

See also **AKINĒTON KINOUN**; **APORIA**; **DIALECTIC**, **DIALEKTIKĒ**; **ENANTIA**; **ENERGEIA**; **ESSENCE**; **HĒI**; **HEN**; **HOLON**; **HORISMOS**; **HYPOKEIMENON**; **LAW OF NON-CONTRADICTION**; **METAXY**; **NOUS (NOOS)**; **ON, ONTA**; **PERAS**; **PHTHARTOS**; **PHYSIS**; **HISTORIA PERI PHYSEŌS**; **PRŌTĒ PHILOSOPHIA**; **PRŌTON KINOUN**; **SŌMA**; **SOPHISTĒS**, **SOPHISTA**; **SOPHISTIKĒ TECHNĒ**; **SOPHOS**, **SOPHOI**, **SOPHIA**; **SYMPLOKĒ EIDŌN**; **THEŌRIA**,

[THEŌREIN](#); [THEOS](#), [THEIOS](#), [THEOLOGIA](#); [THIRD MAN ARGUMENT](#); [WORLD SOUL](#).

METAPONTUM

Μεταπόντιον. Greek city on the bay of Tarentum about 40 km from the city of **Tarentum**, 40°23'00"N 16°49'28"E. When **Pythagoras** and his followers were kicked out of **Croton**, they moved primarily to Metapontum where they were left in peace. The Pythagoreans **Brontinus** and **Hippasus** seem to have been born there. Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #61.

METAXY

Μεταξύ. Between. One of **Zeno of Elea**'s more puzzling arguments is the one that holds that if there are more than one being in the world, then additional beings can be inserted "between" the beings that there are, but that process can be continued indefinitely, so if there exist more than one being, there must be an infinite number of beings, which is impossible (reported by **Simplicius**, in *Phys.* 140, 27).

On a somewhat different note, **Aristotle** accuses **Plato** of having "intermediate" knowable objects, between the Forms (*eidē*) and the phenomena, at *Metaphysics* I.6, 987b15. These "intermediates" are, he says, the "objects of mathematics." It would be possible to gather something on that order from the **Sun-Line-Cave** passage, *Republic* VI, 510b–c, though it would be more attractive to consider that *dianoia* would not be *limited* to mathematical calculations.

For Aristotle, *to metaxy* is the "medium" of any of the senses, that which conveys the sensible form from the sensed object to the sense organ (*De Anima* II). He also uses it as a synonym for several of the senses of *meson*, *mesotēs*.

See also [MATHĒMA](#), [MATHĒMATA](#); [TA MATHĒMATIKA](#).

METEMPSYCHOSIS

Μετεμψύχωσις. This is the late Greek (starting 2nd century CE) word for the idea that souls (*psychai*) leave the body (*sōma*) of people (and perhaps animals) at death and are reborn in new individuals (people or animals). This is of course a standard part of Hindu and Buddhist belief; **Pythagoras** is credited with bringing it to Greece—**Herodotus** suggests from **Egypt**, where it was not at all part of the standard belief. **Xenophanes** tells the story that when Pythagoras came upon someone beating his puppy, he told him to stop, because he "heard the voice of a friend" (f. 7). *Metempsychosis* is an important part of **Empedocles**' theory of the soul: "For before now I have been at some time boy and girl, bush, bird, and a mute fish in the sea" (f. 117). It is a

central part of the argument of **Plato's** *Phaedo* and *Phaedrus* and appears in the *Republic*. We should also note that the **Orphic** cult in Greece also believed in *metempsychosis*, but there appears to be no evidence of that cult before the time of Pythagoras.

In some authors, the word *palingenesia* is a synonym for *metempsychosis*. *Palingenesia* literally means “regeneration” and is used by the **Stoics** for the rebirth of the world after the period of conflagration (*ekpyrōsis*). In the New Testament, it is applied both to the status of having been “born again” through baptism and to the resurrection.

In modern usage, the word “transmigration” is applied to the Pythagorean form of *metempsychosis*, in which souls may go from animal to human or human to animal form; the word “reincarnation” is sometimes restricted to the sort of *metempsychosis* in which human souls always return to another human life.

METEOROLOGY

(Treatise by **Aristotle**.) Μετεωρολογία. Abbr. *Mete*.

Aristotle names the subject of the work in the first paragraph and describes it as the study of those events that occur above the surface of the earth but below the stars. Modern readers would immediately call into question whether the phenomena to be discussed really belong under this description, since he says that he will discuss such things as the Milky Way, comets, and meteors—for us, all astronomical in character. But he also will discuss winds, earthquakes, lightning, and tornados.

His attempt to explain many of these phenomena depends very largely on speculation about the relationships between the elements, since he has the theory that the natural place of earth is as close as possible to the center of the planet earth; water's natural place is on top of that, air on top of water, fire rises in air, and beyond all of those four terrestrial elements there is the sidereal element, *aithēr*. Aristotle speculates (rather freely) about how the interactions between the elements bring about the phenomena.

He is on a bit firmer ground when he discusses the origin of rivers (I.13–14). Some of his comments in this section are fairly astute and reflect a significant knowledge of geography. His comments in book II on the saltiness of the sea and the causes of winds also have some reasonable observational basis. Earthquakes, however, have him totally puzzled—but that's not a surprise, since the understanding of earthquakes is

only now improving, 2,400 years later.

METHEXIS

Μέθεξις. This is a Platonic word, translated “participation” (literally, “having with”); it is one of the metaphors for describing the relationship between Forms (*eidē*) and phenomena (*phainomena*). In the *methexis* model, phenomena “have some of” or “share in” the Form. **Plato** is well aware of the potential paradoxes of the model; in fact he explores them in the first part of the *Parmenides*. **Aristotle** assures us that it is Plato’s coinage in this sense. A typical non-metaphysical use of the word occurs at *Politics* III.5, where Aristotle talks of aristocracies that limit who can have a “share” of honors.

METOICHOS

Μέτοικος. Metic. Alien resident in a foreign city. (“Reside with.”) **Aristotle**, and many other ancient philosophers, were “metics,” alien residents, without political rights in the city in which they taught or practiced. The extensive use of toponyms referring to cities of origin indicates how common this status was.

See also *POLITĒS*.

METROCLES OF MARONEIA

Μητροκλῆς. (c. 325 BCE.) **Cynic**, student in the **Lyceum** with **Theophrastus**. **Diogenes Laertius** (VI.94) tells of how **Crates** converted him to Cynicism. **Teles**, a later Cynic, says (in a fragment preserved in **Stobaeus**), that Metrocles could not keep up with the expensive lifestyle of the Lyceum and **Academy**; once he became a Cynic he had enough and to spare. His sister **Hipparchia** (famously) married Crates. Metrocles disputed with the **Megarian Stilpo** and wrote a book of *Maxims*, establishing an enduring Cynic genre. **Diogenes Laertius** occasionally quotes him.

Maroneia (Μαρώνεια) is in the eastern end of Macedonian Thrace, 40°54'N 25°31'E, Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #646.

METRODORUS

Μητρόδωρος. (4th–3rd BCE.) Third husband of **Aristotle**’s daughter Pythias, father of Aristotle’s grandson, also named Aristotle. Metrodorus was a physician, not a philosopher; he studied with Chrysippus of Cnidus (a physician who lived a century earlier than the famous Chrysippus) and was teacher of **Erasistratus** of **Ceos**. Although **Theophrastus** says in his will that the young Aristotle would have the right to join the Lyceum, he does not appear to have done so.

METRODORUS OF CHIOS

Μητρόδωρος ὁ Χίος. (4th BCE.) **Atomist**, student of Nessus of Chios or of **Democritus** (**Diogenes Laertius** IX.58); he is said to have taught Diogenes of **Smyrna** who taught **Anaxarchus**. Metrodorus' philosophy was strongly **Skeptical**. According to **Cicero** (*Academica*, ii. 23 § 73) he said, "We know nothing, no, not even whether we know or not." **Aetius** preserves a particularly interesting fragment: "A single ear of wheat in a large field is as strange as a single world in infinite space" (*Placita* I.5.4).

See also [CHIOS](#).

METRODORUS OF COS

(c. 460 BCE.) **Pythagorean**. Son of **Epicharmus**, he worked on medicine as well as philosophy. He wrote a treatise on his father's works, claiming that Doric was the proper dialect of the **Orphic** Hymns (**Iamblichus**, *Vit. Pyth.* c. 34).

See also [COS](#), [KOS](#).

METRODORUS OF LAMPACUS (1)

Μητρόδωρος Λαμψακηνός. (d. 464 BCE.) Contemporary and friend of **Anaxagoras of Clazomenae**, he wrote on Homer as allegory. **Plato** mentions his work on Homer in *Ion* 530d. See **Diogenes Laertius** II.11.

See also [ALLĒGORIA](#); [LAMPACUS](#).

METRODORUS OF LAMPACUS (2)

(331–278 BCE.) Co-founder of the **Epicurean** school. He remained a close associate of Epicurus throughout his life, writing a great deal that contributed to the popularity of the school. His sister and two brothers also joined the school, and he had two children with the ex-prostitute **Leontion**, who had joined the school; one of those children was named Epicurus.

See also [LAMPACUS](#).

METRODORUS OF STRATONICEA

(Late 2nd BCE.) **Academic Skeptic**, student of **Carneades**. **Diogenes Laertius** says that he was an **Epicurean** before going to Carneades.

Stratonicea (Στρατονίκη or Στρατονίκη) was a city in Caria, now southwest Turkey, 37°18'53"N 28°03'57"E. It was founded by one of the Seleucid rulers and prospered into the Roman era.

See also [SKEPTIKOS](#).

MICROCOSM

Democritus is credited with saying that a human being is a *micros kosmos*, a small universe (μικρὸς κόσμος) (DK 68B34). The phraseology was new, but the idea was not, since one could argue that earlier thinkers had thought that the

universe is a big person (see, for example, [XENOPHANES OF COLOPHON](#); [ANAXAGORAS OF CLAZOMENAE](#)). **Plato**'s gambit in the *Republic* of identifying the virtues of the individual person with the virtues of the polis is an analogous idea, and the notion of the **World Soul** even closer. **Plotinus** exploits the relationship between microcosm and macrocosm to the fullest extent. See A. H. Armstrong, *The Architecture of the Intelligible Universe in the Philosophy of Plotinus*, 1940, reprinted 2013.

MIDDLE PLATONISM

The first followers of **Plato**, the Old **Academy**, tended to engage in metaphysical speculation (see [SPEUSIPPUS](#); [XENOCRATES OF CHALCEDON](#); [POLEMON](#)), but after Polemon, the Academy became a center for Skepticism (see [SKEPTIKOS](#)). **Antiochus of Ascalon**, who had joined the Academy and studied with **Philo of Larissa**, broke with Philo after the destruction of the Athenian schools by the attacks of Mithridates and **Sulla** (88 and 86 BCE). From Philo's perspective, there was an essential unity of the Academic, **Peripatetic**, and **Stoic** philosophies, and a positive dogmatic position could be constructed. **Cicero** reports the resultant position in *Academica*. At the same time, the Stoic **Panaetius** was synthesizing **Aristotelian** and Stoic theories, and the Stoic **Posidonius**, who had studied with Panaetius, tended to synthesize Stoicism and Platonism. In **Alexandria**, **Eudorus** developed a dogmatic and syncretistic Platonism, with a **Neopythagorean** twist. We do not have enough text to be totally sure of the details of his teaching, but in the case of **Philo of Alexandria** we have quite a lot of text; he was concerned to synthesize what he took to be the best of Greek philosophy, the dogmatic Platonism that he knew, and bring it into line with the Hebrew Bible.

In the next century in **Athens**, we know of a dogmatic teacher of Platonism, **Ammonius**, and a great deal about his most famous student, **Plutarch of Chaeronea**. Others who should be counted as middle Platonists include **Alcinous** (sometimes known as Albinus), **Apuleius**, **Galen**, and others.

The period of "middle Platonism" may be said to end at the time of **Ammonius Saccas**, the teacher of **Plotinus**, who is credited with initiating **Neoplatonism**. It would also be possible to argue that the distinction between "Old Academy," "middle Platonism," and "Neoplatonism," is more temporal than doctrinal, since all of them thought that they were true to the text of Plato. See J. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists*, 1996.

MIGMA

Μίγμα. Mixture, compound. **Aristotle** reports that according to **Empedocles** and **Anaximander**, things come to be by differentiation from a previous “mixture” (*Metaphysics* XII.2, 1069b23). **Anaxagoras** too has a persistent “mixture” of the various component parts of things. According to Aristotle’s *Generation of Animals*, the beginning of a new individual animal occurs by means of a *migma* of the male semen and the female menstrual fluid (GA I.19, 726a32).

MILETUS

Μίλητος. 37°31’49”N 27°16’42”E. Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #854. In antiquity, it was a prosperous port city near the mouth of the Maeander River. Miletus is said to have established more colonies throughout the ancient world than any other Greek city. The traditional three first Greek philosophers, **Thales**, **Anaximander**, and **Anaximenes**, as well as their contemporary, the historian **Hecataeus**, were all Milesians. Hippodamus, an urban planner discussed by **Aristotle** in *Politics* II.8, 1267b22ff., and **Aspasia**, the mistress of Pericles, were also from Miletus. **Eubulides**, a **Megarian**, was from Miletus. In late antiquity, another Milesian, Isidore, was the architect who designed the Hagia Sophia. In late antiquity the harbor and bay silted in so that today the architectural remains are quite a way inland.

MILO OF CROTON

Μίλων. (6th BCE.) Wrestler with many victories. He is said to have saved the life of **Pythagoras** when a roof was about to fall on him, and is said to have married Pythagoras’ daughter **Myia**. Explaining the mean relative to the individual, **Aristotle** explains that the right amount of food for Milo is way too much for the ordinary person (*Nicomachean Ethics* II.6, 1106b3). He is said to have died having gotten his hands stuck in a split tree; wolves came along and ate him.

See also [CROTON](#).

MIMESIS

Μίμησις. Mimesis, imitation. “The **Pythagoreans** say that **beings** exist by imitation of **numbers**, and **Plato** by **participation**, changing the name” (**Aristotle**, *Metaphysics* I.6, 987b10). In fact according to the Cave part of the **Sun-Line-Cave** story of the *Republic*, the objects of hypothetical-deductive reasoning are already imitations of the Forms (*eidē*) (they are like reflections in pools of water); material things are definitely imitations, since they are represented by the models carried back and forth in front of the fire, in the cave, and our

perceptions (***aisthēseis***) of the world are again imitations of them, for they are like the shadows cast on the wall of the cave. In *Rep.* X, Plato applies this “continuous analogy” to the detriment of representational art, which turns out to be essentially an imitation of the shadows on the wall of the cave, and therefore one more step away from reality (598c). In the ***Timaeus***, the ***Demiourgos*** imitates the Forms in creating the world. But if imitation is not of the Forms, from a Platonic point of view, one is going away from being toward unreality. In the ***Sophist***, there is an extensive analysis of the various sorts of *mimēsis*, with the “Sophist” turning out to be a particularly perverse sort of practitioner of *mimēsis*.

Aristotle says of ***technē*** that it partially imitates nature, partially completes what nature cannot finish (***Physics*** II.8, 199a15). This idea is applied in, for example, the ***Poetics***, where the plot of a tragedy imitates, and to some extent goes beyond imitation of, the action of good people in tragic circumstances.

MIND

See ***NOUS (NOOS)***.

MIXIS

Μίξις. Mixture, blending, sexual intercourse.

Empedocles, f. 8, says (in part):

there is no birth

Of all things mortal, nor end in ruinous death;

But *mixis* only and interchange . . .

Thus Empedocles explains all generation by the various ways that the elements are blended. **Aristotle** discusses *mixis* at ***Generation and Corruption*** I.10, 327a30ff. He argues, against Empedocles and others, that various materials have the potentiality to undergo change, so that once that change has occurred, the constituent parts can no longer be disassembled from the whole. The Empedocles “mixture,” Aristotle says, is really just a “juxtaposition” or ***krasis***, not a real mixture.

See also ***MIGMA***; ***STOICHEION, STOICHEIA***.

MIXTURE

See ***KRAMA, KRASIS; MIGMA; MIXIS; SYNTHESIS***.

MNĒMĒ, MNĒMOSUNĒ

Μνήμη, μνημόσυνη. Memory. **Hesiod** makes Mnemosyne the mother of the **Muses** (*Theogony* 54); **Anaxagoras** says that we dominate the other animals because we have **memory**, experience (*empeiria*), wisdom (***sophia***), and skill

(*technē*) (DK 21b). **Plato** explores the idea of memory especially in *Theaetetus* 163ff.; **Aristotle** has a treatise on *Memory and Recollection*.

See also [ANAMNĒSIS](#).

MNESARCHUS

Μνήσαρχος. (6th–5th BCE.) Son of **Pythagoras**, head of the Pythagorean school after **Aristaeus of Croton**.

MNESARCHUS OF ATHENS

(c. 170–88 BCE.) **Stoic** philosopher, student of **Panaetius**, **Diogenes of Seleucia**, and **Antipater of Tarsus**. **Cicero** mentions him as a leading Stoic in the beginning of the 1st century BCE (*Acad.* 2.22.69).

MODE

See [TROPOS](#).

MODERATION

See [SŌPHROSYNĒ](#).

MODERATUS OF GADES

(c. 50–100 CE.) **Neopythagorean**, contemporary with **Apollonius of Tyana**, friend of **Plutarch of Chaeronea**. His *Lectures on Pythagoras* is cited by **Porphry** and quoted by **Stobaeus** and **Simplicius**. Gades is today Cádiz, in southern Spain, 36°32'N 6°17'W.

MOIRA

Μοῖρα. Allotment, portion, fate. The Goddess tells **Parmenides** that no *kakē moira* has brought him to her (f. 1); **Heraclitus** says that those with “greater deaths” have “greater *moira*” (f. 25); **Anaxagoras** says that there is a *moira* of everything in everything (f. 11). In **Plato**’s *Phaedo* 133e5, the *moira* of incurably evil souls is to be thrown into Tartarus, never to be seen again. The word rarely occurs in **Aristotle**; one place where it does is *Nicomachean Ethics* I.9, 1099b10, where he notes that some have thought that *eudaimonia* comes as a consequence of divine *moira*. This is not Aristotle’s own opinion.

See also [ANAGKĒ](#), [ANANKĒ](#); [HEIMARMENĒ](#).

MONAS

Μονάς. One, unit. **Plato** talks about “ones” and “twos” at *Phaedo* 101c, in a roughly **Pythagorean** way. **Aristotle** critiques the Pythagorean/Platonic idea that the “unit” can exist without being something other than a unit (*Metaphysics* XIV.2, 1089b35). **Nicomachus**, *Introduction to Arithmetic*, develops the **Neopythagorean** concept of units and numbers.

See also [DYAS](#); [HEN](#).

MONIMUS OF SYRACUSE

Μόνιμος. (4th BCE.) A **Cynic**, with **Skeptical** tendencies. **Diogenes Laertius** (VI.3, 82–83) tells us that he had been the slave of a banker, and that he feigned madness to be able to become the follower of **Diogenes the Cynic** and **Crates**. He is noted for his statement that “every supposition is a delusion,” quoted by Menander in a play.

See also [SYRACUSE](#).

MORPHĒ

Μορφή. Shape, form. Unlike *idea* and *eidos*, which are explicitly related to *visible* form, *morphē* tends to imply touchable shape. Consequently **Aristotle** often combines it with *eidos* in referring to the “form” of something: the carpenter imparts “*morphē* and *eidos*” to the wood when he builds, so too the male semen to the female contribution to generation (***Generation of Animals*** I.22, 730b14).

MOTION

See [KINĒSIS](#); [PHORA](#).

MOUSIKĒ, TA MOUSIKA

Μουσική, τὰ μουσικά. The arts of the Muses. While there are several different versions of stories about the Muses, the standard or official version says that there are nine, with the following sponsorships:

Epigram Epigram		
History History (i.e., empirical investigation)		
Epic Epic		
Lyric Lyric		
Music Music		
Melody Melody		
Dehydration Dehydration		
Domestic Domestic		
Comedy Comedy		
Astronomy Astronomy		

Thus *mousikē* potentially covers a wide range of artistic and intellectual endeavors.

Plato often refers to the muses; in the *Greek Anthology*, there is an epigram attributed to him that claims that Sappho should be counted as the 10th Muse (Cooper, *Plato*, p. 1745; H. Beckby, *Anthologia Graeca* 12, 1957). In the ***Phaedrus***, **Socrates** not only invokes the muses before launching into his inspired speech, but he later claims that poets who try to compose without having been maddened by the muses are doomed to failure (245), and tells a charming myth that the cicadas are spies of the muses (259).

In the ***Republic*** (403), *mousikē* is one of the three parts of basic education; the other two are ***grammatikē***, or writing, and

gymnastikē, or physical exercise. At **Politics** VIII.3, 1337b24, **Aristotle** says that some add *graphikē* or drawing to the list of subjects that are required for a basic education. He goes on to defend the inclusion of *mousikē* in education, clearly thinking of it as a combination of what we call music and poetry.

Aristotle also uses the adjective *mousikos* as a standard example of an **accidental** (as opposed to essential) **attribute** of a person (e.g., **Metaphysics** V.6, 1015b15). For more on the muses, see “Mousai” online at theoi.com.

See also [MELOS](#).

MOVEMENT OF ANIMALS

(Treatise by **Aristotle**.) Περὶ ζῴων κινήσεως. Latin, *De Motu Animalium*. Abbr. *MA*. This fairly short treatise is Aristotle’s attempt to bring together his findings on the nature of animal movement and especially human intentional movement with his theory of the movement of the heavens developed in **Physics** VII and VIII. Celestial movement, he reminds us, requires an external unmoved mover; human movement requires both an internal source of movement and an external basis that is relatively at rest.

To explain the internal mechanism of animal movement, Aristotle appeals to “automatic puppets” that are set up to move in a series, given an initial impetus. The initial impetus is, he supposes, a heating or chilling of the central parts. See M. C. Nussbaum, *Aristotle’s De Motu Animalium*, 1978.

MOVER

See [KINOUN](#), [TO](#).

THE MUSES

Μοῦσαι. See [MOUSIKĒ, TA MOUSIKA](#).

MUSEUM (MUSEION, Μουσεῖον) AND LIBRARY OF ALEXANDRIA

Ptolemy II of **Egypt**, with the help and advice of the Aristotelian **Demetrius of Phaleron**, established a shrine to the muses (see [MOUSIKĒ, TA MOUSIKA](#)) that served as an educational and research center; it included a library. The Ptolemies initiated a unique tax on books—every book introduced into Egypt had to be copied for inclusion in the library. Throughout the Ptolemaic period this institution served as an intellectual center, and it helped to establish **Alexandria** as a continuing intellectual center throughout antiquity.

This legendary institution was so great that there are more or less credible stories of its destruction on three separate occasions. The first occasion was the invasion of Egypt by Julius Caesar, in his war against Cleopatra and Mark Antony, in 47/8 BCE; the evidence supports the idea that there was a

serious fire, perhaps total destruction, of the Royal Library of the Ptolemies at that time.

The second occasion was in about 391 CE; Theophilus is said to have destroyed the Serapeion at that time as part of an attack on paganism. Some scholars (notably Edward Gibbon) have claimed that this attack resulted in the destruction of (the remains of?) the Alexandrian library, housed in the Serapeion, which was indeed destroyed. The evidence that a significant library was destroyed in this event is mixed.

The third time has to do with the Caliph Omar, who took Alexandria in 640 CE. The story goes that his troops asked him what to do with the library, and he responded, “Either those books disagree with the Koran, and are heretical, and thus should be burned, or they agree with the Koran, and are duplicative, and thus may also be burned, so burn them all.” It is a great story, but it is unlikely that there was any significant library left in Alexandria after the fanatical **Christians** had finished with it.

See also [APOLLONIUS OF RHODES](#); [HYPATIA OF ALEXANDRIA](#); [PERIPATETIC SCHOOL](#); [SCIENCE](#).

MUSIC

Though one might use this word for the arts of all the muses, that is, ***mousikē***, this entry traces some of the major relationships between ancient Greek philosophy and that which is called “music” today. The early **Pythagoreans** seem to have taken musical harmonies as evidence that the world is fundamentally mathematical; several individuals related to the school wrote treatises on music.

Although **Plato** is critical of much of the music of his day, he has **Socrates** say “that education in music and poetry is most important . . . because rhythm and harmony permeate the inner part of the soul more than anything else” (*Republic* 401d). **Aristotle** devotes the last part of the ***Politics*** to musical education. His student, **Aristoxenus of Tarentum**, wrote an extant treatise on musical harmony.

See also [AULOS](#); [DAMON OF ATHENS](#); [DIASTĒMA](#); [DICAEARCHUS OF MESSENE](#); [MELOS](#); [PHAENIAS \(OR PHANIAS\) OF ERESOS](#); [PTOLEMAIS OF CYRENE](#); [PTOLEMY, CLAUDIUS](#); [THEON OF SMYRNA](#).

MUSONIUS RUFUS

(c. 30–100 CE.) From Volsinii (Bolsena) in Etruria; **Stoic**. Part of the opposition to Nero, he was exiled to the Greek island of Gyaros (incidentally, this island was used again in the 20th century for exiling opponents of the Greek government).

Recalled to **Rome**, he was eventually again exiled for protesting the use of the theater of Dionysus in **Athens** for gladiatorial games. Musonius taught philosophy wherever he was; his two most famous students were **Epictetus** and **Dio Chrysostom**. His students copied down many of his lectures, known as “**diatribes**”; 21 survive, all on ethical and political topics. One diatribe that has gained some recent notice is “That Women Too Should Study Philosophy.” See W. O. Stephens, “Musonius Rufus,” *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. The 1947 Cora Lutz translation is available online.

MYIA

Μυῖα. (c. 500 BCE.) **Pythagorean**, traditionally a daughter of **Theano** and **Pythagoras**, married to **Milo of Croton**. **Lucian** talks about her in *In Praise of a Fly*. She is mentioned by **Iamblichus**, *Life of Pythagoras* 30, 36; **Porphyry**, *Life of Pythagoras* 4; and **Clement of Alexandria**, *Stromata* IV.19.

MYTHOS

Μῦθος. Although this word was often used of any verbal performance, whether in speech or writing, it came to have the connotation of “fiction,” or at any rate something that is contrasted with a rational verbal account, a **logos**. **Socrates** makes this contrast explicitly at the beginning of the **Phaedo** (61b) when he says that poets write *mythoi*, not *logoi*.

Plato has an ambiguous relationship with “myths,” since he mercilessly attacks many of the “myths” most popular in his culture, most notably in the early books of the **Republic**, yet he also recounts his own myths, including the Myth of Er in the *Republic*, the myth of the afterlife in the *Phaedo*, the **charioteer** myth in the **Phaedrus**, another myth of judgment after death in the **Gorgias**, and several others. He represents **Protagoras** telling a myth about the origins of morality in the **Protagoras**. The dialogue taken by later **Platonists** as the definition of Plato’s cosmological opinions, the **Timaeus**, represents itself as a *mythos*. One way to understand that would be to suppose that *logos* can take you just so far, and if you want to go further, you will have to rely upon *mythos*.

Aristotle uses the word *mythos* much as we use the word “story” in English, that is, without necessarily judging whether the story is true or false. Sometimes there is an implication that a *mythos* is an allegory or parable—he refers to the *mythoi* of Aesop, for example (**Meteorologica** II.3, 356b11; **Rhetoric** II.20, 1393a30). In **Metaphysics** XII.8, 1074b1, he says that humankind has handed down the “myth” that the

sun, moon, planets, and stars are **gods**, “and that the divine encloses the whole of nature.” Aristotle believes that that part is true. He goes on to say that the rest of the details of religious teaching have been added “in mythical form” to persuade the people and for legal and utilitarian expediency. In the ***Poetics***, *mythos* is the element of “plot,” crucial for an effective tragic drama.

In post-Aristotelian philosophy, there was an increasing tendency to construct allegorical interpretations of traditional myths; the **Stoics** were particularly interested in such interpretations, as we can see from **Cicero**’s *On the Nature of the Gods*.

See also [ALLĒGORIA](#); [CLEANTHES OF ASSOS](#); [HESIOD](#); [HOMER](#); [PHERECYDES OF SYROS](#).

MYTILENE

Μυτιλήνη. Major municipality on the island of Lesbos, 39°6’N 26°33’E. **Theophrastus** was from the island of Lesbos, from a town on the other side of the island, and **Aristotle** set up his school and research center in or near Mytilene after he left Atarneus and before he went to **Macedonia** as tutor of **Alexander**. **Praxiphanes**, a student of Theophrastus, came from Mytilene; in the next century, **Hermarchus**, an **Epicurean**, was from Mytilene, and a little later **Cratippus of Pergamon**, a **Peripatetic**, taught at Mytilene. In the time of **Galen** there was another Peripatetic, **Aristotle of Mytilene**.

N

NAME

See [ONOMA](#).

NAMES OF ANCIENT GREEK PHILOSOPHERS

We are accustomed to referring to the most famous ancient Greeks by a single name—**Socrates**, **Aristotle**. To distinguish between men with the same name, a patronymic was often added, that is, the name of the man's father, in the genitive. In Athens one might also use a *demotikon*, the name of one's deme. Thus the "full name" of Socrates could be expressed Sokrates Sophroniskou Alopekethen, Socrates son of Sophroniscus, from the deme Alopeke. **Antiphon of Rhamnous** is regularly referred to by his "demotic" name, for example. Traveling philosophers were often known by their name plus the name of their hometown, or sometimes their home territory, typically in adjective form. Thus **Democritus** would be known as "Demokritos Abderitos," Democritus the Abderite. Nicknames were also fairly common; **Plato** got his when he was a young wrestler, "broad, wide"; his given name was Aristocles.

The spelling of the names of ancient people in English (and other modern languages) has its own tradition—the Greek and English alphabets are obviously not completely equivalent; for a start, the Romans "Latinized" many of the most familiar names, and at various times names have been "modernized" in one way or another. Various scholars deal with these things in different ways—some are content with the spelling that has become traditional in their native language; others apply currently standard transliteration rules. Thus Σωκράτης is usually "Socrates" in English, but sometimes "Sokrates"; Φαίδων is usually "**Phaedo**," but sometimes "Phaidon."

In the cases of philosophers known by their name plus a toponymic, there has been an attempt in this dictionary to identify the location from which they came.

NATURAL LAW

See [NOMOS](#); [PHYSIS](#); [HISTORIA PERI PHYSEŌS](#).

NATURAL PHILOSOPHER

See [PHYSIKOI](#), [PHYSIOLOGOI](#).

NATURE

See [PHYSIS](#); [HISTORIA PERI PHYSEŌS](#).

NAUSIPHANES OF TEOS

Ναυσιφάνης. (Late 4th BCE.) Nausiphanes was a follower of **Democritus** and **Pyrrho**, and teacher of **Epicurus** (**Diogenes Laertius** X.1). We surmise from the references in **Diogenes Laertius** that he accepted **atomism** but was otherwise **Skeptical**.

See also [TEOS](#).

NECESSITY

See [ANAGKĒ](#), [ANANKĒ](#).

NEIKOS

Νεῖκος. Strife, as opposed to friendship (*philia*) in the **cosmology** of **Empedocles**. Empedocles uses this word more frequently than its synonym *eris*. *Neikos* is a **Homeric** word for battle and is also used for the conflict between opposing sides in a legal trial.

NELEUS OF SCEPSIS

Νηλεύς. (4th–3rd BCE.) Son of **Coriscus** and student of **Aristotle** and **Theophrastus**. Theophrastus is supposed to have left him his library, which Neleus is supposed to have taken to **Scepsis** where the scrolls were packed up in a basement until the 1st BCE when **Apellicon of Teos** bought them and brought them back to Athens. See **Strabo** XIII; **Diogenes Laertius** V.52, 53, 55, 56; **Athenaeus** I; **Plutarch**, *Sulla*.

NEMESIS

Νέμεσις. Literally, a distribution (from the verb *nemein*). In fact the word always means “retribution,” especially in righteous indignation at having been unjustly treated. It is sometimes personified as divine retribution. **Aristotle**, **Nicomachean Ethics** II.7, 1108a35, extends it to indignation on behalf of others who have been unjustly treated.

NEMESIUS OF EMESA

(4th CE.) **Nemesius** was a **Christian** bishop known mainly as the author of *On the Nature of Man*, a work full of information about the theories of the soul (*psychē*) of many ancient thinkers. He had a serious interest in human physiology, especially of the brain. See *On the Nature of Man*, tr. P. van der Eijk & R. W. Sharples, 2008.

See also [EMESA](#).

NEOPLATONISM

“Neoplatonism” is a modern designation for the form of **Platonism** initiated by **Ammonius Saccas** and developed into its highest expression by his student **Plotinus**, as preserved in the **Enneads**. Neoplatonism may be characterized by its

adoption of conceptual structures from the wide range of religious traditions present in the Greco-Roman world in the first few centuries CE, but always referring its interpretations to the text of **Plato**, primarily, and secondarily to **Aristotle**, **Theophrastus**, and other classical philosophers. Neoplatonism may also be characterized as the *defense* of Platonism and philosophy generally against the inroads of **Christian**, **Gnostic**, **Manichean**, and other religious movements.

Ancient Neoplatonism, although begun in **Alexandria**, was developed in several parts of the ancient world. From 245 until his death in 270, Plotinus taught in **Rome** primarily. Two of his most important students there were **Porphry** and **Amelius**. We do not know where Porphyry was located after the death of Plotinus (some say Rome); his editing of the **Enneads** was of course crucial for the development of the movement, and some of his writings were translated into Latin, influencing the course of Western philosophy. **Victorinus** and **Augustine** were both influenced by Porphyry's version of Neoplatonism.

Amelius, who had studied with **Numenius** in **Apamea** (Syria), returned to Apamea after the death of Plotinus and became the teacher of **Iamblichus**. The Syrian school continued for some time; the successors of Iamblichus seem to have instructed **Plutarch of Athens**, who reestablished the teaching of Platonism in **Athens**, which continued under the leadership of **Syrianus**, **Proclus**, **Marinus**, **Isidore**, and **Damascius**, until the Athenian school was closed in 529 CE.

Syrianus was teacher of both Proclus and **Hermeias**; Hermeias moved to Alexandria, where he seems to have revitalized the Alexandrian school. His son **Ammonius** continued his tradition and was the teacher of **Olympiodorus**; **John Philoponus**, a Christian Neoplatonist commentator on Aristotle; and others.

The Eastern Orthodox church fathers were, many of them, educated as Neoplatonists; perhaps the most extreme examples of Christian Neoplatonic texts are the works of Pseudo-**Dionysius the Areopagite**. But Neoplatonism had a strong foothold in many places in the East, and as it turned out, it was transferred easily to Islamic philosophers (see Mehdi Aminrazavi, "Mysticism in Arabic and Islamic Philosophy," *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*).

In the West, **Augustine** learned his Neoplatonism from **Victorinus** and became in turn the leading theologian of the

Roman church until the time of Thomas Aquinas—who was also influenced by Neoplatonic interpretations of Aristotle.

For the central doctrines of Neoplatonism, see E. Moore, “Neo-platonism,” *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

NEOPYTHAGOREANISM

Pythagoras established his philosophical and religious community toward the end of the 6th century BCE; it seems to have been to some degree a secretive and closed community, but nevertheless we hear of a significant number of people who were first- and second-generation Pythagoreans during the 5th century. Indeed, **Cebes** and **Simmias**, present at the death of **Socrates**, are said to have been students of **Philolaus** in **Thebes**.

In the first half of the 4th century, **Plato** encountered Pythagoreans in Sicily and presented a Pythagorean **cosmology** in the *Timaeus*. After the *Timaeus*, it is difficult to make any philosophical or conceptual differences between “Platonism” and “Pythagoreanism.” After the time of **Archytas** (d. c. 350 BCE), we hear less about an independent Pythagoreanism. **Aristotle** writes of “those who call themselves Pythagoreans” (*hoi kaloumenoi Pythagoreioi*, *Metaphysics* I.5, 985b23). One of his contemporaries, **Heraclides of Pontus**, seems to have written a fairly detailed account of Pythagoreanism, judging from the citations in later authors.

For perhaps 300 years it is difficult to discern any actual practicing Pythagoreans, as distinct from **Platonists**, though Hellenistic writers continued to have a historical interest in the Pythagorean school, and there may have been attempts to revive classical Pythagorean practices and ideas.

The first named individual associated with an attempt to revive Pythagoreanism in the Greco-Roman period is probably **Figulus**, a Roman and friend of **Cicero**. A robust revival came in the 1st century CE with the activity of **Apollonius of Tyana**, **Moderatus of Gades**, **Nicomachus of Gerasa**, and later on, in the 2nd to 3rd centuries, **Numenius of Apamea**. **Iamblichus**, counted by us as a **Neoplatonist**, thought of himself as a (Neo-) Pythagorean; in many respects his writings established a way of reading the history and character of the Pythagorean way of philosophy. See C. Huffman, “Pythagoreanism,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

NICARETE OF MEGARA

Νικόρετη. (c. 300 BCE.) **Megarian**. Student of **Stilpo**. **Athenaeus** says she had been a courtesan (XIII.596e);

Diogenes Laertius says that she was Stilpo's mistress, though he had a wife (II.114).

See also [MEGARA](#).

NICOLAUS OF DAMASCUS

Νικόλαος Δαμασκηνός. (b. 64 BCE.) **Peripatetic**. Friend of Herod the Great, tutor of the children of Antony and Cleopatra. His major work was a *Universal History* in 144 books; he also wrote an autobiography, a life of Augustus, a life of Herod, commentaries on **Aristotle** (Syriac excerpts are extant in a 14th-century manuscript), and *On Plants*, extant in manuscript in Arabic and Syriac translations.

Extensive fragments of the first seven books of the *Universal History* are preserved in the *Excerpta* compiled at the order of Constantine Porphyrogenitus. Josephus probably used this work for his history of Herod (*Ant.* 15–17), because where Nicolaus stops, the account becomes sketchy. He relied heavily on earlier (lost) works; the value of his work often depends on the reliability of those works. The fragments of his autobiography that remain are largely relevant for Jewish history. Collections of the fragments of some of his works are available online: *Life of Augustus*, *Autobiography*, and historical fragments. For Damascus, see [DAMASCIUS OF DAMASCUS](#).

NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

(Treatise by **Aristotle**.) Ἠθικὰ Νικομάχεια. Latin, *Ethica Nicomachea*. Abbr. *EN*. The most famous of the three major ethical treatises included in the **Corpus** Aristotelicum (the others are the *Eudemian Ethics* and the *Magna Moralia*), the *Nicomachean Ethics* is presented as the first part of a course on *politikē*, what those who will be active in political life should know about human happiness (*eudaimonia*) in order to maximize *eudaimonia* in their community.

The first book argues that *eudaimonia* is “virtuous activity of the soul” and that **Plato**’s theory of the Form of the Good is irrelevant for ethics. In the second book, distinguishing between intellectual virtues and virtues of the interaction of mind and body, Aristotle proceeds to focus first on the “ethical” virtues, or virtues of habit. He defines “ethical virtue” as “the disposition to choose lying in a mean relatively to us according to right reason as the person of practical wisdom would determine” (II.6, 1107a1).

In the third book Aristotle takes up the question of moral responsibility, distinguishing acts done from compulsion and acts done in ignorance from those that are voluntary. Chosen

actions are those that are initiated following deliberation. Turning to the “ethical virtues,” Aristotle discusses courage and temperance, two of the major virtues foregrounded by Plato in the **Republic**. For Aristotle these virtues are “means” between extremes—courage between foolhardiness and cowardice, for example. The fourth book is devoted to analyses of other ethical virtues: liberality, magnificence, great-souledness, ambition, good temper, social virtues such as friendliness, honesty about one’s own worth, wit, and tact. He denies that “shame” (*aidos*) is a virtue—noteworthy since **Protagoras** in the dialogue named for him asserts that it is one of the two ultimate bases of morality, along with justice—but there is a mean in this emotion.

The fifth, sixth, and seventh books are shared with the **Eudemian Ethics** (where they are 4, 5, and 6). Book V presents a theory of justice based on the idea that there are two senses of justice—conformity with the law and equitable distribution of goods. Further, of political justice there is both natural justice, everywhere the same, and conventional justice, indifferent until legislated (V.7).

Book VI turns to the intellectual virtues, importantly distinguishing between **sophia** and practical wisdom, or **phronēsis**. Practical wisdom is crucial for determining what one ought to do in one’s own life, in one’s home, and in the community, but at the same time the highest happiness is the achievement of **sophia**. In VII, Aristotle introduces a distinction between three bad conditions—vice, incontinence, and brutishness. Vice would be a disposition to choose the *wrong* actions, where virtue is the disposition to choose the right ones. Incontinence, or **akrasia**, is doing the wrong thing when one has formed an intention to do the right thing. Brutishness or beastliness is a tendency to do bad things without deliberation or choice—acting like an animal. Aristotle’s examples mainly look very like psychotic individuals. The opposed state would be someone who always does the right thing, also without deliberating or choosing—he calls that person “godlike.” The book is completed with a discussion of pleasure; there is another discussion of pleasure in book X. Books VIII and IX are detailed examinations of friendship. In book X, besides the second treatment of pleasure, there is a discussion of the “theoretical life,” proposed as the highest form of *eudaimonia* possible for a human being. How that relates to the ethical virtues discussed earlier in the *Ethics* is a matter of some scholarly discussion. For a good deal more,

see R. Kraut, "Aristotle's Ethics," *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

See also [AIDŌS](#); [ANDREIA](#); [DIKĒ](#), [DIKAIOS](#), [DIKAIOSYNĒ](#); [ELEUTHERIŌTĒS](#); [ETHIKĒ ARETĒ](#); [HĒDONĒ](#), [HĒDYN](#); [LOGOS](#); [NEMESIS](#); [PHILIA](#); [PHRONĒSIS](#); [PROAIRESIS](#), [PROHAIRESIS](#); [SŌPHROSYNĒ](#); [THEŌRIA](#), [THEŌREIN](#); [THĒRIOTĒS](#).

NICOMACHUS (1)

Νικόμαχος. (c. 375 BCE.) Father of Aristotle. According to the **Suda**, he was descended from Nicomachus, son of Machaon, son of Asclepius. He was a native of **Stagira** and personal physician to Amntas III, king of **Macedonia** 393–369 BCE.

NICOMACHUS (2)

(c. 325 BCE.) Son of **Aristotle**. **Diogenes Laertius** (*Life of Theophrastus* 7, V.38) recounts that he was a student of **Theophrastus**. Aristotle's will commends his care to several tutors, and to his adopted son Nicanor. In some manner the **Nicomachean Ethics** was named after either him or Aristotle's father. Nicomachus appears to have died in battle while still a young man.

NICOMACHUS OF GERASA

(c. 60–120 CE.) Nicomachus was the author of the extant works *Introduction to Arithmetic* and *Manual of Harmonics*. There are also considerable fragments of his *Theology of Arithmetic* and his *Life of Pythagoras*. Nicomachus was a **Neopythagorean**; these are some of the major texts of Neopythagoreanism. Modern historians of mathematics find him somewhat careless as a mathematician. The *Introduction to Arithmetic* is available online. See J. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists*, 1996.

Gerasa (Γέρασα) is the modern Jerash, in northern Jordan, 32°16'20.21"N 35°53'29.03"E.

See also [MATHĒMA](#), [MATHĒMATA](#); [TA MATHĒMATIKA](#).

NOĒSIS, NOĒMA, NOĒTON

Νόησις, νόημα, νοητός. Words formed on the verb *noein*, to think, and the noun **nous**, or mind. *Noēsis* is a Platonic term for thinking directed at **Being** (**Republic** 534a), contrasted in the *Republic* with **dianoia**, there taken to be derivative or deductive reasoning. *Noēma* is a word used fairly widely meaning "a thought." **Parmenides** B8, line 34: "*noein* and that for the sake which a *noēma* exists are the same." In **Plato's** **Parmenides**, 132b, **Socrates** briefly suggests that the Forms (**eidē**) might be *noēmata*, but that is quickly refuted. The

noēton is that which is “thinkable,” usually as distinguished from the *aisthēton*, that which is perceptible (cf. **Aristotle**, *Nicomachean Ethics* X.4, 1174b34).

NOMOS

Νόμος. Law; convention. (Noun formed from *nemo*, distribute; **nemesis** is another noun based on the same verb.) There is some tension in the way this word is used in Greek philosophy and literature. On the one hand, the *nomoi* are clearly the laws governing the organization of the state; **Plato**’s longest **dialogue**, outlining the constitution of an ideal state, is called the *Nomoi* (**Laws**). By extension, the rules governing human behavior universally, possibly as decreed by the **gods**, are often called *agraphoi nomoi*, unwritten laws (**Xenophon**, *Mem.* IV.4, 5–25; **Sophocles**, *Oed. Tyr.* 863–871; et al.). As **Heraclitus** says (f. 114, in part), “All human *nomoi* are nourished by the one divine (*nomos*).” On the other hand, legislated laws tended, at least by the 5th century BCE, to be seen as arbitrary and variable from one society to another. Thus some introduced the idea of a contrasting nature (**physis**) that was not subject to social variability. **Antiphon** provides a particularly good example of a writer who emphasizes this contrast (DK 87A44). **Plato** often represents the **Sophists** arguing on the basis of this contrast. **Thrasymachus** in *Republic* I, **Callicles** in the *Gorgias*, and **Protagoras** in the *Protagoras* are just a few examples. **Democritus** took the contrast back into the scientific context, at least in epistemological terms, when he said, “By convention (by *nomos*) sweet by convention bitter, by convention hot by convention cold, in reality atoms and void.”

The **Stoics** supposed that nature operates according to divine reason, or **logos**, so that the tension or dialectic between nature and law is resolved: physics (**physikē**) and **ethics** are both part of the same rational system, the thought of God. Stoics argued that we could discover “natural law” of a normative sort in much the same way as we discover descriptive or explanatory natural law. Possibly the clearest exposition of this Stoic position is in **Cicero**’s *De Legibus* II.

NONBEING

See **BEING**; **MĒ ON**.

NOUS (NOOS)

Νοῦς, νόος. Mind. Classical Greek philosophy is characterized by, as much as anything else, the discovery of the mind. **Xenophanes** says of **God**, “Always he remains in the same place, moving not at all, nor is it fitting for him to

move now here now there, but without toil he makes all things shiver by the impulse of his mind” (f. 25–26). **Anaxagoras** talked so much about mind that comic poets joked about it.

Plato’s Socrates repeatedly emphasizes the centrality of the mind in his philosophy, from the immortality of the soul (**psychē**), envisioned primarily as the mind, in the **Phaedo**, to the argument that the virtue (**aretē**) of the mind, wisdom (**sophia**), is the proper source of both moral and political governance in the **Republic**, and of course beyond. Plato goes on to argue for a cosmic Mind, in the tracks of Xenophanes and Anaxagoras, in his **Timaeus** (30b), **Philebus** (30d), and **Laws** (875, 897, 966).

Aristotle too makes mind central in his philosophy, from the beginning of the **Metaphysics**, where he says that all human beings by nature desire to know and to understand, to the last book of the **Nicomachean Ethics**, where the activity of the mind is the highest happiness for a human being, to the 12th book of the **Metaphysics**, where God is said to be Mind thinking itself (*ho nous autos auto noei*). In the **De Anima**, mind alone is said to be separable (**chōriston**) from the body (**sōma**). Similarly in **Generation of Animals**, mind alone of the psychic functions is said to come into the developing human being “from outside” (*thyrathen*). In **De Anima** III.4–6, Aristotle distinguishes a function of the mind that acquires knowable forms from perception, the *nous pathētikos*, from the active or creative faculty of mind, *nous poiētikos*. Since the superior function of mind is the active and creative, that is the function that we attribute most readily to God, who is consequently a mover, indeed the first and unmoved mover (**akinēton kinoun**) of everything in virtue of being active intellect (*nous*).

The **Stoics** identify mind with what they call the **hēgemonikon**, or directive part of the soul, and they assert that it exists as much in the universe as a whole as it does in us as individuals (**Diogenes Laertius** VII.138).

In **middle Platonism**, the cosmic Mind becomes the source of all good in the universe (**Alcinous** X.1–4). For **Plotinus**, the cosmic Mind is the **energeia** and **logos** of the One (**Enneads** V.1.6).

See also **AGENT INTELLECT**; **ARCHELAUS OF ATHENS** (?); **ATHANATOS**; **CHŌRIS**, **CHŌRISTON**; **COSMOS** (**KOSMOS**), **COSMOLOGY**; **ENNOIA**; **GNŌMĒ**; **PNEUMA**; **TRIPARTITE SOUL**.

See [ARITHMOS](#).

NUMENIUS OF APAMEA

Νουμηνίος ὁ ἐξ Ἀπαμείας. (fl. 160–180 CE.) Numenius is counted as a “**middle Platonist**,” though his teaching is directly connected to the **Neoplatonist** tradition that follows. He was the teacher of **Amelius**, who functioned as secretary to **Plotinus** in **Rome** and returned to **Apamea** on the death of Plotinus. Considerable fragments remain of Numenius’ book *On the Good* and of his history of the **Academy**, *On the Divergence of the Academics from Plato*. Numenius believed that Plato’s teaching was **Pythagorean**, and not only that, but that it derived from **Indian** sages (Brahmins), Persian magi, **Egyptian** priests, **Chaldean Oracles**, and Jews; Numenius supported these ascriptions by interpreting traditional texts allegorically. See G. Karamanolis, “Numenius,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

NUTRITIVE SOUL

Psychē threptikē. In **Aristotle**, this is the part or faculty of the soul concerned with maintaining the bodily life of the individual, shared by all living things, including plants. Aristotle says that this part of the soul is also responsible for generation of new individuals of the species (***De Anima*** II.4, 416a19).

NYMPHIDIANUS OF SMYRNA

Νυμφιδιανός. (c. 360 CE.) **Neoplatonist** and **Sophist**. Brother of **Maximus**, who was very close to the emperor **Julian**. **Eunapius** recounts that Julian made him his personal secretary.

See also [SMYRNA](#).

O

OCELLUS LUCANUS

(5th BCE.) **Pythagorean**, possibly a student of **Pythagoras** himself. **Stobaeus** preserves fragments of two works ascribed to Ocellus, *Peri Nomou* (Ecl. I.13) and *On the Nature of the Universe* (Ecl. 1.20). These are available online in the early 19th-century translation by Thomas Taylor. *On the Nature of the Universe* is certainly, and *Peri Nomou* probably, a later forgery, but both are sources of information about Hellenistic Pythagoreanism.

OCHĒMA

ὄχημα. Literally, carriage or vehicle. **Parmenides** rides in an *ochēma* to see the Goddess in the prologue of his poem; in **Plato's** *Phaedrus*, the soul (*psychē*) is envisaged as a **charioteer** driving an *ochēma* drawn by two horses, symbols of the psychic powers of appetite and ambition. This powerful image naturally leads to speculation about the nature of the chariot itself. A strong tradition going back at least to **Anaximenes** held that the physical basis of the soul is *pneuma*, or breath, and that this *pneuma* has some affinity for or relationship to the element from which the stars are composed (**Aristotle**, *Generation of Animals* II.6). Plato suggests, in the *Timaeus*, that each soul is related to an individual star, as to an *ochēma* (41d–e). All of these themes come together in **Neoplatonism**, especially in **Proclus**, where each individual human soul has *three* bodies: an immortal astral body, a spiritual (pneumatic) body that is mortal, and the flesh-and-bone body it inhabits while on **earth** (*Commentary on Timaeus* 111, 236, 298; *Platonic Theology* 111, 125). Each of these is a “vehicle” for the soul, in different contexts.

OENOMAUS OF GADARA

Οινόμαος. (2nd CE.) Oenomaus was a **Cynic**, possibly the same person as the Abnimus mentioned in the Talmud as a friend of the Rabbi Meir (2nd century). Significant fragments survive of his sarcastic attacks on divination, in a treatise called “Unmasking the Magicians.” He argues that the future is not predestined, so there cannot be foreknowledge of it, and if it were predestined, foreknowledge would be useless since you couldn't change anything.

See also [GADARA](#); [MAGIC](#).

OIKEION

Οἰκεῖον. In everyday Greek, that which belongs to one's household; personal property; anything that is "one's own." It becomes something of a technical term in **Stoic** philosophy for what is proper to or belonging to oneself.

OIKEIŌSIS

Οἰκεῖωσις. Appropriation. In ordinary Greek, this word could mean making a friend of someone, or (going back to the original sense of *oikos*, "home") to include someone in one's household. For the **Stoics**, this word has a lot of significance: starting from the instinct of self-preservation and self-consciousness, then going on to our natural positive feelings toward our family, friends, and community, and ultimately to the whole universe, we make our relationships our own (see, e.g., **Cicero**, *De Fin.* 3.62–68).

"OLD OLIGARCH"

Among the extant writings attributed to **Xenophon** is a "Constitution of the Athenians"; Xenophon could not have written it because it must have been written either before Xenophon was born or when he was still a young child. (The treatise was written between 446 and 424, and Xenophon was born in about 430). In view of the political point of view espoused in the document, its author has come to be known as "the Old Oligarch." Tr. J. L. Marr & P. J. Rhodes, 2008, or online at Perseus.

See also [ATHĒNAIŌN POLITEIA](#).

OLICHARCHIA

Ὀλιγαρχία. Oligarchy. Rule by the few; as **Aristotle** points out, this almost inevitably means rule by the wealthy, so he appropriates the term to mean precisely rule by the wealthy. In Aristotle's analysis in the **Politics**, political life is almost always a tension between the wealthy and the poor, between oligarchy and democracy. Though usually a kind of a democracy in classical times, Athens did have some short oligarchical periods; during one of them (404–403), **Socrates** resisted being implicated in their crimes (**Apology** 32c). In the **Republic** VIII, **Plato** provides a taxonomy of systems of government inferior to his **Kallipolis**, which he here calls aristocracy—the first step away he calls "timocracy," or rule by those who compete for honors; the second is oligarchy (550ff.), defined very much as Aristotle defines it; third is democracy; and the fourth and worst is tyranny. See M. Ostwald, *Oligarchia*, 2000.

OLYMPIODORUS (1)

Ὀλυμπιόδωρος. (5th CE.) **Peripatetic**, taught in

Alexandria. His most famous student was **Proclus**.
OLYMPIODORUS (2)

(Before 510—after 565 CE.) **Neoplatonist** commentator on **Plato** and **Aristotle**. A student of **Hypatia** and friend of **Synesius of Ptolemais**, he was teaching in **Alexandria** after the school of **Athens** was closed by **Justinian** in 529. His commentaries on *Alcibiades I* and *Gorgias* give a good picture of philosophical education in Alexandria in late antiquity, near the end of non-Christian instruction in that city. Subsequent teachers in Alexandria were **Christians** until the city was taken by the Arabs in 641. See C. Wildberg, “Olympiodorus,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

OLYNTHUS

Ὀλυνθος. Ancient city of the Chalkidike in northern Greece, 40.296°N 23.354°E, Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #588. **Callisthenes**, Aristotle’s grand-nephew, and **Euphantus**, the **Megarian**, were natives of this city. Its excavated ruins give a good idea of the city planning of Hippodamus of **Miletus**.

ON, ONTA

Τὸ ὄν, τὰ ὄντα. Being, beings. **Parmenides** problematized **being**; **Plato** focused on a solution to the problem of being that distinguished the static and timeless *ontōs on* (“beingly being,” usually translated “really real”) from the changing *genesis*. **Aristotle** describes the task of his book that we call the *Metaphysics* as the study of *to on hē on* (τὸ ὄν ἢ ὄν), “being qua being.” Being, he says, is primarily *ousia*, and in a secondary sense whatever is referred to in the other nine categories. For **Plotinus**, the One is beyond being; all being is somehow derivative from the One.

See also [KATĒGORIAI](#).

ON DIVINATION IN SLEEP

(Treatise by **Aristotle**.) Περὶ τῆς καθ’ ὕπνον μαντικῆς. Latin, *De Divinatione per Somnum*. Abbr. *Div. Somn*. Included in the *Parva Naturalia*, this is a short discussion of the possibility that there might be veridical dreams. Aristotle regards dreams that are thought to be veridical as mainly coincidences—at any rate, not with divine origin. **Cicero**, *On Divination* 62, 127–128, largely follows the Aristotelian direction. Some who thought that some dreams are prophetic were **Iamblichus**, *Vit. Pyth.* 65; **Aelius Aristides**, *Sacred Discourses*; and **Artemidorus of Ephesus**, *Oneirocritikon*.

See also [ONEIROS](#).

ON DREAMS

(Treatise by **Aristotle**.) Περὶ ἐνυπνίων. Latin, *De*

Insomniis. Abbr. *Insomn*. Part of the **Parva Naturalia**, Aristotle here tries to provide both a psychological and physiological account of the phenomenon of dreaming. See D. Gallop, tr., *Aristotle on Sleep and Dreams*, 1996.

See also [ON DIVINATION IN SLEEP](#); [ONEIROS](#).

ON INTERPRETATION

(Treatise by **Aristotle**.) Περὶ Ἑρμηνείας, *Peri Hermeneias*. Latin, *De Interpretatione*. Abbr. *Int*. The second treatise in the Aristotelian **corpus**. Aristotle examines sentence forms that may function in syllogistic arguments. Near the beginning he says, “Spoken words are the symbols of mental experience and written words are the symbols of spoken words. Just as written marks are not the same for all people, neither are spoken sounds, but the mental experiences which these symbolize are the same for all, as are the things of which our experiences are the images.” But individual words (nouns or verbs) do not have truth or falsity; that happens when words are combined into sentences. Sentences may be universal (All [subject] is [predicate], No [subject] is [predicate]) or particular (Some [subject] is [predicate], Some [subject] is not [predicate]). All S is P and Some S is not P are contradictory assertions, as are No S is P and Some S is P. Interpreters generated from this structure the **Square of Opposition**; some recent scholars have derived a more complex set of logical relations from Aristotle’s text.

But what about sentences in the future tense? Are they necessarily true or false right now? In chapter 9, Aristotle argues that that is the wrong way to construe the logical relationships; not “necessary that p” or “necessary that not-p” but “necessarily, p or not-p.” For example, if two navies are drawn up in battle formation facing each other, it is not now necessary that there will be a sea battle tomorrow, or necessary that there will not be a sea-battle tomorrow, but necessarily, one or the other will occur.

The treatise was translated by Boethius into Latin and thus became a part of the philosophical foundation of Western European medieval philosophy. It was also early translated into Arabic. For contemporary discussion, see C. W. A. Whitaker, *Aristotle’s De Interpretatione: Contradiction and Dialectic*, 1996.

ON LENGTH AND SHORTNESS OF LIFE

(Treatise by **Aristotle**.) Περὶ μακροβιότητος καὶ βραχυβιότητος. Latin, *De Longitudine et Bevitae Vitae*. Abbr.

Long. Short treatise discussing why some species live a long time, others a short time. See R. King, *Aristotle on Life and Death*, 2001.

ON MEMORY AND RECOLLECTION

(Treatise by **Aristotle**.) Περὶ μνήμης καὶ ἀναμνήσεως. Latin, *De Memoria et Reminiscentia*. Abbr. *Mem*. The second treatise in the **Parva Naturalia**, Aristotle here briefly reviews his theory of memory and the ability to recall memories. See R. Sorabji, *Aristotle on Memory*, 1972.

See also [THEAETETUS](#).

ON SLEEP AND WAKING

(Treatise by **Aristotle**.) Περὶ ὕπνου καὶ ἐγρηγορέσεως. Latin, *De Somno et Vigilia*. Abbr. *Somn*. The third treatise in the **Parva Naturalia**, Aristotle tries to give both a physiological and psychological explanation of the phenomenon of sleep (and waking up again). Psychologically, sleep is for him an inactivity of the common capacity of perception, “common sense.” See R. K. Sprague, “Aristotle and the Metaphysics of Sleep,” *Review of Metaphysics* 31, no. 2 (1977): 230–241.

See also [AISTHĒSIS](#).

ON THE HEAVENS

Treatise by Aristotle. See [DE CAELO](#).

ON THE SOUL

Treatise by Aristotle. See [DE ANIMA](#).

ON THE UNIVERSE (DE MUNDO, PERI KOSMOU)

A treatise included in the Aristotelian **corpus**. Most scholars believe that it is not by **Aristotle**. It is ostensibly addressed to **Alexander** and includes some quite interesting geographic details and an **Orphic** hymn. G. Reale and A. P. Bos have defended its authenticity, *Trattato sul Cosmo*, 1974, 1995.

ON YOUTH AND OLD AGE, ON LIFE AND DEATH, ON RESPIRATION

(Treatise by **Aristotle**.) Περὶ νεότητος καὶ γήρος, καὶ ζωῆς καὶ θανάτου, περὶ ἀναπνοῆς. Latin, *De Juventute et Senectute, de Vita et Morte, de Respiration*. Abbr. *Juv*. A treatise in the **Parva Naturalia**. Very brief review of the preservation of the soul in a range of animals and plants followed by an extensive discussion of respiration in response to the theories of **Democritus**, **Empedocles**, and **Plato** in the **Timaeus**, then returning to the consequences of various kinds of respiration for life and death. See R. King, *Aristotle on Life and Death*, 2001.

ONASANDER

(1st CE.) **Academic?** Wrote a (lost) commentary on **Plato's *Republic***, and *Strategikos*, an essay on the duties of a military general, available online at Lacus Curtius.

ONATAS

Ὀνάτας. (5th BCE.) **Pythagorean**, mentioned by **Iamblichus** (*Vit. Pyth.* 267) and Joannes Laurentius Lydus (*De Mens.* 2.12). There is a long passage from *On God and the Divine* quoted by **Stobaeus** (I.1.39) ascribed to him, but written in the 1st BCE to 1st CE, consequently known as "Pseudo-Onatas."

ONE

See [HEN](#).

ONEIROS

Ὀνειρος. Dream. In **Homer**, at *Odyssey* XIX, 560ff., there is a distinction between dreams that come through the gates of ivory and those that come through the gates of horn: the first are fantasies; the second are portents, if we know how to interpret them. Dream interpretation has long been in demand (consider Joseph and Pharaoh, Genesis 41); **Antiphon** the **Sophist** wrote a book on dream interpretation (DK 2.367ff.). The temples of **Asclepius** invited the ill to sleep in their precincts, where they might be visited in their dreams by Asclepius, providing a cure for their ailments. Others thought of dreams as belonging to pure subjectivity (**Heraclitus** f. 89: "The waking have one common world, but the sleeping turn aside each into a world of his own"). **Plato's Socrates** often refers to dreams taken as veridical, perhaps most seriously at *Phaedo* 60e, but sometimes as a rhetorical trope, for example at *Theaetetus* 201e. At *Timaeus* 71a–72b, Plato tries to explain how dreams occur by involving the liver in the process.

Aristotle wrote a short treatise *On Dreams*, providing a physiological explanation of how dreams occur, and another short treatise, *On Divination in Sleep*, which takes somewhat seriously the possibility that there might be veridical dreams. Rejecting the thesis that dreams are sent by **God**, Aristotle supposes that dreams might have a causative relationship with various events, or be signs of those events; for example, physicians take particular sorts of dreams to be diagnostic of particular illnesses, and that totally makes sense to Aristotle. But, he argues, "most dreams are mere coincidences" (463a32). **Cicero**, *On Divination* 62, 127–128, largely follows the Aristotelian direction. Still, many people continued to believe that some dreams are prophetic: **Iamblichus**, *Vit. Pyth.* 65; **Aelius Aristides**, *Sacred Discourses*; **Artemidorus**

of **Ephesus**, *Oneirocritikon*.

ONESICRITUS OF ASTYPALAEA

Ὀνησίκριτος. (c. 360–290 BCE.) **Cynic**, student of **Diogenes of Sinope**. He accompanied Alexander on his campaign to the East as a ship pilot, and on his return wrote about his experiences. He was sent by **Alexander** to interview Indian philosophers, known as **gymnosophists** to the Greeks; he names two Indian philosophers, Mandanis and Calanus. **Diogenes Laertius** provides a short notice of him (VI.84); **Plutarch** (*Alex.* 46), **Strabo** (xv. 65), and others convey enough of his reports so that we know that he was not always scrupulously accurate. See T. S. Brown, *Onesicritus*, 1949. Astypalaea (Ἀστυπάλαια) is an island in the Dodecanese, northwest of **Rhodes**, 36°33'N 26°21'E, Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #476.

ONOMA

Ὀνομα. Name, noun. **Heraclitus** f. 24: “They would not have known the name of justice if these things did not exist.” **Parmenides** f. 8, lines 39–40: “All these things are but names which mortals have given, believing them to be true—coming into being and passing away, being and not being, change of place and alteration of bright color.” Ever since Odysseus told the Cyclops that his name was “*Oudeis*,” which means “Nobody”—and subsequently the Cyclops ran out screaming to his neighbors, “Nobody has blinded me”—the ancient Greeks were concerned with the possibility that words, and particularly names, might fail to communicate the truth (*Od.* IX, 364). The extreme position is that of **Gorgias**, DK 82B3, that there is no connection between names and things.

Are there natural names, or are all names conventional? The **Sophists** clearly talked about these issues, a lot—**Prodicus** and **Protagoras** more than others perhaps. In **Aristophanes’** *Clouds* (875), **Socrates** is represented as arguing that the words we use for male and female chickens are wrong; we can translate the argument as saying that we really ought to call roosters “chickens” and hens “chickesses.” The **Cratylus** is entirely devoted to a discussion of the correctness of names, whether words have a natural or conventional origin. Since for **Plato** words in principle correspond with Forms (*eidē*), their “correctness” is a matter of some importance.

At the beginning of **On Interpretation**, **Aristotle** says, “Spoken sounds are symbols of affections in the soul (*psychē*), and written marks symbols of spoken sounds. And

just as written marks are not the same for all people, neither are spoken sounds. But what these are in the first place signs of—affections of the soul—are the same for all; and what these affections are likenesses of—actual things—are also the same.” He goes on to define (*Int.* 2) an *onoma* as “a spoken sound, significant by convention (**nomos**), without time, none of whose parts is significant in separation. . . . No name is a name naturally but only when it has become a symbol.”

The theory that language is natural did have significant support: **Herodotus** tells the story of the Pharaoh “Psamtik” who had some children raised by deaf-mutes; when the children were brought before him, they said something like “bē,” which he took to be the Phrygian word for bread. Herodotus also points out that the children got their milk from goats. Of philosophers, **Epicurus** believed that the origin of language was natural, that the sounds made by animals and babies are the beginning of language (*Letter to Herodotus*, 75–87; **Lucretius** V.1028–1090).

The **Stoics**, in contrast, believed that language stems from **logos**, reason, and that consequently only human beings have true language. Following the lead of Socrates in the *Cratylus*, the Stoics paid a great deal of attention to etymology (*etymon* actually means “true”), attempting to find the “true” meaning of words.

See also [LEXIS](#); [NAMES OF ANCIENT GREEK PHILOSOPHERS](#).

ŌPHELEIN, ŌPHELĒMA

ὠφελεῖν, ὠφέλημα. Benefit, as at **Plato**, *Meno* 77d: people who desire “bad” things do so believing that those bad things will *benefit* them. In **Aristotle**, sometimes this word means to owe a debt, or the debt itself (e.g., *Nicomachean Ethics* IX.2, 1165a3). In **Stoic ethics**, it is an advantage, or benefit, and since you “ought” to be virtuous, it turns out to be that which is good in itself.

OPINION

See [DOXA](#).

OPPOSITES

See [ENANTIA](#).

OPSIS

Ὀψις. Sight, vision, appearance. “*Ta phainomena opsis adēlon*, phenomena are a glimpse of the unseen” (**Anaxagoras** B21). At **Plato’s** *Theaetetus* 193c, the *opsis* is the visual impression that one compares to the recorded image in the wax block of memory. For **Aristotle** it is the

faculty of seeing (*De Anima* II.7), while in the *Poetics*, *opsis* is the element of spectacle in the presentation of a tragic drama.

ORDER

See [COSMOS \(KOSMOS\)](#), [COSMOLOGY](#); [TAXIS](#).

OREXIS

Ὅρεξις. Often translated “desire,” sometimes translated “intention,” this is the noun form of *oregō*, “I reach out (my hand).” In **Aristotle**’s moral psychology, *orexis* is the capacity of initiating movement shared by all living beings capable of local movement. Aristotle characterizes “choice” (*prohairesis*) as “deliberative orexis.” See G. Pearson, *Aristotle on Desire*, 2012. The **Stoics** preferred to use the term “*hormē*.”

ORGANON

ὄργανον. Literally, “tool.” A knife or an axe is a common example of an *organon*. At least from the time of **Plato** the word was applied to instrumental parts of the body (the eye is the *organon* of vision, *Republic* VI, 508b, for example).

Aristotle of course devotes much of his biological investigation to the understanding of the *organa* of the body. Organs have their meaning only as parts—a severed hand is no longer a hand; it is no more a hand than a carved stone *aulos* is really an *aulos*. More generally, he defines *organon* as whatever exists for the sake of something else, even to the point of saying that “a slave is a living tool, a tool is a non-living slave” (*Nicomachean Ethics* VIII.11, 1161b4).

The books on logic that begin the Aristotelian **corpus** are collectively known as the Organon. It may be that this denomination came from the remark of **Alexander of Aphrodisias** that logic (*logikē*) “has the role of a tool” in philosophy (*in Top.* 74.29). These books are (in English) *Categories*, *On Interpretation*, *Prior Analytics*, *Posterior Analytics*, *Topics*, and *Sophistical Refutations*.

ORGĒ

ὄργη. In the first instance, natural impulse and tendency, but probably more often in philosophical discourse it means “anger.” In the *Republic* 440cff., **Socrates** uses the phenomenon of anger to argue for the existence of a spirited part of the soul distinct from the appetitive. In *De Anima* I.1, **Aristotle** uses “anger” to illustrate two ways of defining a *pathos* of the **soul**: the “dialectician” defines “anger” as the desire to return pain for pain, while the natural philosopher defines it as the boiling of the blood around the heart (403a30). For a **Stoic** angle on anger, see Seneca’s *De Ira*, in Kaster & Nussbaum, trs., 2010. For a general discussion of

anger in ancient philosophy and literature, see Braund & Most, *Ancient Anger*, 2004.

ORIGEN

Ὠριγένης. (c. 185–254/5 CE.) **Christian Neoplatonist** philosopher who studied with **Ammonius Saccas** (also the teacher of **Plotinus**). His work *On First Principles* (*De Principiis*) is a fundamental exposition of Christian Platonism; his *Against Celsus* is a detailed refutation of a pagan attack on the Christian religion. He also wrote significant extended commentaries on books of both the Old and the New Testament.

Influenced by his reading of the Jewish philosopher **Philo of Alexandria**, and the **middle Platonist Numenius**, Origen constructed an intellectually sophisticated doctrine of the Trinity, defended human free will, and argued for an eventual reconciliation of the entire universe with **God**, the ***apokatastasis***.

Neither the Orthodox nor the Roman Catholic branch of Christianity has been entirely comfortable with Origen. Their complaints have been that Origen's allegorical interpretation of Scripture could readily be abused; in his doctrine of the Trinity he appears to subordinate Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit to the Father; and the *apokatastasis* was not accepted by either church, since inconsistent with the doctrine of everlasting damnation of the unforgiven. It is hard to know precisely how far Origen went in any of these respects since we do not have much of the original Greek of the *De Principiis*; rather we have a Latin translation by Rufinus that probably tones down unorthodox positions. See E. Moore, "Origen," *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

ORIGEN

Ὠριγένης. (3rd CE.) Pagan **Neoplatonist** roughly contemporaneous with the famous **Christian** Origen. He too studied with **Ammonius Saccas**; he taught **Porphyry** in **Athens** before Porphyry joined **Plotinus** in **Rome**. Plotinus says nice things about him (in contrast to his attitude toward the Christian Origen): Porphyry, *Life of Plotinus*, chaps. iii, xiv, and xx. **Proclus** ascribes to him the view that the first principle is intellect (***nous***), denying that the first principle is the One beyond **being**.

ORIGIN

See [ARCHĒ](#).

ORPHIC RELIGION

Cult religion originating in the 6th century BCE, loosely

connected with **Pythagoreanism** by some similarities of belief. Like the Pythagoreans, the Orphics believed in **metempsychosis** and lived in religion-based communities. **Adeimantus** in the *Republic* says of them (364b–365a), “They produce a whole collection of books of ritual instructions written by Musaeus and Orpheus, and they persuade not only individuals but whole communities that, both for living and dead, remission and absolution of sins may be had by sacrifices and childish performances, which they are pleased to call initiations, and which they allege deliver us from all ills in the next world, where terrible things await the uninitiated.” See **Aristotle**, *De Anima* I.5, 410b28, identifying the soul with breath. Orphic religious practices seem to have continued into the **Christian** era. See W. K. C. Guthrie. *Orpheus and Greek Religion: A Study of the Orphic Movement*, 1993.

See also [DERVENI PAPYRUS](#); [PNEUMA](#).

OU MALLON

Οὐ μάλλον. Literally, “no more” (no more this than that); this common phrase became a shorthand expression for a way of arguing during the Hellenistic period. In Pyrrhonian **Skepticism**, especially, it implies “determining nothing, and suspending judgment” (**Diogenes Laertius** IX.76).

See also [SKEPTIKOS](#).

OURANOS, OURANIA

Οὐρανός, οὐρανία. Sky, heaven; heavenly. Is there one *ouranos* or more than one? Is the *ouranos* identical with the *kosmos*? **Anaximander** talks of an indefinite from which are generated “the *ouranoi* and the *kosmoi* within them” (f. 1), implying a plurality of both, and a non-identity of the two. It became more usual in Greek philosophy to assert the **unity** of *ouranos* and *kosmos*; indeed, according to **Aristotle**, **Xenophanes** “contemplated the *Ouranos* and concluded that the One is **God**” (*Metaphysics* I.5, 986b23).

The *ouranioi* are the entities that exist in the sky, and they are very commonly, in Greek philosophy, considered to be living divinities. One heaven, one deity, may be the source of all the others, but there is a plurality of lesser celestial deities, starting from the sun, the moon, and the planets or the deities that move those celestial entities around. Aristotle clearly believed that this was the fundamental religious understanding for all humanity, that anthropomorphic deities were a later invention (*Metaph.* XII.8, 1074b1ff.).

It is an easy step from astral religion to astrology, a step widely embraced in antiquity but roundly rejected by the

Epicurean tradition, particularly **Lucretius** (V.110–145).

See also **ASTROLOGIA**; **ASTRONOMY**; **COSMOS** (**KOSMOS**), **COSMOLOGY**; **DE CAELO**; **ON THE UNIVERSE** (**DE MUNDO, PERI KOSMOU**); **TIMAEUS**.

OUSIA

Οὐσία. Abstract noun built on the participle **on**, *ontos* (**being**) plus an abstract ending. Consequently, the most obvious translation into English would be “beingness.” In non-philosophical Greek, *ousia* means “wealth,” especially “real estate.” The typical translation of *ousia* in English versions of **Plato** is “reality,” which tends to remove the word from its origins in the verb *einai*, “to be.” Similarly the Platonic phrase, closely related to *ousia* in the texts, *to ontōs on*, literally “the beingly being,” is normally translated “the really real.” In English translations of **Aristotle**, the most usual translation of *ousia* is “substance,” a word that really translates the Greek word **hypostasis**. It is arguable that the right translation would be “entity” since that is formed on the Latin *ens*, *entis*, plus the Latin abstract ending cognate with the Greek one in *ousia*.

In any case, in philosophical usage the word *ousia* is used to designate whatever it is that exists primarily. That usage may well have started with Plato when he applied it to the Forms (*eidē*) (e.g., **Phaedo** 70d and many other places). Aristotle attributes to the **pre-Socratics** the belief that *ousia* is **matter** on the ground that they appear to believe that one or more of the elements (**stoicheia**) (water, air, fire), or all four, or the atoms (**atoma**) are what exist primarily (**Metaphysics** I.3, 983b6ff.). Given that **Democritus** says, “By convention sweet, by convention bitter, by convention hot, by convention cold, by convention colored, but in existence (*eteēi*) atoms and void” (B9), that ascription seems justified.

Aristotle does accept this as one sense of the word *ousia*, in that, in a way, matter does exist primarily. And, in a way, the form of anything is also *ousia*, especially of a living thing; its soul (**psychē**) is its *ousia*, since that is what it *is* (cf. **Metaph.** V.8, 1017b16). But for Aristotle the primary sense of *ousia*, that is, that which primarily exists, is the compound of matter and form, the individual thing, or a definable class of things.

In **Metaph.** XII, Aristotle distinguishes entities (*ousia*) into sensible and unchangeable, and the sensible into permanent and perishable. Almost everything that we know is in the class of perishable sensible things; only the astronomical beings are permanent and sensible. And there seems to be just one unchangeable entity, the unmoved mover (**akinēton kinoun**).

In post-Aristotelian philosophy, the **Epicureans**, to the extent that they were concerned about metaphysical issues, believed the atoms to be that which primarily exists, following the lead of **Democritus**. The **Stoics** use the word *ousia* to denominate the underlying substrate, that is, as ***hypokeimenon***. Of course, if we ask, “What exists primarily?” the Stoics would *also* say **God**, or reason, so that in a way there is just *one* entity in Stoic philosophy: everything. **Plotinus** is critical of the whole Aristotelian enterprise concerning *ousia* (***Enneads*** VI.1), in that it makes a multiplicity of what Plotinus believes to be a **unity**. He is also critical of the Stoic position, in that it makes of God a material entity.

See also **BECOMING**; **THE CATEGORIES**; **HYPEROUSION**; **PHYSIS**; **HISTORIA PERI PHYSEŌS**; **TODE TI**.

P

PAIDEIA

Παιδεία. Education: reading, writing, and the arts. (Literally, “child stuff.”) The **Sophists** focused on advancing education; a major conflict between **Socrates**, the Sophists, and popular culture as represented by **Aristophanes**, for example, concerned the nature of that education. The Sophists taught skills, primarily but not exclusively rhetorical skills, generally maintaining a “value-neutral” pose. Socrates urged his young admirers to search for fundamental values, but usually avoided promulgating any of his own value beliefs in any didactic manner. Popular culture, as defined by Aristophanes’ *Clouds* and the judgment of the jury in the trial of Socrates, determined that Socrates’ failure to inculcate traditional values was as dangerous as the Sophistic avoidance of values entirely.

The organized schools that came into existence after the death of Socrates tended to make room for both training in the skills required by social leaders and at least acquaintance with the ethical expectations of the society into which the products of these schools would enter.

In subsequent centuries, organized educational institutions continued to function in many cities of the ancient world; some of the cities with more or less stable educational establishments providing instruction in philosophy for extended periods of time included **Athens**, **Alexandria**, **Rhodes**, **Pergamum**, **Apamea** of Syria, **Rome**, and others. See W. Jaeger, *Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture*, vols. 1–3, 1945.

See also [ACADEMY](#); [EPICURUS AND EPICUREANISM](#); [ISOCRATES OF ATHENS](#); [LYCEUM](#); [MUSEUM \(MUSEION, Μουσείον\) AND LIBRARY OF ALEXANDRIA](#); [PERIPATETIC SCHOOL](#); [STOA](#), [STOIC SCHOOL](#).

PAIN

See [ALGOS](#); [LYPĒ](#); [PONOS](#).

PALINGENESIA

Παλιγγενεσία. The word means “regeneration” (*palin*, again; *genesis*, generation) and is used by the **Stoics** for the rebirth of the world after the periodic conflagration (*ekpyrōsis*). In the New Testament, it is applied both to the status of having been “born again” through baptism, and to the resurrection. In some authors, the word *palingenesis* is a

synonym for **metempsychosis**. In some modern authors, the word *palingenesis* appears, although it is not attested in ancient texts.

PAMPHILE OF EPIDAUROS

Παμφίλη. (1st CE.) Historian, author of *Historical Commentaries*, in 33 books, now lost. **Aulus Gellius** (XV.17, 23) and **Diogenes Laertius** (I.24, 68, 76, 90, 9; II.24; III.23; V.36) often cite her; we learn more about her in the **Suda** (*Pamphile*) and **Photius** (Cod. 175) however. D. L. Gera has argued that she is also the author of the anonymous treatise *De Mulieribus*, in *Warrior Women*, 1997.

See also [EPIDAUROS](#).

PANAETIUS OF RHODES

Παναίτιος. (c. 185–109 BCE.) **Stoic, Scholarch** from 129 to 109 BCE. Panaetius studied with **Diogenes of Babylon** and **Antipater of Tarsus** and frequently visited **Rome**, where he associated with Scipio Africanus. His concentration on ethical and social issues led him to adapt Stoic teachings to the needs of the Roman ruling class. As preserved by **Cicero** (*On Duties*), he taught that there are four “personae” or life roles: generically as a human being, specifically with one’s own natural attributes, the position into which one is cast by fate, and the role one has chosen on one’s own. He also redefined the cardinal virtues, synthesizing and transforming **Platonic** and **Aristotelian** conceptions into part of the Stoic doctrine. The fragments of Panaetius were edited by M. van Straaten in 1946.

See also [RHODES](#).

PANCRATES OF ATHENS

Παγκράτης. (c. 140 CE.) **Cynic**. According to **Philostratus** (*Vit. Soph.* 1.23), when the **Sophist Lollianus** was caught in a riot about bread, Pancrates got him out by saying, “He’s not a bread-seller, he’s a word-seller.” His name is also mentioned by **Alciphron** (*Ep.* III.55).

PANTHOIDES

(c. 275 BCE.) **Megarian**, teacher of the Peripatetic **Lyco of Troas** (**Sextus Empiricus**, *Adv. Math.* VII.13; **Diogenes Laertius** V.68, VII.193). He wrote *On Ambiguities*, attacked by **Chrysippus** (**Epictetus** II.19.5). **Diodorus Cronus’** master argument says that everything that has happened must be true; therefore nothing is possible which can never be true. Panthoides replied that something is possible which can never be true; the impossible can never be the consequence of the possible; and therefore not everything that has happened is

necessarily true.

PAR' HĒMIN

Παρ' ἡμῖν. Familiar, "by us." In **Epicurean** epistemology, we tend to accept appearances that are familiar to us. **Stoics** objected that exceptions are always possible; "not so fast."

PARABOLĒ

Παραβολή. (*Para*, beside; *bolē*, throw.) Comparison, illustration, parable, parody. In **Plato**, **Philebus** 33b2, this word is applied to a comparison (between different lives); a typical **Aristotelian** use occurs at **Rhetoric** II.20, 1393b23, where the **Socratic** habit of giving examples or illustrations of a point is noted. It is an easy step from that to the New Testament "parable." In **Sextus Empiricus** (*Against the Professors* 9) the word takes on a new twist, being applied to "parodies" of arguments, particularly of the **Stoics**. **Zeno** says, "The rational is superior to the non-rational; nothing is superior to the universe; therefore the universe is rational." To which **Alexinus of Elis** (a **Megarian** philosopher who critiqued Zeno) replied, "The poet is superior to the non-poet; nothing is superior to the universe; therefore the universe writes poetry."

PARADEIGMA

Παράδειγμα. Example, standard. (*Para*, beside; *deigma*, indication.) In the **Platonic dialogues**, the Forms (*eidē*) are often said to serve as *paradeigmata* or standards, for example, the ideal state exists as a *paradeigma* in heaven (**Republic** IX 592a–b; cf. **Euthyphro** 6e). Although **Aristotle** usually uses the word in the everyday sense of "example," he is sufficiently influenced by the Platonic usage to use it for the **formal cause** a few times, for example, **Physics** II.3, 194b27.

PARADOXON

Παράδοξον. Paradox. Contrary to expectation. (*Para*, beside; *doxon*, opinion.) Cf. **Plato**, **Republic** 472a; **Aristotle**, **Metaphysics** III.7, 1012a17. The arguments of **Zeno of Elea** are regularly called "paradoxes" by commentators, and the related arguments of the **Megarians**, such as **Eubulides**, also receive that name. **Cicero** wrote a book on "Stoic Paradoxes" (*Paradoxa Stoicorum*), bringing the word into common philosophical usage.

PARAEBATES

Παραίβατης. (4th–3rd BCE.) **Cyrenaic** student of Epitimidēs and teacher of **Hegesias** and **Anniceris**, according to **Diogenes Laertius** II.85. DL also tells us that he was disliked by **Menedemus** (II.134).

PARAKOLOUTHĒSIS, PARAKOLOUTHOUN

Παρακολούθησις, παρακολουθοῦν. Concomitance, concomitant. (*Para*, beside; *akolouthoun*, follow.) Aristotle uses this word in the sense of “follow along with” (“It doesn’t matter whether opinion precedes choice or follows along with it”; **Nicomachean Ethics** III.2, 1112a11). **Epicurus** uses this word to talk about **attributes** that **Aristotle** would have called “**accidents**” (***symbebēkota***); Epicurus does not think that these attributes are “accidental” at all. **Chrysippus** uses the concept to explain various natural inconveniences that were necessary from some other point of view. One of his examples: the cranium bone is rather thin, and thus in danger of breaking; but if it were thicker, your head would be too heavy and there would be less room for your brains (*SVF* 2.1170).

PARENKLISIS

Παρέγκλισις. Swerve. (*Para*, beside; *en*, in; *klisis*, bending.) In **Epicurean** physics, the atoms (***atoma***) that compose the universe are thought to be “falling” through limitless space. If nothing were to interfere with that process, there would be no occasion for complexes of atoms to come together. So atoms must deviate from a perfectly straight line. These deviations or swerves are supposed to occur randomly.

From the Epicurean perspective, the existence of random “swerves” of atoms opens a space for “free will” in an otherwise totally deterministic world.

See also [PHYSIS](#); [HISTORIA PERI PHYSEŌS](#).

PARMENIDES OF ELEA

Παρμενίδης ὁ Ἐλεάτης. (c. 510–after 450 BCE.) Not much is known of his life other than the implication of the introductory section of **Plato’s** ***Parmenides***, indicating that Parmenides and **Zeno** visited **Athens** in about 450 and had a conversation with **Socrates**, represented as reported in the **dialogue**. Parmenides had written a poem, *On Nature*, that seems to have been widely known in the Greek world soon after its composition. Most of those who wrote about “nature” (***physis***) in the years following its composition tried to respond in one way or another to its challenge. **Simplicius** and others preserve a significant portion of the first part of the poem, so we are able to interpret his thought fairly directly, rather than relying on reports and scattered fragments, as we have so often to do with other writers of the period.

The poem of Parmenides includes an introductory proem, in which he tells of traveling in a chariot to visit the Goddess; the way of truth, in which the Goddess tells him about what is;

and the way of opinion (*doxa*), in which the Goddess gives him an account of **cosmology**. The Proem is intact, and we have most of the Way of Truth; there are only a few fragments of the Way of Opinion.

The Goddess tells Parmenides that there are two ways of thinking, one “*is*, and not not-*is*,” the other “*is not*.” In Greek, a verb may be used without a noun or pronoun; thus Parmenides writes *esti* (and *ouk esti*) without noun or pronoun. In this case, one tends to read *esti* as “**being** is.” The Goddess goes on to say that *esti* is the only way to go, since in the case of “*is not*” there is nothing to talk about. She also tells him to avoid “*is* and *is-not*,” where mortals wander around two-headed.

Sticking strictly to *is* has consequences: *is* is neither generated nor destroyed, is absolutely One, indivisible, immobile, and perfect. There is no generation or destruction, since *is not* would have to be the source or destination, and that source or destination *is not*. *Is* is indivisible, because it would have to be divided by *is not*, which of course *is not*. All thought, all speech, in fact refers to *is*, since *is* is all that exists—*not is* is not there to be spoken of or thought of. All differentiations—various colors, for example—are “mere names.”

The Way of Opinion, characterized by the Goddess as untrustworthy and deceptive, turns on an opposition and mixing of light and night. It is sometimes said that Parmenides is simply reporting a cosmology developed by someone else, perhaps a **Pythagorean**, but we should notice that the few scattered fragments include some real cosmological advances: Parmenides knows that the moon is illuminated by the sun, that the morning and evening star are identical (and thus a planet), and by implication that the **earth** is spherical. **Anaximander** had thought that the earth was cylindrical (we live on one flat end), and apparently that the moon shines with its own internal light.

Parmenides’ associate **Zeno** is represented as defending the thesis of Parmenides that what is, is one, dialectically; that is, Zeno starts by assuming plurality and shows that that assumption leads to self-contradictions. While Parmenides’ thesis may be represented as primarily “logical,” **Melissus of Samos** gives it a decidedly material edge.

The **atomism** of **Leucippus** and **Democritus** can be seen as the flip side of the **Eleatic** philosophy—instead of one being, in which all relations are internal, they assert many

beings, for which all relations are external.

Plato's later philosophy is clearly much indebted to consideration of the implications of the thought of Parmenides; the dialogue *Parmenides*, and the interventions of the Eleatic Stranger in the *Sophist* and *Statesman*, include many of Plato's most profound metaphysical ideas, ones that continue to resonate throughout ancient philosophy, and particularly in the **Neoplatonic** synthesis. See J. Palmer, "Parmenides," in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

See also [ELEA](#).

PARMENIDES

(Dialogue by **Plato**.) Παρμενίδης. Abbr. *Parm*. The young (about 20 years old) **Socrates** is represented meeting with **Parmenides** and **Zeno** in **Athens** in about 450 BCE. Although this meeting probably never occurred, this is the best evidence we have of the approximate dates of these **Eleatic** philosophers—Parmenides is described as about 65, Zeno about 40. Zeno has been reading from his book; Socrates concludes that Zeno, by arguing that being is not many, is defending the point of Parmenides' poem, that being is one. He goes on to claim that there is a form of likeness and a form of unlikeness, separate from the things that share in them; Parmenides asks him whether there are also Forms of justice, beauty, goodness—of these Socrates is sure. How about human being, fire, and water? Socrates is not so sure. Hair, mud, and dirt? No, those are just what we see. Parmenides says that to be consistent, he must claim that there are Forms of those as well. So how are the Forms and the things related to each other? By participation (*methexis*) or imitation (*mimesis*)? Either way, Parmenides argues, you'll get a regress—since the form must have the characteristic that it names, and the theory demands that there is a separate form for all the items that have the same characteristic. (See also [THIRD MAN ARGUMENT](#).) Worse yet, according to Parmenides, Forms are related only to other Forms, and phenomena to other phenomena—for example, slaves are slaves only of a "phenomenal" master, not of the Form of master. So we, being phenomenal entities, cannot know the Forms; presumably the gods can, but they can't know us, on this showing.

There is a huge literature about all this, trying to analyze exactly what has gone wrong. Plato's own approach is not to attack these arguments directly, but rather to suggest dramatically that those present need some (additional) training

in dialectic—the remainder of the dialogue. Parmenides engages the youngest person present, a young man by the name of Aristotle (not *our* Aristotle) in an examination of eight separate examinations of the relationship between one and many. These dialectical deductions, we are led to suppose, somehow contain the solution to the problems of the first part of the dialogue. Platonists generally do believe that this dialogue is the most important explanation of the theory of Forms. See S. Rickless, “Plato’s Parmenides,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

PARŌNYMOS

Παράνυμος. (*Para*: beside, *onyma*: name.) According to **Aristotle** in the ***Categories***, a word is a “paronym” if it gets its meaning from another word; a derivative word (*Cat.* 1a13, 6b13). Two of the rare times he uses this word are ***Physics*** VII.3, 245b11, where he says, for example, that a statue is not “bronze” but “brazen,” paronymously, and ***Eudemian Ethics*** III.1, 1228a31, where the coward is called cowardly, by paronymy.

PARTICIPATION

See **METHESIS**.

PARTICULAR

The word “particular” functions in English-language **metaphysics** as the vehicle for a certain fudge factor. To the extent that “particular” means something like “individual,” the following words are the closest equivalents: ***henad***, ***kath’ hekaston***, and ***tode ti***. There is an academic discussion about whether Aristotle believed in “non-substantial particulars” (see S. M. Cohen, “Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Supplement,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 2012) that might be cleared up if the discussants could agree on what “particular” means and how it would be expressed in Aristotle’s Greek.

PARTS OF ANIMALS

(Treatise by **Aristotle**.) Περί ζῴων μορίων. Latin, *De Partibus Animalium*. Abbr. *PA*. The first book is a collection of three introductory essays to the study of zoology: the first and fifth chapters are protreptic; chapters 2 through 4 comprise a quick discussion of taxonomy. The remainder of the treatise is a discussion of the nature and function of the organic parts of animals ranging from sponges to human beings. Book II begins with a discussion of the “homogeneous” parts of animals with blood (nearly equivalent to our chordata)—blood, fat, marrow, flesh, and bone—and continues with a quick review of the organs of perception. Book III starts with non-

sensory parts of the head, teeth, beaks, and horns; goes on to necks, including the esophagus and windpipe; then to the heart and vascular system, the lungs, and the digestive organs. This discussion continues in the first part of book IV, but then Aristotle moves on to animals without (red) blood, cephalopods, crustaceans, testaceans, and insects. Continuing to the organs of local movement, Aristotle reviews arms, legs, wings, and fins.

In *PA* Aristotle regularly appeals to the functions that organs must perform for the sake of the survival of the individual animal and the survival of the species. Limiting conditions on the sorts of organs that a particular sort of animal may have would include the material available for forming the organ and the general characteristics of the group to which the animal belongs. See J. Lennox, "Aristotle's Biology," *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, and P. Pellegrin, *Aristotle's Classification of Animals*, 1986.

PARVA NATURALIA

Μικρὰ φυσικά. Abbr. *PN*. A group of several short treatises on natural subjects by **Aristotle**. It includes ***Sense and Sensible Objects*** (*De sensu et sensibilia*, abbr. *Sens.*), ***On Memory and Recollection*** (*De memoria et reminiscencia*, abbr. *Mem.*), ***On Sleep and Waking*** (*De somno et vigilia*, abbr. *Somn.*), ***On Dreams*** (*De insomniis*, abbr. *Insomn.*), ***On Divination in Sleep*** (*De divinatione per somnum*, abbr. *Div. Somn.*), ***On Length and Shortness of Life*** (*De longitudine et brevitate vitae*, abbr. *Long.*), ***On Youth and Old Age, on Life and Death, on Respiration*** (*De juventute et senectute, de vita et morte, de respiration*, abbr. *Juv.*), and "On Breath." The "On Breath" is generally regarded as the work of a later **Peripatetic**.

PASCHEIN

Πάσχειν. To be affected, to suffer. **Plato** distinguishes change (***kinēsis***) into active (***poiein***) and passive (***paschein***) (e.g., ***Theaetetus*** 156a), so that these in a sense exhaust the world of **becoming** (***genesis***) (***Sophist*** 248c). As one of **Aristotle's** 10 categories, ***paschein*** refers to passive verbs in general. For Aristotle as for the **Stoics**, ***paschein*** is closely associated with **matter**, as ***poiein*** is closely associated with the origin of movement (***archē kinēseōs***). It is also the verb from which the noun ***pathos*** is derived.

See also **[KATĒGORIAI](#)**.

PASICLES OF THEBES

Πασικλῆς. (4th BCE.) **Megarian**, brother of **Cynic Crates**

of **Thebes**. Student of **Euclides of Megara**, teacher of **Stilpo**. Thus, Pasicles taught Stilpo, Stilpo taught Crates, and Crates taught Pasicles. See **Diogenes Laertius** VI.88, 89; **Seneca**, Ep. X.1.

See also [THEBES](#).

PASSION

The Latin equivalent of **pathos**. In English, “passion” has come to have an (paradoxical, given its origin) active sense so that it is used for such active principles as lust and ambition.

This is, however, not so surprising, since the classical authors include active passions as *pathē*.

PASSIVE INTELLECT

See [NOUS](#) ([NOOS](#)).

PATHOS, PATHĒ

πάθος, πάθη. Noun derived from the verb **paschein**, meaning that which happens to a person (or anything else); experience, either good or bad. **Democritus** (B31): “Medicine cures the diseases of the body, wisdom frees the soul (*psychē*) from *pathē*.” **Plato** talks of an erotic *pathos* at **Phaedrus** 265b. At **Timaeus** 42a–b, the *pathē* are a consequence of the soul having been implanted in the body (*sōma*). **Aristotle** distinguishes several senses of *pathos* at **Metaphysics** V.21: “We call *pathos*: (1) A quality in respect of which a thing can be altered. . . . (2) The already actualized **alterations**. (3) Especially, injurious alterations and movements, and above all, painful injuries. (4) Experiences pleasant or painful when on a large scale are called *pathē*.” In **Nicomachean Ethics**, he gives a somewhat different account when he distinguishes *pathē* (of the soul) from **dynameis** and **hexeis**. The *pathē* are “appetite, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, love, hatred, longing, emulation, pity, and in general the feelings that are accompanied by pleasure and pain” (II.5, 1105b20). The *dynameis* are the possibilities of having these feelings; the *hexeis* determine how much you have these feelings, and toward what. *Pathos* is often translated “emotion,” but it is more nearly the case that the whole complex analyzes what we mean by “emotion” in English. *Pathē* is often translated “feelings,” and in many cases that is a very good translation.

For **Zeno** the Stoic, a *pathos* is an excessive **hormē**, something that needs to be controlled or gotten rid of.

Chrysippus takes *pathē* to be “judgments.” Given the *hormē*, the **commanding faculty** decides the extent to which it should be pursued, and if that pursuit is excessive, it is a *pathos*.

Galen, in the *Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato*, reports that **Posidonius** disagreed with Chrysippus, arguing that the *pathē* arise to some extent independently and in opposition to reason.

See also [PASSION](#).

PATRO

Πάτρων. (c. 70 BCE.) **Epicurean**. Succeeded **Phaedrus** as **Scholarch** c. 70 BCE. Subject of **Cicero**'s intervention with the Roman bureaucracy, *Ad Fam.* Xiii.1; *Ad Att.* V.11, 19. Patro was acquainted not only with Cicero, but also **Gaius Memmius** and **Atticus**.

PELAGIUS

(c. 390–419 CE.) Irish **Christian** monk who rejected predestination and original sin and taught a particularly strong version of freedom of the will. His major opponent was **Augustine**; Pelagius' views were declared heretical in 413, and only quotations in the works of his opponents have come down to us. Relevant works are collected online in the Library of Theology.

PERAS

Πέρας. Limit, end (in the sense of limit). In **Pythagorean** philosophy, at the beginning of the table of opposites (See also [ENANTIA](#)) and associated with the **Good**. Mathematically, the point is the limit of the line, the line the limit of the surface, and the surface the limit of the solid. In **Plato**, **Philebus** 23c ff., limit and the unlimited are proposed as metaphysical principles. **Epicurus** (*Key Doctrines* 19–21) stresses the “limits” in human life, both the limits of pain and the achievability of pleasure when it is within limits. As **Aristotle** says in *Metaphysics* V.17, “end (as limit)” has as many senses as *archē* (beginning).

PEREGRINUS PROTEUS

Περεγρίνος Πρωτεύς. (c. 95–165 CE.) **Cynic**, from Parium in Mysia. After spending some time with **Christians** in Palestine, he moved to Greece. **Lucian** provides a satirical version of his life and death in *The Death of Peregrinus*, **Aulus Gellius** a perhaps more evenhanded approach in *Attic Nights* XII.11. Peregrinus is most remembered for giving his own funeral oration, then cremating himself on a funeral pyre at the Olympic Games of 165 CE. Both the Lucian and the Aulus Gellius are available online. Lucian says that he took the name “Proteus” and lived up to his Homeric namesake by continually changing his nature.

PERFECTION

See [ENTELECHEIA](#); [TELOS](#).

PERGAMON

Τὸ Πέργαμον, also “Pergamum.” City in northwest Ionia, 9°07'57"N 27°11'03"E, Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #828.

Flourishing under Roman rule, Pergamon had a famous medical establishment, the Asclepeion, and the second-most important library after **Alexandria**. **Galen** is its most famous citizen. The word “parchment” is derived from the name of this city, because it was there that the process of making high-quality writing material from animal skins was perfected.

PERICTIONE

Περικτιόνη. (5th BCE.) **Plato**’s mother. Descended from **Solon**, she was married to Ariston with whom she had three sons—Glaucon, **Adeimantus**, and Plato—and a daughter, Potone, the mother of **Speusippus**. When Ariston died, she married Pyrilampes, her uncle. With him she had another son, **Antiphon**, who appears in the *Parmenides*. Two pieces of pseudonymous **Pythagorean** literature bear her name: *On the Harmony of Women*, dated to the late 4th or 3rd BCE, and *On Wisdom*, written perhaps a century later. See M. E. Waithe, *History of Women Philosophers*, vol. 1, 1987.

PERIPATETIC SCHOOL

Ὁ Περὶπατος. This is the usual name for the ancient followers of Aristotle, taken as a group. The name comes from the alternative name for the **Lyceum**; the building used by the school included a covered walkway (*peripatos*) around the area where wrestling had been taught. Aristotle legendarily taught while strolling there. A school continued to exist in the Lyceum from 345 BCE (when it was founded by Aristotle) perhaps until 86 BCE (when it was destroyed by Sulla). But it is important to note that when the Museum of Alexandria was founded, Aristotelians were prominently involved, and several other Aristotelian schools were founded—in the lifetime of Aristotle, **Eudemus** founded a school at **Rhodes**.

Theophrastus was Aristotle’s successor at the Lyceum, followed (36 years later) by **Strato of Lampsacus**. Other early Peripatetics include **Dicaearchus**, **Aristoxenus**, **Clearchus**, and **Phaenias**. **Demetrius of Phaleron** was a student of Aristotle who served as governor of Athens after the death of Alexander and was later involved in the founding of the **Museum and Library at Alexandria**. **Erasistratus of Chios** (c. 304–250 BCE) established the study of anatomy at Alexandria; **Aristarchus of Samos** (310–230 BCE) was a student of Strato who established the study of **astronomy** and

mathematics on a very firm footing in Alexandria, leading to the work of **Euclid** and **Claudius Ptolemy**. **Arius Didymus**, (1st century BCE) and **Hero of Alexandria** (approx. 10–70 CE) were two more Alexandrian Aristotelians.

Strato was succeeded in **Athens** by **Lyco** (d. 225 BCE), followed by **Aristo of Ceos**, and then **Critolaus**, who was in the embassy of philosophers from Athens to **Rome** in 155 BCE.

In the 1st century BCE, **Andronicus of Rhodes** produced an edition of the **corpus** of Aristotle's works, possibly based mainly on the copies of Aristotle's library brought to Rhodes by Eudemus, or on the remains of the Lyceum library shipped to Rome by **Sulla**. The Peripatetic school continued to be one of the four major "schools" of philosophy—**Marcus Aurelius** appointed an Aristotelian chair of philosophy at Athens, and **Alexander of Aphrodisias** produced important (and orthodox) commentaries on some of Aristotle's works. In late antiquity and, to a large extent, in the medieval period, there was a strong belief that Plato and Aristotle were in fundamental agreement; the **Neoplatonic** school saw itself as the synthesis of the teachings of both philosophers and supported that belief by their commentaries on Aristotle's works. How Platonism and Aristotelianism came to be distinguished and put into opposition is a story belonging to late medieval and early modern philosophy, and thus not a subject for this dictionary.

The works of the earlier Peripatetics have been edited by F. Wehrle and by the Theophrastus Project, under the direction of W. W. Fortenbaugh.

See also [MATHĒMA](#), [MATHĒMATA](#); [TA MATHĒMATIKA](#).

PERSAEUS OF CITIUM

Περσαῖος. (307/6–243 BCE.) **Stoic**, student of **Zeno of Citium**. **Diogenes Laertius** (VII.36) provides a list of his writings, none of which survive. When Antigonos II Gonatas invited Zeno to his court around 276 BCE, Zeno refused and sent Persaeus and Philonides of **Thebes** in his place.

Persaeus became an important person in the **Macedonian** court; he became archon of **Corinth** in 244 and died defending the city in 243. See **Diogenes Laertius** VII.6, 9, 13; **Aulus Gellius**, *Attic Nights* II.18.8; **Athenaeus**, *Deipnosophists* IV.162; **Cicero**, *Nat. Deor.* 1.15).

See also [CITIUM](#).

PHAEDO

(Dialogue by **Plato**.) Φαίδων. Plato's account of the last day of **Socrates**. **Phaedo** narrates his recollections of the

events to **Echecrates** in **Phlius**. Socrates claims that he is of good cheer in dying, because he believes that he will join “good men and the gods.” He offers several arguments for the immortality of the soul, presumed to be derived in part from **Pythagorean** sources. One argument holds that for human beings to be able to understand concepts such as mathematical and evaluative concepts, they must have had prior acquaintance with them, before birth, and are now “recalling” them, via *anamnēsis*. Socrates also argues that the fact that the soul directs the body indicates that they are two, and the soul is prior to or more authoritative than the body. Toward the end of the dialogue Socrates recounts a myth of the afterlife that has influenced literary representations of Hades. He courageously drinks poisonous hemlock and dies. See D. Gallop, *Phaedo*, 1999.

PHAEDO OF ELIS

Φαίδων. (5th–4th BCE.) **Plato**’s **dialogue** recounting **Socrates**’ death is named **Phaedo** because Phaedo is its dramatic narrator. As a teenager, he was captured and sold into slavery, winding up in **Athens**. Socrates got to know him and asked **Crito** to buy his freedom. He apparently wrote Socratic dialogues and opened a Socratic school in his native **Elis**, known as the **Elia school** (*Phaedo* 89a–b; **Diogenes Laertius** II.105). **Seneca** (*Ep.* XCIV.41) quotes him, “Certain tiny animals do not leave any pain when they sting us; so subtle is their power, so deceptive for purpose of harm. The bite is disclosed by a swelling, and even in the swelling there is no visible wound.” Seneca says that the influence of some people is like that.

See also [DOULOS](#), [DOULEIA](#).

PHAEDRUS

(c. 138–70 BCE.) An **Epicurean**, leader of the Epicureans in **Athens**; **Cicero** met him in **Rome** and attended his lectures in Athens. Phaedrus was succeeded, as leader of the Epicurean school, by **Patro**. Cicero uses his work “On Gods” for his description of Epicurean doctrine in *De Natura Deorum*. (Cicero, *Ad Fam.* XIII.1.2; *Ad Att.* XIII.39; *Nat. Deor.* I.21, 33, et al.)

PHAEDRUS

(Dialogue by **Plato**.) Φαῖδρος. Socrates, strolling with **Phaedrus** outside the walls of **Athens** in an unusual rural setting, persuades Phaedrus to read the set speech (purportedly) by **Lysias**, representing the attempt of an older man to persuade a boy to have a relationship with him on the

ground that he does *not* love him. Socrates says that he can do better than that; he begins by representing the lover as explaining to the boy that the inborn desire for pleasure may drive a person to violence (**hybris**), overpowering his sense of what is right, so he would do well to avoid that sort of lover.

But instead of going on to praise the non-lover, Socrates offers a “palinode” to love (**erōs**), distinguishing several sorts of madness (**mania**). Asserting the immortality of the soul, Socrates says that between lives, human souls have been given the opportunity to see the Forms; having seen the Form of **beauty**, once they are in a body they have an innate urge to be united with beauty again.

The palinode completed, the dialogue turns to a discussion of speechwriting good and bad. See Nehamas & Woodruff, trs., *Phaedrus*, 1995.

See also **EIDOS**, **EIDĒ**; **POETRY**; **PSYCHĒ**; **RHĒTORIKĒ**.

PHAEDRUS OF ATHENS

Φαῖδρος Πυθοκλέους Μυρρινούσιος. (c. 444–393 BCE.)

Main character, with **Socrates**, in the **Phaedrus**; one of the speakers on love in the **Symposium**. He is also present in the **Protagoras**. He was indicted in 415 for profanation of the Eleusinian mysteries and fled Athens. For more about him, see J. Sallis, *Being and Logos*, 1997, pp. 104–172.

PHAENIAS (OR PHANIAS) OF ERESOS

Φαινίας ὁ Ἐρέσιος. (fl. 332 BCE.) Compatriot of

Theophrastus (**Diogenes Laertius** V.37), Phaenias joined the **Peripatetic school** upon **Aristotle**’s founding the school at the **Lyceum**. He wrote extensively on a range of topics, but none of his writings have survived. He wrote on logic, and he worked with Theophrastus on plants—his work in this area and others is quoted several times by **Athenaeus** (I, II, III, VI, VIII, IX, X, XIV). His work on history is cited by **Plutarch** (*Themistocles* 13) and Athenaeus: he wrote a history of **Eresos**, used by later authors, and a work on “Killing Tyrants for Revenge,” apparently elaborating on what Aristotle writes in **Politics** V, e.g., 8 and 9, on this topic. His work on the **Socratics** is cited by Diogenes Laertius (II.65, VI.8). He also wrote on the history of literature and the history of music, both used by later authors.

PHAINOMENON

Φαινόμενον. Passive or middle participle of the verb *phainein*, to appear, a *phainomenon* is consequently that which appears, a phenomenon, an appearance. “*Ta*

phainomena **opsis adēlon**, phenomena are a glimpse of the unseen” (**Anaxagoras** B21). For **Plato**, the perceptible world consists of *phainomena*, always in change, never persistent, while the knowable world is the source both of the **being** and the understanding of the *phainomena*.

While **Aristotle** does not contrast phenomena with Forms (*eidē*), he does contrast phenomena with “truth” or “**being**,” in expressions that we would translate “apparent, not real” (**Rhetoric** II.24, 25). He also, very often, conjoins **logos** and *phainomenon* in a manner that says that appearances agree (or disagree) with what one would figure from a rational point of view. On the whole, Aristotle agrees with Anaxagoras that one can gain an understanding of what one cannot perceive on the basis of appearances. In very different ways, the **Epicureans** and **Stoics** also thought that some knowledge could be based on appearances, while the Skeptics (whether Academic or Pyrrhonian) never tired of reminding their audiences that appearances are deceiving.

See also [SKEPTIKOS](#).

PHANTASIA

Φαντασία. Abstract noun built on *phainein*, to appear (related, for example, to **phainomenon**). “Appearance or presentation to consciousness, whether immediate or in memory, whether true or illusory” (LSJ). The word is seriously confusing, especially in **Aristotle**’s usage, because sometimes it means any appearance whatever (as in the LSJ definition), and sometimes it has a more limited sense, either (approximately) the faculty of imagination, or even specifically having *false* appearances. Also, sometimes *phantasia* is the faculty, sometimes the activity of the faculty, and sometimes the content or object of the faculty. It is more than usually important that one be aware of the current sense of the word when attempting to interpret Aristotelian passages including the word *phantasia*. See K. M. Scheiter, “Images, Appearances, and Phantasia in Aristotle,” *Phronesis* 57 (2012): 251–278.

For the **Stoics**, a *phantasia* is an “impression on the soul” that can be grasped (**Diogenes Laertius** VII.149). *False* perceptions they call *phantasmata*.

PHANTASMA

Φάντασμα. Appearance (**Aristotle**, **De Anima** III.3, 423a1). Figment of the imagination, phantom, dream image (**Nicomachean Ethics** I.13, 1102b10). When ancient philosophers wanted to refer to a seriously unreliable

appearance, they called it a “phantasma.”

See also [ONEIROS](#); [PHANTASIA](#).

PHANTO OF PHLIUS

Φάντων. (4th BCE.) **Pythagorean**, student of **Philolaus** and **Eurytus**, possibly contemporary with **Aristoxenus** the **Peripatetic** (**Iamblichus**, *Vit. Pyth.* 35, 36; **Diogenes Laertius** VIII.46). **Phlius** is the refuge village of Pythagoreans where **Phaedo** narrates the **Phaedo** to **Echecrates**. Apparently Phanto would be one of the last named members of the classical Pythagorean school.

PHAULOS

Φαῦλος. Small, insignificant, worthless, bad. Possibly **Plato**’s most common word for “bad” as in “bad person” (e.g., **Apology** 28b) as it is for **Aristotle** (e.g., **Nicomachean Ethics** IV.1, 1121a25). For Aristotle, the opposite of *phaulos* is **spoudaios**.

PHENOMENON

See [PHAINOMENON](#).

PHERECYDES OF SYROS

Φερεκῦδης. (6th BCE.) Pherecydes was a theologian-cosmologist credited by **Diogenes Laertius** and others with having been the teacher of **Pythagoras**. **Aristotle** calls him a theologian who mixed philosophical reasoning with **myth** (**Metaphysics** 1091b8). Syros is a small island in the Cyclades, south of Athens, 37°27’N 24°54’E, Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #523. See H. S. Schibli, *Pherecydes of Syros*, 1990.

PHILEBUS

(Dialogue by **Plato**.) Φίληβος. **Socrates** discusses the relative value of pleasure and knowledge with Philebus and Protarchus. Philebus, the convinced hedonist, says very little; most of the discussion is carried on with Protarchus. The best life turns out to be a rationally measured blend of knowledge and pleasure. But the whole idea of “rational measure” leads to an analysis of the kinds of being—the “limitless,” the “limited,” and the “mixed,” and the cause of the mixture—and of the art of measurement. See C. Hampton, *Pleasure Knowledge and Being*, 1990.

See also [HĒDONĒ](#), [HĒDYN](#).

PHILIA

Φιλία. Friendship, love. One of the two cosmic principles of **Empedocles** (the other is “strife”—**eris**, **neikos**). *Philia* is analyzed by **Socrates** in **Plato**’s **Lysis**. The related concept of **erōs** is prominent in the **Phaedrus** and **Symposium**.

Aristotle discusses *philia* especially in **Nicomachean Ethics** VIII and IX; the concept is also fundamental for his political theory, since individual affinities ultimately result in a unified and functional society. Friendship is central in **Epicurean** ethics: “Of the things acquired by wisdom for the blessedness of life, far the greatest is the possession of friendship” (*Key Doctrines* 27).

PHILIPPUS OF OPUS (PHILIP OF OPUS)

Φίλιππος Ὀπούντιος. (4th BCE.) **Academic**. Philip of Opus became **Plato**’s secretary toward the end of Plato’s life. He is credited with editing the **Laws** and writing the **dialogue** the *Epinomis*, included in the Platonic **corpus** as a kind of appendix to the *Laws*. He is thought to be the same person as Philip of Medma or Mende, an astronomer cited by several later authors (**Diogenes Laertius** III.37, 46). Opus (Ὀποῦς) was the chief city of eastern Locris, at or near the location of the present Atalanti, 38°39’N 23°0’E, Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #386. Medma (Μέδμη) was at the site of the current Rosarno, in southern Italy, 38°30’N 15°59’E, Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #60; it was a colony of Locrians, so Philip could have been born in Opus and moved to Medme before becoming a member of the Academy. See L. Tarán, *Academica: Plato, Philip of Opus, and the Pseudo-Platonic Epinomis*, 1975.

PHILISCUS OF AEGINA

Φιλίσκος. (late 4th BCE.) **Cynic**. Son of **Onesicritus** who sent him, and his brother Androsthenes, to **Athens** to be educated. They were so impressed by **Diogenes of Sinope** that they told their father to come to Athens, where he became a follower of Diogenes (**Diogenes Laertius** VI.75). Philiscus is said to have studied also with **Stilpo** and Phocion (**Suda**, *Philiscus*). Aegina (Aigina) is an island 17 km southwest of Athens, 37°45’N 23°26’E, Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #358.

PHILISCUS OF THESSALY

(2nd–3rd CE.) **Sophist**. According to **Philostratus** he was one of the “geometers and philosophers” associated with the Empress Julia Domna.

See also [THESSALY](#).

PHILO OF ALEXANDRIA

Φίλων. (c. 20 BCE–45 CE.) A Jewish philosopher, Philo served in the delegation from **Alexandria** to the emperor Gaius Caligula in 39 CE. Philo thought that **Pythagoras** had learned his philosophy from Moses, and **Plato** from Pythagoras, so Greek philosophy should be consistent with the Torah. He practiced **allegorical** exegesis of the Torah

toward the end of making the desired connections. His basic philosophical orientation was Platonic (he is counted as a “**middle Platonist**”), with a significant amount of **Stoic** thought, especially, included. For example, his use of the Stoic version of **logos** in theological contexts, together with the Platonic **World Soul**, provides a philosophical anticipation of the **Christian** doctrine of the Trinity. See M. Hillar, “Philo of Alexandria,” *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

See also [DĒMIOURGOS](#); [JUDAISM](#); [ORIGEN](#); [THEOS](#), [THEIOS](#), [THEOLOGIA](#); [TIMAEUS](#); [TRIAS](#).

PHILO OF LARISSA

(158–84 BCE.) **Scholarch** of the **Academy** from about 110 BCE, after **Clitomachus**, until he moved to **Rome** during the Mithridatic wars. Unlike his immediate predecessors, he seems to have taught the content of Plato’s **dialogues**. **Cicero** was one of his students. He was succeeded as Scholarch by **Antiochus of Ascalon**. See C. Brittain, *Philo of Larissa*, 2001.

See also [AENESIDEMUS](#); [CHARMADAS](#); [ECLECTIC](#); [LARISSA](#); [MIDDLE PLATONISM](#).

PHILO THE LOGICIAN

(4th–3rd BCE.) Student of **Diodorus Cronus**, leader of the **Dialectical school**. He contributed to the development of formal logic (**logikē**) including modal logic, influencing the development of **Stoic** logic. Philo is sometimes said to be a **Megarian**, but more recent scholarship has distinguished the two schools. See S. Bobzien, “Dialectical School,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

PHILODEMUS OF GADARA

Φιλόδημος ὁ Γαδάρειος. (c. 110–40 BCE.) **Epicurean** whose writings were discovered, as charred papyri, in the Villa of the Pisones at Herculaneum. He seems to have been particularly adept at adapting the teachings of his school to the needs of his Roman audience. See David Blank, “Philodemus,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

See also [GADARA](#).

PHILOLAUS OF CROTON

Φιλόλαος. (c. 470–385 BCE.) Author of a book presenting many of the **Pythagorean** ideas, probably one of the people **Aristotle** had in mind in talking about “those who call themselves Pythagoreans.” He is presented as the teacher of **Simmias** and **Cebes** (in **Thebes**) in Plato’s **Phaedo**. In the **Philebus**, Plato uses several of Philolaus’ philosophic ideas, including the relation of “limit” and “unlimit.” Philolaus believed that mathematics (**mathēmatikē**) was fundamental for

understanding the world. He had a **cosmological** theory including a hypothesized “counter-earth” that we could not see because it is always on the other side of the “central fire”; that is, Philolaus anticipated a heliocentric universe, as Copernicus noted. See Carl Huffman, “Philolaus,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

See also [CROTON](#).

PHILONIDES OF LAODICEA

(c. 200–c. 130 BCE.) **Epicurean** and mathematician; lived at the Seleucid court during the reigns of Antiochus IV Epiphanes and Demetrius I Soter. He is known from a *Life of Philonides* found among the charred papyrus scrolls in Herculaneum (*Vita Philonidi*, *PHerc.* 1044). He is said to be “of **Laodicea**” because he was sent to govern that city by the Seleucids.

PHILOPONUS, JOHN

Ἰωάννης ὁ Φιλόπονος. (c. 490–570 CE.) **Alexandrian Christian** commentator on **Aristotle**, he studied with **Ammonius son of Hermeias**; “Philoponus” is a nickname, given him because he liked to work. Several commentaries survive (CAG 13–17); he also wrote treatises attacking the Aristotelian idea that the world has neither beginning nor end: he defends the thesis that the world was created and will be destroyed. There are also several theological treatises and treatises on **astronomy** and mathematics (*mathēmatikē*). His views on the Trinity were not regarded as sufficiently orthodox, so he was not much studied in Europe until the Renaissance. See C. Wildberg, “John Philoponus,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

See also [HERMIAS \(HERMEIAS\)](#).

PHILOSOPHIA, PHILOSOPHOS

Φιλοσοφία, φιλόσοφος. The word “philosophia” is said to have been invented by **Pythagoras**: when some said that he was a **sophos**, or wise man, he demurred and said that he was rather a lover of wisdom (*sophia*), that **God** alone is wise. Before the time of **Socrates**, the word *philosophoi* seemed to be used primarily to designate people whose intellectual adventures were influenced in some measure by Pythagoras and his school. **Plato**’s **dialogues** dramatically depict a range of activities that he calls “philosophy” and a range of methodologies that for him deserve the honorific term “philosophical.” **Aristotle** broadened the concept of philosophy to make it nearly synonymous with any attempt to gain knowledge (*epistēmē*) and understanding of the world (cf.

Metaphysics I.1). In the ancient world after Aristotle there were writers who distinguished various parts of philosophy, for example “natural philosophy” (i.e., natural **science**), “**ethics**,” and “logic” (*logikē*).

In the ancient world, philosophy had the reputation of encouraging independent thought, of following the argument wherever it would lead. Many ancient philosophers are depicted as unimpressed by money and power and disinclined to accept religious orthodoxies. When Christian thinkers argued that philosophy should be the handmaiden of theology, and enforced that idea with the weight of the government, philosophy went underground for a while, emerging when people became less persuaded by the theologians.

See also [ISOCRATES OF ATHENS](#); [POLITIKĒ](#); [PRÔTĒ PHILOSOPHIA](#); [SYMPOSIUM](#).

PHILOSTORGIUS

Φιλοστόργιος. (368–439 CE.) Christian church historian of the 4th and 5th centuries. He is included here because he includes some anecdotes about philosophers in his history. His *Church History*, ed. & tr. P. R. Amidon, S.J., 2007.

See also [TIMYCHA OF SPARTA](#).

PHILOSTRATUS, FLAVIUS

Φλόβιος Φιλόστρατος. (Early 3rd CE.) Author of the *Life of Apollonius of Tyana* and of *Lives of the Sophists*. Since his writings often read like fiction, scholars do not rely very heavily on them as a source of historical information. He was a part of the movement known as the Second Sophistic, a revival beginning in the 1st century CE and continuing throughout antiquity and into the **Byzantine** period, emphasizing rhetorical style. *Life of Apollonius* and *Lives of the Sophists* are available online.

See also [DAMIS](#); [RHĒTORIKĒ](#); [SOPHISTĒS](#), [SOPHISTAI](#); [SOPHISTIKĒ TECHNĒ](#).

PHINTIS

Φίντυς. (4th or 3rd BCE.) **Pythagorean. Stobaeus** (IV.23.11) preserves two extracts of her work on the correct behavior of **women**; nothing else is known about her. These fragments are available in translation online.

PHILIUS

Φλειοῦς. Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #355. Town in the mountains of the Argolid, southwest of **Corinth**, that served as a refuge for **Pythagorean** refugees from southern Italy. **Plato's Phaedo** is narrated to **Echecrates of Phlius**, presumably a Pythagorean, in this town; **Phanto** is another

Pythagorean of this time. **Axiothea**, one of the female students in Plato's **Academy**, came from Phlius. But not all the philosophers from Phlius were Pythagoreans—**Timon of Phlius** is a noted **Skeptic**, and **Asclepiades of Phlius** was co-founder of the **Eretrian school**.

PHŌNĒ

Φωνή. Sound. This word may be used of the sounds made by animals, or applied to vowels as distinguished from consonants. The **Stoics** distinguish the “sound” from the **lexis** and **lekton**. **Diogenes of Babylon** argues, according to **Galen**, that since the “sound” proceeds from the chest, and the sound acquires and carries meaning as language, the rational faculty must be located in the chest, not in the head.

PHORA

Φορά. From the verb φέρειν, *pherein*, “to carry,” **phora** means primarily the act of carrying or that which is carried. **Aristotle** intentionally defines the word as a very general term for local movement, **Physics** V.2, 226a33. As such, it is the primary form of **kinēsis** (*Phys.* VIII.7, 260a20ff.) and is either primarily in a straight line or in a circle (*Phys.* VIII.9, 265a14). The circular form of *phora* is especially typical of **astronomical** entities (**De Caelo** II.12, 292a14). For the four terrestrial elements (**stoicheia**)—earth, water, air, and fire—the natural *phora* is toward the element's natural location, and perhaps cyclical motion once arrived at the natural place.

PHOTIUS

Φώτιος. (c. 810–893). Patriarch of **Constantinople** from 858 to 867 and 877 to 886, Photius is regarded as perhaps the greatest scholar of 9th-century **Byzantium**. His most important work is the *Bibliotheca* (or *Myriobiblon*), a massive collection of classical Greek history and literature (*Myriobiblon* means 10,000 books). We mention him here because of his contribution to the preservation of classical culture. Most of the *Bibliotheca* is available online at Tertullian.org. Photius also had a rich and varied political and ecclesiastical life, beyond the scope of this dictionary.

PHRONĒSIS

Φρόνησις. Abstract noun based on φρονεῖν, *phronein*, to think, to have understanding, to be prudent. **Heraclitus** f. 2: “Although the **logos** is common, the many live as if they had a private *phronēsis*.” In the **Symposium**, **Socrates** says that the priestess **Diotima** told him that some people are pregnant in their souls with a *phronēsis* that enables them to order cities and households. Although the word appears often enough in

the broader sense of rational thought (cf. **Republic** VI, 505a), it most especially means “practical wisdom,” or the intellectual virtue of being able to organize one’s life, one’s home, one’s society, in the best possible way. The concept of *phronēsis* is fundamental for **Aristotle**’s ethical theory, since the definition of any ethical virtue is determined by the person who has *phronēsis*. The concept continues to function along these lines in later Greek ethical theory. See C. Natali, *The Wisdom of Aristotle*, 2001.

See also [SOPHOS](#), [SOPHOI](#), [SOPHIA](#); [THEŌRIA](#), [THEŌREIN](#).

PHRONIMOS

Φρόνιμος. The quality of having *phronesis*, as an adjective, or as a noun, a person who exhibits *phronesis*, has practical wisdom. **Aristotle** makes the *phronimos* the arbiter of ethical virtues in **Nicomachean Ethics** VI and VII. He also thinks that some animals can be *phronimoi* (e.g., **Parts of Animals** II.2, 648a4–11).

PHTARTIKOS

Φθαρτικός. Destructive, as vice is destructive of one’s ability to choose (**Nicomachean Ethics** VI.5, 1140b19).

PHTHARTOS

Φθαρτός. Destructible, as terrestrial entities are destructible while celestial entities are not, according to **Aristotle**, **Metaphysics** XII.1, 1069a31.

PHTHEIREIN

Φθείρειν. To destroy, to perish. Verb form of **phthora**. In **Generation and Corruption**, **Aristotle** examines how entities come into existence and perish; for example, at *GC* I.3, 318a25, he compares complete (*haplōs*) destruction with “not complete.”

PHTHISIS

Φθίσις. Wasting away, shrinking, atrophy. See, for example, **Aristotle**, **Physics** V.2, 226a31. Aristotle also applies this word to the “waning” of the moon, for example, at **History of Animals** VII.2, 582b1.

See also [AUXĒSIS](#).

PHTHORA

Φθορά. Destruction, the correlative of **genesis**. *Phthora* is change that involves the termination of the existence of an entity (**ousia**). See, for example, **Aristotle**, **Physics** III.1, 201a15.

PHYSICIAN

See [IATROS](#), [IATRIKĒ](#).

THE PHYSICS

(Treatise by **Aristotle**.) Φυσικὴ ἀκρόασις, *Phusike akroasis*. Latin, *Physica*. Abbr. *Phys*. Aristotle's eight-book account of the understanding of the natural world. In the first book he reviews opinions of his predecessors, including argument about why **Parmenides'** account of **being** is not a contribution to physics, and develops his concept of matter (*hylē*). In the second book he defines "nature" (*physis*), outlines the "four causes" (*aitia*), and defends his teleological understanding of the natural world, putting in their proper place the roles of chance (*tychē*) and necessity (*anankē*). Book III analyzes motion (*kinēsis*) and change in terms of potentiality and actuality (*dynamis* and *energeia*) and explores the idea of the indefinite or infinite (*apeiron*). Book IV looks at the necessary conditions of motion, place (*topos*), and time (*chronos*) and argues that it is not necessary to posit a void (*kenon*). Book V looks at change in terms of the categories of quantity, quality, place, and "substance" (*ousia*): growth, alteration, local movement, and coming into existence and passing away. Book VI addresses the problem of **Zeno's** paradoxes: if change or motion must go through an infinite number of intermediate stages, how can it ever be completed? Aristotle argues that time and place are not composed of discrete parts, so Zeno's arguments about motion have no basis. Book VII deals relatively briefly with his differences with **Plato's** theories about the origin of motion; Plato posits a mover that moves itself and other things, and Aristotle argues that the ultimate cause of change causes change in other things, but does not itself change. This theme is taken up at considerable length in book VIII, where the everlasting motion of the universe is explained by reference to the eternal unmoved mover. This theme is also explored in *Metaphysics* XII. See I. Bodnar, "Aristotle's Natural Philosophy," *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

PHYSIKOI, PHYSIOLOGOI

Φυσικοί, φυσιολόγοι. **Aristotle's** terms for his predecessors who concentrated on the study of nature (*physis*), primarily **Thales**, **Anaximander**, **Anaximenes**, **Empedocles**, **Anaxagoras**, **Leucippus**, and **Democritus**. Aristotle tends to consider these people material reductionists, as in *Metaphysics* I. In *Parts of Animals* I.1, 640b4–22, he enlarges that somewhat: he says that "the old philosophers who first studied *physis*" focused on the material principle, and how the universe is generated from that "under the influence of

what motion, whether strife or mind (**nous**) or love or chance” and animals and plants are explained the same way.

See also **COSMOS** (**KOSMOS**), **COSMOLOGY**; **MATTER**; **STOICHEION**, **STOICHEIA**.

PHYSIS; HISTORIA PERI PHYSEŌS

Φύσις, ἱστορία περὶ φύσεως. Nature; the study of nature.

Aristotle’s definition of “nature” is a good place to start:

“Source or cause of change or rest in that to which it belongs primarily” (**Physics** II.1). More elaborately: (1) the coming-to-be of growing things; (2) the principle of growth in the things that grow; (3) the source of change present in the thing in virtue of its **essence**, and the cause of the organic unity of living things; (4) the basic material of which anything is made (so the “nature” of the knife depends on the iron); and (5) the **ousia** of a natural thing (**Metaphysics** V.4).

It has been argued that one of the greatest contributions of ancient Greek civilization was the development of the concept of nature, a development that has had vast and permanent consequences for the history of human thought. In this entry, reference can be made only to one or two starting points for thinking about this issue. (For more on this theme, see G. Naddaf, *The Greek Concept of Nature*, 2005.)

In the *Odyssey*, the word *physis* occurs just once; Hermes tells Odysseus that he must know the *physis* of the plant *moly* so that he can use it to turn his crew back from pigs to people (10.303). **Heraclitus** says (f. 1) that although people do not understand his **logos**, he “distinguishes each thing according to its *physis* and says how it is.” He also says, “Nature loves to hide” (f. 123). Later Greek philosophers believed that essentially all the pre-Socratics were primarily concerned with “nature,” that their books could be described as *historia peri physeōs*.

Greek philosophers relate the concept of *physis* to several other leading concepts, notably **technē** and **nomos**. When *physis* is contrasted with *technē*, nature is whatever happens without human intervention; art is what happens *with* human intervention. Of course there is a possibility of *continuity* between art and nature: as Aristotle says in *Physics* II, art partially imitates nature, and partially completes what nature cannot finish.

When *physis* is contrasted with *nomos*, the nature in question is human nature without social intervention, and law or convention is the social intervention that supervenes on human nature. That way of looking at things tends to bracket

or elide discourse about divine intervention. But those who believe in divine intervention can readily use this vocabulary to bring it back in: nature can be seen as an expression of divine art and law.

Plato is a good example of a philosopher who takes the contrast between art and nature and breaks it down to the benefit of a more theological perspective. In the ***Phaedo***, at 96b, **Socrates** says that he was attracted to *historia periphyseōs*, investigation of nature, but was disappointed that those who pursued this study did not give teleological explanations. Although **Anaxagoras** posited a divine Mind (*nous*), he neglects to show how Mind planned things.

In ***Laws*** X.889a4ff., Plato gives a detailed account of the explanation on the basis of “nature and chance,” that the material elements (***stoicheia***) give rise to the sun, moon, stars, and earth, and that all the cosmological effects we see are simply the result of powers inhering in the material elements. Art, according to that account, is subsequent and inferior, the creation of mortals. Some arts that cooperate with nature, like medicine (***iatrikē***) and agriculture, have much to recommend them, but others, like government, have results that are “quite artificial.” That Plato does not agree with this view of nature does not detract from the fact that it was a remarkable intellectual construct with very significant consequences in later centuries. Plato points out in this passage that the naturalist philosophers essentially argued that the **gods** are human artifacts; as he continues in *Laws* X, he of course argues that the universe is the artifact of God, and ultimately human laws (*nomoi*) depend on divine law as well.

The **Stoic** philosophers took over this idea and developed it further. For them, God is totally present in all of nature, bringing about all natural processes; materially, God is ***pyr technikon***, “artisanal fire.” At the same time, natural laws and divine laws are identical and comprise both the laws of physics and the laws of morality and government, so *physis*, *technē*, and *nomos* are all contained within God. The battle lines were drawn.

See also ***AITION***, ***AITIA***; ***ARCHĒ***; ***EIDOS***, ***EIDĒ***; ***LUCRETIUS***; ***TELOS***.

PIETY

See ***ARETĒ***; ***HOSIOTĒS***.

PISTIS

Πίστις. Belief. Noun built on the verb *πείθω*, *peithō*,

“persuade.” *Pistis* is both the subjective state of having been persuaded, and the evidence that brings about that persuasion. In the **Sun-Line-Cave** passage in the *Republic*, *pistis* is the improved form of opinion (*doxa*) characterizing those who have broken the chains of ignorance and are no longer staring at the wall of the cave. In **Aristotle**, the word occurs most frequently in the context of talking about arguments and the state of having been persuaded by arguments. In religious contexts, *pistis* is religious faith, especially **Christian** faith, as in the Second Letter to the Corinthians 2.

PITHANOS

Πίθανος. Convincing, inspiring *pistis*. **Aristotle** closely relates this concept with that of *endoxa* (*Rhetoric* 1.2, 1356b27). **Chrysippus** distinguished “convincing” from “unconvincing” impressions. We do not believe everything we see, but up to a point, seeing is believing.

PLACE

See **TOPOS**.

PLATO OF ATHENS

(Πλάτων) (424/7–347 BCE.) His parents were Ariston and **Perictione**. Plato had two older brothers, Glaucon and **Adeimantus** (they are featured in the *Republic*), and a sister, Potone (the mother of **Speusippus**). After the death of Ariston, Perictione married Pyrilampes, with whom she had a son named **Antiphon** (he appears in the frame **dialogue** of the *Parmenides*). Pyrilampes brought to the marriage a son by a previous marriage, named Demos (mentioned in the *Gorgias* as the object of **Callicles**’ affection). It is well attested that Plato believed that his real father was the God Apollo.

According to **Diogenes Laertius**, the name “Plato” is in fact a nickname, meaning “broad” and dating back to his wrestling days, and his actual given name was “Aristocles” after his grandfather. The dating of his birth to 424 (by D. Nails) implies that he would not have served in the military during the Peloponnesian War, because he would have reached the age of 20 right at the end of the war. The traditional dating of his birth to 427 or even a year or two earlier would make it highly probable that Plato *did* serve in the military just at the end of the war.

On the Nails dating, Plato would have been 25 at the death of **Socrates**; according to Diogenes Laertius, Plato then associated with **Cratylus**, an enthusiast of **Heracclitus**, and **Hermogenes**, an enthusiast of **Parmenides**. Diogenes says

that after the death of Socrates, Plato left with other followers of Socrates for **Megara** where he visited **Euclides**. In the next few years he seems to have traveled, including possibly to **Egypt**. In 384/3, he, along with other intellectuals, was invited by Dionysius I to visit **Syracuse**. This would be an indication that he had written some of his dialogues by that time, and that they had been noticed, a reasonable assumption. While in Sicily, Plato became friendly with Dion, a member of the royal family.

This visit to Syracuse ended badly, with Dionysius reportedly selling Plato into slavery for 20 minas. Plato was, according to the story, purchased by **Anniceris of Cyrene**, who set him free and bought for Plato a garden in the vicinity of the **Academy**, enabling him to establish his school.

Dionysius I died in 367; on receiving the news, Plato left for another visit to Syracuse, where Dionysius II was now in power. When Dionysius II and Dion had a falling out, Plato returned to **Athens**. In 361, Plato returned to Syracuse for a third time and was virtually imprisoned by Dionysius, escaping only with the help of **Archytas**. From that time on it appears that Plato focused on philosophical discussions in the Academy and writing his dialogues.

Fitting the composition of his dialogues into this biography is a somewhat complex exercise. Plato's dialogues fall fairly naturally into three groups, arguably roughly chronological. The first group of dialogues have Socrates as their major character, regularly presented as challenging beliefs held by his interlocutors by asking them to state clearly and unambiguously what those beliefs are. While some of the people with whom Socrates is talking could be called "experts" in some sense, none, with the exception of a **Sophist** or two, has any philosophical sophistication. Most often, the beliefs in question are, roughly speaking, moral in character, and the questions with which his interlocutors have most trouble are demands for a definition of a key term, or some other explication of a key term. In this group of dialogues there is usually no agreed-upon solution to the problem discussed, although some progress in understanding has been made. No one, including Socrates, seems to have a definitive answer to the crucial issues Socrates has posed. Some dialogues that fit this model would be the **Euthyphro**, the **Laches**, the **Lysis**, the **Charmides**, the **Ion**, the **Euthydemus**, and to some extent the **Protagoras**.

A second group of dialogues has many of those

characteristics, but in addition, Socrates is presented as confidently presenting a fair amount of positive doctrine, and some of the people with whom he is speaking have some philosophical sophistication. The **Gorgias** has Socrates talking with a very able Sophist and two of his more clever students, and Socrates does present some positive doctrine. In the **Meno**, Socrates' major interlocutor is philosophically relatively naïve, but Socrates does present a version of the doctrine of **anamnēsis** and by implication at least a version of the theory of Forms (**eidē**). In the **Phaedo**, Socrates argues for the immortality of the soul (**psychē**) and for an ontological and epistemological scheme within which immortality makes sense; his major interlocutors are two students of the Pythagorean teacher **Philolaus**. In the **Republic**, Socrates' major interlocutor in the first book is a fairly clever Sophist, and in the rest of the book Plato's older brothers, both fairly alert philosophically. Socrates outlines a theory of justice in the state and in the individual, and in the **Sun-Line-Cave** passage locates that theory within an ontological-epistemological system. In the **Symposium** and **Phaedrus**, Socrates presents two versions of a theory of love (**erōs**) that fit his moral psychology into the larger ontological scheme, whatever we may say about the other participants.

The third group of dialogues is unified primarily by the fact that, unlike the dialogues in groups 1 and 2, they seem to emanate from an environment with a strong emphasis on highly technical discussions of philosophical issues. Socrates is not always the protagonist; the lead is sometimes taken by others. The **Theaetetus**, the **Cratylus**, and the **Philebus** do have Socrates as a principal leader of the discussion, but the topics are rather technical, and at least some of the people in these dialogues are philosophically quite sophisticated. In the **Parmenides**, we see a young Socrates getting a lesson in how to do **dialectical** argument from Parmenides, and we get a very technical lesson in what kind of theory of Forms might work, and what kind not. In the **Sophist** and **Statesman**, we have a visitor from **Elea** taking on the lead role in the argument; in the **Timaeus**, a Sicilian **Pythagorean** presents a detailed **cosmological** theory, followed in the incomplete **Critias** by a description of the lost island of **Atlantis**. Finally, the **Laws**, Plato's longest dialogue, has as its protagonist an "Athenian Stranger," clearly not Socrates, perhaps a stand-in for Plato himself. It is a discussion between three well-informed individuals about the possible legislation for an ideal

state.

Plato wrote these dialogues over a period of about 50 years; he traveled out of Athens several times, especially to Sicily, and between trips to Sicily established his philosophical school, the Academy. We can reasonably suppose that Plato's ideas developed and perhaps even changed over that half century; historians of philosophy have often attempted to trace those developments, importantly assisted by philological investigations that provide evidence of changes in Plato's writing style. At the same time, there is a strong tradition that assumes the unity of Plato's thought. Certainly the ancient **Platonists** believed that Plato always was putting forward the same message.

What message is that? If we focus on the medium, the philosophical dialogue, and ask ourselves, what is the message of this medium, we may respond that it entices us into engaging in philosophical discussion, not necessarily predetermining the outcome of that discussion. Socrates is a philosophical role model, represented by Plato for imitation and admiration.

But the dialogues include many positive philosophical assertions, positions defended, systematic points made. Scattered through the present dictionary, one may find a good many of those positions and arguments; here are a few of the most salient:

- Plato's Socrates famously defends the thesis that the true objects of knowledge (*epistēmē*) are "Forms" (*eidē*) or "ideas" (*ideai*). Things in the phenomenal world are knowable only inasmuch as they "imitate" or "participate in" the Forms. The Forms are true reality and make language meaningful.
- Knowledge of the Forms is gained through dialectic. The precise description of the dialectical method varies somewhat from dialogue to dialogue, but it is primarily *critical*; **hypotheses** are tested, and the presumption is that the true hypothesis will remain standing.
- While the theory of Forms is in principle completely general, Plato's Socrates is mainly interested in gaining knowledge of virtues and values. What is courage? Temperance? Justice? **Friendship**? Love?
- In some dialogues, notably *Meno*, *Phaedo*, and *Phaedrus*, Plato presents a theory that knowledge of the Forms is innate, and that learning is a matter of recollecting the Forms (*anamnēsis*).

- **Aristotle** says that Plato “in most respects” followed the Pythagoreans (*Metaphysics* I.8). Plato surely followed the Pythagorean lead in accepting the idea of **transmigration** of the soul; his frequently repeated reliance on mathematical categories is also strongly similar to Pythagorean speculation in the period—this is especially true of the *Timaeus*. And the Pythagoreans seemed to favor elitist political arrangements, something we see in detail in Plato’s *Republic*.

In a sense, Plato’s dialogues provide an ostensive definition of the word “philosophy” by demonstrating how it is done, and by asking the questions that count as philosophical. See R. Kraut, “Plato,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

See also [DOULOS](#), [DOULEIA](#); [METHESIS](#); [MIMĒSIS](#).

PLATONISM, PLATONIST

Platonism is the philosophy of **Plato**; a Platonist is a follower of the teachings of Plato. Those formally associated with his school are called **Academics**; many philosophers (and others) not directly associated with the school in **Athens** are known as Platonists—today, Platonists from the time of **Antiochus of Ascalon** (90 BCE) to **Numenius** (160 CE) are generally thought of as “**middle Platonists**,” while those working in the period from **Ammonius Saccas** (175–242 CE) and **Plotinus** (204–270 CE) until the end of the ancient tradition are called **Neoplatonists**.

In a more general sense, people who believe in the existence of abstract objects independently of either the physical world or minds are called Platonists. See M. Balaguer, “Platonism in Metaphysics,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

PLEASURE

See [HĒDONĒ](#), [HĒDYN](#).

PLEONEXIA

Πλεονεξία. Getting more than one’s fair share. As **Aristotle** puts it in *Nicomachean Ethics* V, there are two ways of being unjust: one is to get more than one’s fair share, and the other is to disobey the law. Obviously the two need not coincide. Cf. **Plato**’s *Gorgias* 483c, where Callicles is in favor of *pleonexia*, for himself anyway.

See also [DIKĒ](#), [DIKAIOS](#), [DIKAIOSYNĒ](#).

PLĒTHOS

Πλῆθος. Plurality, large number, quantity, magnitude. In **Plato**, there is a dialectic between the One (**to Hen**) and the many (*plēthos*) (especially in *Philebus* and *Parmenides*).

Since *to plēthos* also means “most people,” **Plato** also contrasts the wisdom of the few and the ignorance of the many. **Aristotle** defines *plēthos* as that which is divisible into non-continuous parts (***Metaphysics*** V.13). *Plēthos* followed by a plural genitive would often be translated, especially in Aristotle, as “a lot of . . .,” as in ***History of Animals*** IV.8, 534b13, where he talks of “four classes which include *a lot of* the other animals.” In the ***Politics***, rule by *to plēthos* is “democracy.”

PLINY THE ELDER

Gaius Plinius Secundus (23–79 CE). Distinguished Roman, naturalist, and author of *Natural History*, available online on Lacus Curtius.

PLINY THE YOUNGER

Gaius Plinius Caecilius Secundus (61–112 CE), nephew of Pliny the Elder, author of many interesting letters, available in English on Project Gutenberg.

PLOTINUS

Πλωτῖνος. (204–270 CE.) Plotinus was born in Lycopolis, **Egypt**; he studied with **Ammonius Saccas** in **Alexandria**. Encouraged by Ammonius, Plotinus, at the age of 28, joined a campaign led by the emperor Gordian III aimed at conquering the Persians and perhaps continuing to **India**. Gordian was assassinated in Mesopotamia, and Plotinus went to **Rome** and proceeded to teach philosophy there for the rest of his life. In 263 **Porphyry** joined Plotinus in Rome and proceeded to gather and edit into topical units Plotinus’ writings in the work we know as the ***Enneads***. Porphyry also wrote an account of the order in which Plotinus wrote these things, not at all the order in which they are included in the *Enneads*.

Plotinus’ *Enneads* are taken as the fundamental and inaugural statement of the philosophical movement that is today called **Neoplatonism**. At the center of his philosophy is the idea of an ineffable and transcendent One (***Hen***), self-aware and the source of all **being**. All differentiated beings, all pluralities, emanate from this One. Our individual soul (***psychē***), ultimately derived from the One, yearns to rejoin the One. The natural world too, what we call the material world, is ultimately derived from the One; as the material universe shows forth the glory of **God**, so our bodies are revelations of our souls. And as our minds contemplate the Forms (***eidē***), they become united with the Mind (***nous***) of the universe, in which those Forms have their being and reality. See L. Gerson, “Plotinus,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

Lycopolis is in the Nile Delta, 31°5'N 30°57'E.
See also *PHYSIS*; *HISTORIA PERI PHYSEŌS*.

PLURALITY

See *PLĒTHOS*.

PLUTARCH OF ATHENS

Πλούταρχος. (d. 432 CE.) He seems to have studied with the successors of **Iamblichus** in **Apamea** (Syria); he reestablished the Platonic school in **Athens**. Plutarch was the teacher of **Hierocles of Alexandria**, **Syrianus**, and **Proclus**. His commentaries on works of **Plato** and **Aristotle** are lost, but he influenced extant commentaries by **Philoponus** and others.

PLUTARCH OF CHAERONEA

(c. 45–125 CE.) **Platonist** (“middle Platonist”). He studied in **Athens** with a man named Ammonius, and he became a priest at **Delphi**. Plutarch is the author of many extant works: perhaps best known is his *Parallel Lives*, a literary-historical work pairing eminent Greek and Roman figures. Most of the remainder of his extant works are gathered under the general title of *Moralia* and include over 70 **dialogues** and essays, available in 15 volumes in the Loeb edition. In ethical matters, Plutarch tends to follow **Aristotle**, assuming that Plato and Aristotle have no conflicts in this area of investigation. Plutarch tends to be more dualist than many Platonists, influenced perhaps by Persian religion. His account of **Egyptian** religion, in *On Isis and Osiris*, is also strikingly dualistic. See J. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists*, 1996.

Chaeronea is a town in **Boeotia**, north of **Athens**, 38°31'N 22°51'E, Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #201. It was the site of a decisive battle in 338 BCE, giving Philip II of **Macedon** control of Athens and **Thebes**.

PNEUMA

Πνεῦμα. Literally, “breath” or “wind”; eventually, “spirit.” Already in the **pre-Socratic** period the word was used with a range of meanings from a synonym for air, to breathed air, to the winds, to soul (*psychē*). **Anaximenes** says, “As our soul being air holds us together, so air and breath encompass the whole universe” (f. 2). **Aristotle** says that the **Pythagoreans** believed that the universe breathes in empty space from the infinite (*apeiron*) “like taking a breath” (*Physics* IV.6, 213b25). **Plato** was content to ridicule the idea that the soul is a material thing like breath, for example in the *Phaedo* (77e): “You seem to have this childish fear that the wind will dissolve and scatter the soul as it leaves the body, especially if one

happens to die on a windy day and not in calm weather.”

While Aristotle hardly mentions *pneuma* in the ***De Anima***, in ***Generation of Animals***, ***Movement of Animals***, and some of the ***Parva Naturalia*** it is an important part of his biological explanations of life functions. In *GA* II, *pneuma* in semen carries the information about form from the male parent to the female contribution to generation, whether egg or menstrual fluid. In *Movement of Animals*, *pneuma* carries information from the sense organs to the central governing part, and back again to the parts involved in moving the animal from place to place. At the end of *GA* (V.8) Aristotle says, “It is reasonable that nature should perform most of her operations using *pneuma* as a tool, for as the hammer and anvil in the art of the smith, so *pneuma* in the things formed by nature.”

In **Stoic** philosophy, *pneuma* is the material basis for the pervasive presence of the divine Mind (***nous***). Physically, *pneuma* assures the coherence of individual bodies, not only of living things, but even of logs and rocks; because it is omnipresent in the world, it assures the **unity** and coherence of the entire **cosmos**. Since the Stoics were materialists, it was crucial that they find an appropriately talented material that would assist them in carrying out their project.

Others, notably **Platonists** like Philo, seem to have dematerialized *pneuma*, a trend that we definitely see in the New Testament, where it is used of a presumably immaterial soul (especially in the Pauline epistles). The **Christian** Holy Spirit is, in Greek, the *Pneuma Hagion*. **Basil of Caesarea** wrote the definitive defense of the divinity of the *Pneuma Hagion* in the 4th century.

See also [AĒR](#); [AITHĒR](#); [PHYSIS](#); [HISTORIA PERI PHYSEŌS](#); [WORLD SOUL](#).

THE POETICS

(Treatise by **Aristotle**.) Περὶ ποιητικῆς. Latin, *De Poetica*. Abbr. *Poet*. The *Poetics* and the ***Rhetoric*** comprise Aristotle’s aesthetic theory, or more precisely, his theory of literature. In the ***Physics*** (II.8, 199a15) he says that art partially imitates nature, and partially completes what nature cannot finish. In the *Poetics* he begins with a discussion of what poetry imitates, and how. Distinguishing tragedy from epic and comedy, he focuses on the effective construction of tragedies: plot, characters, diction, thought, spectacle, and melody (1450a10). Appropriate construction of plot is most important for him, and then characters. “Thought” is obviously important, and inextricable from plot and character. He does have some

comments on “diction” and very little to say about “spectacle” and “melody.” Some key terms that appear in the *Poetics* are **mimesis**, **catharsis** (**katharsis**), **hamartia**, **mythos**, **ēthos**, **dianoia**, **lexis**, **melos**, and **opsis**. These are discussed elsewhere in this dictionary. See A. Rorty, ed., *Essays on Aristotle's Poetics*, 1992.

POETRY

Before the time of **Thales** and **Anaximander**, we have little evidence of Greeks writing prose texts. **Homer** and **Hesiod**, Sappho, Alcaeus, Archilochus, and **Solon** composed whatever works are preserved in poetic meter and diction. Of the earliest philosophers, some wrote in established poetic styles: **Xenophanes** was primarily a poet, and a philosopher to the extent that some of his poems took up philosophical themes; **Parmenides** presented his revolutionary philosophical position in epic meter and diction, though some complain that the poem is not very poetical; **Empedocles** had a significant mastery of the poetic style while presenting a coherent philosophical position that included **cosmology**, physics, biology, psychology, and much else besides. At the same time, the philosophical tradition early demonstrates some ambivalence about poetry: **Heraclitus** says that Homer and Archilochus deserve to be whipped (f. 42); Hesiod, **Pythagoras**, Xenophanes, and **Hecataeus** (of **Miletus**) are grouped as ignorant polymaths (f. 40).

The normal education of ancient Greeks in the 5th century BCE included the memorization of a good bit of poetry—extensive passages of Homer, Hesiod, the lyric poets, Pindar, and the dramatists such as Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides, for a start. Although only professionals like Ion (see **Plato's Ion**) were able to recite entire epics, many in their audience would have been able to sing along, more than can today sing “Un Bel Di” along with Butterfly or “Si, Mi Chiamo Mimi” along with Mimi. The **Sophists** reasonably took advantage of that shared education to further their own goals; we see **Gorgias** writing rhetorical defenses of Helen of Troy and of Palamedes, and **Protagoras**, as represented by Plato, not only recruiting the classical poets into the genealogy of the Sophistic tradition, but challenging **Socrates** to outdo him in the interpretation of a morally charged poem by **Simonides**.

Socrates, Plato, and **Aristotle** all exhibited a somewhat ambivalent attitude toward the Greek poetical tradition as they knew it. Plato represents Socrates shredding the performance artist *Ion*, mainly because Ion appears to claim that if you

know Homer's poems, you know everything worth knowing, because Homer knew everything worth knowing and put it in his poems. In the **Protagoras**, after amply demonstrating that he knows Simonides better and can interpret him better than Protagoras can, Socrates notoriously remarks (in the Lombardo-Bell translation), "Discussing poetry strikes me as no different from the second-rate drinking parties of the agora crowd. . . . (Our group) should require no extraneous voices, not even of poets" (347c). Still, Socrates, in both Plato and **Xenophon**, frequently quotes poets (especially Homer!) in support of his assertions.

Plato's attack on "the poets" in the **Republic** is justly famous not only for the energy put into it, but also for the level of detail, seeming to leave little that the poets of **Kallipolis** could write about. Nevertheless, in the *Republic* Socrates concludes "that education in music and poetry is most important . . . because rhythm and harmony permeate the inner part of the soul more than anything else" (401d). Again, in the **Phaedrus**, the great speech of Socrates on the nature of **erōs** is called a "palinode" after the manner of Stesichorus, and while it is not in poetic meter, it is certainly "poetic."

Aristotle wrote a book, *Poetics*, that attempts to tell how to write a successful tragedy, after the manner of Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides. Along the way he provides some comments on epic poetry as well. Throughout his works he occasionally quotes from various poets; sometimes he is amused by poets—for example at **Nicomachean Ethics** IX.7, 1168a2, he notes that poets are sometimes excessively fond of their poems, like parents of children.

In regard to the **Stoics**, we may note that **Cleanthes**, the second leader of the Stoic school, wrote a justly famous *Hymn to Zeus*, and that **Chrysippus** persistently supported his arguments with "proof texts" drawn from the poets.

Finally, **Lucretius**, the Roman **Epicurean**, presented the definitive account of that philosophy in the great poem *De Rerum Natura*, perhaps returning to the tradition of Empedocles.

A classic study of the early relationships between poetry and philosophy is H. Fränkel, 1975.

See also **EPIGRAMMA**; **ION**; **MOUSIKĒ, TA MOUSIKA. POIEIN, POIĒSIS, POIĒTIKĒ**

Ποιεῖν, ποιήσις, ποιητική. *Poiein* means "to make or do"; *poiēsis* is the abstract noun built on this verb: "making, production"; *poiētikē* is the adjective based on the abstract

noun: “productive.” A *poiētēs* (ποιητής) is a person who makes something; a *poiēma* (ποίημα) is the object made. **Plato** talks about the *poiētēs* of a bed in **Republic** X, and of the **Demiourgos** as the *poiētēs* of the universe in **Timaeus** 28c, but generally *poiētēs* and *poiēma* refer to literary productions.

The verb *poiein* and some of the forms based on the verb are used in much more general senses philosophically, however. *Poiein* is contrasted with ***paschein*** to distinguish “active” and “passive”—these are two of Aristotle’s categories, essentially the categories for verbs. But on the active side of that distinction there is a further division between *poiein* and *prattein*, between “making” and “doing”—as Aristotle sees it, *poiēsis* has as its goal a product, while in the case of *praxis* the activity itself is the goal.

Something or someone is *poiētikos* if it (he, she) is “productive” of something. Thus Aristotle uses this word to pick out (some cases of) the “cause” that he also calls the “source of change.”

See also [KATĒGORIAI](#); [POETRY](#).

POINT

See [STIGMĒ](#).

POION

Ποῖον. “Of what sort.” *Poion* is used by **Aristotle** as the name of one of the categories (***Categories*** 8b–11a), the one we call “quality” in English. “Quality” is really the Ciceronian translation of the abstract noun built on *poion*, that is, *poiotes*, possibly introduced by **Plato** in the ***Theaetetus*** 182a.

See also [KATĒGORIAI](#).

POIOTĒS

Ποιότης. Quality. **Plato**, ***Theaetetus*** 182a, picked up by **Aristotle**, ***Categories*** 8b25ff.; ***Physics*** I.2, 185a34; ***Metaphysics*** V.21, 1022b15; and elsewhere.

POLEMARCHUS

Πολέμαρχος. (d. 404 BCE.) **Plato**’s ***Republic*** is set in his home in the Piraeus. He had inherited the shield-making factory set up by his father, Cephalus of **Syracuse**; his brother **Lysias** was a famous speechwriter. The 30 Tyrants executed him (Lysias escaped). In the ***Republic***, Polemarchus defends the thesis that justice is benefiting one’s friends and harming one’s enemies, a thesis that **Socrates** works on until Polemarchus agrees that one should never harm anyone but always benefit people. At ***Phaedrus*** 257b, Socrates says that Polemarchus was converted to philosophy, unlike his brother Lysias.

The Piraeus is the port of Athens.

POLEMON

Πολέμων. (c. 350–266/5 BCE.) **Scholarch** of the **Academy** from 315/4. Student of **Xenocrates**. During the half century that Polemon was Scholarch, the Academy moved away from the metaphysical speculations that had characterized the Academy of **Speusippus** and Xenocrates and toward more emphasis on moral issues. Academic **Skepticism** developed during this period, led by fellow Academics **Crantor** and **Crates**. **Zeno of Citium**, founder of the **Stoic** school, studied in the Academy during this period, as did **Arcesilaus**. Crates was his successor as Scholarch. (**Diogenes Laertius** IV.16–20.) See J. Dillon, *The Heirs of Plato*, 2003.

See also [SKEPTIKOS](#).

POLEMON OF ATHENS

(2nd BCE.) **Stoic** and geographer. A follower of **Panaetius**, Polemon traveled widely, putting together *On the Inscriptions to be Found in the Cities*. **Athenaeus** frequently quotes him on descriptions of places in Greece and of works of art and monuments, e.g., VI.234; X.435d, 442e.

POLEMON OF LAODICEA

Marcus Antonius Polemon. Μάρκος Ἀντώνιος Πολέμων. (c. 90–144 CE.) **Sophist**. Favored by the emperors Trajan, Hadrian, and Antoninus Pius, he directed a school of rhetoric in **Smyrna**. His *epitaphioi*, or commemorative speeches, on Callimachus and Cynaegirus, who died at the Battle of Marathon in 490 BCE, survive. A treatise on physiognomy is preserved in an Arabic translation; it has been translated into Latin. See M. W. Gleason, *Making Men*, 1995.

See also [LAODICEA](#); [RHĒTORIKĒ](#).

POLIS

Πόλις. City, state. One aspect of the classical *polis* that is easily forgotten by modern people is that the normal *polis* was a *walled* city. That has a lot to do with what people thought about the normal *size* of a *polis*. The Greek-speaking world included many *poleis*; while the size of these *poleis* varied considerably, Attica, at a population of perhaps 200,000, would have to be counted among the largest. The political theories of both **Plato** (both **Republic** and **Laws**) and **Aristotle** assumed unquestioningly that political units of that size (or rather smaller) were good and right and natural. Yet they were well aware that the Greeks had fought off the Persians by uniting into a larger confederacy and that

confederacy was succeeded by the Delian League, ultimately dominated by the Athenians and opposed by a confederacy led by the Spartans. They also knew about the empire of the Persians, of course, and the **Macedonian** kingdom, and Aristotle, especially, witnessed in the course of his lifetime the expansion of Macedonia to an empire greater than the world had ever seen.

Why did they cling to a model that could not survive? Of course many cities continued to have walls, and there was thereby a local identity. For Aristotle at least, the answer must also include the idea that the traditional *polis* offered the opportunity for a significant percentage of the citizens to have direct participation in real political decision making. While the Hellenistic kingdoms often left local affairs to the traditional local decision-making bodies, no one was fooled. Independence was gone, even if the rulers allowed some of the *poleis* to keep their walls and local self-governance.

But Hellenistic philosophers adjusted, one way or another. **Epicureans** simply avoided public life entirely, on the ground that it was more likely to be painful than pleasurable. **Stoics**, however, were willing to accept whatever responsibilities might come to them. From their perspective, the wise person is a “citizen of the universe,” *kosmopolitēs* (SVF III.82). For the wise person, there are no walls. See M. H. Hansen, *Polis*, 2006.

POLITEIA

Πολιτεία. The citizens of a *polis*, taken as a group. The system of government of a *polis*. The name of **Plato's Republic** is, in Greek, Ἡ Πολιτεία. Plato distinguishes in *Rep.* VIII several possible *politeiai*: his ideal system, which he here calls an “aristocracy”; a city where there is competition for honors, a “timocracy”; a city ruled by the wealthy, the “oligarchy”; a city ruled by the mob, the “democracy”; and the worst form, “tyranny,” which properly speaking is not a *politeia* at all. **Aristotle** based his political theory on a collection of about 158 *politeiai*, that is, descriptions of the systems of government across the known world. One of those descriptions survives, the **Athēnaiōn Politeia**. In his **Politics**, he summarizes the forms of government as fundamentally six varieties: good and bad rule by one, few, or many; the good forms rule for the sake of the *polis*, the bad forms for one's own benefit. In *Pol.* IV.2, 1293b2, he applies the word *politeia* to an ideal form of government in which there is a balance between the wealthy and the many; in this sense *politeia* is

often translated “constitutional government.” No matter the form of government, in normal usage *politeia* means the citizenry of the *polis*.

POLITĒS

Πολίτης. Citizen, defined by **Aristotle** in ***Politics*** III.1 as a person who participates in deliberation and judgment in the ***polis***. In common parlance, a free person descended from persons considered to be citizens of the *polis*. Thus, members of the citizen class who did not actually participate in government (young boys, women, old men, people who fell below the income level set for participation in a given *polis*) would still be *politai*. If one needed to make a distinction, the general term was *astos/astē*, anyone who “belonged” to a particular ***asty*** (urban area). A *politēs* is clearly distinguished from a slave (***doulos***), a “metic” (***metoichos***), and a foreigner (***xenos***). See A. Preus in *Skepsis* 16, no. 1 (2005): 150–163.

POLITICS

See **POLITIKĒ**.

THE POLITICS

(Treatise by **Aristotle**.) Πολιτικά. Latin, *Politica*. Abbr. *Pol*. Following on the ***Nicomachean Ethics***, the *Politics* explores the possibility of a happy ***polis***. For Aristotle, the *polis* is a natural entity composed of households; thus the first book explores the nature of the household, especially including a defense of natural slavery and the basis of economics. In the second book Aristotle critiques earlier proposals for the ideal state, especially **Plato's *Republic*** and ***Laws***, as well as some polities often thought to be worth imitation, for example those of **Sparta**, **Crete**, and **Carthage**. Book III is the heart of the work, defining “citizen” (*politēs*) and outlining the types of government that guide Aristotle’s discussion throughout the work—democracy, **oligarchy**, and monarchy, and their positive and negative variations. This latter theme is explored in more detail in book IV. Book V explores changes in the system of government (***stasis***), and VI the ways that changes in government may be avoided. Book VII is a beginning of a discussion of an ideal *polis*, the *polis* that Aristotle hopes will achieve ***eudaimonia*** for itself and its citizens. Book VIII, sometimes printed as part of book VII, explores the early education, especially musical education, of the children of citizens in the ideal state. The work is clearly incomplete, since the remainder of the educational process (at least) is missing. See F. Miller, “Aristotle’s Political Theory,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

See also *DĒMOKRATIA*; *MOUSIKĒ*; *TA MOUSIKA*; *PAIDEIA*.

POLITICUS

Dialogue by **Plato**. See *THE STATESMAN*.

POLITIKĒ

Πολιτική. Political theory and the “art” of politics. In **Plato**, the art of justice; in the ***Republic*** (*Politeia* in Greek), **Socrates** expresses the hope that *politikē* and *philosophia* would coincide and become identical. In the ***Statesman*** (*Politikos* in Greek), *politikē* is characterized as the art of weaving together those who have courage with those who have temperate natures for the happier life of all.

As **Aristotle** puts it, *politikē* aims at the highest goods achievable by action (***Nicomachean Ethics*** I.2, 1095a15). For him, all *praxis* is subsumed under the “political art.” His book, the ***Politics***, brings together empirical investigation of existing states and a theory of the possible structure of civil society. For Aristotle, the basic unit of the *polis* is the family or household, not only because it is the locus for procreation and thus continuity, but also because, in Aristotle’s world, the household was the primary location for the production of goods. Families are located in a complex web of social relationships, or “friendships” (*philiai*), which jointly form the community (*koinōnia*) in which the family is located. For Aristotle, the human being is a *zoon politikon*, an animal whose nature it is to live in a *polis*; human language has as its primary function making possible the social interactions that form the community and state.

In the time of Plato and Aristotle the philosophical schools seem to have had the production of political leaders as one of their major functions. This function continued to operate to some degree even in the Hellenistic period as the structure of government became more imperial. For example, **Demetrius of Phaleron**, a student of Aristotle and **Theophrastus**, became the governor of **Athens** under the **Macedonians** for a period of time.

Eventually the **Stoic** philosophy was adopted by many Roman leaders—**Cicero**, **Seneca**, and **Marcus Aurelius** for three especially notable examples—and became one of the cornerstones of Roman law and thus for Western political theory. Also in the Eastern Roman Empire, philosophers sometimes influenced public policy: we note that the emperor **Julian** (the Apostate) was philosophically trained and tended to have philosophers around him.

See also [DIKĒ](#), [DIKAIOS](#), [DIKAIOSYNĒ](#).

POLITIKOS

Πολιτικός. As an adjective, “living in a **polis**” or “suitable for living in a **polis**.” As a noun, “politician” or “statesman.” It is the Greek name of a dialogue of **Plato**, the **Statesman**.

POLUS OF ACRAGAS

Πῶλος. (5th BCE.) Teacher of oratory, he appears in several **dialogues** of **Plato** and is also referred to by **Aristotle**. A student of **Gorgias**, he takes over the discussion with **Socrates** in the **Gorgias** from his teacher. Polus thinks that rhetoric gives its practitioner power to do what he wants; Socrates insists that real power comes from acting justly. In the **Phaedrus** (267b) he is said to have invented some technical terms, probably in his *Art of Rhetoric* (see *Theages* 127–128). **Aristotle** quotes him, “Experience made art, but inexperience luck” (*Metaphysics* I.1, 981a4). **Stobaeus** has several fragments of his works.

See also [ACRAGAS](#); [RHĒTORIKĒ](#).

POLYAENUS OF LAMPSACUS

Πολύαινος Λαμψακηνός. (d. 278/7 BCE.) Co-founder of the **Epicurean** school. Having been a mathematician prior to his conversion to Epicureanism, he wrote, among other things, works critical of standard **mathematics**, though, some members of the school seem to have thought, not critical enough.

See also [LAMPSACUS](#).

POLYSTRATUS

(d. 219/18 BCE.) **Epicurean**, **Scholarch** after **Hermarchus**, c. 250 BCE. He was succeeded by **Dionysius of Lamptraí**. Fragments of his works have been found in the charred scrolls at Herculaneum (*PHerc.* 336/1150; *PHerc.* 1520).

PONOS

Πόνος. Hard work, toil, pain from working. In **Plato**’s **Phaedrus** 247b5, the horses pulling the chariot of the soul have **ponos**. **Aristotle**, in the **Politics** VIII.4, says that children should not be given exercises that involve **ponos** when they are young—the Spartans err in that respect—but when they are in their late teens it is acceptable. Adults need to trade off **ponos** with their bodies versus their minds—you can’t do both at the same time.

PORPHYRY OF TYRE

Πορφύριος. (234–c. 305 CE.) A **Neoplatonist**, educated by **Longinus**, he joined **Plotinus** in Rome; he edited and

published Plotinus' **Enneads** and wrote a biography of Plotinus. Of his popular works, his *Life of Pythagoras*, *To Marcella* (his wife), *The Cave of the Nymphs* (about **Homer**), and *On Abstinence from Animal Food* survive. His *Introduction to Aristotle's Categories (Isagoge)* had wide influence. His *Starting Points Leading to the Intelligibles* is intended to be an accessible introduction to some of the central issues in Neoplatonic thought. There are also fragments of his critique of **Christianity**, *Against the Christians*, and fragments of a commentary on the **Parmenides**.

A number of his writings were translated into Latin and thus influenced the course of philosophy in the Latin West. Also, he seems to have taught in Rome or somewhere in Italy after the death of Plotinus, and his students established a Latin Platonist tradition, starting with **Victorinus** and continuing with **Augustine**. See E. Emilsson, "Porphyry," *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

See also [TYRE](#).

PŌS ECHEIN (PŌS ECHŌN), PŌS ECHEIN PROS TI (PŌS ECHŌN PROS TI)

Πῶς ἔχειν (πῶς ἔχων), πῶς ἔχειν πρὸς τί. Two of the four **Stoic** categories, "how disposed," and "how disposed in relation to something."

See also [ECHEIN](#); [HEXIS](#); [KATĒGORIAI](#).

POSIDONIUS OF APAMEA; POSEIDONIOS

Ποσειδώνιος. (c. 135–51 BCE.) Posidonius was a **Stoic** philosopher from Syria. He studied with **Panaetius** in **Athens** and traveled widely through the Roman world and beyond before establishing a school in **Rhodes**. He was a prolific writer of scientific and literary works, which survive only in fragments today. His geographic and ethnographic writings gained him attention in the Roman world, and he attempted to improve the measurements of the size of the **earth**, moon, and sun, and the distances from earth to moon and sun. In addition, he extended the history written by Polybius to include the years 146–88 BCE. Philosophically, he is regarded as an **eclectic** Stoic, integrating Platonic and Aristotelian concepts into a fundamentally Stoic system. Posidonius' fragments have been edited and published by Edelstein and Kidd, 1988–1989.

See also [APAMEA](#).

POSITION

One of **Aristotle's** "categories" (*katēgoriai*) or types of predicates; a paradigmatic example would be "So and so is *sitting*."

See also [THE CATEGORIES](#); [KEISTHAI](#); [THESIS](#).

POSON

Πόσον. Literally, “how much,” used by **Aristotle** as the name of one of the categories (*katēgoriaī*) or predicates (***Categories*** 4a–6b), the one we call “quantity.” Paradigmatic examples would include the height and **weight** of a person.

POSSESSION

An English name of one of **Aristotle**’s categories (*katēgoriaī*) called **echein**. **Hexis** is the noun formed on this verb. A paradigmatic example of this category would be that a certain person is *wearing a hat*.

See also [THE CATEGORIES](#).

POSTERIOR ANALYTICS

(Treatise by **Aristotle**.) Ἀναλυτικά Ὑστερα. Latin, *Analytica Posteriora*. Abbr. *APo*. Aristotle explores demonstration (***apodeixis***) as a way to gain knowledge (***epistēmē***). If one has true propositions about what is in a valid **syllogism**, then the conclusion should be a reliable piece of knowledge. Aristotle explains why not every true proposition is demonstrable—for one thing, that would lead to an infinite regress. Aristotle believes rather that some propositions include essential predication, that one can know that a predicate belongs to a subject without a demonstration. But how? He sums up the process in *APo*. II.19, 100a4ff., thus:

So from perception there comes memory, as we call it, and from memory (when it occurs often in connection with the same thing), experience; for memories that are many in number form a single experience. And from experience, or from the whole universal that has come to rest in the soul (the one apart from the many, whatever is one and the same in all those things), there comes a principle of skill and of understanding—of skill if it deals with how things come about, of understanding if it deals with what is the case. Thus the states neither belong in us in a determinate form nor come about from other states that are more cognitive; but they come about from perception—as in a battle when a rout occurs, if one man makes a stand, another does and then another, until a position of strength is reached. And the soul is such as to be capable of undergoing this. (Tr. J. Barnes)

See R. Smith, “Aristotle’s Logic,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

See also [AISTHĒSIS](#); [ARCHĒ](#); [EPISTĒMĒ](#); [KATHOLOU](#);

[MNĒMĒ](#), [MNĒMOSUNĒ](#); [PSYCHĒ](#); [TECHNĒ](#).

POTAMO OF ALEXANDRIA

Ποτάμων. (2nd CE?) **Eclectic**. **Diogenes Laertius** (I.21) explains his eclecticism. There is also an entry for him in the **Suda**. See M. Hatzimichali, *Potamo of Alexandria and the Emergence of Eclecticism in Late Hellenistic Philosophy*, 2011.

See also [ALEXANDRIA](#).

POTE

Πότε. Literally, “when,” used by **Aristotle** as the name of one of the 10 categories (*katēgoriai*), the one we call “time.” His examples are “yesterday” and “next year.”

POTENTIALITY

See [DYNAMIS](#), [DYNAMEIS](#).

POU

Πού. Literally, “where,” used by **Aristotle** as the name of one of the 10 categories (*katēgoriai*), the one called in English “place.” His examples at **Categories** 2a1 are “in the **Lyceum**, in the agora.”

See also [TOPOS](#).

POWER

See [DYNAMIS](#), [DYNAMEIS](#).

PRACTICAL SYLLOGISM

Beginning with Aristotle, **Nicomachean Ethics** VII and **Movement of Animals**, an analysis of action in the form of a syllogistic argument. For example, *MA* 7, 701a17: “I need a covering, a coat is a covering: I need a coat. What I need I ought to make, I need a coat: I make a coat. And the conclusion, ‘I must make a coat’ is an action. . . . That the action is the conclusion is clear. But the premises of action are of two kinds, of the good and of the possible.”

See also [AKRASIA](#), [AKRATEIA](#), [AKRATĒS](#); [PRAXIS](#), [PRAKTIKĒ](#).

PRAGMA

Πράγμα. From the verb *prattein* (*prassein*), to do, *pragma* has as its primary sense “a thing done.” Philosophically, the word gains the sense of “thing” as opposed to “word,” for example in **Plato**’s **Cratylus** 391b; **Aristotle** claims (**De Anima** III.8, 432a3) that there are no *pragmata* apart from “sensible spatial magnitudes.” For the **Stoics**, *lekta* are intermediate between thoughts and *pragmata*.

PRAXIPHANES OF MYTILENE

Πραξιφάνης. (c. 322 BCE.) **Peripatetic** student of **Theophrastus**, he lived most of his life in **Rhodes**. **Epicurus**

is said to have studied with him. Concentrating on grammatical and literary studies, he wrote a work *On Poets* in which Plato and Isocrates are presented as speakers, and a work *On History*.

See also [MYTILENE](#).

PRAXIS, PRAKTIKĒ

Πρᾶξις, πρακτική. Action, as opposed to production (which would be *poiēsis*), or as opposed to passivity (*pathos*). *Praktikē* is the adjective; in the feminine (as here), it is taken to be a “practical art” or “practical science” as opposed to productive on the one hand or theoretical on the other. As **Aristotle** says, tragic drama is an imitation of *praxis* and life (***Poetics*** 1450a16). Of course ethical and political studies examine specifically human *praxeis*. From that perspective, animals do not share in action (***Nicomachean Ethics*** VI.2, 1139a20)—nor do the **gods** (***EN*** X.8, 1178b10), since *praxis* is unworthy of them; their life is totally involved with *theoria*.

Aristotle does use the word *praxis* in a wider sense as well, in which the activities of animals are called *praxeis* (***Parts of Animals*** II.1, 646b15), and the movements of the heavens (*ouranoi*) (which Aristotle thinks of as divine activities) are also *praxeis* (***De Caelo*** II.6, 288b30).

PRECONCEPTION

See [PROLĒPSIS](#).

PREDICATE, PREDICATION

See [HYPARCHEIN](#); [KATĒGORIAI](#).

PREFERABLES, PREFERRED; PROĒGMENA

In **Stoic ethics**, since only virtue (*aretē*) is truly good (and vice truly bad), there are a number of things that other people may call good, but Stoics say are neither good nor bad; some Stoics say that some such things may be “preferred.” Possible examples would be life, health, **beauty**, strength, pleasure, wealth, reputation, and noble birth (***Diogenes Laertius*** VII.101). **Aristo of Chios** objected that those things too are indifferent.

See also [ADIAPHORA](#); [PROĒGMENA](#).

PRE-SOCRATIC

Term commonly used to refer to philosophers who lived before **Socrates**. In several cases, it is used of people who were the contemporaries of Socrates. There is a sense that Socrates’ attention to definition and moral issues was truly revolutionary, so that the word “pre-Socratic” picks out discernible philosophical characteristics. Many of the pre-

Socratics were primarily concerned with developing an understanding of the material universe, often by some form of material reduction to a primary form of **matter**. Others, like the **Eleatics**, focused on the logical understanding of **Being**. They also exhibit a rich variety of stances regarding religious issues, from the revolutionary doctrine of rebirth taught by the **Pythagoreans** and **Empedocles**, to the Skeptical henotheism of **Xenophanes**, to the frank agnosticism of some of the **Sophists**.

Aristotle tends to group many of them together as ***physiologoi***, those who talk about nature. This would appear to be especially true of the Milesians, including **Thales**, **Anaximander**, and **Anaximenes**; Empedocles, **Anaxagoras**, and **Diogenes of Apollonia**; and the atomists, **Leucippus** and **Democritus**. It would be less true of **Pythagoras** and most of his followers, who were more concerned with a mathematical understanding of the world. Although **Heraclitus** does seem to make fire a fundamental material principle, that is surely not what his philosophy is “about.”

If we count the earlier Sophists as pre-Socratics, it would be only in the sense that Socrates surpassed their relativism with a heightened attention to the possible foundations of value judgments.

In a sense, for modern scholars, “pre-Socratics” are those people whose fragments are included in **Diels-Kranz**. But we really should include several texts that are more or less complete, and thus not included in DK—for example, several of the treatises in the **Hippocratic corpus** are quite philosophical, in about the same way that many of the “fragments” are philosophical. The first book of the Hippocratic *On Regimen* would be an example. See P. Curd, “Presocratic Philosophy,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

PRIME MATTER; *PRÔTE HYLĒ*

See *[HYLĒ](#)*.

PRIME MOVER

See *[PRÔTON KINOUN](#)*.

PRINCIPLE

See *[ARCHĒ](#)*; *[HYPOTHESIS](#)*.

PRIOR ANALYTICS

(Treatise by **Aristotle**.) Ἀναλυτικὰ Πρότερα. Latin, *Analytica Priora*. Abbr. *APr*. Aristotle’s revolutionary analysis of syllogistic reasoning. This work began the systematic study of formal logic. In it, Aristotle identifies valid and invalid forms of argument. See R. Smith, “Aristotle’s Logic,” *Stanford*

PRISCIAN OF LYDIA

Πρισκιανὸς Λυδός. (5th to 6th CE.) One of the **Neoplatonists** exiled from Athens to Persia in 529 CE, part of his *Metaphrase* of **Theophrastus'** *On the Soul* survives, as well as a late and corrupt Latin translation of his *Answers to Chosroes*. Apparently Chosroes posed questions to him while he was in exile at the Persian court; these were the answers. He mentions many classical Greek works, as well as some that were recent at the time, on cosmology and natural history as well as Neoplatonic metaphysics. See P. Huby, *Priscian on Theophrastus*, 1997.

Lydia (Λυδία) was a region of what is now Turkey, inland from the Ionian coast. **Sardis** was its major urban center.

PRISCUS OF EPIRUS

(c. 305–c. 395 CE.) **Neoplatonist** and theurge. Student of **Aedesius** in **Pergamon**, he taught the future emperor **Julian** in **Athens**. Along with his colleague **Maximus of Ephesus**, he traveled with Julian on campaign; they were with him when he died. Priscus was arrested but freed, returning to Athens to teach for another 30 years. All this and more is recounted by **Eunapius** in his *Life of Priscus*.

See also [EPIRUS](#); [THEOURGIA](#).

PRIVATION

See [STERĒSIS](#).

PROAIRESIS, PROHAIRESIS

Προαίρεσις. Choice. Forms of this word appear in several places in **Plato** with an unproblematic meaning of “choice”—for example, at **Phaedrus** 245b4, **Socrates** talks about “choosing” as a friend someone who is in control of himself over someone who is disturbed. But serious focus on the word comes in **Aristotle's** *Nicomachean Ethics*, where it is defined as “deliberative desire or desiderative deliberation” (**orexis bouleutikē** or **bouleusis orektikē**) (EN III). It is essential for Aristotle to get clear about *prohairesis* because “ethical virtue” is defined as “the habit of *choosing* the action that lies in a mean relative to us according to the right rule as determined by the person of practical wisdom.” “Ethics” is *about* choices.

Epictetus also uses the term *prohairesis*, more nearly in the sense of the faculty of **assenting** or not assenting to one's perceptions (**aisthēseis**).

Outside the philosophical world, *prohairesis* eventually takes on the sense of “preference,” so that it can mean a political party or a religious sect to which one belongs.

PROBLEM

See [APORIA](#).

PROCESS

See [GENESIS](#).

PROCLUS

Πρόκλος ὁ Διάδοχος. (412–485 CE.) Born in **Constantinople**, Proclus studied rhetoric, law, and philosophy in **Alexandria** and in **Athens** with **Plutarch of Athens** and with **Syrianus**. Proclus succeeded Syrianus as **Scholarch** in Athens in 437. In a period of increasing **Christian** domination of Greek-language intellectual life, Proclus remained a “pagan” but wrote many works that strongly influenced theological writings both in Christendom and Islam during subsequent centuries. Most of his surviving works are formally commentaries on various **dialogues** of **Plato**, but these commentaries significantly expand upon and extend the Platonic philosophy in ways surely not envisioned by Plato himself. Proclus also wrote an important commentary on **Euclid**; it includes a very valuable account of the history of Greek mathematics (*mathēmatikē*) and influential comments on the mathematical character of Plato’s Forms (*eidē*).

His *Elements of Theology* presents a number of theses about **God** and other theological topics in the guise of geometrical proofs, in imitation of the Euclidian model. It was translated and adapted into Arabic; translated from Arabic into Latin under the title *Liber de Causis*, it exerted an influence on the development of Scholastic theology.

His *Platonic Theology* was used extensively by Pseudo-**Dionysius the Areopagite**, whose writings are in turn fundamental for Orthodox Christian theology. Perhaps the central feature of Proclus’ thought is his unique synthesis of a profound understanding of classical mathematical reasoning with a **Neoplatonic** analysis of theological concepts.

“Diadochus” is a nickname, meaning “Successor,” perhaps because he was the last major successor of the line of great pagan Neoplatonic philosophers.

For a more detailed account and a bibliography, see C. Helmig & C. Steele, “Proclus,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

See also [RHĒTORIKĒ](#).

PROCOPIUS OF GAZA

(c. 465–528 CE.) Christian rhetor and **Sophist**, commentator on several Old Testament books. His letters illustrate the intellectual tenor of his time. There is a

fragmentary anti-**Proclus** work sometimes ascribed to him, now thought to be the work of someone else. His works are available online at Documenta Catholica Omnia.

See also [GAZA](#).

PRODICUS OF CEOS

Πρόδικος. (c. 460–after 399 BCE.) Prodicus was a **Sophist** with a strong interest in language; his views were satirized in **Aristophanes**' *Clouds*. **Socrates** seems to have had a certain respect for him (e.g., **Apology** 19e); we get a flavor of his style at **Protagoras** 337. **Plato** often refers to him, and **Aristotle** cites him (**Topics** II.6, 112b22) for a distinction of pleasures into "joy, delight, and good cheer." Perhaps his most famous composition was the *Choice of Heracles*, which represented Heracles at a crossroads with virtue (**aretē**) down one road and vice (**kakia**) down the other. We know of the contents of this work through a paraphrase by **Xenophon**. Prodicus had theories about the origins of the various deities worshipped by the Greeks and other peoples; although some concluded that he was an atheist, the evidence points rather to a theology somewhat similar to that of **Xenophanes**. See Dillon & Gergel, *The Greek Sophists*, pp. 98–118.

See also [CEOS](#).

PRODUCTION

See [POIEIN](#), [POIĒSIS](#), [POIĒTIKĒ](#).

PROĒGMENA

Προήγμενα. In **Stoic** philosophy, "preferables," "things preferred." The word literally means something like "leading, guiding." (*Pro*, forward; *agere*, lead, passive participle.) The Stoics distinguish things good, bad, and indifferent, but among indifferents, some things are "preferred" and others "dispreferred." When circumstances permit, one chooses health rather than disease, life rather than death, wealth instead of poverty. Not all Stoics accepted this concept; some thought that "preferred" and "dispreferred" things were still really indifferent, **adiaphora**.

PROĒGOUMENON AITION

Προηγούμενον αἴτιον. Antecedent cause. For some **Stoics**, this was the term used to pick out what **Aristotle** calls the "source of movement."

See also [AITION](#), [AITIA](#).

PROGRESSION OF ANIMALS

(Treatise by **Aristotle**.) Περὶ πορείας ζώων. Latin, *De Incessu Animalium*. Abbr. *IA*. Aristotle attempts to explain how animals walk, with a bit about flying and other ways of local

motion. A. S. L. Farquharson's translation (*On the Gait of Animals*, 1912) is available online.

PROLĒPSIS

Πρόληψις. Preconception. (*Pro*, before; *lēpsis*, taking.) This is a central concept in post-Aristotelian epistemology, apparently introduced by **Epicurus**, who makes of it one of three criteria (*kritēria*) of truth (*alētheia*), the other two being sensations and feelings. For Epicurus, we put together a *prolēpsis* from repeated experiences of the same thing, either something external or of ourselves. A *prolēpsis* is the starting point for any inquiry. For **Chrysippus**, a preconception is the "natural conception of universals" (**Diogenes Laertius** VII.154). Skeptics, reasonably enough, thought that preconceptions (*prolēpseis*) were unreliable criteria of truth.

See also [PHAINOMENON](#); [SKEPTIKOS](#).

PRONOIA

Πρόνοια. Providence, foresight, forethought. (*Pro*, before; *noia*, thinking.) Human *pronoia* is intention, planning, even malice aforethought. Both **Plato** and **Aristotle** talk of the "forethought" of wise legislators. But especially in philosophic contexts this word seems increasingly applied to **God**. **Herodotus** 3.108: "Somehow the forethought of God (just as is reasonable) being wise has made all creatures prolific that are timid and edible, so that they do not become extinct through being eaten, whereas few young are born to hardy and vexatious creatures." Plato's *Demiourgos* is called *Pronoia* at **Timaeus** 30C, for example, for bringing into existence the world "as a living creature, endowed with soul and intelligence."

For the Stoics, *Pronoia* is the most usual *name* of God. **Chrysippus**, for example, argued that God's providence was exercised especially for the benefit of humanity. **Neoplatonists** tended to be a good deal less anthropocentric; the One (*Hen*) is surely beyond any form of forethought, but even lesser deities are concerned about their own tasks, and providence for human beings is the responsibility of human souls (**Plotinus**, *Enneads* VI.8). The Neoplatonists were acutely aware of the tension between divine omnipotence and divine beneficence in a world where bad things happen (**Proclus**, *Elem. Theol.*, prop. 122).

PROODOS

Πρόοδος. Procession. A **Neoplatonic** solution to the dialectic of **unity** and multiplicity going back to the **Eleatics** and **Plato's Parmenides**: pluralities "proceed" from unities.

Proclus bases his argument on an analogy between mathematical and ontological reasoning in the *Elements of Theology*.

PROOF

See [APODEIXIS](#).

PROPERTY

See [IDION](#).

PROPORTION

See [ANALOGIA](#); [LOGOS](#).

PROS TI

Πρὸς τί. **Relation**, one of **Aristotle's** 10 categories (*katēgoriai*). Ancient thinkers returned repeatedly to the problem of understanding relational predicates. The **Sophists** loved to play tricks with relational predicates: in **Plato's** *Euthydemus*, Dionysodorus asks Ctesippus if he has a dog, and if the dog had fathered puppies, and from two affirmative answers, Dionysodorus argues that the dog is Ctesippus' father, and that the puppies are his brothers (298d–e). Somewhat more seriously, in Plato's *Parmenides*, if equal things are equal in virtue of a share of equality itself, those shares must be less than equal, and if small things are small in virtue of a share of smallness itself, those shares must be smaller than smallness itself, and how could that be? How could anything be smaller than smallness itself? (*Parm.* 130d–3). Plato returns to relational issues very frequently—see, for example, *Theaetetus* 154b, and many other places.

In *Categories* VII, Aristotle argues that relative terms imply a reciprocal relationship: “slave” and “master” are obviously reciprocal relative terms. In the context, Aristotle does some fancy footwork to support the thesis for terms like “wing” and “rudder.” In *Metaphysics* V.15, Aristotle distinguishes relative terms that are quantitative in character from those that are causative—that is, the relationship is a causal relationship; a third sort of relation is epistemological—the knower and the known, the hearer and the heard.

In their reduction of the categories to four, the **Stoics** highlight *pros ti* (*pōs echein pros ti*). The Pyrrhonian Skeptics found in relative predication grounds for suspending judgment—if everything is relative, then nothing is reliable.

See also [SKEPTIKOS](#).

PROSĒGORIA

Προσηγορία. “Appellative.” (*Pros*, to; *agoria*, reference.) According to **Diogenes Laertius**, **Diogenes of Babylon** distinguished “name” (*onoma*) from *prosēgoria*, wanting to

limit *onoma* to what we call in English “proper names,” and applying *prosēgoria* to the other things called *onomata* in Greek, specifically common nouns and adjectives.

PROSLĒPSIS

Πρόσληψις. Additional premise, in **Stoic** logic (**Diogenes Laertius** VII.76). (*Pros*, to, in addition; *lēpsis*, taking.) The Stoics tended to construe arguments as initially hypothetical (“If it is night, it is dark”); the “additional premise” here might be the assertion “It is night,” which conjoined with the hypothetical yields “It is dark.” This term is sometimes translated “minor premise,” but since the Stoic premises work differently than **Aristotelian** premises, a different translation seems appropriate. The easiest (possibly *too* easy) way to characterize the difference is to say that Aristotelian logic is a kind of predicate calculus, while Stoic logic is a kind of propositional calculus. See S. Bobzien, “Stoic Logic,” in Algra et al., 1999, pp. 92–157.

See also [LOGIKĒ](#).

PROTAGORAS

(Dialogue by **Plato**.) Πρωταγόρας. Abbr. *Prot*. The young Hippocrates (not the doctor) rousts **Socrates** at an early hour, demanding that he be introduced to the great **Protagoras**, the leading **Sophist** of the day. They go to the house of Callias, where Protagoras is staying while in Athens, along with two other leading Sophists, **Hippias** and **Prodicus**. Two sons of Pericles, various students of the Sophists, and several of Socrates associates are also there.

Socrates asks Protagoras what Hippocrates will get by studying with him. Protagoras answers, how to be a good citizen (*politēs*). Socrates wonders whether that can be taught at all. In response Protagoras tells a myth that suggests that human beings are able to survive in a hostile world only because they have inborn senses of shame (*aidos*) and justice (*dike*) in virtue of which they are able to band together for mutual advantage. These inborn senses need to be educated through reward and punishment (324), and thus virtues are teachable. Protagoras claims that he is an especially good teacher of virtue. In response, Socrates asks whether virtue is one or many; Protagoras answers, “one, but the parts may be distinguished.”

Socrates pursues this answer in an *elenchus* that tends to show that the virtues are not actually distinguishable from each other. Socrates and Protagoras are ready to break it off, but the assembled group persuade them to go on with the

discussion with Protagoras asking the questions. Protagoras turns to a poem by **Simonides** arguing that Simonides contradicts himself, saying that it is hard for a person to be good, and then criticizes Pittacus for saying what appears to be the same thing. A fairly lengthy discussion of the poem follows, but ultimately Socrates points out that no progress was made in that discussion about the distinctions between the virtues (349).

Socrates has essentially argued that all the virtues are reducible to wisdom; Protagoras wants to insist that courage is quite different from the other virtues and not reducible to wisdom. Socrates (rather oddly, in virtue of his usual disdain of hedonism) argues that courage is indeed reducible to wisdom, because the courageous person has carried out a correct hedonic calculus. See N. Denyer, *Plato Protagoras*, 2008.

See also [ARETĒ](#); [MYTHOS](#).

PROTAGORAS OF ABDERA

Πρωταγόρας. (c. 490–420 BCE.) A **Sophist**, he lived and taught in **Athens** for many years, closely associated with Pericles and his family. Most of what we know about Protagoras we learn from the many representations and references to him in **Plato's dialogues**, and the probably derivative references in **Aristotle** (the critique of Protagoras in the *Metaphysics* IV and IX assumes the *Theaetetus*). The two most famous fragments of his writings are “Human beings are the measure of all things: of the things that are, that they are, and of the things that are not, that they are not” and “Concerning the gods I do not know whether they exist, nor if they exist what they are like, for the question is too difficult, and life is too short.” The second may seem to us simply evasive, but in the context of the Athens that condemned **Socrates** for impiety, it must have seemed rather shocking. The first is the famous “*homo mensura*” doctrine, interpreted by Plato in the *Theaetetus* as holding that knowledge (*epistēmē*) and **being** are relative to each individual observer, but it is much more likely that the historical Protagoras believed that knowledge and reality are relative to various social groups, to communities of language users. The **Protagoras** presents a vivid portrait of this leading Sophist. See C. Poster, “Protagoras,” *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, or E. Schiappa, *Protagoras and Logos*, 2003.

See also [ABDERA](#).

PRŌTĒ PHILOSOPHIA

Ἡ πρώτη φιλοσοφία. First Philosophy, one of **Aristotle's**

ways of referring to that study that we call “metaphysics,” **Metaphysics** VI.1, 1026a16. It is “first” not by order of study, but because it examines the most fundamental realities.

PROTEROS, PRŌTOS, PRŌTON

Πρότερος, πρῶτος, πρῶτον. First. In logic, the propositions from which everything else is demonstrated are “first.” In physics, the elements are “first,” and so on.

PRŌTON KINOUN

Τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν. First mover. **Aristotle**, **Physics** VIII.5, 265a ff.: cause of all motion in the universe. One tends to assume that Aristotle is referring to an entity approximately equivalent to the Judeo-Christian (and Muslim) **God**, and that is surely how that tradition has often understood **Physics** VIII and **Metaphysics** XII, where the “first mover” or “unmoved mover” (**akinēton kinoun**) is discussed most extensively. Still, especially in **Physics** VIII, the “first mover” appears more as a theoretical entity of **science** than as a potential object of worship.

PROVIDENCE

See [PRONOIA](#).

PRUDENCE

See [PHRONĒSIS](#).

PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS THE AREOPAGITE

See [DIONYSIUS THE AREOPAGITE](#).

PSEUDOS

Ψεῦδος. False. Considering **Aristotle**’s analysis at **Metaphysics** V.29, falsity is non-correspondence between a verbal formula and a state of affairs. In some cases one attributes the falsity to the object—a drawing that does not resemble, or a dream (**oneiros**)—and in some cases to the verbal formula, false of this object (though it might be true of another). A false *person* is one who is apt to try to get people to believe things that are not true.

PSYCHĒ

Ψυχή. Soul. From the beginning of Greek literature, *psychē* signifies life or the principle of life. To what extent is it a principle of life that can in some sense be separated from the body? **Homer** speaks of souls of the dead as we would speak of “ghosts” in several places; thus there is a literary tradition of souls that are in a way “undying.” At the end of the 6th century BCE several related things happened that changed the Greek view of *psychē* permanently. First, there was a growth of “mystery” religions that promised some form of life after death; the **Orphic** movement may be seen in this

light. Second, **Pythagoras** seems to have introduced the idea of the transmigration of souls from some non-Greek source into the Greek world. There may have been some connection between Pythagoras and the Orphic movement—it is difficult to be sure from the evidence we have. Third, there was an increasing identification of the human personality with the “mind” and, at the same time, an identification of **God** as Mind (**nous**). Fourth, the universe, or parts of the universe, came to be thought of as alive, and thus endowed with a principle of life, a *psychē*. **Heraclitus**: “You will not find the limits of soul, no matter how far you go, so profound is its **logos**” (f. 45).

For some of the materialists among the **pre-Socratics**, it seemed obvious that soul would have to be some sort of material: perhaps **fire** for Heraclitus, **air** for **Anaximenes** and **Diogenes of Apollonia**, or some special spherical atoms (**atoma**) for **Leucippus** and **Democritus**. Other pre-Socratics seemed to think soul distinct from spatial **matter**:

Anaxagoras, in addition to the Pythagoreans and those influenced by the Pythagoreans, would be an example. Perhaps **Xenophanes** too would have to be committed to an immaterial “Mind” (**nous**), unless his deity is simply the mind of the entire universe.

Plato seems to accept and to develop the Pythagorean theory of the soul: Pythagoras thought that he could remember his previous lives; Plato thought that one might also recollect experiences from the time *between* incarnate lives, and that those recollections could be foundational for accurate knowledge. Plato depicts the human soul as having three different parts or functions: the mind, the spirit, and the appetite. When in the body, those three parts are lodged in the head, heart, and organs below the diaphragm. But all three are represented in the image of the two-horse chariot in the **Phaedrus**, with the charioteer as mind and the two horses as spirit and appetite.

In **Aristotle**’s treatise *On the Soul*, he represents earlier theories as beginning from two obvious phenomena ascribed to the soul: the capacity of living things to initiate movement, and human consciousness. If one focuses on movement, it may be tempting to think of the soul as a particularly active material, such as fire or **pneuma**; that does not, however, help to understand the phenomenon of consciousness. We might see water by the water in us, but to see love and hate, we must have those in our composition as well.

Thus Aristotle argues that the soul is not some element of

the body, not even an immaterial element (like a Platonic “self-moving number”), but is rather a consequence of the way the body is put together, a result of the form of the body. So he defines *psychē* as “the first level of **actuality** of a natural organic body.” It is the “first” level because the soul is the capacity to do something, not necessarily the actual doing, and the body must be “organic” because it is the organs that have these capacities to do the various functions of living. The functions of the soul include, at the most basic, the capacity for nutrition and reproduction: those functions are shared by plants. Animals have, in addition, the ability to sense and react to their environment, and generally to move from place to place in pursuit of food or to avoid being eaten. Human beings are the only animals that possess the capacity to communicate, or at any rate have that capacity in the highest degree, and are the only ones to live in a ***polis*** and to engage in theoretical thought.

If we ask whether the Aristotelian *psychē* is separable from body, we get an ambiguous answer: there is just one capacity of the soul that must be thought of as logically (but not spatially) separable from the body, and that is the active power of the mind. The active power of the mind in a sense “supervenes” on the body; how that is possible in Aristotle’s philosophy is rather mysterious and puzzled even his closest disciple, **Theophrastus**.

Among post-Aristotelian philosophies, both the **Epicureans** and **Stoics** are resolutely materialist about *psychē*. However, there is an important difference in their materialism. Epicureans believe the soul to be composed of atoms that at death dissipate or disassociate and no longer have any of the functions they had when incorporated in a complex body. Stoics, however, believe the soul to be the effect of the presence of *pneuma*, particularly a special *pneuma* that constitutes the “governing faculty” of the body, and that *pneuma* is really ultimately a part of God.

Platonists in all periods held that the soul is a different kind of entity, separable from body and immortal. As Plato indicates in the ***Timaeus***, human souls are formed from the leftovers of the soul of the universe and thus are destined eventually to rejoin the **World Soul**. See H. Lorenz, “Ancient Theories of the Soul,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 2009.

PTOLEMAIS

Πτολεμαῖς. Town in the area of **Cyrene**, 32°42'N 20°57'E.

A much older town, it was renamed by Ptolemy III; later the name was Latinized as Tolmeta. **Aithiops**, a Cyrenaic leader, and **Synesius**, a Neoplatonist bishop, came from here.

PTOLEMAIS OF CYRENE

Πτολεμαῖς ἡ Κυρηναία. (3rd BCE?) **Pythagorean** music theorist. Her work is known from **Porphry**'s commentary on **Ptolemy's** *Harmonica*. See F. Levin, *Greek Reflections on the Nature of Music*, 2009.

See also [CYRENE](#).

PTOLEMY, CLAUDIUS

Κλαύδιος Πτολεμαῖος. (c. 90–c. 168 CE.) Claudius Ptolemy was the author of several important scientific works: “The Great Treatise” (known by the Greco-Arabic name, *Almagest*), laying out the astronomical system we still call “Ptolemaic”; the *Geography*, presenting what was known about the physical world in his day; and the *Tetrabiblos* (four books), a work on **astrology**. He also wrote on music theory and optics. Much of Ptolemy's work is available, in translation, online at Lacus Curtius; see G. J. Toomer's translation of the *Almagest*, 1998, and A. Barker's study of the *Harmonics*, 2000.

Ptolemy lived in **Alexandria**, Egypt.

See also [ASTRONOMY](#).

PTOLEMY EL-GHARIB

“Ptolemy the Unknown.” Author of a *Life of Aristotle* that includes a catalog of Aristotle's works. It survives in an Arabic manuscript in Istanbul; excerpts known before the discovery of the manuscript were collected by I. Düring, *Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition* (Göteborg 1957), 221–231.

PTŌSIS

Πτῶσις. “Case.” **Aristotle** notices (*On Interpretation* 16a32) the differences in ontological commitment between nominative, genitive, dative, and accusative, the “cases” of Greek nouns, adjectives, and pronouns. The **Stoics** use the term *ptōsis* of inflected words and include this concept under the idea of **lekta**, or “sayables.”

PURIFICATION

See [KATHARSIS](#).

PURPOSE

See [TELOS](#).

PYR

Πῦρ. Fire. **Heraclitus** f. 30: “This order, which is the same for all, none of gods or men has made; but it was ever, is now and ever shall be an ever-living fire, fixed measures of it

kindling and fixed measures going out.” In **Plato’s *Timaeus***, fire is the tetrahedron, the minimal regular solid. For **Aristotle**, fire is the natural element (***stoicheion***) with the natural place above the air (***aēr***). The **Stoics** describe **God** as *pyr technikon*, fire with the capacity of crafting things. When God has assimilated everything to himself, there is a universal conflagration (***ekpyrōsis***), and everything starts over.

PYRRHO OF ELIS

Πύρρων. (c. 360–270 BCE.) Founder of the Skeptical (See ***SKEPTIKOS***) line of philosophy. Pyrrho was trained as a painter and studied philosophy with the **Megarians** and **Democritus**; he traveled to **India** with **Alexander of Macedon**, where he met Hindu philosophers, called ***gymnosophistai*** by the Greeks. On his return to Greece, he acquired several disciples, notably **Timon of Phlius**. As reported by Timon, Pyrrho recommended not putting any trust in either perception (***aisthēsis***) or opinion (***doxa***); if one successfully avoids such commitments, the first result is aphasia, or speechlessness, then ***ataraxia***, or freedom from disturbance, then happiness. **Sextus Empiricus** (2nd to 3rd CE), who gives Pyrrho a lot of credit for the development of Skepticism in his *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*, nevertheless expresses some hesitation about the actual extent of Pyrrho’s contribution to Skepticism as he knew it 500 years later. See R. Bett, “Pyrrho,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

See also **ELIS**.

PYTHAGORAS OF SAMOS

Πυθαγόρας ὁ Σάμιος. (c. 570–490 BCE.) Pythagoras wrote nothing but was well known to his contemporaries and to the later Greek world as the person credited with bringing the idea of **metempsychosis** (transmigration of the soul) to Greece. It is clear that he established a community in **Croton**, in southern Italy, around 530 BCE and fled with his followers to **Metapontum** in about 510, where he died in about 490. The evidence that Pythagoras traveled to **Egypt** as a young man is fairly strong; **Herodotus** strongly supports that idea, and **Isocrates**, in the early 4th century (*Busiris* 28), also indicates that Pythagoras brought religious ideas from Egypt to Greece. Later Greek authors claimed that he also went to Persia before returning to **Samos** and proceeding to Italy.

It is not clear how much of the mathematical knowledge and lore attributed to Pythagoras really stems from his teaching; his disciples tended to attribute to him their own discoveries. **Plato’s *Timaeus*** is the most complete and

nuanced presentation of Pythagorean mathematics (***mathēmatikē***) from a time not too distant from that of Pythagoras himself, but it is in essence attributed to Timaeus, not to Pythagoras. Similarly **Aristotle** generally speaks of the “people who call themselves **Pythagoreans**” as the source of the mathematical lore. See Carl Huffman, “Pythagoras,” in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

PYTHAGOREAN SCHOOL; PYTHAGOREANS

People who call themselves, or are called by others, “Pythagoreans” fall into two separate periods: the first are the immediate disciples of **Pythagoras** and their successors in the first 200 years or so after his death; the second group appeared about 500 years after the death of Pythagoras and continued for at least 500 years. The second group are also known as **Neopythagoreans** (see that entry for them).

Pythagoras seems to have had two kinds of immediate followers, or to put it another way, his immediate followers had two distinct sorts of interest in his teaching. One group or sort of interest focused on the religious aspects, the promise of a better future life after this present life. This group is called by **Iamblichus**, who wrote an account of Pythagoras and his school, the ***akousmatikoi***, or “enthusiastic audience.” The other group or sort of interest seems to have focused on the scientific and mathematical aspects of his teaching, the ***mathēmatikoi***, or “advanced students,” as Iamblichus has it. This group may have developed a little later, after the death of Pythagoras perhaps.

The teachings that are gathered under the title of ***akousmata*** tend to be a bit mysterious, with possibly moral or religious implications. We have more information about the “advanced” teaching, because Aristotle refers fairly frequently to Pythagorean scientific teachings.

According to the “mathematical” Pythagoreans, the world is fundamentally mathematical in character: geometrical principles describe the most real things about the world. Musical intervals are understood as whole-number ratios; **matter** ultimately divides into geometrically regular solids.

Of the more famous **pre-Socratics** who were influenced fairly directly by the teaching of Pythagoras and his school we may mention **Parmenides** (apparently taught by Ameinias the Pythagorean); **Empedocles**, who refers to Pythagoras in a complimentary way; and **Alcmaeon**.

Diels-Kranz list as “Older Pythagoreans” the following: Kerkops, Petron, **Brontinos**, Hippasos, Kallipon, Demokedes,

and Parmeniskos. The next generations were led by **Philolaus of Croton** (c. 470–385) and his student **Eurytus**, and then **Archytas** (d. c. 350), of whom we know quite a lot, comparatively speaking. Iamblichus (*Vit. Pyth.* 267) lists dozens of early Pythagoreans by their home **polis**. Included in Iamblichus' list are 16 **women** whom he counts as Pythagorean philosophers. Diels-Kranz name several who do not appear on Iamblichus' list but are noted by other sources. It is clear that Pythagoreanism was in a position to have a pervasive influence during the 5th and 4th centuries BCE; this widespread movement may account for the rapid acceptance of the word **philosophia** to describe the preoccupations typical of Pythagorean *mathēmatikoi*. See C. Huffman, "Pythagoreanism," *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

Q

QUA

See [HĒI](#).

QUALITY, QUALITATIVE CHANGE

See [POION](#); [POIOTĒS](#); [ALLOIŌSIS](#).

QUANTITY

See [POSON](#).

QUINTESSENCE

See [AITHĒR](#). *Aithēr* is the “fifth” element (***stoicheion***), counting up from **earth**, **water**, **air**, and **fire**. In *On the Heavens* (***De Caelo***) III, where the number of elements is addressed, **Aristotle** does not say explicitly that *aithēr* is the fifth element, but it is a reasonable inference to be drawn from his argument. Late medieval philosophers drew the conclusion and invented the word.

R

RATIO

See [LOGOS](#).

REASON

See [LOGISTIKON](#); [LOGOS](#); [NOUS \(NOOS\)](#).

RECEPTACLE

See [HYPODOCHĒ](#).

RECOLLECTION

See [ANAMNĒSIS](#).

REFUTATION

See [ELENCHUS](#).

REINCARNATION

See [METEMPSYCHOSIS](#).

RELATION

See [PROS TI](#).

RELIGION

See [GOD](#), [GODS](#); [HOSIOTĒS](#); [THEOS](#), [THEIOS](#),
[THEOLOGIA](#).

THE REPUBLIC; POLITEIA

(Dialogue by **Plato**.) Πολιτεία. Abbr. *Rep.* Plato's second-longest dialogue, in 10 books, all narrated by **Socrates**. Socrates is in the Peiraeus on the occasion of a festival; he is invited to the home of wealthy metic industrialists, Cephalus and his son **Polemarchus**, where he discusses the meaning of justice (*dikaïosynē*) with his hosts and with another guest, **Thrasymachus of Chalcedon**, in the first book, and with Glaucon and **Adeimantus**, Plato's older brothers, in the other nine.

Socrates turns the discussion to justice (*dikaïosunē*); Polemarchus, quoting **Simonides'** line that we should give each person what we owe, when pushed interprets that as helping friends and harming enemies. Socrates wonders whether there is a craft (*technē*) that enables us to do that, and how do you know who is an enemy and who a friend? Ought we not benefit everyone by making them better people?

Thrasymachus intervenes, demanding that Socrates himself define justice. When Socrates demurs, Thrasymachus says that justice is the advantage of the stronger. Socrates answers that each *technē* seeks the advantage of its clients—medicine is for the sake of the patient, the ship captain works to the benefit of the passengers and crew, and so on.

Thrasymachus points out that the shepherd indeed looks after the sheep, until he shears them or turns them into mutton. Somewhat changing his position, he claims that complete injustice is more profitable than complete justice, and that the unjust tries to outdo both the just and the unjust. But, Socrates shows, the person who tries to outdo everyone is ignorant and bad. In fact, even a band of thieves needs to have justice between its members in order to be strong. The unjust person is at war with himself and ultimately is unable to achieve anything—the soul must be able to fulfill its function if one is to be happy.

In the second book, Glaucon and Adeimantus suggest that Thrasymachus has a point after all. Glaucon tells the story that Gyges the Lydian found a ring that gave him invisibility at will; with the help of the ring he was able to commit all sorts of crimes and become king of Lydia. If a person is sure of being able to get away with anything, why wouldn't he? Adeimantus adds, why is justice a benefit to the just person, and injustice bad for the unjust person?

To answer that question, Socrates proposes to examine “justice writ large” as it exists in the *polis* in order to understand justice as it exists in the individual person. His first try is a rather primitive agricultural community, one that Glaucon calls a “city of pigs” as he demands a more luxurious lifestyle, one that incidentally includes meat eating, which the first did not. This Socrates calls the “fevered” city, one that needs a greater expanse of land to satisfy the demands of the population. In particular, it will need a military to gain and defend that greater territory. This is the origin of the **guardians** who play a large role in the rest of the *Republic*. Socrates turns to the proper education of those who will be the guardians, critiquing current educational practices in the rest of book II and all of book III. He points out, at the beginning of Book IV, that the goal here is to depict the happy city as a whole, not to make one class supremely happy. Justice, as was noted in Book I, has to do with the harmony of all the elements that make up the just individual. In Book V, Socrates recommends that the women of the guardian class have the same education, and the same military duties, as the men, and that the guardian class be bred “scientifically” to make the young as effective as possible in carrying out their future duties. And everything must be held in common.

Most important, we need to have philosophers ruling as kings, or kings becoming philosophers. In Book VI, Socrates

turns to the special education that will make philosopher-kings (and queens). Current education is entirely too “aesthetic”—we need an education that points toward reality rather than appearance.

See also [SUN-LINE-CAVE](#). If the education of the future rulers has the task of getting them to turn away from appearances and seek reality, and that reality is “formal,” like mathematics and the study of ultimate values, the good, beauty, and justice itself, then we have a philosophical education that is intended to make effective governments possible.

In Book VII, Socrates particularly outlines the mathematical part of the education and its move to **dialectic**. In VIII, he outlines the various forms of government, and how the ideal state could break down to lesser forms. Book IX is an extended exercise in showing how the tyrannical man (read: Gyges) is the *most* unhappy person alive.

Book X argues, first, that imitative art is especially bad because it emphasizes appearance rather than reality, then goes on to the myth of Er, depicting the punishments of the wicked and the rewards of the just in the afterlife. See E. Brown, “Plato’s Ethics and Politics in the Republic,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

See also [MYTHOS](#); [POLITEIA](#).

RESPONSIBILITY

See [AITION](#), [AITIA](#).

RHETORIC

See [RHĒTORIKĒ](#).

THE RHETORIC

(Treatise by **Aristotle**.) Ῥητορικὴ. Latin, *Rhetorica*. Abbr. *Rhet*. Book I presents a general outline of the various kinds of persuasive speech. He distinguishes deliberative, forensic, and **epideixis**. “Deliberative” or **symbouleutikon** is advisory to individuals or groups; “forensic” or **dikanikon** is used in the law courts; **epideiktikon** is used to praise or censure someone. Typical subjects discussed in deliberative rhetoric are finance, war and peace, national defense, imports and exports, and the framing of laws. He reminds the reader that the goal of political life is happiness (**eudaimonia**) and that deliberation will vary according to the system of government in effect, democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, or monarchy. I.9 reviews the sorts of things one might be praised or blamed for; it gives an interesting angle on the discussion of the virtues in the **Nicomachean Ethics**. Turning to forensic rhetoric, Aristotle

provides a useful angle on moral psychology, trying to understand the motivations of crimes and analyzing the kinds of justice and injustice.

Book II explores **ēthos** (character) and **pathos** (emotion) as they apply to the rhetorical environment. Book III examines **lexis** (the sort of language one uses) and **taxis** (effective organization of a speech). The discussion of metaphor is illuminated by many examples from the literature available to Aristotle. In terms of organization, “A speech has two parts. You must state your case, and you must prove it” (1414a30). See C. Rapp, “Aristotle’s Rhetoric,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

See also [ARETĒ](#).

RHETORIC TO ALEXANDER

Treatise included in the Aristotelian **corpus**, now commonly attributed to a contemporary of **Aristotle**, **Anaximenes of Lampsacus**. The treatise includes a wide range of advice for the young monarch, not only of a rhetorical nature.

RHĒTORIKĒ

Ῥητορικὴ. Rhetoric, the art of the *rhētōr*, or public speaker. In the latter part of the **Phaedrus** there is a very interesting summary of the “Art of Rhetoric” as it was taught at the end of the 5th century BCE. **Socrates** mentions as teachers of rhetoric **Gorgias** of Leontini and his student **Polus**, **Thrasymachus**, **Theodorus of Byzantium**, **Evenus** of Paros, **Tisias of Syracuse**, **Prodicus of Ceos**, **Hippias of Elis**, **Licymnius of Chios**, **Protagoras**, and (prospectively) **Isocrates**. Some but not all of these people are counted as **Sophists** as well. Protagoras and Hippias, for example, were quite proud of being Sophists, which meant for them that they were teaching *more* than just the skill of public speaking. As represented by **Plato**, Gorgias presented himself as a teacher of rhetoric as distinguished from a Sophist in that he claimed to be teaching a skill and no particular content. Thus the **Gorgias** might be understood as, in the first instance at least, a critique of content-free skill instruction. Similarly the latter part of the *Phaedrus* argues that a truly successful rhetoric would require knowledge of the subject, understanding of the beliefs of the audience and of psychology, and an understanding of what one was attempting to accomplish.

Aristotle wrote an extant book on *Rhetoric* that describes the art as that of persuasive speech, especially in political and juridical contexts. (There is also a work included in the **corpus**

called **Rhetoric to Alexander** that scholars tend now to attribute to a contemporary of Aristotle named **Anaximenes**.)

For some of the **Stoics**, the study of language divided into *rhētorikē* and *dialektikē*; since dialectic is essential for the discovery of truth (*alētheia*), it is the more important of the two divisions for the philosopher, but the Stoics did not totally ignore rhetoric.

Cicero, in *On the Orator*, makes philosophy the servant of rhetoric, a view held even more strongly by Quintillian in the *Institutio Oratoria*. For Quintillian, the orator needs to know philosophy essentially for self-defense against those who might pose philosophical objections to positions defended by the orator.

In late antiquity the line between rhetorician and philosopher was often blurred, in part because rhetoricians often had recourse to philosophical tropes. People like **Victorinus**, **Damascius**, and **Syrianus** combined philosophical and rhetorical careers.

See also [RHĒTORIKĒ](#).

RHODES

Ῥόδος. The largest of the Dodecanese Islands, off the southwest Ionian coast, 36°10'N 28°0'E, Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #1000. **Eudemus**, a native of Rhodes and a student of **Aristotle**, left the **Lyceum** during the lifetime of Aristotle to establish a **Peripatetic school** there. **Hieronymus of Rhodes**, a 3rd-century member of this school, contributed to the history of philosophy. **Apollonius**, head of the **Museum of Alexandria** in the 3rd century BCE, was a Rhodian. **Panaetius**, Scholarch of the Stoic school in the 2nd to 1st centuries BCE, was born there, and his student **Posidonius** established a school there around 100 BCE; **Cicero** visited him there. **Andronicus**, purportedly the editor of Aristotle's **corpus** in the 1st century BCE, was a Rhodian.

RHOĒ

Ῥοή. Flow, stream, flux. **Heraclitus** f. 12: “You cannot step twice into the same river; for fresh **waters** are flowing (*epirrei*) in upon you.” According to **Aristotle**, **Plato** was persuaded by his teacher **Cratylus**, an enthusiast of Heraclitus, that the sensible world was always in radical change or flux. We see evidence of that especially in the **Cratylus** where many of the etymologies are based on *rhoē* and its relatives (e.g., 420a9, where **erōs** flows in through the eyes). In the **Theaetetus**, universal flux is a fundamental part of the argument (cf. e.g., 182d). In general, “flux” is part of the

problematic of “**becoming**” or *genesis*.

ROME

Roma. Capital of the Roman Empire. 41°54'N 12°30'E. As Rome gained power in the Mediterranean world, some philosophers gravitated toward the center of power, and some cultured Romans sought to assimilate the culture, including philosophy, of the Greeks. In 155 BCE, **Athens** sent a delegation to Rome, including three philosophers, **Carneades**, Scholarch of the **Academy**; **Diogenes of Babylon**, Scholarch of the **Stoic** school; and **Critolaus**, Scholarch of the **Lyceum**. They apparently made a significant impression on the Roman elite, since in subsequent decades many leading Romans expressed allegiance to one or another philosophical school. **Panaetius**, Stoic Scholarch after Diogenes, frequently traveled to Rome where he had influential disciples.

Not all Romans were favorable to Athenian philosophy. **Sulla**, in subduing Athens in 86 BCE, destroyed the groves and buildings of the Academy and Lyceum and is said to have shipped off the library of the Lyceum to Rome.

In 79–78 BCE, **Cicero** studied rhetoric and philosophy in Athens; he brought back his learning to Rome where it shaped much of his later writing. In the same general time period **Lucretius** wrote his great **Epicurean** poem, *De Rerum Natura*.

In the 1st century CE, **Seneca**, tutor and advisor to the emperor Nero, wrote Stoic essays. At about the same time, **Musonius Rufus** pursued a more consistently philosophical life, partly in Rome, where he taught Stoicism to **Epictetus** and others. **Marcus Aurelius**, in the late 2nd century, was both emperor and Stoic; his court physician, **Galen**, synthesized Greek medicine and philosophy. In the 3rd century, **Plotinus** moved from **Alexandria** to Rome, attracting a circle of disciples who continued to develop **Neoplatonism** in the capital of the empire.

As the Western Empire was being taken over by non-Romans, **Boethius** began but did not complete the work of translating Aristotle into Latin. Erudite Christian scholars did preserve a good deal of classical culture, selected of course from their perspective.

See also [*RHĒTORIKĒ*](#).

RULE

See [*ARCHĒ*](#).

S

SAGES

Before there was philosophy, there was “wisdom literature.” In Greece, lists were made of the wise men (*sophoi*); some of the lists have seven members (so we hear of “Seven Sages”), but if we put the lists together, we get about 17. Some that are also counted as “philosophers” at one time or another include **Thales**, **Solon**, and **Pherecydes**.

Diogenes Laertius associates the names of the “sages” with various sayings, like “Nothing too much,” “Know yourself,” and so on. Later, in **Stoic** philosophy, the ideal or perfect human being is called the *sophos*, or sage. We would be hard put to find even one of these, let alone seven. See Plutarch, *The Dinner of the Seven Wise Men*, in *Moralia* (Loeb), vol. 2, now available online.

SALLUSTIUS, SATURNINUS SECUNDUS

Σαλούστιος. (4th CE.) Friend of the emperor **Julian**, he wrote *On the Gods and the Cosmos*. It is a synthesis of the teachings of **Iamblichus** with the views of Julian, available online.

SALLUSTIUS OF EMESA (OR SALLUSTIUS OF SYRIA)

Σαλούστιος. (5th CE.) **Cynic**. Although first a **Sophist**, as a consequence of subsequent studies he took up Cynicism. Simplicius (*Commentary on Epictetus' Manual*, 13) tells stories about him.

See also [EMESA](#).

SAMOS

Σάμος. 37°45'N 26°50'E. Island in the Aegean Sea, just a mile off the Ionian coast. Birthplace of **Pythagoras**, **Melissus**, **Epicurus**, and the astronomer **Aristarchus**. In the 6th century BCE an aqueduct tunnel was dug from both ends under the direction of the engineer Eupalinos, a remarkable mathematical and engineering accomplishment.

SARDIS

Σάρδεις. Major city of the territory of Lydia, now in western Turkey, a good bit inland from the Ionian coast, the current location of the village of Sart (38°29'18"N 28°02'25"E).

Eunapius and **Chrysanthus** were both from Sardis,

SATYRUS OF CALLATIS

Σάτυρος. (late 3rd BCE?) **Peripatetic** historian, author of *Lives* used by **Diogenes Laertius** and **Athenaeus**.

Examination of the available fragments indicates that he was not a very reliable historian. Callatis (Κάλλατις) was a town on the Black Sea, now known as Mangalia, in Romania, 43°49'02"N 28°34'58"E.

SCEPSIS

See [SKEPSIS](#), [SCEPSIS](#).

SCEPTIC

See [SKEPTIC](#), [SKEPTICISM](#).

SCHĒMA

Σχῆμα. Form, shape, appearance. Used of the characteristic properties of something; for the **atomists**, the differences in the shape of atoms were called *schēmata*.

Aristotle uses the word for the different forms of **sylogism**; the word is also used for various grammatical constructions.

SCHESIS

Σχέσις. State, condition, a temporary state of affairs in contrast to **hexis**, which tends to be permanent. **Stobaeus** notes that the **Stoics** distinguish between goods that are in **kinēsis** and those that are in *schesis*. The latter appear to be more static. True virtues, according to the same passage, are *scheseis* that are in **tonos**, which appears to be another way of saying that they are *hexeis*.

SCHOLARCH

Σχολάρχης. From the time of **Plato**'s founding of the **Academy**, the various ancient philosophical schools regularly had one person "in charge" of the school, and later histories, like that of **Diogenes Laertius**, tended to record the successions of these "Scholarchs." In this dictionary, if a person is known to have held that position, it is noted in the entry.

SCIENCE

The word "science" derives from the Latin word *scientia*, meaning "knowledge"; *scientia* is the standard Latin translation of the Greek word **epistēmē**. In its most common usage, the English word "science" refers to a practice that to a large extent can be traced back to the early Greek philosophers. To be sure, much that those people did was anticipated in some way or other by earlier **Egyptians**, Babylonians, and others, but there is a combination of factors that seems particularly Hellenic:

- Early Greek philosophy focused on **matter**, hypothesizing that all phenomena are actualizations of potentialities present in the material substratum of the world.

- Early Greek philosophy developed a concept of nature, or ***physis***, whose material potentialities were understood as leading to or including processes of growth and development, with further consequences that could be studied empirically.
- The **Hippocratic** medical tradition took over from the Egyptians and further developed a habit of detailed investigation of (medically important) phenomena and keeping objective records of the observations. (See [IATROS](#), [IATRIKĒ](#).)
- **Thales**, **Anaximander**, and **Pythagoras** introduced or at least strongly encouraged the idea that the world can best be understood in terms of mathematics (***mathēmatikē***), that explanations of natural phenomena are far more persuasive if expressed in terms of proportionality, geometry, or mathematical formulae.
- **Plato** developed the **Pythagorean** mathematical theory further by proposing the possibility of an intellectual discovery of the principles upon which all phenomena, of whatever sort, could be (must be) understood.
- **Aristotle** attempted to formulate an explanatory system, based on empirical observation, that would unify in a metaphysically and epistemologically satisfying way all existing knowledge in an interconnected and coherent manner.
- By the establishment of the **Academy** and **Lyceum**, Plato and Aristotle founded at least the ideal of cooperative investigation and formulation of explanatory systems, demonstrated in the early years of operation by the **Peripatetic** collection of writings known as the *Problemata* and the establishment of the **Museum of Alexandria**, intended both to imitate and outdo the Athenian schools.

While it is easy to complain of ancient science that it did not advance farther than it did, despite a number of advantages, it is worth noticing that in mathematics, **astronomy**, and medicine (*iatrikē*), for three, significant progress continued to occur in the Hellenistic and Roman periods. Certainly the founders of modern science—people like Galileo Galilei, Nicolaus Copernicus, and William Harvey—were inspired by their studies of ancient science and were very conscious of building upon those foundations.

See also [HISTORIA](#).

SECUNDUS THE SILENT

(2nd CE.) **Cynic** or **Neopythagorean** of **Athens**. An anonymous text, the *Life of Secundus*, claims to give details of his life—how he came to take a vow of silence, and consequences thereof—and the answers he wrote on a tablet to questions that were asked of him. The work was very popular in the Middle Ages. It has been studied, edited, and translated by B. E. Perry, 1964, *Secundus the Silent Philosopher*.

SELEUCIA

Σελεύκεια. Several places were called “Seleucia” in antiquity, but the largest and most important was “Seleucia on the Tigris,” 33°5'40"N 44°31'20"E, in Iraq. There are two philosophers named **Diogenes** who are said to be from either Seleucia or **Babylon** at about the same time (3rd to 2nd century BCE), as well as the student of one of them, **Apollodorus of Seleucia** (mid-2nd century), and then **Xenarchus of Seleucia** in the 1st century BCE.

SELF-CONTROL

See [SŌPHROSYNĒ](#).

SELF-EVIDENT

See [ENARGEIA](#), an Epicurean term.

SELF-MOVING

See [AUTOMATON](#).

SELF-SUFFICIENCY

See [AUTARKEIA](#).

SĒMAINEIN

Σημαίνειν. To show by a sign, indicate; to mean something. In *Metaphysics* IV, **Aristotle** argues that those who deny the law of non-contradiction in a sense refute themselves as soon as they say something and mean it, *sēmainei ti*. The **Stoics** too are very interested in sorting out the semantics of *lekta*.

SĒMEION

Σημεῖον. Sign, token, indication. **Aristotle** uses this word to pick out probable, not conclusive, arguments, in contrast to *tekmērion*, where he takes the conclusion as certain. For the **Stoics** and **Epicureans**, a *sēmeion* is a perceptible “sign” of something that is not observable or at least not currently observed. In many contexts *sēmeion* could well be translated “evidence” as that word is used in modern epistemology.

SENECA, LUCIUS ANNAEUS

(c. 4 BCE–65 CE.) Seneca was a **Stoic** philosopher, statesman, playwright, and tutor and advisor to the emperor

Nero. Seneca adapted the ethical and political thought of earlier Stoic thinkers to Roman imperial circumstances. His *On Clemency*, addressed to Nero at the beginning of his reign, advised avoiding abuse of imperial power; eventually Nero completely ignored that advice. His essays *On Anger* and *On Benefits* are interesting applications of Stoic concepts; *On the Happy Life* is a somewhat self-serving treatise arguing that it is all right for a philosopher to be wealthy. Several of his essays are “Consolations”: to Marcia, to his mother, to Polybius. His essays *On the Shortness of Life* and *On Tranquillity of Mind* are in the same direction.

The *Letters to Lucilius* are a rather popular collection, full of advice on a wide range of subjects. The *Natural Inquiries* deals primarily with **astronomy** and meteorology without much advancing the study.

There are also eight or more extant plays and a piece of comic writing called the *Apocolocyntosis Divi Claudii*, or the *Pumpkinification of the Divine Claudius*. See K. Vogt, “Seneca,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

SENSATION

See [AISTHĒSIS](#).

SENSE AND SENSIBLE OBJECTS

(Treatise by **Aristotle**.) Περί αἰσθήσεως καὶ αἰσθητῶν. Latin, *De Sensu et Sensibilia*. Abbr. *Sens*. The first treatise in the collection known as the **Parva Naturalia**. Aristotle here reviews the theories of perception proposed by some of his predecessors and develops further the account given of the special senses in the **De Anima**. See C. Shields, “Aristotle’s Psychology,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

SENSORY RECOGNITION

See [EPAISTHĒSIS](#).

SEPARATE

See [CHŌRIS](#), [CHŌRISTON](#).

SERIOUS

See [SPOUDAIOS](#).

SEVENTH LETTER

Included in the collection of **Plato**’s writings are 13 letters ascribed to Plato. Most of these letters are clearly forgeries, but one or two might be genuine, or at least forged by someone with extremely good inside information about the events discussed. Perhaps the most important of those is the “seventh letter,” a document with very detailed information about Plato’s relationships with the **Syracusan** royal family and some significant pointers about how to read the dialogues.

See V. B. Lewis, "The Seventh Letter and the Unity of Plato's Political Philosophy," *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 38, no. 2 (2000): 231–250.

SEXTIUS, QUINTUS

(1st BCE–1st CE.) Founded a school in **Rome** that drew on both **Stoicism** and **Pythagoreanism**. An ascetic and vegetarian, he left the school to his son. His student **Sotion** (1st CE) taught **Seneca**, who has words of high praise for Sextius' philosophy (*Epistles*, lxiv, 3).

SEXTUS EMPIRICUS

(2nd to 3rd CE.) The writings of Sextus Empiricus are a major source of our understanding of philosophical Skepticism during the Roman imperial period. Indeed, his critiques of other philosophical positions are among our best sources for those philosophies as well. His extant works include *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*, *Against the Logicians*, *Against the Physicists*, *Against the Ethicists*, and *Against the Professors*; the latter four titles are sometimes taken together as one work, *Against the Mathematicians*. His entire opus is, in any case, directed at refuting all forms of dogmatism and attaining a life of **ataraxia**, or freedom from disturbance. We learn from his extant writings that he was, in addition, a practicing physician of the Empiricist school (thus the appellation "Empiricus"). See B. Morrison, "Sextus Empiricus," *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

See also [SKEPTIKOS](#).

SEXTUS OF CHAERONEA

(c. 160 CE.) **Stoic**, nephew or grandson (*nepos*) of **Plutarch**, a teacher of **Marcus Aurelius** (**Philostratus**, *Vit. Soph.* II.9). Marcus speaks highly of him in the *Meditations* (I.9). Apuleius also mentions him favorably at the beginning of *The Golden Ass* (1.2). For "Chaeronea," see [PLUTARCH OF CHAERONEA](#).

SHAPE

See [SCHĒMA](#).

SIDON

City on the coast of Lebanon between Beirut and **Tyre**, 33°33'38"N 35°23'53"E. Two philosophers named **Boethus of Sidon** hailed from there, as well as **Zeno of Sidon**.

SIGN

See [SĒMEION](#).

SIMILAR

See [HOMOIOS](#).

SIMMIAS OF THEBES

Σίμμιας. (5th–4th BCE.) **Socratic**. In **Plato's** *Phaedo*, he

is a leading participant, with **Cebes**. In the **dialogue**, he proposes the “harmony” theory of the soul (92–95). He is also mentioned in the ***Phaedrus*** (242b), ***Crito*** (45b), and Letter 13. **Diogenes Laertius** includes him in his *Lives* (II.124). He may have been a student of **Philolaus**.

See also **THEBES**.

SIMON THE SHOEMAKER

Σίμων Ἀθηναῖος, σκυτοτόμος. (Late 5th BCE.) **Socratic**. **Diogenes Laertius** includes him in the *Lives* (II.105), saying that he wrote down the conversations that he had with Socrates, making those some of the first “Socratic **dialogues**” committed to writing. **Phaedo of Elis** wrote a dialogue entitled “Simon”; some thought Simon was an invented character, but archaeologists have found the remains of a cobbler’s shop in the ancient agora with a pot inscribed *simonos*, “Simon’s.” **Cynics** of the 2nd and 3rd centuries CE idealized Simon, writing letters purporting to be from him to others (e.g., *Socratic Epistle* 12).

SIMONIDES OF CEOS

Σίμωνιδης ὁ Κεῖος. (c. 556–468 BCE.) Lyric poet who inspired philosophical reflection. In ***Republic*** I, 331, **Polemarchus** cites Simonides in defense of the thesis that justice is giving each person his due (Polemarchus does not have a subtle understanding of Simonides’ point). In the ***Protagoras***, **Protagoras** claims that Simonides contradicts himself in one of his poems, and a long discussion ensues that demonstrates at least that **Socrates** has a subtle understanding of Simonides’ points. **Aristotle** cites him rather frequently, most tellingly at ***Metaphysics*** I.2, 892b30, where he takes issue with Simonides’ claim that “God alone can have this privilege” of possessing **wisdom**. See Boedeker & Sider, *The New Simonides*, 2001.

SIMPLICIUS

Σιμπλικιος. (c. 490–560 CE.) Simplicius was from **Cilicia**, in what is now Turkey. He studied with **Ammonius** (d. after 538) in **Alexandria** and with **Damascius** in **Athens**. When **Justinian** closed the school of Athens in 529, Simplicius and others took refuge in Persia; a peace treaty between Justinian and the Persian king Chosroes allowed Simplicius to return to the Eastern Roman Empire. According to some scholars, he chose to live in Harran (in southeast Turkey, near the Syrian border) where he proceeded to write his commentaries. There are extant commentaries on **Epictetus’ *Encheiridion*** and **Aristotle’s *Categories*, *De Caelo*, *De Anima*, and *Physics***.

Others of his works are lost. Simplicius' commentaries are often a valuable source for information about the entire history of Greek philosophy, since he generously quotes large chunks of material not available elsewhere. He is, for example, responsible for the preservation of most of the first part of the poem of **Parmenides**. See H. Baltussen, *Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius*, 2008.

SIRO THE EPICUREAN

(c. 50 BCE.) Taught in Naples; Virgil was one of his students (Virgil, *Catalepton* 5, 8). **Cicero** mentions him with **Philodemus** (*De Fin.* II.35).

SKEPSIS, SCEPSIS

Σκῆψις. Scepsis was near Assos, at 39°51'10"N 26°48'13"E, Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #792.

Coriscus and **Erastus of Scepsis** were brothers who studied with **Plato** and became friends with **Aristotle**. **Neleus**, son of Coriscus, apparently inherited a lot of manuscripts of Aristotle and hid them in his basement where they were eventually discovered by agents of **Sulla** and thus were eventually published, or so goes the story.

SKEPTIC, SKEPTICISM

See [SKEPTIKOS](#).

SKEPTIKOS

Σκεπτικός. Skeptic. Derived from the verb *skeptesthai*, σκέπτεσθαι, "to consider carefully," the *skeptikos* is a person who reflects so thoroughly that he does not come to any conclusions. **Pyrrho of Elis** (c. 360–270 BCE) gets credit for establishing the Skeptical manner of doing philosophy, although one might argue that a good many of predecessors, not least **Socrates**, often seemed quite "skeptical" in the sense that we generally understand the term.

Plato's Academy became a center for Skepticism beginning with the **Scholarch Arcesilaus** (c. 316–c. 241 BCE) and his successors, notably **Carneades** (214/3–129/8 BCE). It is not that difficult to conclude, from a reading of Plato's **dialogues**, that one should not make claims to knowledge (*epistēmē*); after all, many of the dialogues are purely aporetic, and Plato's Socrates repeatedly reduces those who do claim some form of knowledge to speechlessness. Arcesilaus, Carneades, and the others wielded the **dialectical** skills learned from close study of Socrates' techniques against the pretenses to knowledge emanating from the **Stoic** school.

Academic Skeptics typically argued on both sides of every issue, with the goal of demonstrating that one would be best

off to suspend belief rather than commit to one side of the debate or the other.

Aenesidemus, a student of **Philo of Larissa**, broke with the Academy in the 1st century CE and established his own Skeptical school in **Alexandria**, claiming Pyrrho of Elis as his spiritual inspiration. He formulated the Ten Modes of Skepticism, preserved by Sextus Empiricus and others:

- Why should we suppose that our way of perceiving the world is more accurate than the way other species of animals perceive the world? Think: dogs and rotten fish.
- Even people do not agree with each other: different philosophies make radically incompatible assertions.
- In fact you do not really agree with yourself—something that looks delicious can taste awful.
- Your emotional and physical state radically affects how you perceive things.
- How you are related to the object perceived (spatially, etc.) makes a big difference in how it looks or sounds.
- Everything is experienced via a medium, which has unknown influences on the result.
- Proportion makes a big difference in how you perceive things—a little hot sauce is delicious; a lot makes the food inedible.
- We always perceive things in relation to something else.
- How we perceive things often depends on our previous experience with things that we take as similar.
- People evaluate the same things in radically different ways: some think that gay marriage is normal, others that it is an abomination.

See Annas and J. Barnes, *The Modes of Skepticism*,

1985.

SKOPOS

Σκοπός. Target. At **Gorgias** 507d, **Socrates** tells **Callicles** about the “target” that one should aim at in one’s life. For Aristotle, it is a synonym of *telos* (e.g., **Politics** VII.13, 1331b27, happiness starts with choosing the right *telos* or *skopos*). The **Stoics** use this word to refer to the goal or end of human life; that is, **eudaimonia** or living in accordance with nature may be said to be the “target” of human life. **Panaetius** says that people achieve their “target” in different ways, just as there are different parts of the target aimed at by the archer.

SLAVE, SLAVERY

See [DOULOS](#), [DOULEIA](#).

SMYRNA

Σμύρνη. City now known as Izmir in Ionia, 38°25'7"N 27°8'21"E, Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #867. It underwent considerable "urban renewal" in the Hellenistic period and became an important center of commerce, enhanced by their early allegiance to **Rome**. Close to the time of its Hellenistic rise, **Hermippus** the **Peripatetic** came from Smyrna, but the real philosophical flowering happened in the late 1st and early 2nd CE: **Galen**, who hailed from **Pergamon**, to the north of Smyrna, studied **Platonism** with **Albinus** in Smyrna; **Polemon of Laodicea** directed a school of rhetoric in Smyrna; and **Theon**, a Pythagorean mathematician came from there. In the 4th century, **Nymphidianus** and **Maximus**, **Neoplatonist** brothers, called Smyrna home.

SOCRATES' DREAM

There are at least three places in the dialogues where Socrates reports that he has had a dream. At **Crito** 44 he tells **Crito** that he dreamed of a beautiful woman, dressed in white, who came to him and told him, "May you arrive at fertile Phthia on the third day." Both Socrates and Crito take it as an omen of his impending death. In the **Phaedo** 60–61 he reports that he has frequently had a dream telling him to "make music and work at it" (μουσικὴν ποιεῖ καὶ ἐργάζου). Although he previously took it that the dream encouraged him to keep doing philosophy, just to be safe, while in prison he decided to put Aesop into verse and to compose a hymn to Apollo. In the **Theaetetus**, 201ff., he reports a dream that the objects of knowledge are composed of unknowable elements.

See also [MOUSIKĒ](#), [TA MOUSIKA](#); [ONEIROS](#); [STOICHEION](#), [STOICHEIA](#).

SOCRATES OF ATHENS

Σωκράτης. (469–399 BCE.) His father was Sophroniscus, a sculptor, and his mother was Phaenarete, a midwife. He was married to Xanthippe and had three sons. Socrates fought as a hoplite at Potidaea (432–429), Delion (424), and Amphipolis (422); served as president of the Assembly in 406; and presided at the trial of the generals defeated at Arginusae in 404. In 399 he refused the order of the oligarchy to participate in a posse arresting Leon of Salamis. On the restoration of the democracy in 399, he was accused of "corrupting the young" and of "impiety" by Meletus, Anytus, and Lycon and was convicted and executed as outlined by **Plato** in the series of dialogues **Euthyphro**, **Apology**, **Crito**, and **Phaedo**.

Xenophon's *Apology* also recounts, in its fashion, the trial and death of Socrates.

Socrates appears as protagonist in most of Plato's dialogues and in Xenophon's *Memorabilia* and *Symposium*. It is rather difficult to disentangle a picture of the historical Socrates from those representations. A kind of evidence that might help is the fact that a character named "Socrates" appears in several comic plays, notably **Aristophanes'** *Clouds*, *Frogs*, and *Birds*. If one starts from the assumption that Aristophanes is depicting Socrates in his forties and Plato and Xenophon are depicting Socrates in his sixties, more or less, one might triangulate to arrive at one's own impression of the philosopher. Among **Aristotle's** various comments on Socrates, two stand out for their usefulness in locating his historical importance: "In the time of Socrates, progress was made in defining the essence and entity, but investigation into nature went out of fashion, and philosophers turned to useful virtues and politics" (*Parts of Animals* 642a29). "Socrates, disregarding the physical universe and confining his study to moral questions, sought here for the universal and was the first to concentrate upon definition; Plato followed him and assumed that the problem of definition is concerned not with any sensible thing but with entities of another kind" (*Metaphysics* I.6, 987b1). Some characteristics of Socrates that seem to have a reality beyond the fictions include:

- The **daimonion**: Socrates claimed to have his own special **angel** that occasionally warned him not to do something or other. More than what we would call a "conscience," the *daimonion* may have been what psychiatrists today would call an auditory hallucination.
- In the *Apology* he claims that the Delphic Oracle had responded to a question posed by **Chaerephon** that Socrates was the wisest man in Greece. Since he did not believe that he had any particular wisdom, he took it that the wisdom to which the Oracle referred was that consciousness of ignorance. In the *Apology*, he says that that was the inspiration of his quizzing various people in **Athens**, demonstrating that they did not know what they thought they knew.
- In any case, Socrates is often depicted persuading his interlocutors to state their most fundamental beliefs, and then demonstrating that those beliefs are incoherent or inconsistent with each other. Very frequently the challenge that proves insurmountable is a demand that

one define one's terms.

- Occasionally Socrates does claim to know something (after all), notably about love (**erōs**). He does offer definitions of love, both in the **Symposium** (a definition he says he got from **Diotima**) and in the **Phaedrus**.
- When he finds a sympathetic and cooperative interlocutor, he sometimes gets a fair number of accepted ideas from them; this process is called, in the **Theaetetus**, “midwifery,” as if he were helping his interlocutors give birth to ideas just as his mother had helped women give birth to babies.
- The allegiance of Socrates to the Delphic Apollo extends to his enthusiastic acceptance of the motto of that deity, “Know thyself” (*gnōthe seauton*). Socrates clearly aimed at helping people know themselves, first and foremost.
- Some supposedly paradoxical moral positions are attributed to Socrates on the basis of the dialogues: “Virtue (**aretē**) is knowledge, vice is ignorance, wrongdoing is (therefore) involuntary.”
- **Cicero** says of his work: **philosophia de caelo devocata**, “philosophy was called down out of heaven.” See, for example, D. Nails, “Socrates,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

SOCRATICS

This word is used of people known to have associated with **Socrates**, especially those who founded philosophical schools or wrote works influenced by the teaching of Socrates. Examples of followers of Socrates include **Plato**, **Xenophon**, **Antisthenes**, **Aristippus of Cyrene**, **Critias**, Cleombrotus, **Euclides of Megara**, **Aeschines of Sphettus**, **Phaedo**, Callias, **Hermogenes**, Critoboulos, Apollodorus, Epigenes, Menexenus, **Crito**, **Chaerephon**, Charmides, **Alcibiades**, **Simmias**, **Cebes**, Phaedondes, Terpsion of **Megara**, Glaucon, and Nicias. To some extent it is possible to reconstruct the thought of the historical Socrates, as distinguished from the Socrates of Plato's **dialogues**, by looking at the teachings of his other successors. When one does that, one is tempted to agree with Søren Kierkegaard (*Concept of Irony*) that Socrates was fortunate in having been misunderstood in so many different ways. See P. Van der Waerdt, ed., *The Socratic Movement*, 1994.

There were two important cities named Soli (Σόλοι) in the ancient world. One was a port city on the south coast of Cilicia, in what is now Turkey, about 30 km west of **Tarsus**; the other was on the north coast of Cyprus; according to legend, this one was laid out by the Athenian statesman **Solon** during his 10-year exile, hence its name. **Chrysippus**, the great **Stoic** philosopher, is said to be from Soli. Other philosophical notables include **Aratus of Soli** and his brother **Athenodorus**, the **Peripatetic Clearchus of Soli**, and **Crantor** the **Academic**.

SOLON OF ATHENS

Σόλων. (c. 635–558 BCE.) Poet and political reformer. Solon replaced the Athenian law code attributed to Drako with a system that provided for a mix of democratic and oligarchic elements and reformed the economic system. Having provided the law code, Solon left in voluntary exile for some 10 years, during which time Peisistratus gained political ascendancy in **Athens**, while respecting, for the most part, the Solonic provisions. Solon figures in **Plato's** ***Timaeus*** as the person who learned from the **Egyptian** priests the story of the destruction of **Atlantis**. **Plutarch of Chaeronea** claims that he did indeed spend some time studying with Egyptian priests (*Life of Solon* 26). See R. Owens, *Solon*, 2010.

SOLUTION

See [LYSIS](#).

SŌMA

Σῶμα. Body. For the **pre-Socratics**, *sōma* is, for one thing, that which occupies **space**; typically also, the elements (***stoicheia***: **earth**, **air**, **fire**, and **water**) or the atoms (***atoma***) of **Leucippus** and **Democritus** are thought of as *sōmata*.

For human beings one finds an analysis into body and soul, *sōma* and ***psychē***. In the ***Cratylus*** (400b–c), **Socrates** suggests that some people thought that the *sōma* is the *sēma* of the soul, an ambiguous word that can mean either “tomb” or “sign.” He goes on to attribute to the **Orphics** a derivation of *sōma* from the verb *sōzetai*, kept or saved, in that the soul is “kept” in the body until “the penalty is paid.”

In the ***Timaeus***, Plato derives the classical elemental “bodies” from triangles formed into regular solids (53ff.). In general, however, he is more interested in human bodies, and their relationship to souls. In the ***Phaedo***, for example, Socrates, about to die, assures his friends and associates that he will be well rid of his body, that the body is a kind of prison that distracts the mind. In the latter part of the ***Timaeus***, for

example, a more complex relationship of soul and body is presented, arguing that many “mental” illnesses can be attributed to bodily conditions (86b ff.).

In the ***Sophist***, at 246ff., the **Eleatic** Stranger discusses with **Theaetetus** the history of theories about body in a passage called the Battle of the Gods and Giants: the Giants are those who believe that only bodily things are real, while the Gods believe in incorporeal Forms and souls.

Aristotle has a great deal to say about all the senses of *sōma*, from the mathematical sense (three-dimensional object; ***Metaphysics*** V.13), to the basic physical sense (you cannot have two bodies in the same place at the same time; *Generation and Corruption* I.8, 321a8), to the body of astronomical entities (***De Caelo*** I.3) and the four terrestrial elements, to the bodies of living animals. One might well say that Aristotle’s philosophy is focused on bodily existence, not reductively, but in all aspects of the capacities of bodily entities to function in their environments.

See also [ASŌMATON](#).

SOPATER OF APAMEA

Σώπατρος. (4th CE.) **Neoplatonist** and **Sophist**. Student of **Iamblichus**, he went to **Constantinople** where he associated with Constantine I. Eventually Constantine had him executed (**Eunapius**, *Lives of the Sophists*).

See also [APAMEA](#).

THE SOPHIST

(Dialogue by **Plato**.) Σοφιστής. Abbr. *Soph*. The day after the **Theaetetus**, **Socrates**, Theodorus, **Theaetetus**, and an age-mate of Theaetetus also named Socrates meet with a visitor from **Elea**, the **Eleatic** Stranger. Socrates asks whether the **Sophist**, the statesman, and the philosopher are the same or distinct. The Stranger proceeds to look for a definition of the Sophist in this dialogue, and of the statesman or *politikos* in the following dialogue (see [THE STATESMAN](#)); this is not followed by a philosopher dialogue.

Using a method called “collection and division,” the Stranger first compares the Sophist to an angler, with the provisional conclusion that the Sophist is a hunter of men for spurious education (223). Or a wholesaler in merchandise of the soul concerned with speech and the knowledge of virtue (224). Or a retailer of the knowledge of virtue. Or a fabricator of the knowledge of virtue. Or a moneymaker via eristic.

Focusing on “purification,” the Stranger gives a description of the “Sophist of Noble Lineage” that looks to

many readers like a description of Socrates himself. Further collections and divisions come to the conclusion that Sophists are producers of imitations, illusions. How can we talk about things that appear but are not? How can we talk intelligibly about images?

This leads to an extended discussion of **pre-Socratic** notions of reality, **ousia**. We are caught in an ongoing struggle, the “Battle of the Gods and Giants”—the Giants are the materialists, and the Gods are the believers in the Forms. We need to be able to account for both motion and rest, being and becoming. The philosopher, suggests the Stranger, knows how to do this; the Sophist, in contrast, “takes refuge in the darkness of non-being.” See M. L. Gill, “Method and Metaphysics in Plato’s Sophist and Statesman,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

See also [ASÔMATON](#); [DIAIRĒSIS](#); [EIDŌLON](#); [HETERON](#); [KATHARSIS](#); [MIMĒSIS](#); [PARMENIDES OF ELEA](#); [SYMPLOKĒ EIDŌN](#); [SYNAGEIN](#), [SYNAGŌGĒ](#), [SYNAKTIKOS](#).

SOPHISTĒS, SOPHISTAI; SOPHISTIKĒ TECHNĒ

Σοφιστής, Σοφισταί, σοφιστικὸς τέχνη. Sophist, Sophists; the Sophistic art: sophistry. A Sophist is a person who claims to teach *sophia* (see [SOPHOS](#), [SOPHOI](#), [SOPHIA](#)).

Theoretically that would mean any instruction in any advanced skill, and some Sophists claimed to teach a significant range of different sorts of things—**Hippias of Elis**, for example, appeared at the Olympic Games decked out in resplendent clothing and jewelry of his own manufacture, and **Euthydemus** and Dionysodorus in the **Euthydemus** claim to teach fighting in armor. But in general, Sophists were teachers of verbal argumentation. Since they were teaching their students to defend their own positions (whatever they might be), they often did not try to support positive theses of their own.

We are acquainted with the older Sophists primarily through **Plato’s dialogues**; **Socrates** is represented demonstrating defects in Sophistic stands repeatedly. In the **Protagoras**, Socrates demonstrates to the young Hippocrates that Protagoras actually knows little about virtue (**aretē**), so it is pointless to study with him—although we know that Protagoras had many apparently satisfied customers. Although his fees were high, Protagoras told his students that if they were willing to go into a temple and swear that they had not learned anything from him, they would not have to pay

him.

In the *Theaetetus*, Socrates examines and refutes the relativism implied by Protagoras' famous statement, "Human beings are the measure of all things: of the things that are, that they are, and of the things that are not, that they are not."

Socrates reveals the moral relativism consequent on the teaching of **Gorgias** in the *Gorgias*; demonstrating the inherent contradictions in the positions of **Thrasymachus** gets the argument of the *Republic* going. Ultimately if we judge the art of the Sophists by what we read in Plato's dialogues, we might reach the conclusion that the Sophists are hapless purveyors of invalid arguments. Still, many have been inspired to take the part of the Sophists against Socrates. Plato himself, as an honest dramatist, is often more sympathetic to the Sophists than one might suppose at first glance. Indeed, in his dialogue the *Sophist* there is a description of a person called "the Sophist of noble lineage" that seems very like the Socrates of the **eristic** dialogues. Still, the conclusion of this dialogue is that the Sophist deals in appearance rather than reality.

Aristotle follows this line of interpretation, for example in *Metaphysics* IV.2, where he says, "Dialectic is merely critical where philosophy claims to know, and sophistic is what appears to be philosophy but is not" (1004b25). His book, *Sophistical Refutations*, part of the **Organon** (or *Logical Works*), examines arguments that appear to be valid but are not. An example of one sort of argument he has in mind as "sophistical" is this: "If x belongs to y, then x is the property of y; human beings belong to the animal kingdom; therefore human beings are the property of the animal kingdom" (cf. *SE* 17, 176b).

Despite their bad press from Plato and Aristotle, the role of Sophist as teacher of rhetoric (*rhētorikē*) and argumentation was considerably revived in the 1st century CE and continued strongly through the rest of antiquity and into the **Byzantine** period, a movement known as the Second Sophistic. Among the many illustrious Sophists in this period were **Philostratus** and **Herodes Atticus**. A valuable source for Sophists (and others) in late antiquity is **Eunapius**, *Lives of the Sophists*. One might well argue that the Sophistic art remains a large part of post-secondary education even today. See T. Whitmarsh, *The Second Sophistic*, 2005.

SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS

(Treatise by **Aristotle**.) Σοφιστικοὶ Ἐλεγχοί. Latin, *De*

Sophisticis Elenchis. Abbr. *Soph. El.*, *SE*. The final treatise in Aristotle's **Organon**, *Soph. El.* discusses several fallacies. Modern logicians tend to divide fallacies into "formal" and "informal." Aristotle rather distinguishes linguistic and material fallacies. See S. Schreiber, *Aristotle on False Reasoning*, 2003.

SOPHOS, SOPHOI, SOPHIA

Σοφός, σοφοί, σοφία. A *sophos* is a wise or able person; *sophoi* is the plural form; *sophia* is the abstract noun, denominating wisdom or an admired ability. A person skilled in any art can be called a *sophos*. Before "philosophy" came into existence, there were people noted for their wisdom and talents; lists were made of these "**sages**," and people memorized their pithy sayings. The practice of writing down collections of wise advice was widespread throughout the literate eastern Mediterranean region. The biblical Ecclesiastes is an excellent example of the genre; among the several **Egyptian** examples we might note especially the *Instructions of Amenemope*. The Babylonians too had a wisdom literature of this kind. Some of the earliest people that make it onto our lists of ancient Greek philosophers were also on the list of *sophoi*; **Thales** is an excellent example.

Around 500 BCE there was the beginning of a change in attitude about "wisdom" in the Greek world. **Pythagoras** is said to have refused the title *sophos*, preferring to call himself **philosophos**, lover of wisdom, aware that he did not possess the wisdom to which he aspired. **Heraclitus** (f. 41) says that "wisdom is one thing, to know the thought that steers all things through all things." The wisdom of the Seven Sages, and of the various wisdom literatures, tended to be practical or at least applicable to one's life; the wisdom of Pythagoras and Heraclitus, as well as other early philosophers, was transcendent and not necessarily focused on practical application. Perhaps the extreme case of theoretical "wisdom" (without, however, using any form of the word *sophia*) among the **pre-Socratics** is that of **Parmenides**; it is worth noticing that the immediate successors of the **Eleatics** took those conclusions very seriously.

Democritus says quite a lot about *sophia*: for example, "Medicine cures diseases of the body; wisdom rids the soul of **passions**" (f. 31). Of course the **Sophists** also say a lot about *sophia*, since they claim to be able to teach "wisdom" to their students. In some respects the wisdom of the Sophists is a continuation of the ancient wisdom literature tradition in the

respect that they believed that their teaching would enable their students to get along better in society and in positions of authority. But the Sophists are distinguished by their strong tendency to various sorts of relativism, whether social or individual, epistemological or moral.

Socrates in the ***Apology*** famously denies that anyone is wise, via the story that the Delphic Oracle, when asked whether Socrates was the wisest person in Greece, responded “yes”; Socrates took the oracle to mean that the only sort of wisdom available to mortal human beings would be the sort that he had, being quite sure that he was not wise. We note that in his attempt to find a wise person, he says in the *Apology* that he interviewed poets and craftsmen, two classes of individuals traditionally regarded to have *sophia* in a narrow sense, but even there he was disappointed, he says, because those people claimed to have knowledge that they clearly did not have, and that, from a Socratic point of view, immediately disqualified them from being “wise.”

Of the many **Platonic** texts that focus on *sophia*, we refer here only to the most famous, the ***Republic***, in which *sophia* is the cardinal virtue of the mind (*nous*) and of the philosopher-rulers, ensuring that each faculty of the soul and each class of participants in the ideal state does its proper job in harmony with the other elements of the soul and state, so as to bring about the just individual and the just state. We are led to understand that *sophia* is to be gained by coming into full cognition of the Forms (*eidē*), the intended outcome of the education of the future philosopher-rulers outlined by Socrates in this text.

Aristotle, in ***Nicomachean Ethics*** VI.7, 1141a9, points out the distinction between *sophia* as skill in the arts and a more general intellectual virtue, “the most finished of the forms of knowledge,” involving both knowledge of first principles and of what follows from those principles. In the context, he needs to distinguish *sophia* from *phronēsis*, since *phronēsis* is the intellectual basis of *praxis*. In the ***Metaphysics***, he can focus entirely on the sorts of principles and derivations that one must know in order to be counted truly wise. “Such a knowledge **God** alone can have, or God above all others” (*Metaph.* I.2, 983a9). One may describe the work that we call the *Metaphysics* Aristotle’s attempt to present whatever he can of that divine knowledge.

In **Stoic** philosophy, *sophia* and the *sophos* occupy an even more special role, if that is possible. **Seneca** (*Letters*

89.4) puts it this way: “Wisdom is the good of the human mind (*nous*) brought to perfection; philosophy is the love and pursuit of wisdom; it strives for the goal that wisdom has achieved.” Stoicism presents the image of the *sophos*, the sage, the person who has achieved this intellectual and moral perfection, and then goes on to say that everyone else is seriously imperfect.

SŌPHROSYNĒ

Σωφροσύνη. Temperance, moderation, self-control, mental health. In the *Odyssey*, when Odysseus’ old nurse first tells Penelope about the carnage Odysseus and Telemachus have wreaked among the suitors, Penelope responds, “Dear nurse, the gods have made thee mad, they who can make foolish even one who is full wise, and set the simple-minded in the paths of understanding (*sōphrosynē*); it is they that have marred thy wits, though heretofore thou wast sound of mind.” The word (in verb form) appears again in **Herodotus** III.35 in a story about Cambyses. Cambyses asks his hit man, Prexaspes, what the Persians think of him; Prexaspes responds that some of them think that he drinks too much. Cambyses takes it that the Persians are saying that he is out of his mind. “We will see about that,” he responds. “You see your son there standing on the porch; if I can shoot him with my bow and hit him in the heart, the Persians are wrong; if I miss, they are right and I am not in my right mind (*mē sōphronein*).” Of course Cambyses hit his target, demonstrating that he was a good shot, but definitely not *sōphrōn*.

Sōphrosynē is discussed in some detail in **Plato’s** ***Charmides***, though inconclusively—perhaps we can take away the idea that it does involve some form of self-knowledge. In other Platonic dialogues, for example the ***Republic***, it is taken to be the virtue (*aretē*) of the appetitive part of the soul (*psychē*), that is, moderation of the appetites. In the ***Ethics***, **Aristotle** makes it very clear that he thinks of *sōphrosynē* as the mean between overindulgence and underindulgence in food, drink, and sex. It is the virtue of satisfying one’s appetites to the right degree, at the right time, in the right manner.

We may note that in Plato’s ***Laws*** (908a), one of the institutions of incarceration is called the *sōphronistērion*, or place for inculcating *sōphrosynē*. The modern linguistic equivalent is “Reformatory.” See H. North, *Sophrosyne*, 1966.

See also [EPITHYMIA](#).

SORANUS OF EPHEBUS

(1st–2nd CE.) Physician of the Methodist school. His four-volume textbook on *Gynecology* is extant, as is a complete Latin translation of his *Acute and Chronic Diseases*. He also wrote biographies of important medical people; his *Life of Hippocrates* is our best source of information about the father of medicine. He is included here because he makes an attempt to include causal explanations relying on philosophers of science known to him. His works are available online.

See also [EPHEBUS](#); [IATROS](#), [IATRIKĒ](#).

SOSIGENES OF ALEXANDRIA

(1st BCE.) **Pliny the Elder** names him as the astronomer consulted by Julius Caesar for the design of the Julian calendar (*Natural History* II.6, 18, 210–212).

See also [ALEXANDRIA](#).

SOSIGENES THE PERIPATETIC

(End of 2nd CE.) Tutor of **Alexander of Aphrodisias**, he wrote on **astronomy**, *On Revolving Spheres*. According to **Simplicius**' commentary on **Aristotle's** *De Caelo*, he found the epicycle theory implausible.

SOSIPATRA

(4th CE.) **Neoplatonist** chronicled by **Eunapius**. Eunapius implies that she was schooled in **Chaldean** lore by two mystical beings; anyway, she married **Eustathius of Cappadocia** with whom she had three sons, one of whom was **Antoninus**, also a philosopher. After Eustathius died she moved to **Pergamon** where she taught with **Aedesius**. Eunapius also recounts her skill in **magic**. She is supposed to have been born in **Ephesus**.

See also [WOMEN IN ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY](#).

SOTION OF ALEXANDRIA

Σωτίων. **(1)** (c. 200–170 BCE.) **Doxographer**, an important source for **Diogenes Laertius** (e.g., proem 1, 7; II.12, 26; V.86; X.4), **Athenaeus** (e.g., IV.162e, VIII.336d), and **Eunapius**. He organized philosophers into successions or schools of philosophy. **(2)** (1st CE.) Student of **Quintus Sextius** in **Rome**, **Pythagorean**, and teacher of **Seneca**. Seneca writes approvingly of Sotion's commitment to vegetarianism on the basis of transmigration of the soul, for example at *Ep.* cviii, 20–21.

SOUL

See [PSYCHĒ](#).

SOURCE

See [ARCHĒ](#).

SOURCE OF MOVEMENT

See [ARCHĒ KINĒSEŌS](#).

SPACE

See [CHŌRA](#); [TOPOS](#).

SPARTA

Σπάρτα. 37°4'N 22°26'E. Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #345.

Dominant power in the Peloponnesus during the classical period, adversary of Athens in the Peloponnesian War, Sparta is often discussed by ancient philosophers, for example, **Aristotle**, *Politics* II.9. The territory of Sparta is known as Laconia or Lacedaemonia; Spartans are often called Lacedaemonians in ancient texts.

See also [DEMETRIUS OF LACONIA](#); [SPHAERUS \(Σφαῖρος\) OF BOSPORUS \(OR BORYSTHENES\)](#); [TARENTUM](#); [TIMYCHA OF SPARTA](#); [XENOPHON OF ATHENS](#).

SPECIES

See [EIDOS](#), [EIDĒ](#).

SPERMA

Σπέρμα. Seed. Primarily the seed of plants, but the word is often used metaphorically for the origin of something; **Anaxagoras** uses the word for one level of his analysis of the material structure of the world. The word is also used of male semen, although when a biologically aware individual like **Aristotle** is writing carefully, the word for semen is *gonē*.

SPERMATIKOS LOGOS

Σπερματικός λόγος. In **Stoic** philosophy, rational form present in **matter**, the cause of emergent properties of complex entities. **Justin Martyr** appropriated the phrase to argue that the “seeds” of Christianity were present in some of the pre-Christian philosophers.

See also [LOGOS](#).

SPEUSIPPUS

Σπεύσιππος. (c. 410–340 BCE.) **Plato**’s nephew and heir, Speusippus became **Scholarch** of the **Academy** upon his uncle’s death in 348. Although **Diogenes Laertius** provides a “life” of Speusippus, it is difficult to figure out from that account the extent to which Speusippus may have agreed or disagreed with Plato on various issues. **Aristotle** mentions Speusippus’ name in connection with his views twice in the *Metaphysics*: VII.2, 1028b21, and XII.7, 1072b31. In the first of these passages he says that while Plato posited Forms (*eidē*), the objects of mathematics (*mathēmata*), and the entity of perceptible bodies, Speusippus “started from the One, making

archai for each kind of entity, one for numbers, one for spatial magnitudes, and another for souls.” From that we would at least figure that Speusippus did *not* believe in Platonic Forms, but that he was within the **Pythagorean** ambit in his ontology. That supposition is supported by the other *Metaphysics* passage, where Aristotle says that “the Pythagoreans and Speusippus” are wrong to claim that **beauty** and goodness are not present in the *archē* on the ground that beauty and goodness develop as effects of the causative process.

At *Metaph.* XII.10, 1075b30, Aristotle says that “those who say that mathematical number is first and go on to generate one kind of entity after another and give different *archai* for each make the entity of the universe a series of episodes.” Scholars reasonably suppose that this is directed against Speusippus, given the earlier characterization of his views. In the same vein, compare *Metaph.* XIII.9, 1085a31, and other places in the later books of the *Metaphysics* where Aristotle is critiquing the Pythagoreanism of the contemporary Academy.

In the **Nicomachean Ethics** (I.6, 1096b6), Aristotle says that Speusippus “seems to have followed” the Pythagoreans in “putting the One in the column of goods,” rather than following the standard Platonic theory of Forms. In *EN* VII.13, 1153b5, we gather that Speusippus did not believe that pleasure is a good; putting this passage together with X.2, 1173a6, we conclude that Speusippus argued that just because pain is an evil does not show that pleasure is a good. Aristotle believes that that argument is unsuccessful. Others have concluded that Speusippus believed that both pain and pleasure are evils, and that the good is, as **Clement** reports, “unperturbedness” or **aochlēsia**. See R. Dancy, “Speusippus,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

SPHAERUS (Σφαῖρος) OF BOSPORUS (OR BORYSTHENES)

(c. 285–after 222 BCE.) **Stoic**, student of **Zeno of Citium** and **Cleanthes**, Sphaerus became the advisor of Cleomenes III, king of **Sparta**. In that position he wrote a treatise on the Spartan constitution, known only by repute. He seems to have been taken to **Alexandria** by Ptolemy Philopator in 222; **Diogenes Laertius** recounts that Ptolemy asked whether he would be guided by opinion; when Sphaerus said that he would not, Ptolemy offered him some wax pomegranates, and when Sphaerus was fooled by them, Ptolemy argued that he had believed a false proposition. Not at all, Sphaerus said; I believed the true proposition that they might be pomegranates (**Diogenes Laertius** VII.177–178).

The Bosphorus is the strait separating European from Asiatic Turkey. Borysthenes is the ancient name of the Dnieper River, and of a town at its mouth. **Bion of Borysthenes** (also) has his toponym from that river or town.

SPIRIT

See [ANIMA](#); [PNEUMA](#); [THYMOS](#).

SPONTANEOUS


See [AUTOMATON](#).

SPOUDAIOS

Σπουδαῖος. Serious, eager, excellent. In **Republic IV**, 423d, when discussing the education of the future **guardians**, **Socrates** says that they will look for a *spoudaios* offspring of the non-guardian classes. In the **Nicomachean Ethics**, Aristotle essentially makes the *spoudaios* person the standard of the ethical virtues (V.2, 1130b5, for example). Aristotle also says of laws and of states that they may be *spoudaioi*.

SQUARE OF OPPOSITION

In the treatise **On Interpretation**, **Aristotle** distinguishes four sorts of statements: universal affirmative (All S is P, or P belongs to all S; “A” on the chart), universal negative (No S is P, or P belongs to no S; “E” on this chart), particular affirmative (Some S is P, or P belongs to some S; “I” on this chart), and particular negative (Some S is not P, or P does not belong to some S; “O” on this chart). He outlines the logical relationships between these statements; later commentators arranged his comments in this chart, explaining that A and E statements are contrary to A and O, as well as E and I, and so on. It is good to get straight about that before going on to explore syllogistic arguments, which Aristotle does in the **Prior Analytics**.



STAGIRA

Στάγῖρος, Στάγῖρα. Aristotle's hometown in the Chalkidike region, 0°35'30"N 23°47'41"E, Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #613.

STARS

See [ASTĒR](#), [ASTRON](#).

STASIS

Στάσις. In a primary sense, standing, stationariness, position, state, condition (of a person). In a secondary sense, a party formed to oppose the current political order. In this sense, it is a major topic of **Aristotle's *Politics***, as he examines the causes of stability and instability of various political arrangements. It is a little paradoxical that this word can mean both lack of change and political revolution. See R. Weed, *Aristotle on Stasis*, 2007, and K. Kalimtzis, *Aristotle on Political Enmity and Disease*, 2000.

STATE

In the sense of “condition,” see [HEXIS](#); [PŌS ECHEIN](#) ([PŌS ECHŌN](#)), [PŌS ECHEIN PROS TI](#) ([PŌS ECHŌN PROS TI](#)); [SCHESIS](#); in the sense of “political structure,” see [POLIS](#).

THE STATESMAN

(Dialogue by **Plato**.) Ὁ Πολιτικός. Latin, *Politicus*. Abbr. *Pol*. A visitor from **Elea** engages **Socrates** and several of his young followers in a discussion shortly before Socrates' trial—**Theaetetus**, **Sophist**, and **Statesman** are explicitly linked, with the **Euthyphro** occurring between *Tht.* and *Soph.*, and *Pol.* followed fairly closely by Socrates' trial and the **Apology**.

The **Eleatic** Stranger engages the young Socrates (a contemporary of **Theaetetus**) in the attempt to define the “statesman” using the method of “collection and division” announced in the **Phaedrus** and practiced by the Eleatic Stranger in the **Sophist**. The Stranger proposes that there is an expertise in ruling shared by the statesman, the king, and the slave-master. This hypothesis is roundly criticized by **Aristotle** in the **Politics**, incidentally, although Plato modifies it later in this dialogue. This expertise, it is suggested, is that of rearing herd animals—and then we have a division of all sorts of herd animals, concluding (268) that the statesman is the herdsman of the human herd. But perhaps there are competitors for that role.

So the Stranger tells a **myth** that there are two processes in the universe—being wound up by **God**, and running down. There is the age of Kronos, and the age of Zeus. The age of Kronos is a kind of age of innocence, where people are directly supervised by God; we are in the age of Zeus, where human beings supervise other human beings.

The king, the Stranger suggests, would best be understood by a comparison with the art of weaving. After considerable discussion, it is agreed that the statesman weaves together the tough warp of the courageous with the

softer woof of the temperate (305). See C. J. Rowe, *Plato Statesman*, 1995; M. L. Gill, "Method and Metaphysics in Plato's *Sophist* and *Statesman*," *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

STEPHANUS (STEPHEN) OF ALEXANDRIA

(6th–7th CE.) **Neoplatonist** who converted to **Christianity**. He was "public lecturer" in the court of the emperor Heraclius (610–641 CE), on **Plato**, **Aristotle**, geometry, arithmetic, alchemy, astronomy, and music. Several of his commentaries are extant; there is also a treatise on alchemy, which may or may not be from his hand. As the emperor Heraclius marks the line between "late antiquity" and "Byzantine," so Stephanus is the scholar who bridges that line.

See also [ALEXANDRIA](#).

STERĒSIS

Στέρσις. Privation, negation, deprivation. **Aristotle** distinguishes several senses of *sterēsis* at ***Metaphysics* V.22**: a blind person, a mole, and a plant are "deprived" of sight in three different ways—plants do not have vision at all; moles are blind as a species though the genus to which they belong is normally sighted; for a blind person, the blindness is an individual characteristic, contrary to the natural disposition of the human race. Aristotle claims that there are as many kinds of *sterēsis* as there are kinds of words that can be negated. **Chrysippus** wrote a book about *sterēsis*.

STIGMĒ

Στιγμή. Point. **Aristotle** attributes to the **Pythagoreans** the thesis that "the limits of body"—surface, line, and point—are *ousiai* (***Metaphysics* VII.2**, 1028b16). If the Pythagoreans had committed themselves to the real existence of points before the time of **Zeno of Elea**, that would certainly help to explain why he argues as he does in some of his famous paradoxes.

STILPO

Στίλπων. (c. 360–280 BCE.) According to **Diogenes Laertius**, Stilpo was the most eminent member of the **Megarian school** of philosophy (II.113–120). He succeeded **Eubulides of Miletus** as head of the school. The rather slim evidence about his views seems to indicate that he propounded an ontological and linguistic theory that resembled **Eleatic** monism, defended with puzzles like those of **Zeno of Elea**; in ethical theory he pursued *ataraxia*, or freedom from disturbance, like his contemporaries the **Cynics** and his successors the **Stoics**. **Zeno of Citium** is said to have studied

with him for a period of time, possibly also **Crates of Thebes**.
STOA, STOIC SCHOOL

Στοά. The Stoic school was founded in **Athens**, in the Stoa Poikile (or Painted Porch, a shopping mall) in about 300 BCE by **Zeno of Citium**. Zeno, a Phoenician by ancestry from Cyprus, had studied with **Crates the Cynic**, **Polemo the Platonist**, **Stilpo**, and others before establishing his own philosophical school. The school seems to have attracted a significant number of members. In 261, Zeno was succeeded as **Scholarch** by **Cleanthes**, best known today as the author of the (extant) Hymn to Zeus. Cleanthes was succeeded as Scholarch by **Chrysippus**, a very prolific writer. Although we do not have any complete works by Chrysippus, we do have significant fragments, and it is apparent that a great deal of what we know about the earlier Stoics, those of the period from Zeno through Chrysippus, goes back most precisely to Chrysippus.

Panaetius was Scholarch beginning in 129 BCE; he frequently traveled to Rome, where he strongly encouraged the tendency of Roman intellectuals to favor the Stoic philosophy. He seems to have brought a good deal of **Aristotelian** doctrine into the Stoic system. **Posidonius**, one of Panaetius' students, traveled widely in the Roman world before establishing his school in **Rhodes**. Posidonius tended to synthesize Platonist themes into the Stoic system. The teachings of Panaetius and Posidonius are reflected extensively in the writings of **Cicero**.

Stoics of the Roman period provide the only complete works that we have from the Stoic school; in addition to Cicero (who might better be described as "eclectic"), we should notice the works of **Seneca**, **Epictetus**, and **Marcus Aurelius**. There are also extensive accounts or quotations of Stoic philosophy in **Diogenes Laertius**, **Galen**, and **Stobaeus**. **Plutarch of Chaeronea** wrote two extant books critiquing the Stoic philosophy from a Platonic perspective; **Sextus Empiricus** wrote extensively critiquing the Stoics from a **Skeptical** angle; **Plotinus** has a number of critical comments, and several early Christian church fathers also attacked Stoicism, although we must recognize that all of those movements, including early **Christianity**, imitated or borrowed at the same time.

Stoicism is a seriously systematic philosophy, coordinating logic (philosophy of language), physics (philosophy of nature), and **ethics** (practical philosophy) into an integrated whole. It is a materialist philosophy in the sense

that in principle anything that truly exists is a material thing. That definitely includes **God**, who is present everywhere in the material universe as creative fire and as immanent rationality. Since the physical universe is the visible manifestation of divine rationality, the Stoic believes in a rigid **determinism**.

There is, for the Stoic, no serious gap between physics and morality; both are expressions of God's thought. The goal for human beings is to conform one's life to that divine rationality; Stoicism is well known for its image of the person who achieves that goal perfectly, the **sage**, and its assertion that all who fall short of that ideal are immoral and fools.

Stoicism was attractive to the Roman leadership—it is a philosophy that offers a way of understanding one's life experiences and encourages the acceptance of whatever tasks fate may bring. A Stoic soldier or administrator may readily see himself as an instrument bringing divine order to this particular corner of the universe. See D. Baltzly, "Stoicism," *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

See also [LOGIKĒ](#); [PHYSIS](#); [HISTORIA PERI PHYSEŌS](#).

STOBAEUS, JOHN (JOHN OF STOBI)

Ἰωάννης ὁ Στοβαῖος. (Early 5th CE.) Stobaeus put together a massive anthology for the sake of educating his son. As the most popular such work in the Middle Ages, a good deal of it survived. Many of our "fragments" of various writers stem from this anthology. Since he does not quote **Christian** authors, it is assumed that he was not a Christian. The modern edition of the Greek text is by C. Wachsmuth and O. Hense (Berlin, 1884–1912) in 5 volumes. This is available online. There is no general translation, although of course various bits have been translated.

Stobi (Στόβοι) is an archaeological site in the Republic of **Macedonia**, near the present town of Gradsko, 41°33'06"N 21°58'30"E.

STOICHEION, STOICHEIA

Στοιχεῖον, στοιχεῖα. Element, elements. The primary sense of this word is the minimal sound of speech, symbolized by a letter of the alphabet, thus also a letter of the alphabet itself.

Plato seems to have been the first to apply the term *stoicheia* to the minimal components of the material and/or sensory world, in the **Theaetetus**. Subsequently **Aristotle**, **Theophrastus**, and others used the term in their interpretation of the early philosophers from **Thales** onward to characterize what those people took to be the ultimate material of the

physical universe. Thus Thales is thought to have made **water** the “element,” **Anaximander** the **indefinite**, **Anaximenes** **air**, **Heraclitus** **fire**, and **Empedocles** **earth**, water, air, and fire.

For Plato and Aristotle, at least, these so-called elements are hardly irreducible: Plato argues in the ***Timaeus*** that the four are not really “elements” on the ground that they can be divided into geometrical subunits; and Aristotle believed that they could be transformed into each other. Aristotle’s widespread use of the four Empedoclean elements in his physical writings helped to establish them as part of “normal physics” until the early modern era.

The word *stoicheia* came to be applied to the “elements” of any field whatever, whether geometry, arithmetic, or theology.

See also [MATTER](#); [PHYSIS](#); [HISTORIA PERI PHYSEŌS](#).

STRABO

Στράβων. (64 BCE–24 CE.) Author of a sizeable (largely extant) *Geography*, describing a great deal of the Roman Empire. Although he did a fair amount of traveling, many of his descriptions were based on literary sources, including **Homer**, for whom he had great respect. Modern scholars regard Strabo’s work as generally reliable, as ancient sources go. There are indications that he was trained as a **Stoic**. Strabo also wrote a massive *History*, now lost. Strabo’s *Geography* is mostly available online.

STRATO OF LAMPSACUS

Στράτων. (c. 340–268 BCE.) **Peripatetic**. Strato was a student of **Theophrastus** and became the third **Scholarch** of the **Lyceum** after the death of his teacher (**Diogenes Laertius**, *Life of Strato*). His major interest was physics; he asserted the existence of **void** within **matter** to account for differences in **weight** between objects of the same size; he also observed that falling bodies accelerate. See M.-L. DeClos and W. W. Fortenbaugh, *Strato of Lampsacus*, 2010.

See also [LAMPSACUS](#); [PHYSIS](#); [HISTORIA PERI PHYSEŌS](#)..

STRIFE

See [ERIS](#); [NEIKOS](#).

SUBSIST

See [HYPHISTASTHAI](#).

SUBSTANCE

See [OUSIA](#).

SUBSTRATUM

See [HYPOKEIMENON](#).

THE SUDA

Σοῦδα. (10th CE.) **Byzantine** encyclopedia of the ancient world, with 30,000 entries. In many cases information that we record in this dictionary is derived, at least in part, from this work. It is arranged alphabetically and is now largely available online.

SULLA

Lucius Cornelius Sulla Felix. In his 86 BCE campaign against Mithridates VI of Pontus, whose puppet was in control of **Athens**, Sulla besieged Athens, cutting down all the trees and destroying the buildings outside the walls of Athens, including the **Academy** and **Lyceum**. The Athenian schools were slow to recover. For more on Sulla, see Plutarch, “Life of Sulla,” in the Loeb Plutarch and online at Penelope, and A. Keaveney, *Sulla*, 2005.

See also [ANDRONICUS OF RHODES](#); [APELLICON OF TEOS](#); [TYRANNION OF AMISUS](#).

SUN

The sun was widely regarded as a deity in pre-classical and classical Greece—Apollo, Zeus, or Hēlios. **Hecataeus** took the **Egyptians** as identifying the sun with Osiris, and the moon with Isis (DL 1.10). The **pre-Socratic** philosophers speculated about the distance of the sun from the **earth**, its size, and its composition; that is, they took the sun as an object of scientific investigation, whether a deity or not.

Parmenides knew that the moon was “wandering around the earth shining with borrowed light” (f. 14), “always straining her eyes toward the light of the sun” (f. 15).

We get some idea of the astronomical understanding of the sun gained by the earlier natural philosophers from **Plato**’s description of the construction of the solar system at **Timaeus** 38C. At **Metaphysics** XII.8, 1073b18ff., **Aristotle** rapidly summarizes the findings of **Eudoxus**, an attempt to give a mechanical explanation of the phenomena of the sun, moon, and planets, based on the assumption of geocentrism. They were aware that some of the **Pythagoreans** had proposed a heliocentric theory, but that remained a minority opinion throughout antiquity.

SUN-LINE-CAVE

Plato’s **Republic** VI.507–VII.518 presents an analogy between the sun and its relationship to the visible world on the one hand and the Form of the Good (*to agathon*) and its relationship to the knowable world on the other, followed by an allegory sketching the progress that one may make from

guesswork on the basis of sensory images, through confidence in material objects, to true knowledge of transcendent realities. This passage is generally taken to be the epitome of Plato's metaphysical and epistemological theory.

See also *ALLĒGORIA*; *DIANOIA*; *DOXA*; *EPISTĒMĒ*; *LOGOS*; *PISTIS*.

SUSPENSION (OF BELIEF)

See *EPOCHĒ*.

SWERVE

The deviation from totally regular straight-line motion attributed to atoms (*atoma*) "falling" through space, in **Epicurean** physics.

See also *PARENKLISIS*; *PHYSIS*; *HISTORIA PERI PHYSEŌS*.

SYLLOGISM

See *SYLLOGISMOS*.

SYLLOGISMOS

Συλλογισμός. Syllogism. Literally, putting *logoi* together. In the *Theaetetus*, 186d, **Socrates** says that knowledge is "not in the experiences but in the *sylllogismos* about them." **Aristotle** adopts the word as a technical term for formalized argument structures. A standard *sylllogismos* has two premises and a conclusion that follows from the premises in virtue of a connection between the premises via a middle term. An actual example (from *Prior Analytics* II.23, 68b15): If all bileless animals are long-lived, and horses are bileless, then horses are long-lived. In a sense, the "syllogism" brings together *logoi* in the sense of definitions and demonstrates relationships between those definitions. See R. Smith, "Aristotle's Logic," *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

SYMBEBĒKOS, SYMBEBĒKOTA

Συμβεβηκός, συμβεβηκότα. **Accident, attribute**. This is a participle formed on the verb συμβαίνειν, *symbainein*, "to come together, to occur" (*sym*, together; *bainein*, go). For Aristotle, it is a technical term, defined as "that which attaches to something and can be truly asserted, but neither of necessity nor for the most part," *Metaphysics* V.30, 1025a14. *Ta symbebēkota* are non-essential attributes: that a particular musician has pale skin, for example. **Epicurus** seems to have adopted *ta symbebēkota* to refer to *essential* attributes, to refer to qualities inhering in bodies as bodies (size, shape, **weight**, motion), and applied the word *symptomata* to qualities arising through the perceptual process (color, sound, etc.)

(*Letter to Herodotus*).

SYMBOLON, SYMBOLA

Σύμβολον, σύμβολα. (*Sym*, together; *bolos*, something thrown.) **Empedocles** hypothesizes that the male and female each contribute something “*hoion symbolon*,” like a “symbol,” to sexual generation. If you break a twig, each half will fit precisely only the other half, so this was used to guarantee the bona fides of a messenger. Empedocles suggests that the male and female parents contribute something that fit the other part thus precisely and give rise to the new individual in this way. **Aristotle** occasionally uses the word to refer to parts that naturally fit together, as for example “air” (*aēr*) is composed of “fluid” and “hot” “as from *symbola*” (***Meteorologica*** II.4, 360a26).

The “identity token” sense was much extended to any method of guaranteeing the identity of the bearer, or in general to guarantees of other sorts. As a “token,” a *symbolon* may be a sign of something else, like a portent of the weather or a symptom of a disease.

In a different sense, the (somewhat mysterious) **Pythagorean** sayings, like “Do not stir the fire with a knife,” and “Do not sit on a bushel basket,” are collectively known as the *symbola*. Of course it is possible that those sayings are “tokens” of something else, some meaning that was understood by those who were initiated.

SYMBOULEUTIKOS

Συμβουλευτικός. Advisory, hortatory, deliberative. (*Sym*, together; *bouleuein*, deliberate.) Some of the “regulations” proposed in **Plato’s** ***Laws*** are “advisory” rather than compulsory, for example, 922a. In **Aristotle’s** ***Rhetoric*** I.3, one form of persuasion is “symbolleutic,” that used in advising individuals or groups.

See also [BOULEUSIS](#).

SYMMACHUS, QUINTUS AURELIUS

(347–402 CE.) Roman statesman and man of letters.

Many of his writings, including some that related to philosophical developments in his era, survive in Latin, but few have been translated into English. See C. Sogno, *Q. Aurelius Symmachus: A Political Biography*, 2006.

SYMPASCHEIN, SYMPATHEIA

Συμπάσχειν, συμπάθεια. Literally, “feeling together.” The verb may be translated “interact,” and the abstract noun not only “sympathy” but also “interaction.” In the best-ordered state of **Plato’s** ***Republic***, if one citizen is injured, the whole

state feels it, just as in an individual person, if a finger is injured, the whole person feels it (*Rep.* V.462d). **Poetry** too can arouse our sympathy (*Rep.* X.605d). **Aristotle** tended to use the word in a directly physiological sense: if the outer surface of the brain is heated or cooled there is an immediate response from the heart, “for it is most delicate in its sympathies” (***Parts of Animals*** II.7, 653b7). **Epicurus**, in *Letter to Herodotus* 50–53, also used *sympatheia* in a physical sense, that is, that perceptual movements are communicated among the atoms (***atoma***) in the body via *sympatheia*. **Chrysippus** used the “interaction” of soul (***psychē***) and body to demonstrate that the soul must be a body. **Posidonius** extended “*sympatheia*” to the cosmic scale, essentially on the grounds that the **cosmos** is one great living being. **Plotinus** also believed in cosmic sympathy and used it to explain such things as divination, **astrology**, and **magic** (***Enneads*** IV.4).

SYMPERASMA

Συμπέρασμα. Conclusion of a **syllogism** in **Aristotle’s** logic (***Prior Analytics*** I.8, 30a5, and often elsewhere); the word is also used by the **Stoics**.

See also [LOGIKĒ](#).

SYMPLOKĒ EIDŌN

Συμπλοκή εἰδῶν. Weaving together of Forms. In the ***Sophist***, the **Eleatic** Stranger describes this process in a way that has led many scholars to believe that this is an integral part of **Plato’s** metaphysical theory. The classic study, leading to several later discussions, is J. L. Ackrill, “*Symploke Eidon*,” reprinted in R. E. Allen, ed., *Studies in Plato’s Metaphysics*, 1965.

SYMPOSIUM

(Dialogue by **Plato**.) Συμπόσιον. “Symposium” means drinking party; this one celebrates the victory of Agathon for best tragedy in 416 BCE. It is decided that the participants will each speak in praise of love (***erōs***). **Phaedrus** says that love is the “oldest of the gods” and that an army composed of homosexual lovers would be unbeatable. Pausanias distinguishes two Aphrodites, Aphrodite Pandemos, or “popular” Aphrodite, and Aphrodite Urania, or “heavenly” Aphrodite, and consequently two *erōses*; the “good” *erōs*, leading to educational improvement, is associated with the heavenly. Eryximachus, a physician, speaks of *erōs* as a cosmic and physiological force that can be used by a capable physician in curing human ills. **Aristophanes** says that human beings originally had four arms and four legs, some were

male-male, some female-female, some male-female. As they were too powerful, Zeus cut them in half, and now everyone spends a lot of time and effort finding their other half. We should be wary of being cut in half again. Agathon says that love is young and beautiful, in a youthful and beautiful speech.

And then it is **Socrates'** turn. He says that he has learned about love from **Diotima**. She has taught him that love is a desire for immortality, and that true love is love of wisdom (**philosophia**), wanting to be one with the highest goods forever. When Socrates is finished, a drunken **Alcibiades** bursts in and avows his love for Socrates. See Christopher J. Rowe, tr., *Plato: Symposium*, 1993.

Xenophon also wrote a "Symposium" featuring a discussion of Socrates with friends.

See also [BEAUTY](#); [ERŌS](#); [PHILIA](#); [PHRONĒSIS](#); [THAUMA](#), [THAUMASIA](#).

SYNAGEIN, SYNAGŌGĒ, SYNAKTIKOS

Συνάγειν, συναγωγή, συνακτικός. To bring together, collect; a collection. *Synagōgē* is the title of a lost book by **Hippias of Elis** that seems to have summarized the opinions of earlier thinkers. **Plato** uses the word as something close to "induction," gathering together the examples before dividing them (**diairēsis**). This "method of collection and division" appears particularly in **Phaedrus** 265d and is applied at length in the **Sophist** and **Statesman**.

In **Stoic** usage these words mean "deduce," "deduction," and "deductive." *Synaktikos* in that context thus means approximately "deductive."

More generally *synagōgē* means a gathering of people, thus its application to Jewish temples.

SYNAITION

Συνάπτιον. Joint cause. In **Stoic** physics, a *synaition* is roughly what we call a "necessary condition" where there is some set of conditions regarded as jointly sufficient. **Aristotle** occasionally uses the word, for example at **Nicomachean Ethics** III.5, 1114b23, where we are "partly responsible" for our states of character.

See also [PHYSIS](#); [HISTORIA PERI PHYSEŌS](#).

SYNARTĒSIS

Συνάρτησις. Cohesion. In **Stoic** logic, a conditional is sound if the contradictory of the consequent conflicts with the antecedent; they call that "cohesion" (**Sextus Empiricus**, *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*, 2.112).

See also [LOGIKĒ](#).

SYNECHEIA

Συνέχεια. Continuity. **Aristotle**, *Physics* IV.13, 222a10: “The ‘now’ is the *synecheia* of time.” **History of Animals** VIII.1, 588b5: “Nature proceeds little by little from soulless things to animals so that their distinctions escape notice because of their *synecheia*.” The continuity of nature is a favorite theme of the **Stoics** as well.

See also [CHRONOS](#); [PHYSIS](#); [HISTORIA PERI PHYSEŌS](#).

SYNECHEIN

Συνέχειν. Sustain, hold together. *SYNEKTIKĒ DYNAMIS*. Συνεκτικὸς δύνάμις. Sustaining power. *SYNEKTIKON AITION*. Συνεκτικὸν αἴτιον. Sustaining cause. **Aristotle**, *Politics* II.9, 1270b17: In Sparta, the ephors “*hold* (the state) *together*.” According to the **Stoics**, *pneuma* provides the power or cause holding things together as unities.

SYNEIMARMENON

Συνειμαρμένον. Co-fated. **Chrysippus** criticized the so-called Lazy Argument that said that if everything is fated, you do not need to bother to make an effort to achieve anything. Chrysippus replied that your level of effort and your success and failure were *both* pre-determined. When a slave complained to his **Stoic** master that it was unjust to punish him because he was fated to steal from his master, the Stoic master replied, “And I was fated to beat you.”

See also [ANAGKĒ](#), [ANANKĒ](#); [DOULOS](#), [DOULEIA](#); [HEIMARMENĒ](#); [MOIRA](#).

SYNERGON (AITION)

Συνεργὸν (αἴτιον). Auxiliary (cause). In **Nicomachean Ethics** I.7, 1098a21, **Aristotle** says that given a good outline, anyone can fill it in—“time is a good discoverer or *partner* in such a work.” In **Stoic** theory of causation, a *synergon* is something that contributes to the effect being produced. The modern term “synergy” was borrowed from this usage.

SYNESIUS OF CYRENE, BISHOP OF PTOLEMAIS

Συνέσιος. (c. 373–c. 414 CE.) **Neoplatonist** student of **Hypatia** in **Alexandria**, he became politically active for his homeland and eventually was appointed bishop, even though he had not been very insistent upon his **Christianity**. A significant number of his writings survive; philosophically interesting are an essay on why he would devote himself to philosophy (in contrast to his well-attested political life), a treatise on dreams, a scientifically perceptive letter to **Hypatia**, and six hymns that are more **Neoplatonic** than Christian. His

collected works are available in the Budé series, in Greek and French, edited by Lacombrade, Garzya, and Lamoureux in six volumes, 1978–2008.

See also [CYRENE](#); [PTOLEMAIS](#).

SYNKATATHESIS

Συγκατάθεσις. (*Syn*, with; *kata*, down; *thesis*, placing.) In **Stoic** epistemology, “assent.” Knowledge follows upon assent to correct perceptions (*aisthēseis*); false opinions follow upon assent to incorrect perceptions. The wise man withholds assent from incorrect perceptions. When Ptolemy Philopator (ruler of **Egypt**) presented the Stoic philosopher **Sphaerus** with wax pomegranates and Sphaerus appeared to be fooled by them, Ptolemy gleefully pointed out that Sphaerus had assented to an incorrect perception. “Not at all,” said Sphaerus; “I assented to the perception that it was reasonable to believe that they were pomegranates” (**Diogenes Laertius** VII.177).

SYNOLON

Σύνολον. **Aristotle** uses this word for a “whole,” especially the whole body (*Parts of Animals* I.5, 645b16), and for the combination of **matter** and form (*eidōs*) that makes up an *ousia* (*Metaphysics* VII.11, 1037a30).

See also [HOLON](#).

SYNŌNYMOI

Συνώνυμοι. According to **Aristotle** in the *Categories*, if two entities share the same name, and the **definition** is the same in both cases, then they are “synonymous.”

See also [HOMŌNYMOI](#); [PARŌNYMOS](#).

SYNTHESIS

Σύνθεσις. For **Aristotle**, a *synthesis* is a combination of parts in which the parts actually change in nature as a consequence of the combination; this is distinguished from a *krasis* in which the component bits could, in principle, still be distinguished and separated. In **Epicurean** epistemology, notions can be derived from perceptions (*aisthēseis*) via *synthesis*, for example. Similarly in **Stoic** epistemology, *synthesis* is one of the activities of the faculty of imagination; an example of a result is the hippocentaur (**Diogenes Laertius** VII.53).

See also [MIGMA](#); [MIXIS](#).

SYNTHETON

Σύνθετον. Literally, put together. A “*syntheton*” is a compound, for example of elements. “The people become a monarch *syntheton* (compounded) of many” (**Aristotle**,

SYRACUSE

Συράκουσαι. Siracusa (Italian). 37°05'N 15°17'E. Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #47. Important port city on the eastern shore of Sicily. Syracuse was a dominant city in Sicily during much of the 5th and 4th centuries BCE. In 415–413, Syracuse handed **Athens** one of its most crushing defeats. **Tisias**, a Syracusan, was one of the first to write about the art of rhetoric. **Plato** visited the ruling family of Syracuse three times; those visits are an important part of his biography. **Hermodorus**, a member of Plato's academy and a source for information about early **Platonism**, probably followed him to Athens from Syracuse. **Monimus the Cynic** (4th BCE) and **Archimedes**, the great 3rd-century BCE mathematician, were Syracusans.

See also [RHĒTORIKĒ](#); [SEVENTH LETTER](#).

SYRIANUS

Συριανός. (d. c. 437 CE.) A **Neoplatonist**, student of **Plutarch of Athens**, he became **Scholarch** of the **Athenian** school upon the death of Plutarch and was succeeded by his student **Proclus**. He was also the teacher of **Hermeias**, who moved to **Alexandria**, and was the father and teacher of **Ammonius**, who was in turn one of the teachers of **Damascius**, the last (official) head of a pagan philosophical school in the **Christian** Eastern Roman Empire. Syrianus' commentary on several books of **Aristotle's** **Metaphysics** is extant, as well as his commentaries on rhetorical works by **Hermogenes of Tarsus**. See C. Wildberg, "Syrianus," *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

SYSTASIS

Σύστασις. Composition or constitution; used both of the construction of an individual living body and of a political organization. **Plato** uses it of the organization of the state (**polis**), in **Republic** VIII, 546a, for example; **Aristotle** most frequently uses it for the arrangement or development of the parts of an animal (e.g., **Generation of Animals** II.6, 744b28). In **Stoic** philosophy, this is the standard word for the constitution of the body (**sōma**) and the relation of the soul (**psychē**) to the body.

SYSTĒMA

Σύστημα. Literally, something that stands together, or a whole composed of parts. In **Generation of Animals** II.4, 740a20, **Aristotle** argues that the embryo is a *systēma* as soon as the embryonic heart begins to serve as an **archē** for the development of the whole.

T

TABULA RASA

Literally, “blank (or smoothed) tablet” (in Latin). In the **Theaetetus**, **Plato** proposes, hypothetically, that memory is like a block of wax upon or in which experiences are written or impressed (191c ff.). One kind of writing tablet in antiquity was a wooden board, painted black, then covered with a layer of beeswax; one could write or draw on it by scratching with a stylus, and erase by smoothing out the wax again. “When a man is born, the **Stoics** say, he has the commanding part (***hēgemonikon***) of his soul (***psychē***) like a sheet of paper ready for writing upon. On this he inscribes each one of his conceptions” (**Aetius** 4.11.1–4). Web sources trace the phrase *tabula rasa* to John Locke or to Thomas Aquinas; the idea, if not definitely the phrase, is older.

TARENTUM

Τάρων. Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #71. City in southern Italy (base of the heel of the boot, 40°28'N 17°14'E). The only colony of **Sparta**, it was home to the **Pythagoreans Archytas** and **Cleinias**, contemporaries of **Plato**, and **Eudoxus**, a member of the **Academy**.

TARSUS

Ταρσός. City in south-central Turkey. 36°55'00"N 34°53'44"E. In the Hellenistic and Roman periods a significant number of philosophers were born here, as well as Saul/St. Paul of Tarsus. The **Stoics Antipater**, **Zeno of Tarsus**, **Archedemus**, and **Athenodorus Cordylion** were born in Tarsus, and **Athenodorus Cananites** taught there. **Diogenes of Tarsus**, an **Epicurean**, and **Hagnon of Tarsus**, an **Academic**, were also from Tarsus.

TAURUS, LUCIUS CALVENUS

Λούκιος Καλβήνωνς Ταῦρος. (2nd CE.) **Platonist**, author of a commentary on **Plato's Timaeus**. Although in metaphysical issues he was a Platonist, in ethics he tended to follow **Aristotle**. His views are discussed by **Aulus Gellius** (*Attic Nights* 1.9.8–11). See J. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists*, 1996.

TAXIS

Τάξις. Order, arrangement. In ordinary Greek, *taxis* is often the arrangement of military forces. In the **Anaximander** fragment, things that come into being pay for their injustice “according to the *taxis* of time.” The **Pythagoreans** apparently

used the word to describe the “ordering” of the astronomical bodies (DK 1.452, 18, et al.). In **Plato**, *Timaeus* 30A, the **Demiourgos** imposes *taxis* on disorder (*ataxia*). **Aristotle** is interested in all forms of order, from the ordering of the elements in relation to each other (*Meteorology* I.3, 339b5), to the ordering of the parts of animals (*History of Animals* I.6, 491a17), to the arrangement of magistracies in the state (*Politics* III.6, 1278b9), to the everlasting arrangement of the universe (*De Caelo* II.14, 296a34; *Metaphysics* XII.10, 1075a12).

TECHNĒ

Τέχνη. Art, craft, skill. In **Homer**, examples of *technai* would be metalworking, shipbuilding, soothsaying, and general trickiness; the Hippocratic texts hold that medicine (*iatrikē*) is a *technē*. There is a sense that *technē* is in some measure opposed to nature (*physis*); see [TECHNIKOS](#).

In classical society there was a widespread belief that mastery of one or more arts was tantamount to *sophia*, or wisdom. In that context, the **Sophists** proposed to instruct in the “arts” of speaking, use of language, and especially governance (*politikē*)—**Protagoras**, **Gorgias**, and **Thrasymachus** are all reported to have used “*Technē*” in the title of an instructional book.

Socrates turned the tables on the Sophists by demanding that they demonstrate appropriate knowledge of the art. In the *Protagoras*, for example, Protagoras claims that he can teach virtue (*aretē*) as if it were an art, but Socrates demonstrates that Protagoras’ verbalizable knowledge of virtue is rather limited. In *Republic* I, Thrasymachus readily agrees with Socrates that there is an “art” of governing, analogous to medicine and sheepherding; Socrates turns that admission against Thrasymachus, arguing that the end of the art of medicine is the benefit of the patient, that of the art of sheepherding is the well-being of the sheep, and thus the end of the art of governance is the well-being or benefit of the governed. This discussion sets up a major thread of the *Republic* as a whole, that there is an art of governing and that it can be learned by the **guardians** and the philosopher-rulers.

Plato takes the analogy of the arts a step further with the image of the **Demiourgos** in the *Timaeus*; the physical universe is a product of the *technē* of a creative deity.

For **Aristotle**, *technē* is contrasted with nature (*physis*), in that the source of change for a product of *technē* is external to that which is produced, but the source of change for a

natural production is within the thing that changes. There is a bit of continuity in this contrast: nature is like a physician who cures herself; and *technē* partially imitates nature, partially completes what nature cannot finish. Aristotle also explores the epistemic requirements for *technē*: “experience” (*empeiria*) deals with individuals (*kath’ hekasta*), but the “art” knows the universal (*katholou*) and can teach (*Metaphysics* I.1). But “art” is not the same as “knowledge” (*epistēmē*), because *epistēmē* is about “being” and art is about “becoming” (*genesis*).

Technē can be distinguished into *poiētikē* and *praktikē*, productive and practical.

It should be pointed out that there is no specific concept of “fine art” as that is understood in the modern world. The closest approach would be *mousikē*, but that is both partial and not understood in quite the same way as “fine art” is today. The visual and plastic arts especially were expected to have some function, whether religious, educational, political, or at least decorative. See R. Parry, “Episteme and Techne,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 2014.

TECHNIKOS

Τεχνικός. Skillful, but also often “artificial.” Aristotle remarks that wrens (*History of Animals* 9.11, 615b19) and insects and especially spiders (*HA* IX.38, 6722b20–27) are *technikoi*; if people want to become *technikoi*, they also need to know theory (*Nicomachean Ethics* X.10, 1180b20). In the *Rhetoric* (III.15, 1416b7), he links “very technical” with “very unfair” prosecutors. In Stoic philosophy, *pyr technikon*, creative fire, is the material aspect of God.

TELAUGES

Τηλαύγης. (c. 500 BCE.) Pythagorean, traditionally son of Pythagoras and Theano. Iamblichus (*Vit. Pyth.* 146) says that he composed a work on the gods, using notes passed to Damo by Pythagoras; Diogenes Laertius (VIII.43) says that he wrote nothing. He is mentioned by Marcus Aurelius (VII.66).

TELECLES OF PHOCIS

Τηλεκλῆς. (Late 3rd BCE.) Academic. Student of Lacydes, he was joint Scholarch with Evander. Telecles predeceased Evander, who was succeeded by Hegesinus (Diogenes Laertius IV.60; Cicero, *Academica* II.6). There seems to be some obscurity about whether Telecles was from Phocis, a territory on the north side of the Saronic Gulf, or from Phocaea, a town on the Ionian coast, now Foça, Turkey.

Phocis is the territory that includes **Delphi**.

TELES OF MEGARA

Τέλης. (c. 235 BCE.) **Cynic**. Author of **diatribes**; seven fragments are preserved by **Stobaeus**. See E. O'Neil, *Teles: The Cynic Teacher*, 1977. Teles taught in **Megara**; it is not at all certain that he was born there.

TELOS

Τέλος. TELEOLOGY. **Alcmaeon**, f. 2, says, "Human beings perish because they are not able to join their beginning to their end." The *telos* is the end or goal of some activity. In fact the word is so widely used that it gains a range of senses, depending on context. It can mean "the end" as in death—"Call no man happy until you see his end," **Solon** said (**Nicomachean Ethics** I.11, 1100a10); or it can be the purpose, that for the sake of which something is done.

Thus *telos* is one of the standard names for that mode of **Aristotelian** explanation called "final causation" or "teleology." Of course teleological explanation did not begin with Aristotle; **Socrates** often appeals to teleology. For example, in **Phaedo** 97–98, he tells of hearing how **Anaxagoras** made Mind (**nous**) the cause of motion in the universe, and how disappointed he was that Anaxagoras did not go on to explain how Mind arranged things as they are because it would be better thus.

But Aristotle was convinced that no one had adequately presented a truly teleological system of explanation. Appeals to a cosmic force of love (**erōs**), or even a providential demiurge (**demiourgos**), would not ultimately succeed. No, we have to assume from the start that "**being** is better than non-being, life better than death, having a soul better than not having a soul, having a mind better than not having a mind" (**Generation of Animals** II.1). If we assume from the start that the continued existence of individual entities and of natural kinds is *good*, then one sort of investigation that we can carry out is toward understanding what processes contribute to the persistence of entities and kinds.

Thus the organic parts of animals exist *for the sake of* the life of the animal, and for reproduction; the nature of the individual and of the kind is *telos* and that on account of which it comes into being (**Physics** II.2, 194a34).

And for the human being, not only life, but a happy (**eudaimōn**) life should be the goal. Not the Solonic "end" of life, but the fullness of life itself is the purpose. See A. Falcon, "Aristotle on Causality," *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*,

2012.

See also [ENERGEIA](#); [ENTELECHEIA](#).

TEMNEIN, TOMĒ

Τέμνειν, τομή. Cut—*temnein* is the verb; *tomē* is the noun. **Chrysippus** proposed dealing with a whole class of reductive arguments with a move called the “cut.” Take for example **Zeno of Elea**’s dichotomy argument, that you cannot go from A to B without going halfway first, and then repeating that indefinitely, with the conclusion that you cannot get started, because you cannot go any finite distance without taking an infinite number of steps first. The Chrysippus “cut” says that there is a (rough) minimum distance you can go and still call it a “step,” so that is what you add up to go the distance from A to B. **Aristotle** deploys the notion of a “cut” in his discussions of the use of collections and divisions in arriving at definitions, for example, at *Metaphysics* VII.12, 1038a9ff.

TEMPERANCE

See [SŌPHROSYNĒ](#).

TENOR

This word is used as a translation of the word *hexis* when it occurs in **Stoic** contexts. It refers then primarily to the capacity of *pneuma* to hold things together, or to non-moral dispositions of people, like the ability to play a musical instrument.

See also [TONOS](#).

TENSION

See [TONOS](#).

TEOS

Τέως. An archaeological site on the Ionian coast, 38°10'38"N 26°47'06"E, Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #868. It is supposed that **Epicturus** studied with **Nausiphanes** in this location. **Apellicon**, involved with the history of Aristotelian manuscripts, came from here.

TERPSIS

Τέρψις. Pleasure, delight. **Democritus** (DK B4) says, “*Terpsis*, and the absence of *terpsis*, is the boundary between advantage and disadvantage.” **Socrates** in the *Cratylus* (419c) says that it glides through the soul like breath. **Aristotle** rarely uses the word, but he does apply it to the pleasure of friendship in *Nicomachean Ethics* IX.1, 1164a19.

See also [CHARA](#); [HĒDONĒ](#), [HĒDYN](#).

TERTULLIAN (QUINTUS SEPTIMIUS FLORENS TERTULLIANUS)

(c. 160–225 CE.) Born in **Carthage** (Tunisia), he studied

law and philosophy, as we can tell from his writings. Several of his 31 surviving works are **Christian** polemics against pagan philosophy; others attack **Gnosticism**. He was himself, however, not sufficiently orthodox to be sainted by the Church. See T. D. Barnes, *Tertullian*², 1985.

TETRAKTYS

Τετρακτής. This geometrical figure was regarded as “holy” by the **Pythagoreans**, containing as it does the first four numbers (one, two, three, four), with one in the center and adding up to 10. The numbers also came to represent the four dimensions of space: point, line, surface, solid.



TETRAPHARMAKOS

Τετραφάρμακος. “Fourfold cure,” the **Epicurean** way to a happy life. Keep the following in mind:

1. The gods do not punish or reward.
2. Death is nothing to us.
3. The greatest pleasure is the elimination of pain.
4. Prolonged pain is tolerable, acute pain is short.

Cf. **Philodemus**, *Herculaneum Papyrus* 1005, 4.9–14.

THALES OF MILETUS

Θαλῆς. (c. 620–540 BCE?) Thales was traditionally named as the “first” Greek philosopher, partly because he was thought to have been the teacher of **Anaximander**.

Herodotus tells us that Thales was of Phoenician descent, that he predicted (in some sense) a solar eclipse on the basis of Babylonian records (many figure that this would be the eclipse of 585 BCE). Herodotus also says that Thales attempted to organize the Ionian Greeks to defend against the Persians. He is credited with introducing some geometrical knowledge into the Greek world. A number of amusing stories are told about him; for example, **Aristotle** says that he expected a bumper crop of olives one year and managed to corner the local market on olive presses, establishing a profitable monopoly (***Politics*** 1259a6–23). Aristotle suggests that Thales thought that **water** was the fundamental material for all things, and Thales is credited with the idea that magnets and amber have a principle of soul (***psychē***). See P. O’Grady, “Thales,” *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

See also [MILETUS](#).

THAUMA, THAUMASIA

Θαῦμα, θαυμάσια. Wonder. **Empedocles** f. 35, end:

The multitudinous tribes of mortal things,

At the beginning of the *Phaedo* (58e), **Phaedo** tells Echecrates that the experience of being present at the death of **Socrates** was “amazing”; in the *Symposium* (220a), **Alcibiades** says that “amazingly” no one ever saw Socrates drunk. So **Aristotle**, at the beginning of the *Metaphysics* (I.2, 982b12) says that people began to philosophize “because of wonder.” Aristotle points out that the experience of wonder implies a desire to know (*Rhetoric* I.11, 1371a32); the *Peripatetic Mechanics* (847a10) notes that our wonder is excited by natural events when we do not know the cause, and by works of art (technology) for the benefit of humanity. Aristotle also refers a few times to the “marvelous *automata*” which provide a model for the movements of living beings.

See also [HERO OF ALEXANDRIA](#).

THEAETETUS

(Dialogue by **Plato**.) Θεαιήτης. **Socrates** discusses *epistēmē* (knowledge) with the teenaged **Theaetetus** and his mathematics teacher **Theodorus**. Theaetetus proposes that “knowledge is perception (*aisthēsis*),” a thesis that Socrates supposes relies on the philosophies of **Protagoras** and **Heraclitus**—Protagoras because it implies a radical relativism and subjectivity of knowledge, Heraclitus because knowledge, if identical to perception, would be in constant and radical change. Many commentators suppose that this represents Plato’s own theory of perception, derived in part from his teacher **Cratylus**, a Heraclitean. Among the arguments against the thesis is one that notes that any statement of what one claims to know must include, at least by implication, an assertion of existence (*ousia*), identical or non-identical, similar or not similar, and number, and none of these are *per se* present in perception but are judgments “of the soul.”

The second thesis proposed by Theaetetus is that knowledge is true judgment (*alēthē doxa*). This leads to a discussion of memory, since a paradigm of “true judgment” would be correctly identifying a present perception with a memory image. But a jury can presumably make a “true judgment” of guilt or innocence without any prior perception or memory of the event in question.

The third thesis proposed by Theaetetus is that knowledge is true belief plus a *logos*. While several notions of *logos* are entertained, perhaps the one with the most philosophical import is that a *logos* is an analysis into component parts, or elements (*stoicheia*)—Socrates says that

this idea came to him in a dream. But this theory would imply that the elements are unknowable, because *ex hypothesi* they cannot be analyzed into parts—so how can the known be constructed out of unknowable parts? The dialogue ends in an **aporia**. See T. Chappell, “Plato on Knowledge in the *Theaetetus*,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

See also [AGNŌSTOS](#); [AISTHĒSIS](#); [DYNAMIS](#), [DYNAMEIS](#); [ENARGEIA](#); [EUCLIDES OF MEGARA](#); [HOMO MENSURA](#); [HOMOIŌSIS](#); [KINĒSIS](#); [KRITĒRION](#); [NOUS](#) ([NOOS](#)); [ONEIROS](#); [OPSIS](#); [PASCHEIN](#); [POION](#); [POIOTĒS](#); [RHOĒ](#); [SOPHISTĒS](#), [SOPHISTA](#); [SOPHISTIKĒ TECHNĒ](#); [SYLLOGISMOS](#); [TABULA RASA](#); [THEODORUS OF CYRENE](#).

THEAETETUS OF SOUNIUM

Θεαίτητος. (414–369 BCE?). In **Plato**’s *Theaetetus*, he is represented as a teenager discussing the meaning of the word **epistēmē** (knowledge) with **Socrates** shortly before the trial and execution of Socrates; the frame **dialogue** indicates that this discussion is being recalled a significant number of years later, while Theaetetus lies dying of wounds received in battle. There is a tradition that Theaetetus became a member of Plato’s **Academy** and contributed significantly to the development of mathematics (*mathēmatikē*). Others are skeptical, supposing that the battle in question may have occurred in 391, when Theaetetus would have been in his early twenties. See D. Nails, *The People of Plato*, pp. 274–278.

Sounium (Ἄκρον Σούνιον, Cape Sounion) is the extreme southern point of Attica.

THEAGENES OF PATRAS

Θεαγένης. (c. 160 CE.) **Cynic**. Friend of **Peregrinus Proteus**, the subject of **Lucian**’s *The Death of Peregrinus*. He praises Peregrinus’ plan to cremate himself and actually lights the fire. **Galen** mentions Theagenes as a popular lecturer in **Rome** who died when inappropriately treated for a liver ailment (*Methodus medendi* 13.15). Patras (Πάτραι) was and is a major port on the west coast of mainland Greece, 38°15’N 21°44’E, Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #239.

THEAGES

(Dialogue by **Plato**.) Θεάγης. Dialogue included in the Platonic **corpus**. Although regarded as authentic in antiquity, modern scholars tend to regard it as the product of a later **Academic**. Demodocus brings his son Theages to **Socrates** in the hope that Socrates will instruct him. Socrates suggests

several other people that the young man might study with, then goes on to give a lengthy and uniquely detailed account of his *daimonion*, concluding with the suggestion that Theages will learn from him only if God wills it. Scholars point out that the characterization of the *daimonion* in this dialogue is inconsistent with what is said in clearly genuine dialogues.

Theages is mentioned in the *Republic* 496b to have a physical infirmity that prevents him from participating in politics and keeps him involved in philosophy; we learn in the *Apology* 34a that he predeceased Socrates.

THEANO

Θεανώ. (6th BCE.) **Pythagorean**. The sources about her are contradictory, but a near consensus says that she was the wife of **Pythagoras**. Various sources talk about three daughters and a son—Damo, Myia, and Arignote, and **Telauges** (**Porphyry**, *Vit. Pyth.* 4; **Diogenes Laertius** VIII.42, 43; Suda, *Theano*). There are fragments and letters ascribed to her that are surely later forgeries.

See also [WOMEN IN ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY](#).

THEBES

Θῆβαι. City in Greece, 38°19'N 23°19'E. Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #221. Ancient rival of **Athens**, Thebes often served as a refuge for Greeks driven out of their home cities, for example, **Lysis of Taras** and **Philolaus**. Philosophers from Thebes include, notably, **Cebes** and **Simmias**, **Socrates'** interlocutors in the *Phaedo*; they had been taught by Philolaus. The **Cynic Crates** and his brother (a **Megarian**) **Pasicles** came to Athens from Thebes in the late 4th century BCE.

There are three Greek *poleis* named “Thebes.” The Boeotian Thebes is easily the most important, but there was also one in **Thessaly**, 39°16'N 22°49'E, Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #444, and one in Ionia, Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #869. There is also of course the important Egyptian city, 25°43'14"N 32°36'37"E, home of the 6th CE poet, **Christodorus**.

THEIOS, THEION

See [THEOS](#), [THEIOS](#), [THEOLOGIA](#).

THEMA

Θέμα. Literally, that which is placed or put down. It is the origin of the English word “theme,” and the Greek word can mean the same as its English derivative. As a technical term in **Stoic** logic (see [LOGIKĒ](#)), a *thema* is a rule for determining whether a given deduction is valid.

THEMISON OF LAODICEA

Θεμισων. (123–43 BCE.) Student of **Asclepiades**, founder of the Methodist school of medicine, Themison rejected both the Empirical and Rationalist schools, teaching that for a specific set of symptoms there is a particular “method” for treating. This school is thought to have connections with **Skepticism**, though Asclepiades, Themison’s teacher, was an **atomist**. **Celsus** (*De Med.* I.pref.) and **Galen** (*De Meth. Med.* I.4, 7) discuss his place in the philosophy of medicine; Caelius Aurelianus frequently refers to specific treatment recommendations (*De Morb. Acut.* II.38; III.16, 18; *De Morb. Chron.* I.1; III.8). **Soranus** (*De Arte Obstetr.*) observes that Themison was less humane to mental patients than his teacher had been.

See also [LAODICEA](#).

THEMISTA OF LAMPSACUS

(Early 3rd BCE.) **Epicurean**. Student of Epicurus, wife of **Leontius** (**Diogenes Laertius** X.25, 26). **Cicero** was shocked that Epicurus esteemed her and the other **women** of the school so highly (*De Finibus* 2.21.68).

THEMISTIUS

Θεμιστιος. (c. 317–388 CE.) Themistius was a **Peripatetic** commentator on **Aristotle** who also had a political career. He taught in **Constantinople**, a city that had recently been made a cultural center by the emperor Constantine (306–363). The surviving speeches of Themistius fill three volumes; his surviving commentaries on Aristotle are in five volumes of the *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*. His commentaries on Aristotle’s ***De Anima*** and ***Physics*** have been translated by R. B. Todd, 1996, 2003–2011.

THEMISTOCLEA

Θεμιστόκλεια. (6th BCE.) Priestess at **Delphi**, according to sources, the teacher of **Pythagoras** (**Diogenes Laertius** VIII.1). **Porphry** (*Vit. Pyth.* 41) calls her “Aristoclea,” and the **Suda** (*Pythagoras*) calls her “Theoclea.”

THEODORET OF CYRRHUS

Θεοδώρητος Κύρρου. (393–466 CE.) **Christian** apologist, interesting to historians of ancient philosophy for his work *Cure of the Greek Maladies*, attempting to support Christian **dogma** from philosophical sources. Theodoret was also involved in the Nestorian controversy, parsing how human and how divine Christ may have been. Theodoret is the source for one of the comments that led to the reconstruction of the **doxographer Aetius**. Many of his works are available online, especially his

Ecclesiastical History, a one-sided chronicle of the dispute with Arianism.

Cyrrhus is an archaeological site in northern Syrian, toward the border with Turkey, 36°44'39"N 36°57'33"E.

THEODORUS OF ASINE

Θεόδωρος Ἀσινναῖος. (3rd–4th CE.) **Neoplatonist**.

Student of **Porphry**, mentioned **Proclus**; his work on the soul (lost) is cited by **Nemesius**. Asine is an archeological site in Messenia, 36°40'N 22°30'E, Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #313.

THEODORUS OF BYZANTIUM

Θεόδωρος. (Late 5th BCE.) Rhetorician and orator mentioned by **Plato** in the ***Phaedrus*** (266e) and by **Aristotle** in the ***Sophistical Refutations*** (183b22ff.).

See also [BYZANTIUM](#); [RHĒTORIKĒ](#).

THEODORUS OF CYRENE

(5th–4th BCE.) Theodorus appears in **Plato's** ***Theaetetus*** as the teacher of **Theaetetus**; we learn from the **dialogue** that he had studied with **Protagoras** and that he had an interest in theoretical mathematics. **Diogenes Laertius** (III.6) says that Plato visited him in **Cyrene** after the death of **Socrates**. See D. Nails, *The People of Plato*, pp. 281–282.

THEODORUS THE ATHEIST

Θεόδωρος. (c. 340–c. 250 BCE.) **Cyrenaic**. Student of the younger **Aristippus**, he also heard **Anniceris of Cyrene**, **Dionysius of Chalcedon** the Dialectician, **Zeno of Citium**, and **Pyrro** (**Diogenes Laertius** II.86, 97–103). Banished from **Cyrene**, he went to **Athens**, where he was protected by **Demetrius of Phaleron** until Demetrius was overthrown. He then went into the service of Ptolemy in Egypt. He is cited for his sharp remarks by **Cicero** (*Tusc. Quaest.* I.43) and **Seneca** (*De Tranq. An.*), and several others.

He seems to have founded a sect, called “Theodoreans,” as far as can be discerned, basically Cyrenaic in character. There seems to be some dispute about whether he was a “complete” atheist or simply rejected the popular gods. Since many philosophers rejected the popular beliefs in the gods, probably he denied the existence of any god whatsoever. See **Diogenes Laertius** II.97–102.

THEOLOGIA, THEOLOGY

See [THEOS](#), [THEIOS](#), [THEOLOGIA](#).

THEOMBROTUS

(4th–3rd BCE.) **Cynic**, student of **Crates of Thebes** and **Metrocles**, teacher of Demetrius of **Alexandria**, and probably teacher of Echeclus of **Ephesus** and **Menedemus of**

Lampsacus (Diogenes Laertius VI.95).

THEON OF ALEXANDRIA

Θέων. (c. 335–405 CE.) Scholar and mathematician working in **Alexandria**; he edited and commented on **Euclid** and **Claudius Ptolemy**. Several of his writings are extant, some edited by Anne Tihon. He was the father of **Hypatia**, also a mathematician. See J. J. O'Connor & E. F. Robertson, "Theon of Alexandria," *MacTutor History of Mathematics Archive*, online.

THEON OF SMYRNA

Θέων ὁ Σμυρναῖος. (c. 100 CE.) Mainly **Pythagorean**, mathematician. His work, *On Mathematics Useful for the Understanding of Plato*, is a good introduction to Greek mathematics. He lays out the order in which one ought to read the **dialogues**. Part 1 covers number theory and musical harmony—the section on musical harmony includes the idea of the "music of the spheres," the idea that the heavens make a harmonic sound as they move, only we don't hear it because we have lived with it for our whole lives. Part 2 is on astronomy. He also wrote a commentary on the **Republic**.

See also [SMYRNA](#).

THEOPHRASTUS OF ERESOS

Θεόφραστος. (371–c. 287 BCE.) Theophrastus was a student of both **Plato** and **Aristotle** and was the successor of Aristotle as **Scholarch** of the **Lyceum**. After Plato died (347), Theophrastus appears to have accompanied Aristotle in his various travels and probably helped him set up his school in Lesbos (345). **Eresos** is a town on the island of Lesbos.

Theophrastus wrote a great deal. Surviving texts include two large works on plants, the *Historia Plantarum* (Investigation of Plants) and the *Causa Plantarum* (Explanation of Plants), that parallel Aristotle's works on animals; there is a short work on **metaphysics**, an important doxographical work on sense perception, several short treatises on various topics, and his well-known *Characters*, sketching various kinds of people, partially from a literary perspective. The major source of information about his life is **Diogenes Laertius** V.36–51. His works are available in the Loeb series and in publications of Project Theophrastus. See W. W. Fortenbaugh, P. M. Huby, & A. A. Long, *Theophrastus of Eresus: On His Life and Works*, 1985, and *Sources for His Life, etc.*, 1992.

THEOPOMPUS OF CHIOS

Θεόπομπος. (c. 380–c. 315 BCE.) Rhetorician and

historian, student of **Isocrates**; much quoted by later writers. One of his (lost) treatises was an attack on **Plato**, claiming that Plato plagiarized many of the **dialogues** from **Aristippus of Cyrene** and **Antisthenes**. See M. A. Flower, *Theopompus of Chios*, 1998.

See also [CHIOS](#); [RHĒTORIKĒ](#).

THEŌRIA, THEŌREIN

Θεωρία, θεωρεῖν. *Theōrein* (the verb) means, in the first instance, to look at, be a spectator, observe. An old sense of the noun (*theōria*) is of an official delegation to the Olympic Games or other event. **Plato** and **Aristotle** adapted the word to mean the activity of the mind in relation to its proper objects. In the Cave passage in the *Republic* (517), *theōria* is the activity of those who have gotten out of the Cave; for Aristotle (*Nicomachean Ethics* X.7–9), the “*theōretikos bios*” or life of *theōria* is the most *eudaimōn* life for those who can achieve it. “Theoretical” knowledge is about *ousia*, nature (*physis*), and the causes (*aitia*), for their own sake (*Metaphysics* I.2, 982a29ff.); mind (*nous*) can also be exercised for the sake of *praxis*, that is, *phronēsis*, or for the sake of *poiēsis*, that is, *technē*. **Plotinus** says that *everything* comes from *Theōria* and strives for *Theōria* (*Enneads* III.8). See A. W. Nightingale, *Spectacles of Truth in Classical Greek Philosophy*, 2009.

See also [SUN-LINE-CAVE](#).

THEOS, THEIOS, THEOLOGIA

Θεός, θεῖος, θεολόγια. **God**, the divine, account of God and the divine. **Homer** represents the gods, most of the time, as superhuman but anthropomorphic beings that have many human characteristics. **Hesiod**’s gods are more varied—some are anthropomorphic, some are conceptual, and many are hardly more than names handed down from one tradition or another. The philosophical tradition tends to be anti-anthropomorphic. **Heraclitus** f. 32: “The Wise is one only. It is willing and unwilling to be called by the name of Zeus.”

Xenophanes is well known for critiquing anthropomorphic deities and positing one supreme God. “God is one, supreme among gods and men, and not like mortals in body or in mind.”

Socrates was charged with “not believing in the gods of the state but introducing new and different divinities.” It is remarkable that in his defense in **Plato**’s *Apology* he absolutely does *not* say “but of course I believe in Athena and Poseidon and all the other deities worshipped in **Athens**.”

Aristotle sometimes characterizes the subject matter of his work that we know as the *Metaphysics* as *theologia*. For

the most part, it would be difficult to think of that work as a discussion of deities in the ordinary sense, but it is clear that he thinks of the most fundamental realities as *theia*, divine, so that the study of “**being** qua being” (another characterization of the subject matter) is automatically and directly “theology.”

This way of seeing things is taken up both by the **Stoics** and by the Platonic tradition; neither makes much of a distinction between what we call “metaphysics” and what we call “theology.”

In the Roman period and late antiquity, the challenge of philosophy to the religious faith of Jews and Christians gave rise to the practice of religious leaders attempting to meet philosophers on their own ground, with more and more sophisticated theological systems. **Philo of Alexandria**, **Augustine**, and Pseudo-**Dionysius** are just a few examples of theologians of this period.

See also **AMBROSE (AURELIUS AMBROSIUS)**; **BOETHIUS**; **CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA**; **CORNUTUS**, **LUCIUS ANNAEUS**; **DIODORUS OF TARSUS**; **GREGORY OF NYSSA**; **IRENAEUS OF LYONS**; **PELAGIUS**; **PHERECYDES OF SYROS**; **PHILOPONUS, JOHN**; **PROCLUS**.

THEOSEBIUS

Θεοσέβιος. Student of **Hierocles of Alexandria**, admirer both of **Epictetus** and of **Plato**. **Damascius** (45, 46) relied on his reports of his teacher Hierocles and tells us that Theosebius was committed to living a moral life.

THEOURGIA

Θεουργία. Theurgy. Literally, “divine work.” In some cases it means nothing more than performance of sacred rituals or sacraments. But in the **Neoplatonic** tradition there are texts that propose that one might have a technique to persuade a deity to show up locally and even perhaps to do what you want. **Iamblichus**, *De Myst.* III.4–7, and a number of places in **Proclus**, are examples. The emperor **Julian** was a fan of theurgy.

See also **ASCLEPIGENEIA**; **CHALDEAN ORACLES**; **HERMES TRISMEGISTUS**; **JULIAN THE APOSTATE**; **MAGIC**; **MAXIMUS OF EPHESUS**.

THĒRIOTĒS

Θηριότης. Beastliness, brutishness. In **Nicomachean Ethics** VII, **Aristotle** describes individuals who pursue their appetites with no rational governance with this word. In general, a *thērion*, θηρίον, is a wild beast, either with the

connotation of hostility to human beings, for example a poisonous snake or a lion, or with the connotation of a hunted animal, for example a deer. Aristotle opposes beastliness to “godliness.” Neither the beastly nor the godly make choices about what they will do—the godly naturally do good things, the beastly naturally do bad things, or have become beastly as a result of disease or bad habituation. Aristotle’s examples of *thēriotēs* are telling: several of them are of cannibalism, but he also includes the habit of pulling out one’s hair or chewing one’s fingernails, as well as passive male homosexuality. Aristotle eventually admits that some individuals are borderline cases, since they might, like the wicked Phalaris, have *chosen* to eat babies, in which case they are extreme examples of **akolasia**; or Phalaris might have sometimes restrained the desire to eat a baby and sometimes failed to restrain the desire, so that his action perhaps now seems due to **akrasia** (*EN* VII.5, 1149a). For a study of Greek philosophical attitudes toward animals, see R. Sorabji, *Animal Minds and Human Morals*.

THESIS

Θέσις. Noun formed from the verb τίθημι, *tithēmi*, “put.” The word is used in both a physical and a metaphorical sense. Physically, the word means approximately “position,” as in **Aristotle**, *Categories* 4b21: some quantities have parts that have *thesis* in relation to each other. So, for example, the parts of the body have their *thesis* (e.g., **Parts of Animals** III.4, 666a27). Metaphorically, a *thesis* is a proposition posited for discussion and possible defense (e.g., **Prior Analytics** II.17, 65b26). Thus the modern word “thesis.”

THESSALY

Θεσσαλία. Region of northern Greece. **Larissa** is the major city. **Philiscus**, a Roman-period **Sophist**, has “of Thessaly” as his toponym; **Meno** (of **Plato**’s dialogue by that name) was a Thessalian, and **Socrates** in the **Crito** appears to think that exile in Thessaly is a fate worse than death.

THEURGY

See [THEOURGIA](#).

THINKING

See [DIANOIA](#); [LOGISMOS](#); [NOËSIS](#), [NOËMA](#), [NOËTON](#); [THEŌRIA](#), [THEŌREIN](#).

THIRD MAN ARGUMENT

Aristotle several times refers to a “third man argument” (**Metaphysics** I.9, 990b17; VII.13, 1039a2; XI.1, 1059b8; XIII.4, 1079a13; **Sophistical Refutations** 178b36), suggesting

that **Plato's** theory of **Forms** is committed to a “third” human being in addition to the Form of human being and the individual person. Plato apparently argues that whenever you have entities that share a name, there must be a Form in virtue of which they share that name. For example, Tom, Dick, and Harry are human beings, and for Plato they are human beings because they share in or imitate the Form of Human Being. But the Form of Human Being is itself an entity for Plato, so we now have a new set of entities, Tom, Dick, Harry, and the Form of Human Being, for which there must be a further Form, Human Being #3. This argument generates an infinite regress if Platonic Forms are separate entities, and if they have the characteristics of which they are Forms—if they “self-predicate,” as the literature puts it, starting with G. Vlastos in *Phil. Rev.* 1954.

Plato himself presents this argument in the ***Parmenides***, except there it is the “third largeness” argument—if you have several large things, and understand that they are large in virtue of their participation (***methexis***) in the Form of largeness, then, since the Form of largeness must be large, for the large things to get their largeness from it, it is one more large thing, whose largeness must be explained by an additional Form of largeness (prime)—and so on, ad infinitum. It doesn't help to use the metaphor of imitation (***mimesis***), because if large things are large by imitating largeness itself, then largeness itself has the characteristic that needs to be explained, so we posit largeness prime again . . . and again.

There is a huge literature on this argument that can be conveniently accessed via S. Rickless' article on the *Parmenides* in the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

THRASYLLUS OF MENDES

Θράσυλλος Μενδήσιος. (d. 36 CE.) Personal astrologer to the emperor Tiberius, he seems to have been responsible for the arrangement of the works of **Plato** and **Democritus** into tetralogies. See Chris Brennan, “Thrasyllus,” The Hellenistic Astrology Website, 2014.

See also [ASTROLOGIA](#); [MENDES](#).

THRASYMACHUS OF CHALCEDON

Θρασύμαχος. (Late 5th BCE.) **Sophist**. Although he is easily most famous for his appearance in book I of **Plato's** ***Republic***, where he defends the thesis that “justice is the will of the stronger,” he is also known as a teacher and writer on the art of rhetoric (Plato, ***Phaedrus*** 261ff.; **Aristotle**, ***Rhetoric*** III.1, 1404a14; III.8, 1409a2; III.11, 1413a8).

See also [CHALCEDON](#); [RHĒTORIKĒ](#).

THRASYMACHUS OF CORINTH

Θρασύμαχος. (4th BCE.) **Megarian**. Probably student of **Euclides of Megara**, friend and colleague of **Ichthyas**, and teacher of **Stilpo** (**Diogenes Laertius** II.113).

See also [CORINTH](#).

THUCYDIDES OF ATHENS

Θουκυδίδης. (5th BCE.) Thucydides was the author of the *History of the Peloponnesian War*, from 431 to 411; he is said to have died before he could complete the work. The work includes a time-line narrative, speeches by various leading figures, and analysis. The speeches appear to be something of a mixture of what the speakers may actually have said and what Thucydides believes they would or should have said.

Sophistic influences show in many of the speeches. The Melian **dialogue** (V.89) is taken to be a paradigmatic example of Sophistic reasoning. But Thucydides himself was no Sophist; he believed firmly in the rule of law. His own firmly held beliefs seem to come across in the Periclean Funeral Oration (II.34–46). See C. Orwin, *The Humanity of Thucydides*.

THYMOS

Θυμός. Desire, spirit, anger. The first (surviving) line of **Parmenides'** poem says that the horses took him *hoson t'epi thymos*, as far as he wanted to go. **Heraclitus** f. 85: "It is hard to fight with *thymos*; whatever it wishes to get, it purchases at the cost of soul." A common **Homeric** word for "desire," it also often has the sense of "mind" or "spirit" in epic poetry. In classical philosophical texts, it comes to mean "anger" or the ability to become angry or at least "passionate." **Aristotle**, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1149a24: "**Akrasia** with respect to *thymos* is less disgraceful than *akrasia* with respect to **epithymia**," because *thymos* "listens to reason to some extent."

TI ESTI

Τί ἐστι. "What is . . . ?" One of **Socrates'** standard questions: What is courage? What is friendship? **Aristotle** supposes that the answer to the question—in Greek, τὸ τί ἐστι, *to ti esti*, should be a definition of the term, and that what corresponds to that definition is the "**essence**." Thus, *to ti esti* is one of the designations for what we call essence.

TIMAEUS

(Dialogue by **Plato**.) Τιμαίος. Socrates, having presented a version of the argument of the **Republic** on the previous

day, listens to the story of **Atlantis**, presented by Critias, and a general cosmology, presented by Timaeus. The creation of the world by the **Demiourgos**, the positing of the receptacle (**hypodochē**), and an account of human physiology are some of the salient features of Timaeus' account. **Philo of Alexandria** attempted to synthesize the creation story with the biblical book of Genesis. **Calcidius** translated part of the dialogue into Latin—this turned out to be one of the few bits of Plato available to Latin readers for hundreds of years, along with Cicero's partial translation. The *Timaeus* is followed by an incomplete *Critias*, and the group of dialogues was supposed to have been completed by a presentation by Hermocrates, never written. See D. Zeyl, "Plato's Timaeus," *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

See also [AIŌN](#); [AKINĒTON](#); [AKRASIA](#), [AKRATEIA](#), [AKRATĒS](#); [ANAGKĒ](#), [ANANKĒ](#); [ASTRONOMY](#); [BECOMING](#); [BEING](#); [CHŌRA](#); [CHRONOS](#); [COSMOS \(KOSMOS\)](#), [COSMOLOGY](#); [DĒMIOURGOS](#); [ENANTIA](#); [GALEN OF PERGAMUM](#); [GENESIS](#); [HETERON](#); [HOMOIOS](#); [IATROS](#), [IATRIKĒ](#); [KAKOS](#), [KAKĒ](#), [KAKON](#); [LOGOS](#); [MIMĒSIS](#); [MYTHOS](#); [NOUS \(NOOS\)](#); [ONEIROS](#); [PATHOS](#), [PATHĒ](#); [POIEIN](#), [POIĒSIS](#), [POIĒTIKĒ](#); [PRONOIA](#); [PSYCHĒ](#); [PYTHAGORAS OF SAMOS](#); [SOLON OF ATHENS](#); [STOICHEION](#), [STOICHEIA](#); [TAXIS](#); [TECHNĒ](#); [TRIPARTITE SOUL](#); [WORLD SOUL](#).

TIMAEUS OF LOCRI

Τίμαιος ὁ Λοκρός. (c. 420–380 BCE.) Major speaker in Plato's **Timaeus**, also appears in the *Critias*. He is said to be the author of the work *On the Nature of the World and the Soul*, although some scholars think that this is simply a reworking of Plato's *Timaeus*. This work has been edited and translated by T. Tobin, 1985. **Cicero** refers to him in *De re publica* (I.X.16), **Proclus** in his *Commentary on the Timaeus* (II.38.1), and **Simplicius** and **Diogenes Laertius**. Some have argued that he is a fictional character, invented by Plato, that all the comments can be explained as derived from the **dialogue**. That theory does not explain the reference at the end of the **Peripatetic** treatise, *On Marvelous Things Heard* (178, 847b7): "Demaratus, the pupil of Timaeus Locrus, having fallen ill, was unconscious for ten days, but on the eleventh, having come to his senses, declared that during that time he had lived most agreeably."

The Locri from which Timaeus is supposed to have come is in Calabria, 38°14'N 16°16'E. This is in "**Pythagorean**"

territory, not too far from **Croton**.

TIMAEUS THE SOPHIST

(1st to 4th CE.) Supposed author of a *Lexicon of Platonic Words*, extant. It has been edited and translated into French by M. Bonelli, *Timée le Sophiste*, 2007.

TIME

See [CHRONOS](#).

TIMĒ

Τίμη. Honor. **Empedocles** f. 119: “From what great honor (*timē*) and prosperity have I fallen to take a turn with mortals.” In the Hellenic tradition, there are three possible lifestyles: the pursuit of pleasure, the pursuit of honor, and the pursuit of understanding. In the *Republic*, **Plato** uses this idea to distinguish three classes of people in the ideal state (*polis*); those who pursue honor in particular would be designated as the “**guardians**” (military) of the state; their special virtue (*aretē*) would be courage (*andreia*), for which they would receive the honors due them from the state.

Aristotle too uses this idea, but as a motivation for the pursuit of all the “ethical” virtues (*Nicomachean Ethics* I.5), though he makes sure that it is understood that one wants to be truly deserving of the honors, whether or not one actually receives them.

TIMON OF PHLIUS

Τίμων. (c. 325–235 BCE.) Student of **Pyrrho**, author of satirical verses, surviving in fragments. His *Silloi* satirize various philosophers and philosophical positions, representing **Xenophanes** in a positive light, doubtless because of his critical stand toward religious dogmatism. As a student of Pyrrho, the founder of the Skeptical mode of philosophy, one may count Timon as in some fashion a **Skeptic**, although it is hard to determine exactly how from the remaining fragments. See R. Bett, “Timon of Phlius,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

See also [PHLIUS](#); [SKEPTIKOS](#).

TIMYCHA OF SPARTA

Τιμύχα Λακεδαιμονία. (Early 4th BCE.) **Pythagorean**. When she and her husband Myllias of **Croton** were on their way to **Metapontum** with a group of Pythagoreans, they were attacked by Syracusan soldiers at the command of Dionysius the elder. They had the option of running through a field of beans to escape, but did not; instead they fought, and everyone was killed except the pregnant Timycha and her husband, who were taken captive. When Dionysius asked

them why they didn't run through the bean field, she bit off her tongue and spit it at his feet. (From **Philostorgius**, *Church History*, ed. P. R. Amiodon, p. 174.)

See also **SPARTA**.

TISIAS OF SYRACUSA

Τεισίας. (5th BCE.) **Sophist**, rhetorician. Closely associated in the literature with Corax of **Syracuse**, co-founders of the school represented by **Gorgias** and **Polus**. Thought by some to be a teacher of **Isocrates**. **Plato** notes him in ***Phaedrus*** 267a and 273a, where it appears Tisias wrote a book which said that the “likely” was more important than the true for winning arguments. **Aristotle**, ***Sophistical Refutations*** 34, 183b31, and **Cicero**, *De Inventione* II.ii.6–7.

See also **RHĒTORIKĒ**.

TO AUTOMATON

See **AUTOMATON**.

TO TI EN EINAI

See **ESSENCE**.

TODE TI

Τὸδε τί. Literally, “this something.” **Aristotle** uses this phrase to indicate individual entities: this **particular** person (**Coriscus**), this particular horse (Dobbin) (***Categories*** 2a; ***Metaphysics*** III.6, 1003a5–15). *Tode ti* is contrasted with ***kathōlou*** and is regarded as paradigmatic of ***ousia***.

TONOS

Τόνος. Tension. In non-philosophical usage, *tonos* typically refers to the tension on a bowstring, for example, but by extension, the stress given certain notes in music, or certain syllables in speaking. The **Stoic** philosophers appropriated this word to refer to the physical activity of ***pneuma*** in sustaining the integrity of bodily entities.

TOPICS

(Treatise by **Aristotle**.) Τὰ Τοπικά. Latin, *Topica*. Abbr. *Top*. The fifth treatise in the collection known as the **Organon**. Aristotle here presents his principles of dialectical reasoning in eight books. He says at the beginning that the objective is “to be able to reason from reputable opinions (***endoxa***) about any subject.” The work presupposes a practice of dialectical debates in which one person is asking questions, the other answering; the questioner tries to refute the answerer, and the answerer tries to avoid being refuted.

Aristotle's goal seems to be to instruct the reader in how to construct syllogisms that will bring about the desired goal, whether as questioner or answerer. The ***topoi*** are general

principles or sources from which appropriate premises may be derived. See P. Slomkowski, *Aristotle's Topics*, 1997.

TOPOS

Τόπος. Place. One of the puzzles that interested Greek philosophers was the existence of space and place. **Zeno of Elea** argued (A24) that if the universe is in a place, that place itself is in a place, and thus there is an infinite progression of places. Indeed, the paradoxes of motion are as much paradoxes about place and places. **Plato** in the *Timaeus* (52) was more concerned with “space” (*chora*) as the matrix within which **becoming** occurs. **Aristotle** wanted to give an adequate account of movement; he addressed the question of place in *Physics* IV, taking up a solution of Zeno’s paradoxes.

Aristotle also asserts that each of the four elements, **earth, water, air, and fire**, has its natural place—earth in the center, water around it, air around that, and then fire. These places determine the natural directions of up and down: each element tends to proceed to its natural place, and once in its natural place, tends to circulate.

See also [MATTER](#); [PHYSIS](#); [HISTORIA PERI PHYSEŌS](#); [STOICHEION](#), [STOICHEIA](#).

In the logical and rhetorical works, the word *topos* has a significantly different sense. In the *Rhetoric* I.2, 1358a12, Aristotle says that there are “general” and “special” *topoi*—the general apply equally in whatever discourse you are using, whereas the special apply to one subject matter. They are, as **Theophrastus** puts it, principles from which premises for syllogisms may be derived. (Cited by **Alexander of Aphrodisias**, in *Top.* 5, 21–23.)

TOUCH

See [HAPHĒ](#).

TRANSCENDENCE

See [HYPEROUSION](#).

TRANSMIGRATION (OF THE SOUL)

See [METEMPSYCHOSIS](#).

TRIAS

Τριάς. Triad. The **Platonic** tradition inherited from the **Pythagoreans** a tendency to look for trinities. For all that **Philo of Alexandria** is a dedicated Jewish monotheist, he still distinguishes **God** as creator, the **Logos**, and the **World Soul**. In **Plotinus**, that triad becomes the **One**, **Mind**, and the World Soul. But **Proclus** finds triads everywhere, because he has “cause,” “effect,” and “mean term” (*meson*) on every ontological level.

TRIPARTITE SOUL

Plato distinguishes the functions of the soul (*psychē*) into mind (*nous*), spirit (*thymos*), and appetite (*epithymia*) in the *Republic*; in the *Timaeus*, he locates the mind in the head, the spirit in the heart, and the appetites below the diaphragm; somewhat similarly, in the *Phaedrus* the disembodied soul is represented as a two-horse **chariot**, with the charioteer representing the mind and the two horses presumably spirit and appetite.

While **Aristotle** repeatedly insists on the **unity** of the soul, he also sometimes talks of “rational” versus “irrational” soul, and most similarly to Plato he distinguishes mind, sensory-locomotive soul, and nutritive-generative soul.

In later Greek thought, particularly with the **Stoics** and **Galen**, tripartition stages a kind of comeback with the assertion that *pneuma*, the material basis of psychic activity, comes in three different grades: *physikon*, *zotikon*, and *psychikon*, corresponding to the nutritional, sensory-motor, and intellectual functions.

TROPOS

Τρόπος. Trope, mode. In Pyrrhonian Skepticism as developed by **Aenesidemus**, there are 10 ways of arguing to Skeptical conclusions; these are called the “tropes.” **Agrippa** is credited with five tropes, partly overlapping the 10 of Aenesidemus. The most complete account is given by **Sextus Empiricus** in *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*. *Tropos* is also used by the **Stoics** to refer to the “modes” of arguments, for example different syllogistic forms. See J. Annas & J. Barnes, *The Modes of Scepticism*, 1985.

See also [SKEPTIKOS](#).

TRUTH

See [ALĒTHEIA](#).

TYCHĒ

Τύχη. Luck (especially good luck), chance. In *Physics* II, **Aristotle** accuses earlier philosophers of relying on “good luck” to explain the existence of the universe, rather than providing a teleological explanation. He argues that the claim that some event is lucky *presupposes* a similarity with events that could be explained teleologically—for example, if you run into a friend who owes you money, you can ascribe that to luck, because you would have gone to meet him intentionally had you known. But the existence of the universe is a unique event; therefore it cannot be lucky and must be explained teleologically.

See also [AITION](#), [AITIA](#); [TELOS](#).

TYPOS, TYPŌSIS

Τύπος, τύπωσις. Delineation, imprinting, impression.

Theophrastus uses this term in discussing perception (*Sens.* 53); both **Epicureans** and **Stoics** also use this term in accounting for perception. In Stoic thought, *phantasia*, or the faculty of having an appearance, “imprints” on the soul (*psychē*).

See also [AISTHĒSIS](#).

TYRANNION OF AMISUS

Τυραννίων. 1st BCE. Grammarian. Taken captive by Lucullus in 72 BCE, he was brought to Rome, where he pursued a career as teacher and librarian. Notably, he worked on the manuscripts brought by **Sulla** to Rome, including the manuscripts of **Aristotle**. Amisus is now known as Samsun, a Turkish city on the shore of the Black Sea, 41°17'N 36°20'E, Hansen & Nielsen 2004 #712.

TYRE

City in southern Lebanon, 33°16'15"N 35°11'46"E. Home city of **Porphyry**, the **Stoics Antipater of Tyre** and **Apollonius of Tyre**, the **Aristotelian Diodorus of Tyre**, and the **middle Platonist Maximus of Tyre**.

U

ULPIAN OF GAZA

(5th CE.) Brother of **Isidore**, primarily a mathematician.

According to **Damascius** (123), he died young.

UNDERSTANDING

See [DIANOIA](#).

UNIT

See [HEN](#); [MONAS](#).

UNITY

How do the parts of something make up a “whole” unity? In brief, for **Aristotle**, the answer is “form” (***eidos***); for the **Stoics**, “tension” (***tonos***). For **Plato**, it seems that unity is in the Forms, not in the phenomena.

Is the universe a unity? For the **Eleatics**, the answer is obvious: **Being** is absolutely One. From that perspective, **atomism**, for example, would seem to be a denial of the unity of the universe, but each atom is a unity. **Platonists** came to assert that the One is the principle and source of everything, “beyond” being.

See also [COSMOS \(KOSMOS\)](#), [COSMOLOGY](#); [HENAS](#), [HENADOS](#); [HOLON](#); [MONAS](#); [PHAINOMENON](#).

UNIVERSAL

See [KATHOLOU](#).

UNIVERSE

See [COSMOS \(KOSMOS\)](#), [COSMOLOGY](#).

UNKNOWABLE

See [AGNŌSTOS](#).

UNLIMITED

See [APEIRON](#).

UNMOVED, UNMOVED MOVER

See [AKINĒTON](#); [AKINĒTON KINOUN](#); [PRŌTON KINOUN](#).

UNPROVEN

See [ANAPODEIKTON](#).

UNWRITTEN LAW

See [AGRAPHOS NOMOS](#); [NOMOS](#).

UNWRITTEN TEACHINGS

Thales, **Pythagoras**, **Socrates**, and several other well-known ancient philosophers seem to have written nothing; our knowledge of their teachings comes from reports from other people. In the case of Pythagoras, there was a large and

active group of followers who tended to give credit to the founder not only for his teachings but for their own discoveries as well.

Socrates had a significant number of followers also, and two of them, **Plato** and **Xenophon**, have left extensive written characterizations of Socratic teaching. We have plenty of written text from Plato, but we also have some reports that in person he taught some things that are not in the dialogues. One good example: **Aristoxenus**' report of Plato's lecture on the Good, *Elementa Harmonica* ii.1: "Everyone came expecting they would acquire one of the sorts of thing people normally regard as good, on a par with wealth, good health, or strength. In sum, they came looking for some wonderful kind of happiness. But when the discussion turned out to be about mathematics, about numbers and geometry, and **astronomy**, and then, to cap it all, he claimed that Good is One, it seemed to them, I imagine, something utterly paradoxical. The result was that some of them sneered at the lecture, and others were full of reproaches." (See Huffman, *Aristoxenus of Tarentum*, 2011, citing M. Burnyeat, "Plato on Why Mathematics Is Good for the Soul" for this translation of the passage.)

Aristotle uses the phrase ***exoterikoi logoi*** in a somewhat mysterious way. It means "external accounts," but it is not obvious what or whose accounts he means. The phrase does suggest a contrasting group of *logoi* that would be "esoteric" teachings. We understand that distinction as one between teachings available to those outside a particular philosophical school and teachings limited to those within the school. While that distinction does not precisely track the distinction between "written" and "unwritten" teachings, since oral teaching could be public, and some writings could be jealously guarded, there is obviously considerable overlap, so that "esoteric" is almost a synonym for "unwritten" in this context. In late antiquity, "esoteric" teachings were much in vogue.

We have reports of many post-Platonic philosophers who were influential teachers without writing anything, **Pyrrho** the **Skeptic** and **Diogenes of Sinope**, the **Cynic**, for two. Another well-known philosopher who did not write anything himself, but whose teachings are preserved to a considerable extent, is **Epictetus**. **Arrian** wrote down as much as he could of the otherwise unwritten teaching of this **Stoic** master.

See also [MATHĒMA](#), [MATHĒMATA](#); [TA MATHĒMATIKA](#).

(6th CE.) Syrian by origin, Uranius spent several years in **Constantinople** professing to be a **Skeptic**; **Agathias** (book II) gives a negative description of Uranius in Constantinople—here's an excerpt: "Like Homer's Thersites he was full of noisy abuse and empty chatter." Uranius was sent on an embassy to the Persian king Chosroes where he was lavishly received. Agathias does not give much credit to Uranius for translating, during his time in Persia, several of the works of **Plato** and **Aristotle** into Persian (Farsi).

V

VACUUM

See [KENON](#).

VARRO, MARCUS TERENCE

(116–27 BCE.) Although leading an active military and political life, Varro was a prolific writer. He had studied with **Posidonius of Apamea** and especially **Antiochus of Ascalon**, and may have eventually joined the Roman Pythagorean group with **Figulus**. Surviving works are his *Agricultural Topics* and parts of his *On the Latin Language*. The *Agricultural Topics* includes many important insights—here is one example: he warned people to avoid swampland because they “breed certain minute creatures which cannot be seen by the eyes, but which float in the air and enter the body through the mouth and nose and cause serious diseases” (I.12.2). The *Agricultural Topics* are available online.

VICTORINUS, MARIUS, AFER

(280–365 CE.) Rhetorician and commentator on **Aristotle's *Categories*** and *Interpretation*, **Cicero**, and **Porphyry**; translator of **Plotinus** into Latin. These works are unfortunately lost. Victorinus was a **Neoplatonist** who converted to **Christianity** relatively late in life. After his conversion, he became a passionate defender of Trinitarian doctrine against the Arians; he wrote several commentaries on New Testament books. He used his extensive knowledge of philosophy to construct arguments against those he regarded as heretics; some of these works survive and are available online at Corpus Grammaticorum Latinorum. He was an important influence on **Augustine**.

VIRTUE

See [ARETÉ](#).

VITRUVIUS POLLIO

(c. 80–15 BCE.) Author of the massive *On Architecture*. Vitruvius believed that architects should know about philosophy so that they would have an understanding of the qualities of good architecture: solidity, utility, and beauty. References to philosophers are scattered throughout all 10 books of this work. Relatively recent translation: I. Rowland, 1999. Other translations readily available online.

VOID

See [KENON](#).

VORTEX

See [DINĚ](#).

W

WATER

Thales, the traditional “first” ancient Greek philosopher, is credited with the opinion that the world “rests on” water, or alternatively, that everything is made of water. He very well might have thought that water is the principle of life, and in that sense would be the “source” (*archē*) of everything.

Empedocles makes water one of the four fundamental elements, along with **earth**, **air**, and **fire**.

See also [STOICHEION](#), [STOICHEIA](#).

WEIGHT

How do things have weight? As far as we can tell, the **pre-Socratic** philosophers, as a group, did not think much about this question. **Anaxagoras** is reported (by a much later author) to have included “weight” among the primary qualities distributed everywhere; several pre-Socratics, starting with **Anaximenes**, put some stress on the importance of density and rarity of material things, thus massiveness. But there is a very telling line from **Aetius** that **Democritus** made size and shape the primary qualities of atoms (*atoma*), and that **Epicurus** added weight. The atoms of Democritus move in an unoriented space, freely in all directions, caused to change directions only by collision with each other. The atoms of Epicurus, in contrast, are “falling” through space; that is, they would all continue forever on parallel tracks were there not the “swerve.”

Aristotle specifically addresses the problem of weight, and “solves” it with a theory that is simple, satisfying, and wrong. He says that the center of the universe is occupied by **earth**, and it is the nature of earthy things to tend to go toward the center unless somehow prevented. On top of the earth is **water**, which also tends toward the center, but not as strongly as earth. On top of the water is **air**, which goes up in water but otherwise down until it meets water. Above the air is the natural place of **fire**, which goes up through air until it gets to its natural sphere. Once water, air, and fire get to their natural location, they tend to circulate within that sphere (ocean and wind currents, and the movement of the fiery astronomical entities).

The standard story is that there was no progress on this part of physics until Galileo came along.

See also *PHYSIS*; *HISTORIA PERI PHYSEŌS*.

WHEN

See *POTE*.

WHERE

See *POU*.

WHOLE

See *HOLON*.

WISDOM

See *PHRONĒSIS*; *SOPHOS*, *SOPHOI*, *SOPHIA*.

WISH

See *BOULĒSIS*.

WOMEN IN ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY

Although ancient philosophy has a deserved reputation for being primarily a male endeavor, there are some noteworthy instances both of participation in the philosophical tradition, and of serious contributions.

Ancient Greek societies differed significantly in terms of the participation of women in public and intellectual life: in many places, including **Athens** in the classical period, most women spent most of their adult lives working very hard to contribute to the household economy. The few female members of wealthy families who might have had the leisure to engage in intellectual pursuits were largely limited in their social contacts with other women and were not, on the whole, provided with a level of education that would have made it possible to interest themselves in philosophical issues. Most ancient Greek philosophers seem to have shared the general social assumption of their time that the role of women was inside the home, and the role of men outside the home; philosophy was generally seen as one of the outside activities.

Some of the Ionian states seem to have had a more open and liberal attitude about the role of women. In the pre-philosophical period, Sappho won recognition for her poetry; **Plato** was to call her the “tenth muse.”

Pythagoras established a philosophical community that according to reports readily accepted women as full members: **Iamblichus** lists some 16 women who were early members of the school, and there are fragmentary writings attributed to several of them, included in **Diels-Kranz**. **Theano**, reputed to be the wife of Pythagoras; **Leontion**; and **Batis** are especially worthy of mention. The tradition continued—Pythagorean women of the next few hundred years include **Phintis** and **Aesara of Lucania** (both 4th or 3rd BCE).

We know that Plato too accepted at least a few women as

members of the Academy (e.g., **Axiothea of Phlius** and **Lastheneia of Mantinea**), and he recommends in the ***Republic*** that women of the guardian class receive the same education as men and have the same positions of responsibility open to them. That recommendation is part of a critique of a radical social and political structure of contemporary Athens; to end tyranny, you must end tyranny in the family.

Although the active participants in Plato's dialogues are all male, at least two women are cited in the dialogues as sources of important ideas. In Plato's *Menexenus*, **Aspasia**, immigrant from Ionia and the mistress of Pericles, is credited with having written the famous funeral oration delivered by Pericles and recorded in **Thucydides' History**. **Socrates**, in the *Menexenus*, delivers an alternative speech which he also says he learned from Aspasia. In the ***Symposium***, Socrates credits the priestess **Diotima** with teaching him the theory of love that he presents. While some may doubt that the ideas in question really came from Aspasia or Diotima, these instances do at the very least indicate that Plato believed, and expected his audience to believe, that some women could contribute importantly to philosophical discourse.

Aristotle's views on the role of women were more nearly in line with those of contemporary society. Contrary to Plato, he believed that the family, not the individual person, is the basic building block of a functional and happy ***polis***, and that does seem to him to imply that there are significantly different roles for women and men within the family structure. It is within that context that he comments (***Politics*** I.13, 1260a12) that the slave has "no deliberative faculty"; that the woman has the deliberative faculty but it is "***akuron***," or "without authority"; and the child has it, but it is immature. One may wonder whether Aristotle believed that lack of authority to be the result of immutable natural differences, or the consequence of the particular society with which he was most familiar.

Aristotle's comments about women in **Sparta**, in ***Pol.*** II.9, have considerable social interest, since he argues that the failure of Sparta to give an appropriate education to the women of the state led to its downfall. At 1269b30, he points out that in Sparta's period of greatness, "many things were managed by their women," but more recently, at the time of the Theban invasion, "unlike the women of other cities, they were utterly useless and caused more confusion than the enemy" (1269b37).

During Aristotle's lifetime, the **Cyrenaic school** of philosophy was directed by **Arete**, the daughter of **Aristippus**, so he had at least one example of a contemporary female philosopher, had he cared to cite it. Closer to home, but a little later (within a few years of Aristotle's death), **Hipparchia** of Maroneia was in her very public marriage with **Crates the Cynic**. A few years after that, **Epicurus** set up his school in Athens with several women as full members of the group, including **Themista**, the wife of Leontius—she named her son Epicurus.

Once **Stoicism** had established a foothold in Rome, quite a few upper-class women gained the reputation of follower of the Stoic philosophy; **Musonius Rufus**, a leading Roman Stoic, composed an essay defending the teaching of philosophy to women. At about the same time, **Pamphila of Epidauros** was composing her massive history of Greece.

Finally, toward the end of the history of ancient philosophy, there were several **Neoplatonists**: **Sosipatra** in the 4th century; **Asclepigeneia**, a 5th-century theurge; and **Hypatia** of Alexandria, a highly respected teacher of philosophy and mathematics who died a martyr at the hands of a fanatical mob. See M. E. Waither, *History of Women Philosophers*, vol. 1, 1987.

See also [MOUSIKĒ](#), [TA MOUSIKA](#).

WONDER

See [THAUMA](#), [THAUMASIA](#).

WORLD SOUL

Psychē tou pantos. Ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦ πάντος. The idea that the universe as a whole is alive is a persistent idea in Greek philosophy. **Anaximenes**, for example, appears to think of the sphere of the fixed stars as a giant membrane containing life-sustaining air; **Aristotle** attributes to the **Pythagoreans** the idea that the universe “inhales vacuum” from outside (***Physics*** IV.6, 213b23). He attributes to **Xenophanes** the idea that **God** is the mind of the universe, or conversely that the physical universe is the body of God (***Metaphysics*** I.5, 986b20–25).

In **Plato's** ***Timaeus*** (36), the ***Demiourgos*** creates circles of the same and different and sets them spinning in the heavens as the soul (*psychē*) of the universe; other souls are ultimately created from the leftovers of that primal soul creation. Somewhat less poetically, Aristotle in *Metaph.* XII describes a first mover outside the universe, but the celestial moved movers, the direct causes of movement of astronomical entities, are deities.

In the **Stoic** philosophy, God as *pyr technikon* is the World Soul, permeating and organizing everything until everything is consumed in it. In the **middle Platonists**, such as **Philo of Alexandria** and **Plutarch**, the World Soul is clearly not identical to the supreme deity but a somewhat distinct actualization of divinity: there is a triad or trinity of **One**, the *logos*, and the World Soul. From then on, at least, some form of World Soul is a standard part of Platonistic philosophy, whether in **Alcinous**, **Numenius**, or **Plotinus**.

See also [COSMOS \(KOSMOS\)](#), [COSMOLOGY](#); [OURANOS](#), [OURANIA](#).

X

XANTHIPPE

Ξανθίππη. (5th–4th BCE.) Wife of **Socrates**. In Plato's account of Socrates, she appears only in the **Phaedo** (60a, 116b), as a grieving spouse and the mother of Socrates' three sons. **Xenophon** mentions her in his *Memorabilia* (II.2.1) and *Symposium* (II.10) where **Antisthenes** is represented as saying that she is the most difficult of women, to which Socrates replies that if he can get along with her, he can get along with anybody. Later writers developed that theme—see **Diogenes Laertius** II.36–37.

XENARCHUS OF SELEUCIA

Ξέναρχος. (1st BCE.) **Peripatetic**. Taught at **Alexandria**, **Athens**, and **Rome**. He associated with **Arius**, **Augustus**, and **Strabo** (Strabo 14.5.4). He disagreed with **Aristotle** about the existence of **aithēr** (*Against the Fifth Element*); cf. **Simplicius**, *De Caelo* 1; **Alexander of Aphrodisias**, *De Anima*.

XENIADES (1)

Ξενιάδης. (c. 400 BCE.) **Corinthian** reported by **Sextus Empiricus**: he held that all opinions are false, that there are no true propositions (*Adv. Math.* vii.53, 388, 399; *Pyrrh. Hyp.* II.18).

XENIADES (2)

(c. 350 BCE.) **Corinthian** who purchased **Diogenes the Cynic** when captured by pirates and sold as a slave. **Diogenes Laertius** (VI.29–32, 36, 74, 75, 82) recounts that Diogenes told Xeniaades, “You must obey me, although I am a slave.” Diogenes educated the sons of Xeniaades and remained in his house; Xeniaades may have become a convert to Cynicism, persuading **Monimus** to become a follower of Diogenes.

See also **DOULOS**, **DOULEIA**.

XENOCRATES OF CHALCEDON

Ξενοκράτης. (396/5–314/3 BCE.) Third **Scholarch** of the **Academy**. There are no pieces of his actual writing surviving; most of what we know of the philosophy of Xenocrates is derived from **Aristotle**'s criticisms in the **Topics**, **De Anima**, and **Metaphysics** (e.g., *Top.* II.6, VI.3, VII.1; *De An.* I.2; *Metaph.* XIII and XIV), supplemented by comments by **Sextus Empiricus** (*Adv. Math.* VII.16 et al.) and **Simplicius**, as well

as **Diogenes Laertius** (IV.6–11), among others.

Xenocrates appears to have made a serious attempt to systematize the metaphysical theories presented in **Plato's** dialogues, while remaining a faithful **Pythagorean**. Aristotle's criticisms, in *Metaph.* XIII and XIV, focus on how the Forms (*eidē*) and mathematics (*mathēmatikē*) are related. Plato, in Aristotle's account, had asserted that the Forms are numbers, but those numbers are not the same as the mathematical numbers that we use in normal arithmetic operations. Aristotle represents Xenocrates as breaking down this distinction, doubtless for the sake of metaphysical coherence, but unfortunately, as Aristotle sees it, to the detriment of mathematics.

Taking the *tetraktys* as inspiration, Xenophanes appears to have asserted that the One is also the point, Two is the line, Three is the surface, and Four is the solid. He took that to imply that there are actual spatial minima of each of those geometrical kinds, an idea for which he could find support in Plato's *Timaeus*.

Xenocrates probably anticipated and inspired the Pythagoreanizing **Platonists** of the Roman imperial period. He may be the source of the triadic relationship between One or Mind (*nous*), indefinite dyad or **matter**, and **World Soul**. See R. Dancy, "Xenocrates," *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

See also [CHALCEDON](#).

XENOPHANES OF COLOPHON

Ξενοφάνης ὁ Κολοφώνιος. (570–478 BCE.) Xenophanes was a traveling poet with serious interest in philosophic questions. He dates himself by telling us (in f. 8) that he left Colophon when it was taken by the Persians (546/5) when he was 25, so he was born in 570 or close to it; he goes on to say that he had been bouncing around the Greek world for 67 years since that time, so he was 92 when he wrote the poem in question, thus in 478 or so. Xenophanes is critical of traditional anthropomorphic religion, tending to satirize it.

Ethiopians say that their **gods** are snub-nosed and black;
Thracians that theirs are blue-eyed and red-haired. (B16)

He also suggests that if horses or oxen could make statues, they would make their gods look like horses and oxen—and of course there were plenty of "horse" and "oxen" gods around the Mediterranean in those days. His positive concept of God includes the statement that there is:

One God greatest among gods and men,

not at all like mortals in body or in thought. (B23)

This deity perceives as a whole (not with organs) and always stays in the same place, “moving all things with the thought of his mind (**nous**)” (B25). Xenophanes is also famous for comments critical of the possibility of human knowledge:

. . . and of course the clear and certain truth no man has seen
nor will there be anyone who knows about the gods
and what I say about all things.
For even if, in the best case, one happened to speak
just of what has been brought to pass,
still he himself would not know.
But opinion is allotted to all.
(B34, Leshar translation)

Some have seen Xenophanes as a precursor of **Parmenides** (because of the emphasis on **unity**), and others have seen him as a pantheist, possibly influenced by the characterizations of his thought offered by **Plato** (Sophist 242c–d) and **Aristotle**: “He contemplates the whole heaven and says the One is God” (Metaphysics I, 986b18–27). Nevertheless, his impact on the development of classical epistemology might be his greatest legacy. See J. Leshar, “Xenophanes,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

Colophon is today an archaeological site on the Ionian coast of Turkey, 38°06'32"N 27°08'30"E . Destroyed by the Macedonian Lysimachus in the 3rd century BCE, it never recovered.

XENOPHILUS OF CHALCIDICE

Ξενοφίλος. (4th BCE.) **Pythagorean**. According to **Aulus Gellius**, Xenophilus was the teacher of **Aristoxenus** (*Noctes Attica* 4.11). When asked by someone how to best educate his son, he responded, “By making him the citizen of a well-governed state” (**Diogenes Laertius** VIII.15–16). **Pliny the Elder** claims that Xenophilus lived 105 years without ever being ill (*Nat. Hist.* VII.50), leading to fame for Xenophilus in the Renaissance. See C. Huffman, “Pythagoreanism,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

The Chalcidice is a three-pronged peninsula in northern Greece.

XENOPHON OF ATHENS

Ξενοφῶν. (c. 430–after 355 BCE.) Student of **Socrates**, author of many extant works. In 401 he decided to join the army, along with many Spartans, being raised by Cyrus against Artaxerxes. Cyrus was killed in battle, and the Greek forces found themselves in the middle of what is now Iraq.

Xenophon took charge and got them back to Greece, as recounted in his *Anabasis*. He continued his association with Sparta, and was rewarded with a home near Olympia, where he wrote many of his works. For example, he continued the history of the Peloponnesian Wars and its aftermath from where **Thucydides** left off; he wrote about Cyrus, horses, and dogs.

From a philosophical perspective, his most important works are those concerned with **Socrates**, including an *Apology* directed at attacks made on Socrates after 399, four volumes of *Memorabilia of Socrates*, and a *Symposium*. Xenophon's Socrates is less speculative, more practical, than **Plato's**. See **Diogenes Laertius** II.48–59. See Leo Strauss, *Xenophon's Socrates*, 1972, republished 2004.

XENOS

Ξένος. **(1)** (Foreign) guest. **Plato**, *Meno* 78d; **Aristotle**, *Nicomachean Ethics* IV.2, 1123a2; *Politics* II.5, 123b6. **(2)** Stranger, foreigner. **Plato**, *Apology* 17d4; **Aristotle**, *Pol.* IV.15, 1300b31, et al.

Z

ZACHARIAS (SCHOLASTICUS, BISHOP OF MITYLENE)

(5th–6th CE.) Brother of **Procopius of Gaza**, he had a rhetorical and political career before becoming bishop. He wrote a church history, partially preserved in the history written by Evagrius, and an attack on Ammonius, on the creation of the world. See D. Russell, J. Dillon, & S. Gertz, *Aeneas of Gaza “Theophrastus” with Zacharias of Mytilene “Ammonius,”* 2013.

ZENO OF CITIUM

Ζήνων ὁ Κιτιεύς. (c. 334–261/2 BCE.) Founder of the **Stoic** school. Citium (or Kition) is a city on the southern coast of Cyprus, the biblical Kittim and modern Larnaca; its inhabitants at the time of Zeno were primarily Phoenician in origin. Zeno is said to have come to **Athens** as a young man, perhaps on business; he apparently studied with **Crates** the **Cynic**, **Polemon** the **Scholarch** of the **Academy**, **Stilpo**, and others. After several years in Athens, he started teaching publicly in the Stoa Poikile, or Painted Porch (a shopping mall). He attracted a significant number of students and wrote several treatises, none of which survives except in scattered fragments. We do have a detailed account of Stoic doctrine included in the biography by **Diogenes Laertius**, and to a considerable degree it is possible to distinguish the teachings of Zeno from those of his successors.

Zeno divided philosophy into logic (**logikē**), physics (**physikē**), and **ethics** (**ethikē**). What we call “metaphysical” and “epistemological” issues were included in logic, as indeed were all inquiries concerning language. “Physics” includes all investigation of nature; “ethics” includes political theory.

Many of the attested Stoic advances in logic, at least in the narrow sense, seem to have been the work of Zeno’s successors; his originality seems to have been primarily in physics and ethics. If we start from the physics end, we note that Zeno is resolutely materialist, believing that everything that is, is a material thing. Soul (**psychē**) is **pneuma**; **God** is creative fire. At the same time, God’s rationality is omnipresent, so that natural law, properly understood, is also divine law, and indeed the best guide to morality. But since the universe is totally governed by rational Mind (**nous**), every event is totally determined (“fated”). Indeed, the standard

Stoic view, probably going back to Zeno, is that the universe goes through great cosmic cycles, from birth to conflagration (*ekpyrōsis*); each cycle is precisely the same as the previous ones.

The hallmark of Stoic ethics, clearly a centerpiece of Zeno's philosophy, is the figure of the **sage**, or the perfectly and completely wise and moral individual. This person is one who totally follows the divine/natural law and in a sense cannot be mistaken about anything.

Of Zeno's writings, perhaps the one we know most about is his *Republic*, a work that revealed his Cynical roots to an extent somewhat embarrassing to some of his Stoic successors. Assuming a community of sages, Zeno asserted that they would need no human legislation to govern their activity, no temples, no law courts, and no money. Like all Stoics, he believed in equality of the sexes; for him, that implied that everyone, men and women, should wear the same clothing, that clothing should not totally cover any part of the body, and citizens should freely choose with whom to have sexual relations, somewhat as the **guardians** in **Plato's** *Republic*.

Of the many charming stories about Zeno preserved in **Diogenes Laertius** (VII), one stands out: at the age of 98, on his way to a temple, he stubbed his toe on a rock; looking down at the ground, he said, "Oh Great Mother, I hear your call," and held his breath until he died. See D. Baltzly, "Stoicism," *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

See also [HEIMARMENĒ](#).

ZENO OF ELEA

Ζήνων ὁ Ἐλεάτης. (c. 490–c. 425 BCE.) We learn from **Plato's** *Parmenides* that Zeno was about 40 in about 450 BCE, that he was the associate of **Parmenides**, and that they had been lovers in Zeno's youth. Zeno had written a treatise that seems to have been a collection of arguments—**Proclus**, in his commentary on the *Parmenides*, says that there were 40 such arguments—supporting, indirectly, the thesis proposed by Parmenides that **being** is one. **Aristotle** paraphrases several of the arguments (*Physics* I.3, 187a3; IV.1, 209a23; IV.3, 210b22; VI.9, 233a21; VII.5, 250a20; and some other places), and **Simplicius** in his commentary on some of these passages in the *Physics* also presents some of the arguments, possibly closer to the original text. Zeno's "paradoxes" have tended to attract mathematical commentary. See J. Palmer, "Zeno of Elea," *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

ZENO OF SIDON

(c. 150–c. 75 BCE.) **Epicurean**, student of **Apollodorus the Epicurean** and teacher of **Philodemus**. **Cicero** heard him in **Athens** (*De Natura Deorum* I.21, 93; *Tusculan Disputations* III.17). Cf. **Diogenes Laertius** VII.35, X.26; *PHerc.* 182, 1471.

See also [SIDON](#).

ZENO OF TARSUS

Ζήνων. (c. 200 BCE.) Successor of **Chrysippus** as **Scholarch** of the **Stoa**. According to **Diogenes Laertius** (VII.35, cf. 41, 84), he had many students; he was succeeded by **Diogenes of Babylon**. **Eusebius** (*Praeparatio Evangelica* 15.18) says that he doubted the Stoic theory of the *ekpyrōsis*.

ZENOBIUS

(2nd CE.) **Sophist** teaching rhetoric at **Rome** during the reign of Hadrian. He wrote a collection of proverbs in three books, extant in abridged form, published in Italian in 2006. E. Lelli, F. P. Bianchi, et al., *I proverbi greci: le raccolte di Zenobio e Diogeniano*.

See also [RHĒTORIKĒ](#).

ZENODOTUS

Ζηνόδοτος. (Late 5th CE.) **Neoplatonist** in **Athens**, described as “the darling (*paidika*) of **Proclus**” by **Damascius** (*Life of Isidore*, f. 154). Zenodotus taught under **Marinus** when Marinus became **Scholarch** (c. 485). He taught philosophy to **Damascius** (c. 492).

ZŌĒ, ZŌON, ZOOLOGY

Ζωή, ζῷον. *Zōē* is one of two generally used words in Greek translated “life”; the other is *bios*. *Zōē* tends to mean animal life, while *bios* tends to mean a way of life, or the general web of life. Thus a *zōon* is an animal, though the word is also used of a statue or picture, not necessarily that of an animal. In the *Timaeus*, **Plato** described the whole visible universe, endowed by the **World Soul**, as a *zōon*, imitating the form (*eidōs*) of the universe, which is said to be a “knowable animal,” or *zōon noēton*.

Aristotle wrote three large and several smaller works focusing on animals: the *History* (or Investigation) *of Animals*, the *Parts of Animals*, the *Generation of Animals*, the *Progression of Animals*, the *Movement of Animals*, and some of the treatises included in the *Parva Naturalia*. No doubt Aristotle believed that this study was valuable for its own sake, but he also seems to have believed that if he sorted out an explanation of the being of animals, his metaphysical theory about primary *ousia* would be better supported, since

animals are paradigm cases of entities in his ontological theory. See J. Lennox, "Aristotle's Biology," *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, and M. Boylan, "Aristotle: Biology," *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

ZOROASTRIANISM

Zoroastrianism is the modern name applied to the ancient religion of Persia—a major traditional prophet of that religion was named Zarathustra or Zoroaster. It is a monotheistic religion; the deity is typically known as Ahura Mazda, so one of the older names of the religion is Mazdaism. **Heraclitus** was very likely influenced by the Zoroastrian religion, and we know that ancient **Judaism**, during the Babylonian captivity (which ended in 537 BCE), was also influenced by the religion of the Persians. The priests of the religion were known as magi.

Plato mentions the Zoroastrian instruction received by the future kings of Persia in the *First Alcibiades* (122a); **Aristotle**, in defending his teleological principle of explanation, says that the magi make the "the Best" the originating principle of everything (*Metaphysics* XIV.4, 1091b10). **Diogenes Laertius** says that Aristotle believed that the religion of the magi was older even than the religion of the **Egyptians** (DL I.8), that "Zoroaster" means "star worshipper," and that there is in addition to the good deity (Ahura Mazda) an evil deity, Ahriman. Aristotle says in *Metaph.* XII that the worship of the **stars** is the oldest religion; he may well have had Zoroastrianism in mind when writing that passage.

The dualism of Zoroastrianism becomes evident in two of its manifestations during the Hellenistic and Roman periods, Mithraism and **Manicheanism**. Mithras is represented as a mediator between human beings and Ahura Mazda; the cult of Mithras became very popular in the Greek- and Latin-speaking worlds during the 2nd and 1st centuries BCE and remained a serious competitor with **Christianity** during the first few centuries CE. Some **Neoplatonists** were pleased to assimilate the image of Mithras into their **allegorical** accounts of the universe.

In the 3rd century CE, Mani initiated (in Baghdad) a syncretistic religion, very strongly dualist, and asserting a "good" deity with limited rather than infinite power. While his religion, known as Manicheanism, was regarded as heretical by the Zoroastrians of the day, it is more Zoroastrian than anything else. In any case, the religion rapidly made many converts, including **Augustine**, who subsequently repented the error of his ways. See M. Boyce, *Zoroastrians: Their*

Religious Beliefs and Practices, 2007.

ZOSIMUS OF PANOPOLIS

Ζώσιμος. (3rd–4th CE.) Alchemist and **Gnostic**.

Fragments of his work are present in later Greek alchemists, and there are extant translations of some of his work into Syriac and Persian. His works show influence of philosophy from **Democritus** to **Iamblichus**, **Stoicism** to **Hermes Trismegistus** and the Egyptian religious tradition. One of the works translated into English: *On the Letter Omega*, tr. H. M. Jackson, 1978.

Glossary

This glossary lists all the terms discussed in this dictionary, minus the proper names. Greek, English, and a few Latin terms are all included, in (English) alphabetical order; the major entries are listed in **BOLD**. In most cases the major entries are under the Greek term; the English equivalents or translations are provided here to make it easier to find those entries. In some cases there are relatively extensive entries under both the Greek and English terms, particularly when necessary to disambiguate when there are several terms in one language and only one in the other. In that case both the English and Greek terms are in **BOLD**. Greek and Latin terms are in *italics*, whether bold or not.

Other entries in this dictionary are proper names of people or places; those are not included in the glossary.

- **ABSTRACTION.** *Aphairesis.*
- **ACADEMIC.** Associated with Plato's Academy.
- **ACCIDENT, ACCIDENTAL.** **SYMBEBĒKOS, KATA SYMBE-BĒKOS.** See also **TYCHĒ, AUTOMATON, SYMPTOMATA.**
- ACCOUNT. **LOGOS.**
- ACTUALITY. **ENERGEIA, ENTELECHEIA.**
- ADDITIONAL PREMISE. See **PROSLĒPSIS.**
- **ADĒLON.** Unclear, non-evident.
- **ADIAPHORA.** Indifferents.
- **ADIKIA.** Injustice.
- **ADUNAMIA.** Inability, lack of power.
- **AEI.** Always, ever.
- **AĒR.** Air.
- AFFECTION. See **PATHOS.**
- AFFINITY. See **OIKEIŌSIS.**
- **AGATHON.** Good.
- **AGENT INTELLECT.** *Nous poiētikos.* See also **NOUS.**
- **AGNŌSTOS.** Unknowable.
- **AGRAPHOS NOMOS.** Unwritten law. See **NOMOS.**
- AGREEMENT. See **HOMOLOGIA.**
- **AIDIOS.** Everlasting.
- **AIŌN.** Individual life span, "age"; timeless eternity.
- **AIR.** See **AER.**
- **AISTHĒSIS.** Perception, sensation.
- **AITHĒR.** "Ether."
- **AITION, AITIA.** Responsibility, cause.

- **AITION AUTOTELĒS.** Complete cause.
- **AKATALĒPTON.** Non-cognitive, as applied to sensory impressions.
- **AKINĒTON.** Unmoved, immovable.
- **AKINĒTON KINOUN.** Unmoved mover.
- **AKOLASIA, AKOLASTOS.** Licentiousness, intemperance, the vice opposed to *sōphrosynē*. The *akolastos* is the person who has the vice.
- **AKOLOUTHEIN, AKOLUTHEIA.** To follow; consequentiality.
- **AKOUSMATA; AKOUSMATIKOI.** Literally, things heard; eager hearers. Applied to Pythagorean teachings and their audience.
- **AKRASIA, AKRATEIA; AKRATĒS.** *Akrasia* and *akrateia* are alternate spellings of the word meaning “lack of power, debility, lack of self-control.” The *akratēs* is the person who exhibits a lack of control.
- **AKRON, AKRA.** Extremity.
- **ALĒTHEIA.** Truth.
- **ALGOS.** Pain of body or mind.
- **ALIENATION.** *Allotriōsis*, the opposite of *OIKEIŌSIS*.
- **ALLĒGORIA.** Speaking in such a way as to be interpreted other than literally; interpretation of speech or text other than literally.
- **ALLOIŌSIS.** Qualitative change.
- **ALTERATION.** *ALLOIŌSIS, HETEROIŌSIS, METABOLĒ, KINĒSIS.*
- **AMBIGUITY.** **AMPHIBOLIA.**
- **AMPHIBOLIA.** Ambiguity.
- **ANAGKĒ, ANANKĒ.** Necessity. *See also HEIMARMENĒ.*
- **ANAGŌGĒ.** Bringing up, going to first principles.
- **ANALOGIA.** Proportion, analogy.
- **ANALYSIS.** Loosening, resolving, reduction, solution of a problem.
- **ANAMNĒSIS.** Recollection.
- **ANAPODEIKTON.** Unproven, indemonstrable, inconclusive.
- **ANDREIA.** Courage, literally “manliness.”
- **ANEPIKRITOS.** Undecidable, in a fundamental sense.
- **ANGEL.** *Angelos* in classical Greek is simply a “messenger.”
- **ANIMA.** Latin translation of *PSYCHĒ*, “soul.”
- **ANIMAL.** **ZOŌN.**
- **ANOMIA.** Lawlessness.
- **ANTECEDENT CAUSE.** **PROĒGOUMENON AITION.**

- **ANTHRŌPOS.** Human being.
- **ANTIKOPĒ.** Collision.
- **AOCHLĒSIA.** Unperturbedness, *see also* **ATARAXIA.**
- **AORISTON.** Indefinite.
- **APATHEIA.** Condition of being unaffected.
- **APAXIA.** Stoic term for “disvalue.”
- **APEIRON.** Literally, “without limit” or “without definition.”
- **APODEIXIS.** Exposition, demonstration, proof.
- **APOGEGENĒMENON.** Development, emergent property.
- **APOKATASTASIS.** Restoration.
- **APOPHANSIS.** Declaration, proposition, assertion.
- **APOPHASIS, APOPHATIKOS LOGOS.** Negation, denial, negative proposition.
- **APOPROĒGMENA.** Things dispreferred. *See also* **ADIAPHORA.**
- **APORIA.** “No path”; puzzle.
- **APOTELESMA.** Completion; effect of causes.
- **APPELATIVE. PROSĒGORIA.**
- **APPETITE. EPITHYMIA.**
- **APPROPRIATE. KATHĒKON, OIKEION.**
- **ARCHĒ.** Origin, beginning, source, rule. *See also* **AITION.**
- **ARCHĒ KINĒSEŌS.** Beginning of movement.
- **ARETĒ.** Virtue, excellence.
- **ARGUMENT. LOGOS.**
- **ARITHMOS.** Number.
- **ART. POIEIN, TECHNĒ.**
- **ASŌMATON.** Without body, disembodied, incorporeal.
- **ASSENT. SYNKATATHESIS.**
- **ASTĒR.** Star.
- **ASTROLOGIA. Astronomy, astrology.**
- **ASTRONOMY. ASTROLOGIA.**
- **ASTY, ASTOS, ASTĒ.** Town, free person belonging to a town.
- **ATARAXIA.** Freedom from disturbance, tranquility of the soul.
- **ATAXIA.** Disorder.
- **ATHANATOS.** Immortal, deathless.
- **ATOM. ATOMON.**
- **ATOMON.** Atom, the uncuttable smallest bit of matter.
- **ATTENTION. EPIBOLĒ.**
- **ATTEST. EPIMARTYREIN.**
- **ATTRIBUTE. SYMBEBĒKOS.**
- **AULOS.** An ancient Greek musical instrument with a single or double reed.

- **AUTARKEIA.** Self-sufficiency.
- **AUTOMATON.** Self-moved.
- **AUXĒSIS.** Growth.
- AUXILIARY (CAUSE). **SYNERGON.**
- **AXIA.** Worth, value.
- **AXIÔMA.** Axiom, basic principle.
- **BEAUTY. TO KALON.**
- **BECOMING. GENESIS.**
- BEGINNING. **ARCHĒ.**
- **BEING. ON, ONTA, ESTI, OUSIA, HYPARCHEIN.**
- BELIEF. **DOXA, PISTIS.**
- BELONG. **HYPARCHEIN, OIKEION, PREDICATE.**
- BENEFIT. **ÔPHELĒMA.**
- **BIA.** Force.
- **BIOS.** Life.
- BLEND. **KRAMA, KRASIS, MIGMA, MIXIS, SYNTHESIS.**
- BODY. **SÔMA.**
- **BOULĒSIS.** Wish.
- **BOULEUSIS.** Deliberation.
- BREATH. **PNEUMA.**
- CANON. **KANÔN.**
- CATEGORIES. **KATEGORIAI.**
- CATHARSIS. **KATHARSIS.**
- CAUSE, CAUSATION. **AITION, APOTELESMA.**
- CHANCE. **TYCHĒ, KATA SYMBEBĒKOS.**
- CHANGE. **GENESIS, METABOLĒ, ALLOIÔSIS, KINĒSIS.**
- **CHARA.** Joy.
- CHARACTER. **ETHOS.**
- **CHARIOT, CHARIOTEER. OCHĒMA.**
- **CHARISMA.** Grace.
- CHOICE. **PROAIRESIS, HAIRETON.**
- **CHÔRA.** Place, space.
- **CHÔRIS, CHÔRISTON.** Separate, separable.
- **CHRONOS.** Time.
- COGNITION. **KATALĒPSIS, NOUS, NOĒSIS, DIANOIA.**
- COHESION (logical). **SYNARTĒSIS.**
- COLLECTION. **SYNAGOGĒ.**
- COLLISION. **ANTIROPĒ.**
- COMMANDING FACULTY. **HĒGEMONIKON.**
- COMMON SENSE. **AISTHĒSIS KOINĒ.** See **AISTHĒSIS.**
- COMPLETE CAUSE. **AITION AUTOTELĒS.**
- COMPOSITE. **SYNTHETON.**
- CONCEPT. **ENNOIA, ENNOĒMA.**
- CONCLUSION. **EPIPHORA.**

- CONCOMITANCE, CONCOMITANT. **PARAKOLOUTHĒSIS, PARAKOLOUTHOUN.**
- CONTEMPLATION. **THEŌRIA.**
- CONTINUITY. **SYNECHEIA.**
- CONVINCING. **PITHANOS.**
- CORPUS. Body of extant work of an author.
- **COSMOS, COSMOLOGY. KOSMOS.**
- COURAGE. **ANDREIA, ARETĒ.**
- CRITERION OF TRUTH. **ALĒTHEIA, KRITĒRION.**
- CUT. **TEMNEIN, TOMĒ.**
- **DAIMŌN, DAIMŌNION.** Lesser divinity.
- DEDUCE. **SYNAGEIN.**
- DEDUCTION. **SYNAGŌGĒ.**
- DEDUCTIVE. **SYNAKTIKOS.**
- DEFINE. **HORIZEIN.**
- DEFINITION. **HORISMOS; LOGOS.**
- **DEIXIS.** Indication, demonstration, demonstrative reference.
- DELIBERATION. **BOULEUSIS.**
- DELINEATION. **TYPOS.**
- **DEME.** See **DĒMOS.**
- **DEMIOURGOS.** Literally, someone who works for the city; the deity responsible for putting the **cosmos** in order.
- DEMOCRACY. **DEMOKRATIA.**
- **DEMOKRATIA.** Rule by the people.
- DEMONSTRATION. **APODEIXIS, DEIXIS.**
- **DĒMOS.** Political subdivision of Athens, “deme.” The people.
- DESIRE. **ERŌS, EPITHYMIA, HORMĒ, OREXIS, THYMOS.**
- DEVELOPMENT. **APOGEGENĒMENON.**
- **DIAIRĒSIS.** Division, distinction.
- DIALECTIC. **DIALEKTIKĒ.**
- DIALOGUE. **DIALOGOS.**
- **DIANOIA.** Reasoning.
- **DIAPHORA.** Difference.
- **DIARTĒSIS.** Disconnection.
- **DIASTĒMA.** Interval, dimension, distance.
- **DIATHESIS.** Disposition, character, state.
- **DIATRIBĒ.** Literally, “pastime”; philosophical discourse.
- **DIEZEUGMENON.** Disjunctive proposition.
- **DIKAIOS.** Just person.
- **DIKAIOSYNĒ.** Abstract concept of justice.
- **DIKANIKON.** Forensic, judicial.
- **DIKĒ.** Justice personified; proper procedure.

- **DINĒ.** Vortex.
- DISCONNECTION. **DIARTĒSIS.**
- DISCOURSE. **LOGOS.**
- DISJUNCTIVE PROPOSITION. **DIEZEUGMENON.**
- DISORDER. **ATAXIA.**
- DISPOSED. **PŌS ECHŌN** (one of the Stoic categories).
- DISPREFERRED. **AOPROĒGMENA.**
- DISVALUE. **APAXIA.**
- DIVINATION. **MANTIKĒ.**
- DIVINE. **DEMIOURGOS, GOD, THEOS.**
- DIVISION. **DIAIRĒSIS.**
- DOCTRINE. **DOGMA.**
- **DOGMA.** Teaching, opinion, doctrine.
- **DOGMATIKOS.** Doctrinaire, opinionated. Member of a particular school of medicine.
- **DOULOS, DOULEIA.** Slave, slavery.
- **DOXA.** Opinion, expectation.
- **DOXOGRAPHY.** Collection of opinions.
- DREAM. **ONEIROS.**
- **DYAS.** Dyad.
- **DYNAMIS, DYNAMEIS.** Power, potentiality, capacity.
- **DYNATON.** Dunato/n. Strong, able, powerful.
- **EARTH. GĒ.**
- **ECHEIN.** To have, to be in some condition.
- **ECLECTIC.** Someone who selects from several schools of philosophy.
- EDUCATION. **PAIDEIA.**
- **EFFICIENT CAUSE. ARCHĒ KINĒSEŌS, AITION POIĒTIKON.**
- **EIDŌLON.** Insubstantial image, illusion; in Epicurean philosophy, substantial image.
- **EIDOS.** Form, shape, kind, species.
- **EIKASIA.** Conjecture, guesswork.
- **EIKŌN.** Image.
- **EKPYROSIS.** Conflagration.
- **EKSTASIS.** Displacement, excitement, amazement.
- **ELEMENT. STOICHEION.**
- **ELENCHUS.** Examination.
- **ELEUTHERIA.** Freedom, as opposed to slavery.
- **ELEUTHERIŌTĒS.** Liberality, generosity; the virtue of acting like a free person as opposed to slavishly.
- **ENANTIA.** Opposites.
- **ENARGEIA.** The self-evidence of perceived facts.
- END. **TELOS.**

- **ENDECHOMENON.** Possible.
- **ENDOXÁ.** Accepted opinions.
- **ENERGEIA.** Activity, actuality.
- **ENKRATEIA.** Self-control.
- **ENKRATĒS.** Self-controlled person.
- **ENNOĒMA.** Concept.
- **ENNOIA.** Concept or idea; literally, something in the mind.
- **ENSTASIS.** Objection.
- **ENTELECHEIA.** Actuality.
- **EPAGŌGĒ.** A method of persuasion; induction.
- **EPAISTHĒSIS.** Sensory recognition.
- **EPH' HĒMIN.** Up to us, in our power.
- **EPIBOLĒ.** Focus of attention on the perceptual given.
- **EPIDEIKNUMI.** To show or exhibit.
- **EPIDEIKTIKOS.** Demonstrative.
- **EPIDEIXIS.** Demonstration.
- **EPIEIKEIA.** Reasonableness, equity.
- **EPIGRAMMA.** Epitaph, short poem, epigram.
- **EPIMARTYREIN.** Attest.
- **EPIPHORA.** Term used by **Chrysippus** to denominate the conclusion of a syllogism.
- **EPISTĒMĒ.** Knowledge, particularly knowledge of necessary truths,
- **EPITHYMIA.** Appetite, desire.
- **EPOCHĒ.** Suspension of judgment.
- EQUITY. **EPIEIKEIA.**
- **ERGON.** Work, function.
- **ERIS.** Strife.
- **ERISTIC.** Verbal competition aimed at victory, not necessarily truth.
- **ERŌS.** Love or desire—especially sexual; personified as the god of love.
- **ESOTERIKOI LOGOI.** Literally, “interior accounts.” In late antiquity this phrase comes to mean something like “secret doctrine.”
- **ESSENCE.** *To ti ēn einai*, **OUSIA**, **TI ESTI**, **EIDOS**.
- **ESTI.** Is.
- ETERNITY. **AIŌN.**
- ETHER. **AITHĒR.**
- **ĒTHIKE ARETĒ.** Moral virtue.
- **ĒTHOS.** Character.
- **EUDAIMONIA.** Happiness; literally, the condition of having a good **ANGEL**, widely regarded as the ultimate goal of human existence.

- **EULOGOS.** Reasonable, sensible, probable.
- **EUPATHEIA.** The state of having positive feelings about something; the condition of having innocent emotions.
- EVERLASTING. **AIDIOS.**
- EVIL. **KAKON.**
- EXISTENCE. **OUSIA, HYPARCHEIN.**
- **EXÔTERIKOI LOGOI.** Literally, “exterior accounts.” Public teachings.
- EXPERIENCE. **AISTHĒSIS.**
- EXPERTISE. **TECHNĒ.**
- EXPLANATION. **AITION.**
- EXPRESSION (LINGUISTIC). **LEXIS.**
- EXTENSION. **DIASTĒMA.**
- EXTREMITY. **AKRON, AKRA.**
- FACULTY (OF THE SOUL). **DYNAMIS.**
- FALSE. **PSEUDOS.**
- FAMILIAR. **PAR’ HĒMIN, OIKEION.**
- FATE. **ANAGKĒ, HEIMARMENĒ.**
- FEELING. **PATHOS.**
- FIGMENT (OF IMAGINATION). **PHANTASM.**
- FINAL CAUSE. **TELOS.**
- FIRE. **PYR.**
- FIRST MOVER. **ARCHĒ KINĒSEŌS, PRŌTON KINOUN.**
- FIRST PHILOSOPHY. **PRŌTĒ PHILOSOPHIA.**
- FORM. **EIDOS, MORPHĒ, IDEA.**
- **FORMAL CAUSE. EIDOS, GENOS, OUSIA.**
- FREEDOM. **ELEUTHERIOTĒS.**
- FREEDOM FROM DISTURBANCE. **ATARAXIA.**
- FRIENDSHIP. **PHILIA.**
- FUNCTION. **ERGON, ENERGEIA, DYNAMIS.**
- **GĒ. EARTH.**
- **GENESIS. BECOMING.**
- **GENOS.** Offspring, descent, hereditary group; larger classificatory group.
- **GIGNESTHAI.** To come into being, to be born, to be produced.
- **GNŌMĒ.** The faculty by which one knows or opines; thought, judgment, opinion.
- **GNŌMŌN.** Carpenter’s square, pointer of a sundial, mathematical gnomon.
- **GNŌRIMON.** Well known; intelligible.
- **GNŌRIMŌTATON.** Best known.
- **GNŌRIMŌTERON.** Better known.
- **GNŌSIS.** Knowledge by acquaintance; cognition.

- **GNŌSTIKOS.** Cognitive.
- **GOD, GODS. THEOS.**
- **GOLDEN CHAIN.** The Neoplatonic tradition.
- **GOOD. AGATHON, KALON.**
- **GRAMMATIKĒ (TECHNĒ).** Writing, the art of writing.
- **GUARDIANS. PHYLAKES.**
- **GYMNASION.** Gymnasium, extended to mean a school for young people in their late teens and early twenties.
- **GYMNOSOPHISTAI.** The Greek name for the Hindu wise men; the word literally means “naked sophists.”
- **HABIT. HEXIS.**
- **HAIRETON.** Choiceworthy.
- **HAMARTĒMA.** Error, failure, fault.
- **HAPHĒ.** Touch, the sense of touch, the point of contact between bodies.
- **HAPPINESS. EUDAIMONIA.**
- **HARMONIA.** HARMONY.
- **HEART. KARDIA.**
- **HĒDONĒ, HĒDYN.** Pleasure, the pleasurable.
- **HĒGEMONIKON.** The directive aspect or power of the soul.
A *hēgemōn* is a leader.
- **HĒI .** Qua.
- **HEIMARMENĒ.** Fate.
- **HEN.** One.
- **HENAS, HENADOS.** HENAD, unity.
- **HETERON.** The Other, otherness, difference.
- **HEXIS.** A having, a disposition to act.
- **HISTORIA.** Investigation, inquiry.
- **HOLON.** Whole, organic unity, universe.
- **HOMOIOS.** Similar, like.
- **HOMOIŌSIS.** A process of making similar.
- **HOMOLOGIA, HOMOLOGOUMENOS.** Agreement, agreeing.
- **HOMONYMOI.** Two or more things whose name is the same but whose definition is different.
- **HONOR. TIMĒ.**
- **HONORABLE. KALOS.**
- **HORISMOS.** Definition.
- **HORIZEIN.** To delimit, to define.
- **HORMĒ .** Innate drive or instinct.
- **HOSIOTĒS.** Piety, holiness.
- **HOU HENKA.** “On account of what,” a locution indicating a final cause.
- **HYBRIS.** Wanton violence, lust, outrage, insolence.

- **HYLĒ. MATTER.**
- **HYPARCHEIN. BE, BELONG.**
- **HYPEROUSION.** Transcendent.
- **HYPHISTASTHAI.** Subsist.
- **HYPODOCHĒ.** Receptacle.
- **HYPOKEIMENON.** Substratum.
- **HYPOLAMBANEIN.** Suppose.
- **HYPOLĒPSIS.** Supposition.
- **HYPOSTASIS.** Substance.
- **HYPOTHESIS.** Literally, something that is “put under”; proposal.
- **IATRIKĒ.** The art of medicine.
- **IATROS.** Physician.
- **IDEA.** Visible form; form in general.
- **IDIŌMA.** Peculiarity, specific property, unique feature.
- **IDION.** That which belongs to the individual, private.
- **IMAGE. EIDŌLON, EIKŌN, PHANTASMA.**
- **IMAGINATION. PHANTASIA.**
- **IMITATION. MIMĒSIS.**
- **IMMORTAL. ATHANATOS.**
- **IMPASSIVITY. APATHEIA.**
- **IMPRESSION. AISTHĒSIS, TYPŌSIS.**
- **IMPULSE. HORMĒ.**
- **INDEFINITE, INFINITE. APEIRON, AORISTON.**
- **INDEMONSTRABLE. ANAPODEIKTON.**
- **INDIFFERENT. ADIAPHORAN.**
- **INDIVIDUAL. TODE TI, KATH' HEKASTON.**
- **INDUCTION. EPAGŌGĒ, SYNAGŌGĒ.**
- **INSTINCT. HORMĒ.**
- **INTELLECT. NOĒSIS, NOUS, PHRONĒSIS.**
- **INTELLIGIBLE. GNŌRIMON.**
- **INTUITION. NOUS.**
- **ISONOMIA.** Equality of political rights.
- **JUDGMENT. DOXA.**
- **JUSTICE. DIKĒ, DIKAIOSYNĒ.**
- **KAIROS.** Due measure, proportion; the exact or right time, opportunity.
- **KAKIA.** Vice, badness.
- **KAKOS, KAKON.** Bad, ugly, lowborn, cowardly, unskilled; evil.
- **KALOGATHIA.** The condition of having all the social virtues.
- **KALON.** Beautiful, noble, good.
- **KANŌN.** Canon, standard, measure.

- **KARDIA.** Heart.
- **KATALAMBANEIN.** To grasp, to cognize.
- **KATALĒPSIS.** The act of grasping an impression; cognition.
- **KATAPHASIS.** Affirmation.
- **KATAPHATIKOS LOGOS.** Affirmative statement.
- **KATĒGORIAI.** Categories; accusations.
- **KATH' HEKASTON.** Individual.
- **KATHARSIS.** Purification.
- **KATHĒKONTA.** Appropriate actions or proper functions, i.e., moral duties.
- **KATHODOS.** Descent.
- **KATHOLOU.** As an adverb, "in general"; **TO KATHOLOU,** the universal.
- **KATORTHŌMA.** That which is straight, correct; morally correct action.
- **KEISTHAI.** To lie, be placed; the category of position.
- **KENON.** Empty, void, vacuum.
- **KINĒSIS.** Movement.
- **KINOUN, TO.** Participle of the verb "to move," *to kinoun* means "that which causes motion."
- KNOWLEDGE. **EPISTĒMĒ, GNŌSIS, NOĒSIS.**
- **KOINŌNIA.** Community.
- **KOSMOS. COSMOS.**
- **KRAMA, KRASIS.** Blending mixture.
- **KRITĒRION.** Criterion, basis of judging.
- LANGUAGE, THEORY OF. **LEXIS, LOGOS, ONOMA.**
- LAW. **NOMOS.**
- **LEKTON.** Something said, or sayable.
- **LEXIS.** Speech, style of speech, diction, word, expression, text.
- LIFE. **BIOS, ZOĒ.**
- LIMIT. **PERAS.**
- LOCOMOTION. **PHORA.**
- LOGIC. **KANŌN; LOGIKĒ.**
- **LOGIKĒ.** Logic.
- **LOGISMOS.** Calculation, reasoning.
- **LOGISTIKON.** Skilled in calculation; the rational part of the soul.
- **LOGOS.** Word, account, ratio, definition, proposition, discourse, language.
- LOVE. **ERŌS, PHILIA.**
- **LYPĒ.** Bodily pain, opposed to bodily pleasure.
- **LYSIS.** Solution, seeing free, deliverance.

- **MAGIC.** *Mageia*, the theory and practice of the “Mages” or Persian; *manganeia*, “trickery.”
- **MAGNITUDE.** *MEGETHOS*, *DIASTĒMA*.
- **MAN, HUMAN BEING.** See *ANTHRŌPOS*.
- **MANIA.** Madness.
- **MANTIKĒ.** Divination, prophecy.
- **MATHĒMA.** Something that can be learned.
- **MATHĒMATATA, TA.** Mathematical knowledge: arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, harmonics.
- **MATHĒMATIKA, TA.** “Mathematical” entities such as odd and even, point, line, and surface considered separately from bodies, and so on.
- **MATHĒMATIKOI.** Serious students in the early Pythagorean school.
- **MATTER.** *HYLĒ*.
- **MEAN.** *MESON*.
- **MEDICINE.** *IATRIKĒ*.
- **MEDIUM OF PERCEPTION.** *MESON*, *METAXY*.
- **MEGALOPREPEIA.** Magnificence, as a personal quality.
- **MEGALOPSYCHIA.** “Great-souledness” or pride, as a personal quality.
- **MEGETHOS.** Size, magnitude.
- **MEIGMA.** Mixture, compound. Alternate spelling for *MIGMA*.
- **MELOS.** (1) Bodily limb. (2) Musical phrase, melody; tuneful music.
- **MEMORY.** *ANAMNESIS*, *MNĒMĒ*.
- **MĒ ON.** Non-being.
- **MESON, MESOTĒS.** Mean, middle, medium.
- **METABASIS.** Transition, “going across”; the change of the elements into each other; the continuity of living kinds; regress.
- **METABOLĒ.** Change.
- **METAPHORA.** Metaphor, transfer of sense.
- **METAXY.** Between.
- **METEMPSYCHOSIS.** Transmigration of souls.
- **METHEXIS.** Participation.
- **METOICHOS.** Metic, alien resident in a foreign city.
- **MICROCOSM.** Small universe.
- **MIGMA.** Mixture, compound.
- **MIMĒSIS.** Imitation.
- **MIND.** *NOUS (NOOS)*.
- **MIXIS.** Mixture, blending, sexual intercourse.
- **MIXTURE.** *KRASIS*, *MIXIS*, *MIGMA*, *SYNTHESIS*.
- **MNĒMĒ, MNĒMOSUNĒ.** Memory.

- MODE. **TROPOS**.
- MODERATION. **SŌPHROSYNĒ**.
- **MOIRA**. Allotment, portion, fate.
- **MONAS**. One, unit.
- **MORPHĒ**. Shape, form.
- MOTION. **KINĒSIS**, **PHORA**.
- **MOUSIKĒ**. The arts of the Muses.
- MOVER. **KINOUN**.
- MUSES, THE. **MOUSIKĒ**.
- **MYTHOS**. Any verbal performance, whether in speech or writing; fiction.
- NAME. **ONOMA**.
- NATURAL LAW. **NOMOS**, **PHYSIS**.
- NATURAL PHILOSOPHER. **PHYSIKOS**.
- NATURE. **PHYSIS**.
- NECESSITY. **ANAGKĒ** (**ANANKĒ**).
- **NEIKOS**. Strife.
- **NEMESIS**. Retribution; righteous indignation.
- **NOĒMA**. Thought.
- **NOĒSIS**. Thinking, especially thinking about Being.
- **NOĒTON**. Object of thought, something that is thinkable.
- **NOMOS**. Law; convention.
- NONBEING. **MĒ ON**.
- **NOUS** (**NOOS**). Mind.
- NUMBER. **ARITHMOS**.
- NUTRITIVE SOUL. **PSYCHĒ THREPTIKĒ**.
- **OCHĒMA**. Carriage or vehicle, especially the vehicle of the soul.
- **OIKEION**. That which is one's own; proper to oneself.
- **OIKEIŌSIS**. Appropriation; the process of making something one's own.
- **OLICHARCHIA**. Oligarchy. Rule by the few.
- **ON**, **ONTA**. BEING, BEINGS.
- ONE. **HEN**.
- **ONEIROS**. DREAM.
- **ONOMA**. Name, noun.
- **ŌPHELEIN**. To owe a debt.
- **ŌPHELĒMA**. A debt, obligation.
- OPINION. **DOXA**.
- OPPOSITES. **ENANTIA**.
- **OPSIS**. Sight, vision, appearance.
- ORDER. **COSMOS**, **TAXIS**.
- **OREXIS**. The capacity of initiating movement shared by all animals.

- **ORGANON.** Tool; logic.
- **ORGĒ.** Natural impulse; anger.
- ORIGIN. **ARCHĒ.**
- **OU MALLON.** No more, used in Skeptical arguments with the connotation “no more this than that.”
- **OURANIA.** Heavenly.
- **OURANOS.** Sky, heaven.
- **OUSIA .** Reality, something real; substance.
- **PAIDEIA.** Education: reading, writing, and the arts.
- PAIN. **LYPĒ, ALGOS, PONOS.**
- **PALINGENESIA.** Regeneration, rebirth, resurrection.
- **PAR’ HĒMIN.** Familiar, “by us.”
- **PARABOLĒ.** Comparison, illustration, parable, parody.
- **PARADEIGMA.** Example, standard.
- **PARADOXON.** Paradox, contrary to expectation.
- **PARAKOLOUTHĒSIS.** Concomitance.
- **PARAKOLOUTHOUN.** Concomitant.
- **PARENKLISIS.** Swerve.
- **PARONYMOS.** Something is a paronym if a word or name applied to it is derived secondarily from something that has that appellation in a primary sense. Apples are “healthy” in a paronymous sense because people who eat them are “healthy” in a primary sense.
- PARTICIPATION. **METHEXIS.**
- **PARTICULAR. TODE TI, KATH’ HEKASTON, HENAD.**
- **PASCHEIN.** To be affected, to suffer.
- **PASSION. PATHOS.**
- PASSIVE INTELLECT. **NOUS PATHĒTIKOS.**
- **PATHOS, PATHĒ.** That which happens to a person (or anything else); experience, either good or bad. Emotion.
- **PERAS.** Limit, end (in the sense of limit).
- PERFECTION. **TELOS, ENTELECHEIA.**
- **PHAINOMENON.** That which appears, a phenomenon, an appearance.
- **PHANTASIA.** Any appearance; the faculty of imagination; *false* appearance. Sometimes *phantasia* is the faculty, sometimes the activity of the faculty, and sometimes it is the content or object of the faculty.
- **PHANTASMA.** Figment of the imagination.
- **PHAULOS.** Small, insignificant, worthless, bad.
- PHENOMENON. **PHAINOMENON.**
- **PHILIA.** Friendship, love.
- **PHILOSOPHIA, PHILOSOPHOS.** Philosophy, philosopher.
- **PHŌNĒ.** Sound.

- **PHORA.** The act of carrying or that which is carried; used as a very general term for local movement.
- **PHRONĒSIS.** Thought, understanding, prudence.
- **PHRONIMOS.** The quality of having *phronesis*, or the person with that quality.
- **PHTARTIKOS.** Destructive, as vice is destructive of one's ability to choose.
- **PHTHARTOS.** Destructible.
- **PHTHEIREIN.** To destroy, to perish (in the passive).
- **PHTHISIS.** Wasting away, shrinking, atrophy.
- **PHTHORA.** Destruction.
- **PHYLAKES. GUARDIANS.**
- **PHYSICIAN. IATROS.**
- **PHYSIKOI, PHYSIOLOGOI.** Philosophers of nature; scientists.
- **PHYSIS, HISTORIA PERI PHYSEŌS.** Nature; the study of nature.
- **PIETY. HOSIOTĒS, ARETĒ.**
- **PISTIS.** Belief.
- **PITHANOS.** Convincing, inspiring *pistis*.
- **PLACE. TOPOS.**
- **PLEASURE. HĒDONĒ.**
- **PLEONEXIA.** Getting more than one's fair share.
- **PLĒTHOS.** Plurality, large number, quantity, magnitude.
- **PLURALITY. PLETHOS.**
- **PNEUMA.** Breath, wind, spirit.
- **POIEIN.** To make or do.
- **POIĒMA.** An object that is made.
- **POIĒSIS.** Making, production.
- **POIĒTĒS.** A person who makes something.
- **POIĒTIKĒ.** Productive.
- **POINT. STIGMĒ.**
- **POION.** Of what sort, quality.
- **POIOTĒS.** Quality.
- **POLIS.** City, state.
- **POLITEIA.** The citizens of a *polis*, taken as a group. The system of government of a *polis*.
- **POLITĒS.** Citizen of a *polis*.
- **POLITICS. POLITIKĒ.**
- **POLITIKĒ.** Political theory and the art of politics.
- **POLITIKOS.** As an adjective, "living in a community" or "suitable for living in a community." As a noun, "politician" or "statesman."
- **PONOS.** Hard work, toil, pain from working.

- **PŌS ECHEIN (PŌS ECHŌN), PŌS ECHEIN PROS TI (PŌS ECHŌN PROS TI).** Two of the four Stoic categories, “how disposed,” and “how disposed in relation to something.”
- **POSITION. KEISTHAI, THESIS.**
- **POSON.** How much, quantity.
- **POSSESSION. ECHEIN, HEXIS.**
- **POTE.** When, time.
- **POTENTIALITY. DYNAMIS.**
- **POU.** Where; place.
- **POWER. DYNAMIS.**
- **PRAGMA.** A thing done; “thing” as opposed to “word.”
- **PRAKTIKĒ.** Practical art or practical science as opposed to productive on the one hand, or theoretical on the other.
- **PRAXIS.** Action, as opposed to production.
- **PRECONCEPTION. PROLĒPSIS.**
- **PREDICATE, PREDICATION. KATEGORIAI, HYPARCHEIN.**
- **PREFERABLES, PREFERRED. PROĒGMENA.**
- **PRIME MATTER. PRŌTE HYLĒ.** See **HYLĒ.**
- **PRIME MOVER. PRŌTON KINOUN.**
- **PRINCIPLE. ARCHĒ, HYPOTHESIS.**
- **PRIVATION. STERĒSIS.**
- **PROAIRESIS.** Choice.
- **PROBLEM. APORIA.**
- **PROCESS. GENESIS.**
- **PRODUCTION.** See **POIĒSIS.**
- **PROĒGMENA.** Things preferred.
- **PROĒGOUMENON AITION.** Antecedent cause.
- **PROLĒPSIS.** Preconception.
- **PRONOIA.** Providence, foresight, forethought.
- **PROODOS.** Procession.
- **PROOF. APODEIXIS.**
- **PROPERTY. IDION.**
- **PROPORTION. LOGOS, ANALOGIA.**
- **PROS TI.** Relation.
- **PROSĒGORIA.** “Appelative.”
- **PROSLĒPSIS.** Additional premise.
- **PRŌTĒ PHILOSOPHIA.** First Philosophy.
- **PROTEROS, PRŌTOS, PRŌTON.** Pro/teroj, prw~toj, prw~ton. First.
- **PRŌTON KINOUN.** First Mover.
- **PROVIDENCE. PRONOIA.**
- **PRUDENCE. PHRONESIS.**
- **PSEUDOS.** False.

- **PSYCHĒ.** Soul.
- **PTŌSIS.** “Case,” as in the declension of Greek nouns and adjectives.
- PURIFICATION. **KATHARSIS.**
- PURPOSE. **TELOS.**
- **PYR.** Fire.
- QUA. **HĒI.**
- QUALITY, QUALITATIVE CHANGE. **POION, POIOTĒS, ALLOIŌSIS.**
- QUANTITY. **POSON.**
- QUINTESENCE. **AITHĒR.**
- RATIO. **LOGOS.**
- REASON. **LOGOS, NOUS, LOGISTIKON.**
- RECEPTACLE. **HYPODOCHĒ.**
- RECOLLECTION. **ANAMNĒSIS.**
- REFUTATION. **ELENCHUS.**
- REINCARNATION. **METEMPSYCHOSIS, PALINGENESIS.**
- RELATION. **PROS TI.**
- RESPONSIBILITY. **AITION.**
- **RHĒTORIKĒ.** Rhetoric, the art of the *rhētōr*, or public speaker.
- **RHOĒ.** Flow, stream, flux.
- RULE. **ARCHĒ.**
- **SAGES. SOPHOI.**
- **SCHĒMA.** Form, shape, appearance.
- **SCHEISIS.** State, condition, a temporary state of affairs in contrast to *hexis*, which tends to be permanent.
- **SCIENCE. EPISTĒMĒ.**
- SELF-CONTROL. **SŌPHROSYNĒ, ENKRATEIA.**
- SELF-EVIDENCE. **ENARGEIA.**
- SELF-MOVING. **AUTOKINĒTON.**
- SELF-SUFFICIENCY. **AUTARKEIA.**
- **SĒMAINEIN.** To show by a sign, indicate; to mean something.
- **SĒMEION.** Sign, token, indication.
- SENSATION. **AISTHĒSIS.**
- SENSORY RECOGNITION. **EPAISTHĒSIS.**
- SEPARATE. **CHŌRISTON.**
- SERIOUS. **SPOUDAIOS.**
- SHAPE. **SCHĒMA, MORPHĒ.**
- SIGN. **SĒMEION.**
- SIMILAR. **HOMOIOS.**
- SKEPTIC, SKEPTICISM. **SKEPTIKOS.**
- **SKEPTIKOS.** A person who reflects so thoroughly that he

does not come to any conclusions.

- **SKOPOS.** Target.
- SLAVE, SLAVERY. **DOULOS, DOULEIA.**
- SOLUTION. **LYSIS.**
- **SŌMA.** Body.
- **SOPHISTĒS, SOPHISTAI; SOPHISTIKĒ TECHNE.**
Sophist, Sophists; the sophistic art, sophistry.
- **SOPHOS, SOPHOI, SOPHIA.** A “*sophos*” is a wise or able person; “*sophoi*” is the plural form; “*sophia*” is the abstract noun, denominating wisdom or an admired ability.
- **SŌPHROSYNĒ.** Temperance, moderation, self-control, mental health.
- SOUL. **PSYCHĒ.**
- SOURCE. **ARCHĒ.**
- SOURCE OF MOVEMENT. **ARCHĒ KINĒSEŌS.**
- SPACE. **CHORA, TOPOS.**
- SPECIES. **EIDOS.**
- **SPERMA.** Seed.
- **SPERMATIKOS LOGOS.** Rational form present in matter, the cause of emergent properties of complex entities.
- SPIRIT. **PNEUMA, THYMOS.**
- SPONTANEOUS. **AUTOMATON.**
- **SPOUDAIOS.** Serious, eager, excellent.
- STARS. **ASTRA.**
- **STASIS.** (1) Standing, stationariness, position, state, condition (of a person). (2) A party formed to oppose the current political order.
- STATE. In the sense of “condition,” **HEXIS, PŌS ECHEIN, SCHEISIS;** in the sense of “political structure,” **POLIS.**
- **STERĒSIS.** Privation, negation, deprivation.
- **STIGMĒ.** Point.
- **STOICHEION, STOICHEIA.** Element, phoneme, letter of the alphabet; basic information about a subject.
- **STRIFE. NEIKOS, ERIS.**
- SUBSIST. **HYPHISTASTHAI.**
- SUBSTANCE. **OUSIA.**
- SUBSTRATUM. **HYPOKEIMENON.**
- SUSPENSION (OF BELIEF). **EPOCHĒ.**
- SWERVE. **PARENKLISIS.**
- **SYLLOGISMOS.** Literally, putting *logoi* together; technical term for certain formalized argument structures.
- **SYMBEBĒKOS, SYMBEBĒKOTA.** Accident, attribute.
- **SYMBOLON, SYMBOLA.** Identity token; object or phrase meaningful to the initiated.

- **SYMBOULEUTIKOS.** Advisory, hortatory, deliberative.
- **SYMPASCHEIN.** To “feel together,” interact, co-experience.
- **SYMPATHEIA.** Physical, emotional, or social interaction of feelings.
- **SYMPERASMA.** Conclusion of a syllogism.
- **SYMPLOKĒ EIDŌN.** Weaving together of Forms.
- **SYNAGEIN.** To bring together, collect; deduce.
- **SYNAGŌGĒ.** Collection, induction; deduce; congregation.
- **SYNAITION.** Joint cause.
- **SYNAKTIKOS.** Deductive.
- **SYNARTĒSIS.** Cohesion.
- **SYNECHEIA.** Continuity.
- **SYNECHEIN.** Sustain, hold together.
- **SYNEIMARMENON.** Co-fated.
- **SYNEKTIKĒ DYNAMIS.** Sustaining power.
- **SYNEKTIKON AITION.** Sustaining cause.
- **SYNERGON (AITION).** Auxiliary (cause).
- **SYNKATATHESIS.** Assent.
- **SYNOLON.** Whole, especially the combination of matter and form that results in an entity.
- **SYNONYMOI.** If two entities share the same name, and the definition is the same in both cases, they are “synonymous.”
- **SYNTHESIS.** A *synthesis* is a combination of parts in which the parts change in nature as a consequence of the combination; the intellectual process of constructing ideas from perceptions.
- **SYNTHESIS.** Something put together, a compound; a combination of parts to form a whole.
- **SYNTHETON.** Put together; is a compound.
- **SYSTASIS.** Composition or constitution; used both of the construction of an individual living body, and of a political organization.
- **SYSTĒMA.** A whole composed of parts.
- **TABULA RASA.** Blank (or smoothed) tablet (in Latin).
- **TAXIS.** Order, arrangement.
- **TECHNĒ.** Art, craft, skill.
- **TECHNIKOS.** Skillful, but also often “artificial.”
- **TELOS.** End, goal, purpose.
- **TEMNEIN.** To cut.
- **TENOR. HEXIS,** in Stoic contexts.
- TENSION. **TONOS.**
- **TETRAKTYIS.** The geometrical form best illustrated by the arrangement of the pins in bowling, taken as importantly symbolic by the Pythagoreans.

- **TETRAPHARMAKON.** Fourfold cure, the Epicurean way to a happy life.
- **THAUMA, THAUMASIA.** Wonder.
- **THEIOS.** The divine.
- **THEMA.** Literally, that which is placed or put down; a rule for determining whether a given deduction is valid.
- **THEOLOGIA.** Account of God and the divine.
- **THEŌRIA, THEŌREIN.** *Theōrein* (the verb) means, in the first instance, to look at, be a spectator, observe. *Theoria* may be translated contemplation.
- **THEOS. GOD.**
- **THEOURGIA.** Theurgy; divine work. Performance of sacred rituals or sacraments; persuading a deity to do what you want.
- **THĒRIOTĒS.** Beastliness.
- **THESIS.** Noun formed from the verb meaning “to put.” The word is used in both a physical and a metaphorical sense. Physically, the word means approximately “position”; metaphorically, a *thesis* is a proposition posited for discussion and possible defense.”
- THINKING. **NOĒSIS, LOGISMOS, DIANOIA, THEŌRIA.**
- **THYMOS.** Desire, mind, spirit; anger.
- **TI ESTI.** “What is . . . ?” *To ti esti* is one of the designations for what we call essence.
- TIME. **CHRONOS.**
- **TIMĒ.** Honor.
- **TO TI EN EINAI. ESSENCE.**
- **TODE TI.** This something; individual entity.
- **TOMĒ.** A cut.
- **TONOS.** Tension.
- **TOPOS.** Place.
- TOUCH. **HAPHĒ.**
- TRANSCENDENCE. **HYPEROUSIA.**
- TRANSMIGRATION (OF THE SOUL).
- **METEMPSYCHOSIS.**
- **TRIAS.** Triad.
- **TROPOS.** Trope, mode.
- TRUTH. **ALĒTHEIA.**
- **TYCHĒ.** Luck.
- **TYPOS, TYPŌSIS.** Delineation, imprinting, impression.
- UNDERSTANDING. **DIANOIA.**
- UNIT. **HEN, MONAS.**
- UNITY. **HOLON, HEN, MONAS.**
- UNIVERSAL. **KATHOLOU.**
- UNIVERSE. **COSMOS.**

- UNKNOWABLE. **AGNŌSTOS**.
- UNLIMITED. **APEIRON**.
- UNMOVED, UNMOVED MOVER. **AKINĒTON, AKINĒTON KINOUN**.
- UNPROVEN. **ANAPODEIKTON**.
- UNWRITTEN LAW. **AGRAPHOS NOMOS**. See **NOMOS**.
- VACUUM. **KENON**.
- VIRTUE. **ARETĒ**.
- VOID. **KENON**.
- VORTEX. **DINĒ**.
- WHEN. **POTE**.
- WHERE. **POU**.
- WHOLE. **HOLON**.
- WISDOM. **SOPHIA, PHRONĒSIS**.
- WISH. **BOULĒSIS**.
- WONDER. **THAUMASIA**.
- **WORLD SOUL. PSYCHE (TOU PANTOS)**.
- **XENOS**. (1) Guest. (2) Stranger, foreigner.
- **ZŌĒ**. Life.
- **ZŌON**. Animal.

Bibliography

Contents

Introduction

Constructing a general bibliography for ancient philosophy is a complex task. Fortunately there are ongoing bibliographic resources to which the student may turn for assistance. The most important of these is *L'Année Philologique*, including well over 400,000 bibliographic records since 1969, with over 12,000 added each year. The published volumes of *L'Année Philologique* go back to the 1920s; currently new materials are added online. As a rule, scholarly libraries subscribe. The major drawback is that they are usually two or three years behind in updating the system. For more information, here is the site: <http://www.annee-philologique.com>.

The *Philosopher's Index* began publication in 1967. While it is not as complete as *L'Année Philologique*, it tends to be more nearly up to date. Its home page is <http://www.philinfo.org>. A very good general index is Periodicals Index Online (formerly known as Periodicals Content Index). The home page is <http://pio.chadwyck.co.uk/marketing.do>. Many libraries subscribe to one or both of these services.

The major journals specializing in ancient philosophy and publishing articles in English are *Phronesis*, *Ancient Philosophy*, and *Apeiron*. Many of the general philosophy or classics journals also publish a significant number of articles in ancient philosophy—the *Review of Metaphysics*, *Philosophical Review*, *Mind*, *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, *American Journal of Philology*, and *Classical Quarterly* are a few examples of journals that often publish high-quality articles in ancient philosophy.

The print resources consulted frequently for constructing the present work include, most importantly, Liddell, Scott, and Jones, *Greek-English Lexicon*, 9th edition, and F. E. Peters, *Greek Philosophical Terms* (New York University Press, 1967), for the Greek words, and Donald J. Zeyl, editor, *Encyclopedia of Classical Philosophy* (Greenwood Press, 1997) and Trevor Curnow, *The Philosophers of the Ancient World: An A–Z Guide* (Duckworth, 2006), for philosophers. Our entries are, on the whole, not as detailed as those of either Peters or Zeyl, but are more inclusive, with more Greek terms than Peters, more philosophers than Zeyl, and generally more information than Curnow.

We also used several online resources, most notably the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, <http://plato.stanford.edu>, and the *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, <http://www.iep.utm.edu>. These two sites feature signed articles, often (not always) by one of the ranking authorities in the world on the topic discussed. If one of these sites has an article on an ancient philosopher or topic, it is very possibly the most complete, most reliable, and most up-to-date reference resource available. *Brill's New Pauly* is the only print source that can compete. One noticeable difference between the Stanford and the IEP is that if Stanford does not have a *good* article on a topic, it does not have one at all; IEP includes "stubs" or material cribbed from out-of-copyright sites elsewhere on the Web, often better than nothing, but not necessarily better than a good print source.

Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Main_Page) is, we may say, controversial as a scholarly resource. For topics in ancient Greek philosophy, many or most of the articles are ultimately based on the 11th edition of the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, published in 1911, and then made available to anyone who wishes to edit them, essentially. The result is that it is extremely likely that there will be *some* information on almost any ancient philosopher, and on many philosophical topics that can be formulated clearly enough to be searched. Sometimes Wikipedia articles are every bit as good as the competing articles on Stanford or IEP, but given the fluidity of the Wiki process, there is always a question about reliability. For most (not all) topics in ancient philosophy, there is little motivation for people to do wholesale flimflam on a Wikipedia page, but there is always a possibility that you are reading an article edited most recently by a high school student with a sense of humor. One article I checked, on a minor Hellenistic philosopher, ended with the sentence, "And in addition, he loved bacon double cheeseburgers." Two days later, the sentence was gone; the Wikipedia managers can be pretty efficient. Given the fluid nature of the Wikipedia articles, we have decided not to include them in the bibliography; at the same time, recognize that Wikipedia *might* be the most convenient place to find out significantly more on a topic discussed in this dictionary, and could have information not otherwise readily available.

The Perseus Project, based at Tufts University (www.perseus.tufts.edu), mainly concentrates on digitizing classical texts, but there are some encyclopedia-like features present on the site. It does take a little practice to achieve the ability to use this site effectively.

The Catholic Encyclopedia of Philosophy (<http://www.newadvent.org/cathen>) is mainly useful for short biographical essays on some of the lesser figures, especially in late antiquity. It

resembles Wikipedia in being based on a work originally published in 1911, but it has been much less (if at all) updated since that original publication.

Philosophy Pages (<http://www.philosophypages.com>) includes a general dictionary of philosophy, including a number of Greek terms. It can be useful, but it is clearly incomplete and is not kept up to date.

J. J. O'Connor and E. F. Robertson posted on the St. Andrews University website in and around 1999 a fairly large number of biographies of mathematicians and people of interest to mathematicians, including quite a few ancient figures. In many cases these are the best online resources for the people that they discuss. The URL is <http://www-gap.dcs.st-and.ac.uk/~history>.

In this edition of the dictionary we have included a great many more names of people, mainly ancient philosophers, and entries for many places. Ancient Greeks normally had a single name (e.g., "Heraclitus"); in their home location, if there was more than one person of that name, usually they would be distinguished by the name of their father (e.g., "Socrates son of Sophroniscus"). In Athens, one might be distinguished by the name of one's deme, for example, "Antiphon of Rhamnous." Some people had nicknames, for example, Diodorus Cronus (Diodorus the Old Foggy). "International" references would often be done by the name of one's city of origin, or less often by territory of origin. We have tried to identify as many as possible of these toponyms; where the city of origin is a *polis*, we supply a reference to M. H. Hansen and T. H. Nielsen, *An Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis* (Oxford University Press, 2004). In most cases we also provide latitude and longitude, so that one may plug those into Google Earth or some similar program.

In terms of texts and translations of ancient authors, this bibliography emphasizes print versions. It should be recognized, however, that there are significant online resources for both original texts and for translations into English of many ancient authors. Easily the most complete is the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae (TLG), <http://www.tlg.uci.edu>. The Perseus Project is an accessible alternative. For classic English translations of major authors, the Internet Classics Archive, <http://classics.mit.edu>, is perhaps the best bet. Unlike TLG, it includes Latin authors, such as Cicero and Seneca.

The online sources are not very good for philosophers that we have only in fragmentary form. Perhaps the most convenient online source for the philosophers included is <http://philoctetes.free.fr/index2.htm>, a French site with Greek, French, and English versions of Thales, Anaximander, Heraclitus, Parmenides, Zeno, and Empedocles fragments. For other pre-Socratics the online environment is not good: for example, the most likely site that one would find for Democritus is

<http://philoctetes.free.fr/index2.htm>, and it has only 44 of the fragments, out of 298 included in Diels-Kranz.

If anything the situation is worse for most post-Aristotelian philosophers. The Diogenes Laertius is readily available online, and there is a good index of Epicurean e-texts at <http://www.epicurus.info/etexts.html>; one can find similar sites for the Stoics, for example <http://www.btinternet.com/~k.h.s/stoic-foundation.htm>. There is not, however, any online collection that can begin to compete with the Long and Sedley *Hellenistic Philosophers*.

Ultimately students need to acquire hard-copy collections of the fragments of the pre-Socratics and of post-Aristotelian philosophers.

For philosophical works in late antiquity, the online availability of translations, especially, is spotty at best. Indeed, many of the most interesting philosophical works from late antiquity have only recently been translated, and it will be many years before those translations are out of copyright. Some useful online versions that do exist include Plutarch's *Moralia* at <http://oll.libertyfund.org/Home3/Set.php?recordID=0062> and Plotinus' *Enneads* at <http://classics.mit.edu>. We note many others in the dictionary entries on individual figures.

This bibliography is arranged historically and topically: the major sections correspond with the major periods distinguished in the historical survey of ancient philosophy; within each section the divisions are between major philosophers and schools. At the end of the bibliography there is a section for studies that span more than one period of ancient philosophy.

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